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(Breat Commanbers 

EDITED BY JAMES GRANT WILSON 



ADMIRAL FARRAGUT 



®l)e (Bvtal Commanders 0cricB. 

Edited by General James Grant Wilson. 

Each, i2tno, cloth, gilt top, $1.50 net; 
postage, II cents additional. 



Admiral Farragut. By Captiin A. T. Mahan, U. S. N. 

General Taylor. By General O. O. Howard, U. S. A. 

General Jackson. By James Parton. 

General Greene. By General Francis V. Greene. 

General J. E. Johnston. 

By Robert M. Hughes, of Virginia. 

General Thomas. By Henry Coppee, LL. D. 

General Scott. By General Marcus J. Wright. 

General Washington. 

By General Bradley T. Johnson. 

General Lee. By General Fitzhugh Lee. 

General Hancock. By General Francis A. Walker. 

General Sheridan. By General Henry E. Davies. 

General Grant, By General James Grant Wilson. 

General Sherman. By General Manning F. Force. 

Commodore Paul Jones. 

By Cyrus Townsend Brady. 

General Meade. By Isaac R. Pennypacker. 

General McClellan. By General Peter S. Michie. 

In preparation. 

Admiral Porter. By James R. Solby, late Assistant Secretary 

U. S. Navy. 
General Forrest. By Captain J. Harvey Mathes. 



D. APPLETON AND COMPANY, NEW YORK. 



i 



GREAT COMMANDERS 

* * * • 



ADMIRAL FARRAGUT 



BY 

Captain A. T. MAHAN, U. S. Navy 

IV 

PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES NAVAL WAR COLLEGE 

AUTHOR OF THE GULF AND INLAND WATERS, AND OF 

THE INFLUENCE OF SEA POWER UPON HISTORY, 1660-I783 



IV/T// PORTRAIT AND MAPS 




NEW YORK 

D. APPLETON AND COMPANY 

1901 



^^-^■'■>-'j i. 



• \' • »' J > J 



\1 



Copyright, 1892, 
By D. APPLETON and COMPANY, 



All rights reserved. 



Electrotyped and Printed 

AT THE ApPLETON PrESS, U. S. A. 



c ,c c c 



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PREFACE. 



In preparing this brief sketch of the most 
celebrated of our naval heroes, the author has 
been aided by the very full and valuable bi- 
ography published in 1878 by his son, Mr. Loy- 
all Farragut, who has also kindly supplied for 
this work many additional details of interest 
from the Admiral's journals and correspond- 
ence, and from other memoranda. For the 
public events connected with Farragut's ca- 
reer, either directly or indirectly, recourse has 
been had to the official papers, as well as to 
the general biographical and historical liter- 
ature bearing upon the war, which each suc- 
ceeding year brings forth in books or maga- 
zines. The author has also to express his 
thanks to Rear-Admiral Thornton A. Jenkins, 
formerly chief-of-staff to Admiral Farragut ; to 
Captain John Crittenden Watson, formerly his 
flag-lieutenant ; and to his friend General James 
Grant Wilson, for interesting anecdotes and 

reminiscences. 

A. T. M. 



CONTENTS. 



CHAPTER PAGE 

I. — Family and Early Life, 1801-1811 . . . i 

II. — Cruise of the Essex, 1811-1814 . . . .10 

III. — Midshipman to Lieutenant, 1814-1825 . . 51 

IV. — Lieutenant, 1825-1841 69 

V. — Commander and Captain, 1841-1860 . . . 89 
VI. — The Question of Allegiance, 1860-1861 . . 106 
VII. — The New Orleans Expedition, 1862 . . .115 
VIII. — The First Advance on Vicksburg, 1862 . .177 
IX. — The Blockade, and the Passage of Port Hud- 
son, 1862-1863 196 

X. — Mobile Bay Fight, 1864 237 

XI. — Later Years and Death, 1864-1870 . . . 294 
XII. — The Character of Admiral Farragut . . 308 



LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS. 



FACING 
PAGE 



Portrait of Admiral Farragut . . Frontispiece 

General Map of the scene of Farragut's opera- 
tions 115 

Passage of Mississippi Forts 127 

Passage of Vicksburg Batteries 187 

Passage of Port Hudson 213 

Battle of Mobile Bay 247 



ADMIRAL FARRAGUT. 



CHAPTER I. 

FAMILY AND EARLY LIFE. 
180I-181I. 

The father of Admiral Farragut, George Farra- 
gut, was of unmixed Spanish descent, having been 
born on the 29th of September, 1755, in the island 
of Minorca, one of the Balearic group, where the 
family had been prominent for centuries. One of his 
ancestors, Don Pedro Ferragut, served with great 
distinction under James I, King of Aragon, in the 
wars against the Moors, which resulted in their ex- 
pulsion from Majorca in 1229, and from the king- 
dom of Valencia, in the Spanish Peninsula, in 1238. 
As Minorca in 1755 was a possession of the British 
Crown, to which it had been ceded in 17 13 by the 
Treaty of Utrecht, George Farragut was born under 
the British flag ; but in the following year a French 
expedition, fitted out in Toulon, succeeding in wrest- 
ing from the hands of Great Britain both the island 
and its excellent fortified harbor. Port Mahon, one 
of the most advantageous naval stations in the 
Mediterranean. It was in the course of the opera- 
tions which resulted in this conquest of Minorca by 



2 ADMIRAL FARRAGUT. 

the French that the British fleet, under the command 
of Admiral Byng, met with the check for which the 
admiral paid the penalty of his life a few months 
later. At the close of the Seven Years' War, in 1763, 
the island was restored to Great Britain, in whose 
hands it remained until 1782, when it was again re- 
taken by the French and Spaniards. 

George Farragut, however, had long before sev- 
ered his connection with his native country. In 
March, 1776, he emigrated to North America, which 
was then in the early throes of the Revolutionary 
struggle. Having grown to manhood a subject to 
Great Britain, but alien in race and feeling, he natu- 
rally espoused the cause of the colonists, and served 
gallantly in the war. At its end he found himself, 
like the greater part of his adopted countrymen, 
called to the task of building up his own fortunes, 
neglected during its continuance ; and, by so doing, 
to help in restoring prosperity to the new nation. A 
temper naturally adventurous led him to the border 
lines of civilization ; and it was there, in the region 
where North Carolina and eastern Tennessee meet, 
that the years succeeding the Revolution appear 
mainly to have been passed. It was there also that 
he met and married his wife, Elizabeth Shine, a 
native of Dobbs County, North Carolina, where she 
was born on the 7th of June, 1765. At the time of 
their marriage the country where they lived was 
little more than a wilderness, still infested by In- 
dians; and one of the earliest recollections of the 
future admiral was being sent into the loft, on the 
approach of a party of these, while his mother with 
an axe guarded the door, which she had barricaded. 
This unsettled and dangerous condition necessitated 



FAMILY AND EARLY LIFE. 3 

a constant state of preparedness, with some organi- 
zation of the local militia, among whom George Far- 
ragut held the rank of a major of cavalry, in which 
capacity he served actively for some time. 

While resident in Tennessee, George Farragut 
became known to Mr. W. C. C. Claiborne, at that 
time the member for Tennessee in the National 
House of Representatives. Mr. Claiborne in 1801 
became governor of Mississippi Territory ; and in 
1803, when the United States purchased from France 
the great region west of the Mississippi River, to 
which the name Louisiana was then applied, he 
received the cession of the newly acquired posses- 
sion. This was soon after divided into two parts by 
a line following the thirty-third parallel of north lati- 
tude, and Claiborne became governor of the southern 
division, which was called the Territory of Orleans. 
To this may probably be attributed the removal of 
the Farraguts to Louisiana from eastern Tennessee. 
The region in which the latter is situated, remote 
both from tide-water and from the great river by 
which the Western States found their way to the Gulf 
of Mexico, was singularly unfitted to progress under 
the conditions of communication in that day ; and it 
long remained among the most backward and primi- 
tive portions of the United States. The admiral's 
father, after his long experience there, must have 
seen that there was little hope of bettering his for- 
tunes. Whatever the cause, he moved to Louisiana 
in the early years of the century, and settled his 
family in New Orleans. He himself received the 
appointment of sailing-master in the navy, and was 
ordered to command a gun-boat employed in the river 
and on the adjacent sounds. A dispute had arisen 



4 ADMIRAL FARRAGUT. 

between the United States and the Spanish Govern- 
ment, to whom the Floridas then belonged, as to the 
line of demarcation between the two territories ; and 
George Farragut was at times employed with his 
vessel in composing disturbances and forwarding the 
views of his own government. 

David Glasgow, the second son of George Farra- 
gut, and the future Admiral of the United States 
Navy, was born before the removal to Louisiana, on 
the 5th of July, 1801, at Campbell's Station, near 
Knoxville, in eastern Tennessee. In 1808, while liv- 
ing in his father's house on the banks of Lake Pont- 
chartrain, an incident occurred which led directly 
to his entrance into the navy, and at the same time 
brought into curious coincidence two families, not 
before closely associated, whose names are now 
among the most conspicuous of those in the annals 
of the navy. While George Farragut was fishing one 
day on Lake Pontchartrain he fell in with a boat, also 
engaged in fishing, in which was an old gentleman 
prostrated by the heat of the sun. . He took him to 
his own house, where he was cared for and nursed 
until he died, never having recovered strength suffi- 
cient to be removed. The sufferer was David Porter, 
the father of the Captain David Porter who after- 
ward commanded the frigate Essex in her advent- 
urous and celebrated cruise in the Pacific during the 
years 1813 and 1814, and grandfather of the still more 
distinguished Admiral David D. Porter, who, over 
half a century later, served with David Farragut on 
the Mississippi in the civil war, and in the end suc- 
ceeded him as second admiral of the navy. Captain, 
or rather, as he then was, Commander Porter being 
in charge of the^naval station at New Orleans, his 



FAMILY AND EARLY LIFE. 



5 



father, who had served actively afloat during the 
Revolution and had afterward been appointed by- 
Washington a sailing-master in the navy, had ob- 
tained orders to the same station, in order to be with, 
though nominally under, his son. The latter deeply 
felt the kindness shown to his father by the Farraguts. 
Mrs. Farragut herself died of yellow fever, toward the 
end of Mr. Porter's illness, the funeral of the two tak- 
ing place on the same day ; and Commander Porter 
soon after visited the family at their home and offered 
to adopt one of the children. Young David Farragut 
then knew little of the element upon which his future 
life was to be passed ; but, dazzled by the com- 
mander's uniform and by that of his own elder 
brother William, who had received a midshipman's 
warrant a short time before, he promptly decided to 
accept an offer which held forth to him the same 
brilliant prospects. The arrangement was soon con- 
cluded. Porter promised to be to him always a 
friend and guardian ; and the admiral wrote in after 
life, " I am happy to have it in my power to say, with 
feelings of the warmest gratitude, that he ever was to 
me all that he promised." The boy returned to New 
Orleans with his new protector, in whose house he 
thenceforth resided, making occasional trips across 
Lake Pontchartrain to a plantation which his father 
had purchased on the Pascagoula River. A few 
months later Commander Porter appears to have 
made a visit to Washington on business connected 
with the New Orleans station, and to have taken 
Farragut with him to be placed at school, for which 
there were few advantages at that time in Louisiana. 
The boy then took what proved to be a last farewell 
of his father. George Farragut continued to live 



6 ADMIRx\L FARRAGUT. 

in Pascagoula, and there he died on the 4th of June, 
1817, in his sixty-second year. 

The trip north was made by Porter and his ward 
in the bomb-ketch Vesuvius, a stop being made at 
Havana ; where the commander had business grow- 
ing out of the seizure by him in the Mississippi River 
of some French privateers, for which both Spain and 
the United States had offered a reward. At Havana 
the lad heard of an incident, only too common in those 
days, which set his heart, as those of his countrymen 
were fast being set, against Great Britain. Presum- 
ing confidently upon the naval weakness of the 
United States, and arguing from their long forbear- 
ance that insults to the flag would be indefinitely 
borne for the sake of the profitable commerce which 
neutrality insured. Great Britain, in order to support 
the deadly struggle in which she was engaged with 
France, had endeavored to shut off the intercourse 
of her enemy with the rest of the world, by imposing 
upon neutral trade restrictions before unheard of 
and without justification in accepted international 
law. Both the justice and policy of these restrictions 
were contested by a large party of distinguished 
Englishmen ; but upon another principle men of all 
parties in the old country were practically agreed^ 
and that was the right of the British Government to 
compel the services of British seamen wherever 
found. From this grew the claim, which few Eng- 
lishmen then dared to disavow, that their ships of 
war could rightfully take from any neutral merchant 
ship any seaman of British birth who was found on 
board. In estimating this monstrous pretention, 
Americans have shown little willingness to allow for 
the desperate struggle in which Great Britain was 



FAMILY AND EARLY LIFE. 7 

involved, and the injury which she suffered from the 
fiumber of her seamen who, to escape impressment 
in their home ports and the confinement of ships of 
war, sought service in neutral merchant ships. Her 
salvation depended upon her navy ; and seamen were 
so scarce as seriously to injure its efficiency and 
threaten paralysis. This was naturally no concern of 
the United States, which set up its simple, unde- 
niable right to the protection the neutral flag should 
give to all persons and goods under it, which were 
not involved in any infraction of belligerent rights. 
The straits of Great Britain, however, were too dire 
to allow the voice of justice to override that of ex- 
pediency. Had the United States Navy been a force 
as respectable in numbers as it was in efficiency, the 
same dictates of expediency might have materially 
controlled the action of her opponent ; might have 
prevented outrage and averted war. As it was, right 
was set up against right — the right of the neutral 
flag on the one hand against the right of a country 
to the service of all her citizens on the other. The 
United States protested and wrote with all the con- 
viction of a state upon whose side justice was. She 
resorted to measure after measure of peaceable coer- 
cion ; but she had no military force to show upon 
the sea, and her utterances were consequently too 
uncertain to command respect. Great Britain con- 
tinued to take seamen from American merchant 
ships upon the plea of her right to impress British 
seamen in any place ; and, though the claim to detain 
or search ships of war had been explicitly disavowed 
after the Chesapeake affair of 1807, scant deference 
was shown to the vessels of a power so little able to 
stand up for itself. In a day when most vessels 



8 ADMIRAL FARRAGUT. 

carried some guns for self-defense, it was a simple 
matter to ignore the national character of an armed 
ship and to stop it unceremoniously. Of such an 
insult Farragut heard during this stay in Havana. 
The brig Vixen, of the United States Navy, had been 
fired into by a British ship of war. " This," wrote 
Farragut in hi? journal, " was the first thing that 
caused in me bad feeling toward the English nation. 
I was too young to know anything about the Revolu- 
tion; but I looked upon this as an insult to be paid 
in kind, and was anxious to discharge the debt with 
interest." It is scarcely necessary to say how keen- 
ly this feeling was shared by his seniors in the 
service, to whom the Vixen incident was but one 
among many bitter wrongs which the policy of their 
Government had forced them humbly to swallow. 

After their arrival in Washington Farragut was 
put to school, where he remained until Porter was 
relieved from the New Orleans station. During his 
stay at the capital he was presented by his guardian 
to the Secretary of the Navy, Paul Hamilton, of 
South Carolina ; who, after ascertaining his wish to 
enter the service, promised him a midshipman's war- 
rant when he should be ten years old. The promise 
was more than kept, for the warrant, when issued, 
was dated December 17, 1810; the future admiral 
thus finding himself at least a titular officer, in the 
service which he was afterward to adorn, when not 
quite nine and a half years of age. Although at 
that time, and in earlier generations, boys, no older 
than Farragut then was, were not infrequently turned 
aboard ship to fight their own way in life, Porter did 
not so construe his duties to his charge. In the lat- 
ter part of 1810 he finally left New Orleans and went 



FAMILY AND EARLY LIFE. g 

North again, this time by the Mississippi River and 
in a gun-boat. The voyage to Pittsburg against the 
swift current took three months ; and it was not till 
toward the close of the year that he and his family 
were again settled in their home at Chester, in Penn- 
sylvania, the birthplace of Mrs. Porter. Farragut 
was then removed from Washington and put to 
school in Chester, there to remain until his guardian 
should be able to take him to sea under his own 
eyes, in a vessel commanded by himself. This op- 
portunity was not long in arriving. 



CHAPTER II. 

CRUISE OF THE ESSEX. 
181I-1814. 

Child though Farragut was when he obtained 
his nominal admission to the navy, he had but a short 
time to wait before entering upon its stern reahties 
— realities far harsher in that day than now. The 
difficulties that had existed between the United States 
and Great Britain, ever since the outbreak of war 
between the latter and France in 1793, were now fast 
drifting both nations to the collision of 1812. The 
Non-intercourse Act of March, 1809, forbidding 
American merchant ships to enter any port of France 
or Great Britain, as a retaliation for the outrages in- 
flicted by both upon American commerce, had ex- 
pired by its own limitations in May, 1810, when com- 
merce with the two countries resumed its natural 
course; but Congress had then passed a proviso to 
the effect that if either power should, before March 
3, 181 1, recall its offensive measures, the former act 
should, within three months of such revocation, re- 
vive against the one that maintained its edicts. Na- 
poleon had contrived to satisfy the United States 
Government that his celebrated Berlin and Milan 
decrees had been recalled on the ist of November; 
and, consequently, non-intercourse with Great Britain 



CRUISE OF THE ESSEX. jl 

was again proclaimed in February, 1811. The im- 
mediate result was that two British frigates took 
their station off New York, where they overhauled 
all merchant ships, capturing those bound to ports 
of the French Empire, and impressing any members 
of the crews considered to be British subjects. The 
United States then fitted out a squadron, to be com- 
manded by Commodore John Rodgers; whose orders, 
dated May 6, 181 1, were to cruise off the coast and 
to protect American commerce from unlawful inter- 
ference by British and French cruisers. Ten days 
later occurred the collision between the commodore's 
ship, the President, and the British corvette Little 
Belt. Of Rodgers's squadron the frigate Essex, ex- 
pected shortly to arrive from Europe, was to be one ; 
and Commander Porter, who did not obtain his pro- 
motion to the grade of captain until the following 
year, was ordered to commission her. He took his 
ward with him, and the two joined the ship at Norfolk, 
Virginia, in August, 181 1, when the young midship- 
man had just passed his tenth birthday. Long years 
afterward Mrs. Farragut was told by Commodore 
Bolton, one of the lieutenants of the Essex, that he 
remembered to have found the little boy overcome 
with sleep upon his watch, leaning against a gun- 
carriage, and had covered him with his pea-jacket to 
protect him from the night air. An amusing inci- 
dent, however, which occurred during these first 
months of his naval career showed that the spirit of 
battle was already stirring. Porter, probably with a 
view to keep the lad more immediately under his 
own eye, had made him midshipman of his gig, as 
the captain's special boat is called. On one occasion 
he was sent in to the wharf, to wait for the captain 



12 ADMIRAL FARRAGUT. 

and bring him to the ship when he came. A crowd 
of dock-loungers gradually collected, and the young- 
ster who stood erect in the boat, doubtless looking 
pleasedly conscious of his new uniform and impor- 
tance, became the object of audible comment upon 
his personal appearance. The boat's crew sat silent 
but chafing, tlie bowman holding on with his boat- 
hook, until one loafer proceeded from witticism to 
practical joking by sprinkling the midshipman with 
an old water-pot. Quick as look the bowman caught 
his boot-hook in the culprit's pocket and dragged 
him into the boat, while the rest of the crew, by 
this time spoiling for a fight, seized their stretchers, 
jumped ashore, and began laying on right and left. 
Farragut, so far from restraining, went with them, 
waving his dirk and cheering them on. The vic- 
torious seamen fought their way up to Market Square, 
where the police interfered, arresting all parties, and 
the little officer was formally bound over to keep the 
peace. 

The Hartford, upon which Farragut first hoisted 
his admiral's flag, has obtained a particular interest 
from its close association with the whole of his course 
of victory ; and the Essex, a ship of very different 
type, would attract attention as the one that cradled 
his career, and witnessed the part of it which is only 
second in excitement to his exploits as a commander- 
in-chief, had she no special claims of her own to no- 
tice. But the Essex, both in her origin and through 
her subsequent history, especially when under Por- 
ter's command, was a marked ship. She was an off- 
spring of the quarrel between the United States and 
the French Republic, which arose out of the extrava- 
gant demands made by the latter upon the compli- 



CRUISE OF THE ESSEX. 



13 



ance of her former ally, in consequence of the service 
which it was claimed had been rendered during the 
Revolutionary War. Ignoring the weakness of the 
American Republic, and the dependence of a large 
section of the country upon commerce, the French 
Government had expected that it should resist, even 
by force, the seizure by British cruisers of French 
property in American vessels, and thus bring on hos- 
tilities with Great Britain ; and that, although the 
United States Government admitted the practice of 
capturing enemy's property in neutral ships, how- 
ever objectionable in theory, to be part of the tradi- 
tional and recognized law of nations. Going on from 
step to step, in the vain endeavor by some means to 
injure the maritime predominance of Great Britain, 
which defied the efforts both of their navy and of 
their privateers, the French Legislature in January, 
1798, decreed that any neutral vessel which should 
be found to have on board, not merely British prop- 
erty, but property, to whomsoever belonging, which 
was grown or manufactured in England or her colo- 
nies, should be a lawful prize to French cruisers. 
This extravagant claim, which not only seized goods 
that had been heretofore and by all others accounted 
free, but also, contrary to precedent, confiscated the 
vessel as well as the cargo, broke down the patience 
of the United States, where the Government was 
then still in the hands of the Federalists, whose sym- 
pathies were rather British than French. Nearly a 
year before. President Adams had called a special 
meeting of Congress and recommended an increase 
of the navy, to the numerical weakness of which was 
due the recklessness with which both Great Britain 
and France inflicted insult and injury upon our sea- 



14 



ADMIRAL FARRAGUT. 



men and upon our commerce. That the United 
States of that day, so inferior in wealth and numbers 
to both belligerents, should dream of entering the 
lists with either singly, was perhaps hopeless ; but 
through the indifference of Congress the navy of a 
people, then second only to the English as maritime 
carriers, was left so utterly impotent that it counted 
for naught, even as an additional embarrassment to 
those with which the contending powers were already 
weighted. When, therefore, in retaliation for the 
seizures made under the French decree of January, 
1798, Congress, without declaring war, directed the 
capture of French armed vessels, wherever found on 
the high seas, it became necessary to begin building 
a navy which to some slight degree might carry out 
the order. An act, intended to hasten the increase 
of the navy, was passed in June, 1798, authorizing 
the President to accept such vessels as might be 
built by the citizens for the national service, and to 
issue six-per-cent stock to indemnify the subscribers. 
Under this law the Essex was built in Salem, 
Massachusetts, by a subscription raised among the 
citizens. As the project grew, and the amount likely 
to be obtained became manifest, the purpose to which 
it should be devoted was determined to be the build- 
ing of a frigate of thirty-two guns; one of the well- 
recognized, but smaller, classes under which the 
vessels called frigates were subdivided. Except the 
work of the naval architect proper, the model and 
the superintendence, which were undertaken by a gen- 
tleman from Portsmouth, everything in the building 
and equipment was portioned out among Salem men, 
and was supplied from the resources of the town or 
of the surrounding country. During the winter of 



CRUISE OF THE ESSEX. 1 5 

1798 to 1799 the sleds of all the farmers in the 
neighborhood were employed bringing in the tim- 
ber for the frames and planking of the new ship. 
The rigging was manufactured by the three rope- 
walks then in the place, each undertaking one mast ; 
and the sails were of cloth so carefully selected and 
so admirably cut that it was noticed the frigate never 
again sailed so well as with this first suit. When 
the rope cables, which alone were then used by ships 
instead of the chains of the present day, were com- 
pleted, the workmen took them upon their shoulders 
and marched with them in procession to the vessel, 
headed by a drum and fife. The building of the 
Essex was thus an effort of city pride and local 
patriotism ; and the launch, which took place on the 
30th of September, 1799, became an occasion of gen- 
eral rejoicing and holiday, witnessed by thousands 
of spectators and greeted by salutes from the bat- 
tery and shipping. The new frigate measured 850 
tons, and cost, independent of guns and stores, some- 
what over $75,000. Her battery in her early history 
was composed of twenty-six long twelve-pounders on 
the main deck, with sixteen thirty-two-pound carron- 
ades and two chase guns on the deck above. At a 
later day, and during the cruise under Porter, this 
was changed to forty thirty-two-pound carronades 
and six long twelves. This battery, though throw- 
ing a heavier weight, was of shorter range than the 
former; and therefore, though advantageous to a 
ship able to choose her position, was a fatal source of 
weakness to a slow or crippled vessel, as was pain- 
fully apparent in the action where the Essex was lost. 
Notwithstanding the zeal and emulation aroused 
by the appeal to Salem municipal pride, and notwith- 



1 5 ADMIRAL FARRAGUT. 

standing the comparative rapidity with which ships 
could then be built, the Essex in her day illustrated 
the folly of deferring preparation until hostilities 
are at hand. The first French prize was taken in 
June, 1798, but it was not till December 22d of the 
following year that the Essex sailed out of Salem 
harbor, commanded then by Edward Preble, one of 
the most distinguished officers of the early American 
navy. Newport was her first port of arrival. From 
there she sailed again on the 6th of January, 1800, in 
company with the frigate Congress, both being bound 
for Batavia, whence they were to convoy home a fleet 
of merchant ships ; for in the predatory warfare en- 
couraged by the French Directory, the protection of 
our commerce from its cruisers was a duty even more 
important than the retaliatory action against the 
latter, to which the quasi war of 1798 was confined. 
When six days out, the Congress was dismasted. 
The Essex went on alone, and was thus the first 
ship-of-war to carry the flag of the United States 
around the Cape of Good Hope into the Indian 
Ocean. A dozen years later the bold resolution of 
Porter to take her alone and unsupported into the 
Pacific, during the cruise upon which young Farragut 
was now embarking, secured for this little frigate the 
singular distinction of being the first United States 
ship-of-war to double Cape Horn as well as that of 
Good Hope. In the intervening period the Essex 
had been usefully, but not conspicuously, employed in 
the Mediterranean in the operations against Tripoli 
and in protecting trade. In 181 1, however, she was 
again an actor in an event of solemn significance. 
Upon her return to the United States, where Porter 
was waiting to take command, she bore as a passen- 



CRUISE OF THE ESSEX. 



17 



ger William Pinkney, the late Minister to Great 
Britain; who, after years of struggle, on his part 
both resolute and dignified, to obtain the just de- 
mands of the United States, had now formally broken 
off the diplomatic relations between the two powers 
and taken an unfriendly leave of the British Govern- 
ment 

Being just returned from a foreign cruise, the 
Essex needed a certain amount of refitting before 
again going to sea under her new commander ; but 
in October, 181 1, she sailed for a short cruise on the 
coast, in furtherance of the Government's orders to 
Commodore Rodgers to protect American commerce 
from improper interference. Orders of such a char- 
acter were likely at any moment to result in a collis- 
ion, especially in the hands of a gallant, hasty officer 
scarcely out of his first youth ; for Porter was at this 
time but thirty-one, and for years had felt, with the 
keen resentment of a military man, the passive sub- 
mission to insult shown by Jefferson's government. 
No meeting, however, occurred ; nor were the months 
that elapsed before the outbreak of war marked by 
any event of special interest except a narrow escape 
from shipwreck on Christmas eve, when the Essex 
nearly dragged on shore in a furious northeast gale 
under the cliffs at Newport. Farragut has left on 
record in his journal, with the proper pride of a mid- 
shipman in his ship, that the Essex was the smartest 
vessel in the squadron, and highly complimented 
as such by Commodore Rodgers. In acknowledg- 
ment of the skill and activity of his seamen, Porter 
divided the ship's company into three watches, in- 
stead of the usual two — an arrangement only possible 
when the smaller number in a watch is compensated 



1 8 ADMIRAL FARRAGUT. 

by their greater individual efficiency. This arrange- 
ment continued throughout the cruise, until the ship 
was captured in 1814. 

On the 1 8th of June, 181 2, war was at last de- 
clared against Great Britain. The Essex had again 
been cruising during the spring months ; but the 
serious character of the new duties before her made 
a thorough refit necessary, and she was not able to 
sail with the squadron under Commodore Rodgers, 
which put to sea from New York on the 21st of 
June. On the 3d of July, however, she got away. 
Porter having the day before received his promotion 
to post-captain, then the highest grade in the United 
States Navy. The ship cruised off the coast, making 
several prizes of vessels much inferior to herself in 
force, and on the 7th of September anchored within 
the capes of the Delaware. Much to Porter's sur- 
prise and annoyance, although ready to sail at once 
if furnished with provisions, none reached him. The 
ship was therefore taken up the Delaware and an- 
chored off Chester, where she was prepared for a 
long and distant cruise directed against British com- 
merce, the suggestion of which Porter believed came 
first from himself. By this a squadron consisting 
of the Constitution, Essex, and Hornet sloop-of-war, 
under the command of Commodore Bainbridge in 
the first-named frigate, were to proceed across the 
Atlantic to the Cape Verde Islands, thence to the 
South Atlantic in the neighborhood of Brazil, and 
finally to the Pacific, to destroy the British whale- 
fishery there. The plan was well conceived, and 
particularly was stamped with the essential mark of 
all successful commerce-destroying, the evasion of 
the enemy's cruisers ; for, though the American 



CRUISE OF THE ESSEX. 



19 



cruisers were primed to fight, yet an action, even if 
successful, tended to cripple their powers of pursuit. 
A rapid transit through the Atlantic, with an ulti- 
mate destination to the then little-frequented Pacific, 
was admirably calculated to conceal for a long time 
the purposes of this commerce-destroying squadron. 
As it happened, both the Constitution and Hornet 
met and captured enemy's cruisers off the coast 
of Brazil, and then returned to the United States. 
Farragut thus lost the opportunity of sharing in any 
of the victories of 1812, to be a partaker in one of 
the most glorious of defeats. 

The Constitution and Hornet being in Boston, 
and the Essex in the Delaware, it became necessary 
to appoint for the three a distant place of meeting, 
out of the usual cruising grounds of the enemy, in 
order that the ships, whose first object was to escape 
crippling, could pass rapidly through the belt of Brit- 
ish cruisers then girding the coast of the United 
States. The brilliant record made by United States 
ships in their single combats with the enemy during 
this war should not be allowed to blind our people 
to the fact that, from their numerical inferiority, 
they were practically prisoners in their own ports; 
and, like other prisoners, had to break jail to gain 
freedom to act. The distant and little frequented 
Cape Verde group, off the African coast, was there- 
fore designated as the first rendezvous for Bain- 
bridge's squadron, and the lonely island of Fernando 
Noronha, off the coast of Brazil, close under the 
equator, as the second. Both of these places were 
then possessions of Portugal, the ally of Great Brit- 
ain though neutral as to the United States. With 
these orders the Constitution and Hornet sailed from 



20 ADMIRAL FARRAGUT. 

Boston on the 26th of October, 1812, and the Essex 
two days later from the capes of the Delaware. 
Their course in the passage was to be so directed as 
to cross at the most favorable points the routes of 
British commerce. 

On the 27th of November the Essex, after an un- 
eventful voyage, anchored at Porto Praya, in the 
Cape Verdes, where she remained five days. Re- 
ceiving no news of Bainbridge, Porter sailed again 
for Fernando Noronha. On the nth of December 
a British packet, the Nocton, was captured, and 
from her was taken $55,000 in specie — an acquisition 
which contributed much to facilitate the distant 
cruise contemplated by Porter. Four days later the 
Essex was off Fernando Noronha, and sent a boat 
ashore, which returned with a letter addressed osten- 
sibly to Sir James Yeo, of the British frigate South- 
ampton ; but between the lines, written in sympa- 
thetic ink. Porter found a message from Bainbridge, 
directing him to cruise off Rio and wait for the Con- 
stitution. On the 29th of December he was in the 
prescribed station, and cruised in the neighborhood 
for some days, although he knew a British ship-of- 
the-line, the Montagu, was lying in Rio ; but only 
one British prize was taken, the merchant vessels of 
that nation usually waitmg in port until they could 
sail under convoy of a ship-of-war. Attempting to 
get to windward in a heavy sea, the Essex was 
much racked and injured some of her spars, and her 
captain therefore decided to bear away for refit to 
St. Catherine's — a port five hundred miles south of 
Rio Janeiro, which had been named in his instruc- 
tions as a contingent rendezvous. On the 20th of 
January, 1813, the Essex anchored there, and began 



CRUISE OF THE ESSEX. 2 1 

the work of refitting and filling with water and 
fresh provisions. A few days after her arrival a 
small Portuguese vessel came in, bringing an account 
of the capture by the Montagu of an American cor- 
vette, which Porter supposed to be the Hornet, as 
well as a rumor of the action between the Constitu- 
tion and the Java, and a report that re-enforcements 
were reaching the British naval force on the station. 
The history of past wars convinced Porter that the 
neutrality of the Portuguese port in which he was 
lying would not be respected by the enemy. In 
a very few days his presence there must become 
known ; any junction with his consorts was rendered 
most unlikely by the news just received, and he de- 
termined at once to undertake alone the mission for 
which the three ships had been dispatched. With 
admirable promptitude, both of decision and action, 
the Essex sailed the same night for the Pacific. 

From the time of leaving the United States the 
crew of the ship had been restricted to that close 
and economical allowance of provisions and water 
which was necessary to a vessel whose home ports 
were blocked by enemy's cruisers, and which in every 
quarter of the globe might expect to meet the fleets 
and influence of a powerful foe. The passage round 
Cape Horn, always stormy, was both a long and se- 
vere strain to a vessel bound from east to west, and 
dependent wholly upon sail ; for the winds prevail 
from the westward. The utmost prudence was re- 
quired in portioning out both food and water, and 
of bread there remained, on leaving St. Catherine's, 
only enough for three months at half allowance — 
that is, at half a pound per day. The boy Farragut 
thus found himself, at the outset of his career, ex- 



22 ADMIRAL FARRAGUT. 

posed to one of the severest tests of his arduous 
calling — a long and stormy passage, made in the 
teeth of violent gales, and with a crew reduced to 
the scantiest possible allowance of food, under con- 
ditions when the system most demands support. In 
his journal he speaks, as Porter does in his, of the 
severe suffering and dreadful weather experienced. 
For twenty-one days the Essex struggled with the 
furious blasts, the heavy seas, and the bitter weather, 
which have made the passage round Cape Horn pro- 
verbial for hardship among seamen. On the 3d of 
March, he writes, a sea was shipped which burst in, 
on one side of the ship and from one end to the 
other, all the ports through which the guns are fired, 
and which, for such a passage, are closed and se- 
curely fastened. One boat on the weather side was 
driven in on deck, and that on the opposite carried 
overboard; but with great difficulty the latter was 
saved. Large quantities of water rushed below, lead- 
ing those there to imagine that the ship was sinking. 
'' This was the only instance in which I ever saw a real 
good seaman paralyzed by fear at the dangers of the 
sea. Several of the sailors were seen on their knees 
at prayer; but most were found ready to do their 
duty. They were called on deck, and came promptly, 
led by William Kingsbury, the boatswain's mate. 
Long shall I remember the cheering sound of his 
stentorian voice, which resembled the roaring of a 
lion rather than that of a human being, when he told 
them : ' D — n their eyes, to put their best foot for- 
ward, as there was one side of the ship left yet.' " 

Cape Horn, however, was at last passed and 
enough ground gained to the westward to allow the 
Essex again to head north. On the nth of March 



CRUISE OF THE ESSEX. 



23 



she was off the city of Valparaiso, in Chile. As far 
as Porter then knew, Chile was still a province of 
Spain, and Spain was the ally of Great Britain ; whose 
armies for four years past had been engaged in war 
in the Peninsula, to shake from it the grip of Na- 
poleon. There had been trouble also between Spain 
and the United States about the Floridas. The first 
lieutenant of the Essex was therefore first sent 
ashore to see what reception would be given, and 
returned with the satisfactory intelligence that Chile 
was in revolution agamst the mother country, and was 
ready heartily to welcome a ship-of-war belonging 
to the American Republic. He also brought the 
news that the Viceroy of Spain in Peru had fitted 
out privateers against Chilian commerce ; and that 
these, on the plea of being allies of Great Britain, 
had begun to capture American whalers. It seemed, 
therefore, that the Essex had arrived as opportunely 
for the protection of United States interests as for 
the injury of British commerce. 

Several days were lost in these preliminaries, so 
that it was not till the 15th that the anchor was 
dropped in Valparaiso. Despite the cordial reception 
given, Porter was in haste to reach his scene of ac- 
tion in the North and sailed again on the 22d. Four 
days later he met a Peruvian privateer, the Nereyda, 
the captain of which was deceived by the Essex 
hoisting British colors. Coming on board the frigate, 
he stated freely that the Spaniards considered them- 
selves the allies of Great Britain, that he was him- 
self cruising for American whalers, and had on board 
at the moment the crews of two of these which he 
had taken. Having extracted all the information he 
wanted, Porter undeceived the privateersman, took 



24 



ADMIRAL FARRAGUT. 



possession of the ship, threw overboard her guns and 
ammunition, and then released her, with a letter to 
the Viceroy ; which, backed by the presence of the 
Essex, was calculated to insure peaceable treatment 
to American vessels. 

There were at this time on the coast of Peru and 
in the neighboring waters twenty-three American 
whalers, worth, with their cargoes, two and a half 
million dollars, and mostly unarmed, having left 
home in a time of peace. Of English ships there 
were twenty ; but, their country having been long 
at war, these were generally armed, and in many 
cases provided with letters of marque authorizing 
them to act as privateers and capture vessels hostile 
to their Crown. In this state of things, so unpromis- 
ing for American interests, the arrival of the Essex 
entirely turned the scales, besides stopping the Span- 
ish depredations which had but just begun. 

On the 27th of March, off the harbor of Callao, 
the port of Lima, Porter recaptured the Barclay, one 
of the American ships seized by the Nereyda; but, 
although the frigate again disguised her nationality 
by hoisting British colors, there was among the sev- 
eral vessels in the harbor only one that showed the 
same flag. With the Barclay in company, the Essex 
now stood away for the Galapagos Islands. These 
are a group situated just south of the equator and 
some five hundred miles from the South American 
coast. Uninhabited then, as for the most part they 
still are, they were in 1813 a favorite rendezvous for 
British whalers, who had established upon one of the 
islands (Charles) a means of communication by a box 
nailed to a tree, which was called the post-office. 
They abound in turtle, some of which weigh several 



CRUISE OF THE ESSEX. 



25 



hundred pounds, and form a very valuable as well as 
acceptable change of diet to seamen long confined to 
salt food. On the 17th of April the Essex came in 
sight of Chatham Island, one of the largest, and re- 
mained cruising in the neighborhood of the group 
till the beginning of June, when want of water com- 
pelled her to go to Tumbez, a port on the continent 
just abreast of the Galapagos. In this period seven 
British whalers were taken ; so that on the 24th of 
June there were anchored in Tumbez Bay, including 
the frigate and the Barclay, nine vessels under Por- 
ter's command. Of these, he commissioned one — 
the fastest and best, somewhat less than half the 
size of the Essex herself — as a United States cruiser, 
under his command. She was named the Essex 
Junior, carried twenty guns, of which half were long 
six-pounders and half eighteen-pounder carronades, 
and was manned by sixty of the Essex's crew under 
her first lieutenant. 

The first service of the Essex Junior was to con- 
voy to Valparaiso the Barclay and four of the British 
prizes. The occasion was one of great importance 
and interest to Farragut ; for, though but a boy of 
twelve, he was selected to command the party of sea- 
men detailed to manage the Barclay during this long 
passage. The captain of the Barclay went with his 
ship, but in great discontent that the command of 
the seamen was given not to himself, but to such a 
lad from the ship-of-war. Being a violent-tempered 
old man, he attempted by bluster to overawe the boy 
into surrendering his authority. " When the day 
arrived for our separation from the squadron," 
writes Farragut in his journal, '^ the captain was 
furious, and very plainly intimated to me that I 
3 



26 ADMIRAL FARRAGUT. 

would ' find myself off New Zealand in the morning,' 
to which I most decidedly demurred. We were lying 
still, while the other ships were fast disappearing 
from view, the commodore going north and the 
Essex Junior, with her convoy, steering to the south 
for Valparaiso. I considered that my day of trial 
had arrived (for I was a little afraid of the old fel- 
low, as every one else was). But the time had come 
for me at least to play the man ; so I mustered up 
courage and informed the captain that I desired the 
maintopsail filled away, in order that we might close 
up with the Essex Junior. He replied that he would 
shoot any man who dared to touch a rope without 
his orders ; he * would go his own course, and had no 
idea of trusting himself with a d — d nutshell ' ; and 
then he went below for his pistols. I called my right- 
hand man of the crew and told him my situation. I 
also informed him that I wanted the mamtopsail 
filled. He answered with a clear * Ay, ay, sir ! ' in 
a manner which was not to be misunderstood, and 
my confidence was perfectly restored. From that 
moment I became master of the vessel, and immedi- 
ately gave all necessary orders for making sail, 
notifying the captain not to come on deck with his 
pistols unless he wished to go overboard, for I 
would really have had very little trouble in having 
such an order obeyed. I made my report to Captain 
Downes (of the Essex Junior), on rejoining him ; and 
the captain also told his story, in which he endeav- 
ored to pursuade Downes that he only tried to fright- 
en me. I replied by requesting Captain Downes to 
ask him how he succeeded ; and to show him that I 
did not fear him, I offered to go back and proceed 
with him to Valparaiso. He was informed that I was 



CRUISE OF THE ESSEX. 



27 



in command, he being simply my adviser in navigat- 
ing the vessel in case of separation. So, this being 
settled and understood, I returned to the Barclay, 
and everything went on amicably up to our arrival 
in Valparaiso." 

It was on the 30th of June that the little squad- 
ron sailed from Tumbez, standing to the westward 
till they should reach the trade-winds; and on the 
4th of July that the Essex Junior separated, with the 
prizes, and Farragut had his scene with the captain 
of the Barclay. As the winds on the west coast of 
South America blow throughout the year from the 
southward, the passage of sailing vessels in that di- 
rection is always long ; but for the same reason the 
return is quickly made. When, therefore, the Essex 
Junior rejoined the Essex at the Galapagos, on the 
30th of September, she brought comparatively recent 
news, and that of a very important character. Let- 
ters from the American consul in Buenos Ayres in- 
formed Porter that on the 5th of July the British 
frigate Phoebe, of thirty-six guns, a vessel in every 
way of superior force to the Essex, had sailed from 
Rio Janeiro for the Pacific, accompanied by two 
sloops-of-war, the Cherub and Raccoon, of twenty- 
four guns each. This little squadron was charged 
with the double mission of checking the ravages of 
the Essex and of destroying the fur trade of Ameri- 
can citizens at the mouth of the Columbia River. 
From the date of their leaving Rio these ships were 
not improbably now on the coast ; and allowing for 
time to refit after the stormy passage round the Horn, 
they might be expected soon to seek Porter at the 
Galapagos, the headquarters of the British whalers. 

The Essex Junior brought back the prize-crews 



28 ADMIRAL FARRAGUT. 

and prize-masters who had navigated the captured 
ships to Valparaiso, and with the others Farragut 
now rejoined the frigate. During their absence Por- 
ter had taken four more valuable vessels. Accord- 
ing to his information, there remained but one uncapt- 
ured of the British whalers which centered around 
the islands. The Essex had taken eleven ; and 
among these, 'six carried letters of marque from their 
Government, authorizing them to seize for their own 
profit vessels of a nation at war with Great Britain. 
These powers would doubtless have been exercised 
at the expense of the unprepared American whalers 
but for the opportune appearance of the Essex, 
which had also released the vessels of her country 
from the ports to which, at the time of her arrival, 
they had been driven by Peruvian privateers. Por- 
ter's work in this region was therefore finished. He 
had entirely broken up an important branch of Brit- 
ish commerce, inflicting damage estimated at nearly 
three million dollars ; but the coming of an enemy's 
force considerably superior to his own, an event 
wholly beyond his control, reversed all the conditions 
and imposed upon him some new line of action. For 
this he was already prepared, and he took his decision 
with the promptitude characteristic of the man. The 
commander of the British squadron. Captain Hillyar, 
was personally well known to him, being an old 
acquaintance in the Mediterranean ; and he doubtless 
realized from observation, as well as from his past 
record, that his enemy was not a man to throw away, 
through any carelessness or false feeling of chivalry, 
a single advantage conferred by his superior force. 
On the other hand. Porter himself was not one quiet- 
ly to submit to superiority without an effort to regain 



CRUISE OF THE ESSEX. 



29 



the control which the chances of naval war might 
yet throw into his hands. He was determined to 
fight, if any fair chance offered ; but to do so it was 
necessary to put his ship in the highest state of effi- 
ciency, which could only be done by leaving the spot 
where he was known to be, and, throwing the enemy 
off his scent, repairing to one where the necessary 
work could be performed in security. Two days 
after the arrival of the Essex Junior all the vessels 
sailed from the Galapagos Islands for the Marquesas. 
On the 25th of October they anchored at one of this 
group, called Nukahiva Island. 

During the six weeks the Essex lay at this 
anchorage her crew bore a part in several expedi- 
tions on shore, designed to protect the natives in the 
neighborhood against hostile tribes in other parts of 
the island. In this land fighting Farragut and his 
younger messmates were not allowed to share ; but 
were, on the contrary, compelled to attend a school 
established on board of one of the prizes, with the 
ship's chaplain for school-master. They were, how- 
ever, permitted out of school hours and after the 
day's work, which for the ship's company ended at 
4 p. M., to ramble freely in the island among the 
natives; considerable liberty being allowed to all 
hands, who, during their year's absence from the 
United States, had had little opportunity to visit any 
inhabited places. Farragut here learned to swim, and 
the aptitude of the natives to the water seems to 
have impressed him more than their other peculiari- 
ties which have since then been so liberally described 
in books of travel. '' It appears as natural," he 
wrote, " for these islanders to swim as to eat. I have 
often seen mothers take their little children, appar- 



30 ADMIRAL FARRAGUT. 

ently not more than two years old, down to the sea 
on their backs, walk deliberately into deep water, and 
leave them to paddle for themselves. To my aston- 
ishment, the little creatures could swim like young 
ducks." 

On the 9th of December, 1813, the Essex and 
Essex Junior sailed for Valparaiso with one of the 
prizes, leaving the others at the Marquesas. Noth- 
ing of interest occurred during the passage, but the 
crew were daily exercised at all the arms carried by 
the ship — with the cannon, the muskets, and the 
single-sticks. The latter are for training in the use 
of the broadsword or cutlass, the play with which 
would be too dangerous for ordinary drills. -Porter 
had a strong disposition to resort to boarding and 
hand-to-hand fighting, believing that the very sur- 
prise of an attack by the weaker party would go far 
to compensate for the inequality of numbers. On 
more than one occasion already, in the presence of 
superior force, he had contemplated resorting to 
this desperate game ; and to a ship the character of 
whose battery necessitated a close approach to the 
enemy, the power to throw on board, at a moment's 
notice, a body of thoroughly drilled and equipped 
swordsmen was unquestionably of the first impor- 
tance. " I have never since been in a ship," said 
Farragut at a later day, " where the crew of the old 
Essex was represented, but that I found them to be 
the best swordsmen on board. They had been so 
thoroughly trained as boarders that every man was 
prepared for such an emergency, with his cutlass as 
sharp as a razor, a dirk made from a file by the 
ship's armorer, and a pistol." With a ship well re- 
fitted and with a crew thus perfectly drilled, Porter 



CRUISE OF THE ESSEX. 



31 



had done all that in him lay in the way of prepara- 
tion for victory. If he did not win, he would at least 
deserve to do so. For Farragut it is interesting to 
notice that, in his tender youth and most impressible 
years, he had before him, both in his captain and in 
his ship, most admirable models. The former daring 
to recklessness, yet leaving nothing to chance ; fear- 
less of responsibility, but ever sagacious in its exer- 
cise ; a rigid disciplinarian, who yet tempered rigor 
by a profound knowledge of and sympathy with the 
peculiarities of the men who were under him. The 
latter — the ship — became, as ships under strong cap- 
tains tend to become, the embodiment of the com- 
mander's spirit. Thoroughly prepared and armed 
at all points, she was now advancing at the close of 
her career to an audacious encounter with a greatly 
superior force. Whether the enterprise was justifi- 
able or not, at least nothing that care could do to 
insure success was left to chance or to favor. Por- 
ter might perhaps have quitted the Pacific in Decem- 
ber, 1813, and, reaching the United States coast in 
the winter, have escaped the blockade which at that 
season was necessarily relaxed. By doing so he 
might have saved his ship; but the United States 
Navy would have lost one of the most brilliant pages 
in its history, and its future admiral one of the most 
glorious episodes in his own great career. 

On the 12th of January, 1814, the Essex arrived off 
the coast of Chile, making the land well to the south- 
ward — that is, to windward — of Valparaiso. From 
this point of arrival she ran slowly to the northward, 
looking into the old town of Concepion, between two 
and three hundred miles from Valparaiso. In the 
latter port she anchored on the 3d of February. The 



32 



ADMIRAL FARRAGUT. 



ordinary salutes and civilities with the authorities hav- 
ing been exchanged, every effort was made to get the 
ship ready for sea, the Essex Junior being employed 
cruising off the port so as to give timely notice of 
the approach of an enemy ; a precaution necessary 
at all times, even in a neutral port, but especially so 
at a period when neutral rights were being openly 
disregarded in every direction by both the great 
belligerents, France and Great Britain. Moreover, 
Captain Hillyar, though a brave and experienced 
officer, a favorite with Nelson, whose esteem could 
not be won without high professional merit, was 
reputed to have shown scanty scruples about neutral 
rights on a previous occasion, when the disregard of 
them procured an advantage to the enterprise he had 
in hand. Being sent with several armed boats to at- 
tack two Spanish corvettes lying in the port of Barce- 
lona, in the year 1800, he had pulled alongside a 
neutral vessel, a Swede, which was standing into the 
harbor ; and after examining her papers in the due 
exercise of his right as a belligerent, his boats 
hooked on to her, thus using a neutral to tow them 
into the enemy's port, so that his men reached their 
scene of exertion unfatigued by the oar, and for a 
great part of the way protected by such respect as 
the Spanish batteries might show to a neutral coerced 
into aiding a hostile undertaking. "Having ap- 
proached within about three quarters of a mile of the 
nearest battery," says the British naval historian 
James, " and being reminded by two shots which 
passed over the galliot that it was time to retire 
from the shelter of a neutral vessel. Captain Hillyar 
pulled away." Both the Spanish and Swedish Gov- 
ernments complained of this act, and their complaints 



CRUISE OF THE ESSEX. 33 

delayed the promotion which Hillyar's gallantry 
would otherwise have won. Whatever the strict pro- 
priety of his conduct in this case, it was sufficiently 
doubtful to excite a just suspicion that Hillyar 
would not be deterred, by over-delicacy about the 
neutrality of the port, from seizing any advantage 
offered him by the unwariness of his enemy ; and 
so the event proved. 

On the 7th of February a dance was given on 
board the Essex, which lasted till midnight. In or- 
der that her officers might share in the entertain- 
ment, the Essex Junior was allowed to anchor, 
though in a position to have a clear view of the sea ; 
but, when the guests began to depart, her commander 
went on board and got under way to resume his sta- 
tion outside. Before the decorations of the ball- 
room had been taken down, a signal was made from 
her that two enemy's ships were in sight. A whole 
watch — one third of the Essex's crew — were then on 
shore, but were quickly recalled by a gun. The ship 
was at once cleared for action, and the men at their 
quarters, with all the rapidity to be expected from 
the careful drilling they had had during their long 
commission. Porter himself had gone to the lookout 
ship to reconnoitre the enemy. Upon his return he 
found the frigate all ready for battle, it being then 
just an hour and a half since the alarm was given. 
The Essex Junior was then anchored in a position to 
support the Essex should occasion arise. 

The strangers were the Phoebe and the Cherub. 
The third British ship, the Raccoon, had gone north 
to the Columbia. As has before been said. Captain 
Hillyar was an old friend of Porter's. The two men 
had been thrown together in the Mediterranean, and 



24 ADMIRAL FARRAGUT. 

the American had been a frequent visitor in the 
other's house at Gibraltar. On one occasion Hill- 
yar's family had made a passage from Malta to Gib- 
raltar in an American ship-of-war ; for in those 
troubled times would-be voyagers had to avail 
themselves of such opportunities as offered, and the 
courtesy of a large armed ship was among the most 
favorable. It was natural, therefore, that, as the 
Phoebe stood into the harbor, Captain Hillyar should 
bring his ship, the wind allowing it, close to the Es- 
sex and hail the latter with a polite inquiry after 
Captain Porter's health ; but it was going rather 
too far, under all the circumstances, not to be content 
with passing slowly under the Essex's stern, than 
which no more favorable position could be found for 
an exchange of civil words. Instead of so doing, the 
helm of the Phoebe was put down and the ship luffed 
up into the wind between the Essex and the Essex 
Junior, the latter lying now near the senior ship and 
on her starboard beam. Whethei Hillyar counted 
upon his own seamanship to extricate his ship from 
the awkward position in which he had placed her, or 
whether, as the Americans believed, he intended to 
attack if circumstances favored, he soon saw that he 
had exposed himself to extreme peril. As the Phoebe 
lost her way she naturally fell off from the wind, her 
bows being swept round toward the Essex, while her 
stern was presented to the Essex Junior. Both her 
enemies had their guns trained on her; she could 
use none of hers. At the same time, in the act of 
falling off, she approached the Essex ; and her jib- 
boom, projecting far beyond her bows, swept over 
the forecastle of the latter. Porter, who had been 
watching the whole proceeding with great distrust, 



CRUISE OF THE ESSEX. 



35 



had summoned his boarders as soon as the Phoebe 
luffed. The Essex at the moment was in a state of 
as absolute preparation as is a musket at full cock 
trained on the mark, and with the marksman's eye 
ranging over the sights ; every man at his post, every 
gun trained, matches burning, and boarders standing 
by. The position was one of extreme tension. The 
American captain had in his hand a chance such as 
in his most sanguine dreams he could scarcely have 
hoped. His guns, feeble at a distance, could tell 
with the greatest effect at such short range; and even 
if his enemy dropped an anchor, in the great depths 
of Valparaiso Bay he would not fetch up till far past 
the Essex. Until then he was for the moment help- 
less. Porter hailed that if the ships touched he should 
at once attack. Hillyar kept his presence of mind 
admirably at this critical juncture, replying in an in- 
different manner that he had no intention of allow- 
ing the Phoebe to fall on board the Essex — an as- 
surance that was well enough, and, coupled with his 
nonchalant manner, served the purpose of keeping 
Porter in doubt as to whether a breach of neutrality 
had been mtended. But the British frigate was un- 
questionably in a position where a seaman should 
not have placed her unless he meant mischief. It is 
good luck, not good management, when a ship in 
the Phoebe's position does not foul one in that of the 
Essex. While this was passing, Farragut was witness 
to a circumstance which shows by what a feather's 
weight scales are sometimes turned. Of all the 
watch that had been on shore when the enemy ap- 
peared, he says, one only, a mere boy, returned 
under the influence of liquor. *' When the Phoebe 
was close alongside, and all hands at quarters, the 



36 



ADMIRAL FARRAGUT. 



powder-boys stationed with slow matches ready to 
discharge the guns, the boarders, cutlass in hand, 
standing by to board in the smoke, as was our cus- 
tom at close quarters, the intoxicated youth saw, or 
imagined that he saw, through the port, some one 
on the Phoebe grinning at him. ' My fine fellow, I'll 
stop your making faces,' he exclaimed, and was just 
about to fire his gun, when Lieutenant McKnight saw 
the movement and with a blow sprawled him on the 
deck. Had that gun been fired, I am convinced that 
the Phoebe would have been ours." She probably 
would, for the Essex could have got in three broad- 
sides of her twenty thirty-two-pounder carronades 
before the enemy could effectively reply, a beginning 
which would have reversed the odds between the 
two ships. Farragut fully shared the belief of all 
his shipmates that an attack was intended, in con- 
sequence of the information given to Captain Hill- 
yar, as he was entering, by the boat of an English 
merchant ship in the port, that half the crew of 
the Essex was on shore. As the Phoebe luffed 
through between the two Americans a turn of her 
helm would have landed her on the bows of the 
Essex, if the latter had been caught at disadvantage. 
Instead of this, she was found fully prepared. The 
Essex Junior was also on the spot, while the Cherub, 
having drifted half a mile to leeward, could not have 
taken any part till the action was decided. Under 
these conditions, although their force was inferior, 
the advantage was with the Americans, whose ships 
were anchored and cleared, while the Phoebe still 
had her canvas spread and the anchoring to do, 
which is a troublesome operation in water so deep as 
that of Valparaiso Bay. If men's motives can be 



CRUISE OF THE ESSEX. 



37 



judged by their acts, Captain Hillyar afforded Porter 
full justification for opening fire. He extricated 
himself from a false position with consummate cool- 
ness; but his adversary, when taken later at disad- 
vantage, had reason to regret the generosity with 
which he allowed him the benefit of the doubt as to 
his intentions to respect the neutrality of the port. 
As it was, when the two ships were almost touching, 
the Englishman threw his sails to the mast, and, back- 
ing clear of the Essex, anchored finally some distance 
astern. 

The two British ships remained in port for a few 
days, during which their captains called upon Cap- 
tain Porter on shore, where he was then living in the 
house of a gentleman named Blanco ; and an amica- 
ble intercourse also grew up between the offtcers and 
crews of the two parties. Hillyar, however, told 
Porter frankly that he should not throw away the 
advantage given by his superior force, for the event 
of a naval action was ever uncertain, liable to be 
decided by the accidental loss of an important spar 
or rope ; whereas, by keeping his two ships together, 
he thought he could effectually blockade the Essex 
and prevent her renewing her depredations upon 
British commerce until the arrival of other ships of 
war which were on their way. From this wary atti- 
tude Porter in vain tried to force his antagonist by 
varied provocations ; but, although the exchange of 
oflficial insults, verging closely at times upon person- 
al imputations, caused bitterness to take the place 
of the first friendly courtesies, Hillyar was too old 
an officer, and his reputation for courage too well 
known, to allow his hand to be thus forced. 

After filling with provisions and refitting, the 



38 ADMIRAL FARRAGUT. 

British ships left the anchorage and cruised off the 
approach to it, thus preventing the retreat of the 
Essex to the ocean, unless she could succeed in pass- 
ing and then outsailing them. Valparaiso Bay is not 
an enclosed harbor, but simply a recess in the coast, 
which, running generally north and south, here turns 
abruptly to the eastward for two or three miles and 
then trends north again, leaving thus a concave 
beach facing the north. Along this beach lies the 
city of Valparaiso, stretching back and up on the 
hillsides, which rise to a height of twelve or fifteen 
hundred feet behind it. The prevailing winds along 
this coast being from the southward throughout the 
year, this formation gives an anchorage sheltered 
from them ; but during the winter months of the 
southern hemisphere, from May to October, there 
are occasional northerly gales which endanger ship- 
ping, more from the heavy sea that rolls in than 
from the violence of the wind. In ordinary weather, 
at the season when the Essex was thus blockaded, 
the harbor is quiet through the night until the fore- 
noon, when the southerly wind prevailing outside 
works its way in to the anchorage and blows freshly 
till after sundown. At times it descends in furious 
gusts down the ravines which cleave the hillsides, 
covering the city with clouds of dust and whirling 
sand and pebbles painfully in the faces of those who 
walk the streets. 

On the 28th of March, 1814, such a blast descend- 
ed upon the Essex, whose captain had by that time 
come to despair of forcing Hillyar to single combat. 
As the frigate straightened out her cables under the 
force of the wind, one of them broke, and the anchor 
of the other lost its hold upon the bottom. The 



CRUISE OF THE ESSEX. 



39 



Essex began to drift to sea, and it was apparent 
would by this accident be carried out of reach of 
the port. Porter therefore ordered the cable cut 
and made sail on the ship, intending now to escape. 
The British ships kept habitually close to the west- 
ern point of the bay; so that in case of such an at- 
tempt by their enemy he would have to pass to lee- 
ward of them, giving them a fair wind to follow. As 
Porter stood out, however, he thought possible, by 
keeping close to the wind, to pass to windward, 
which, with the superior sailing qualities of the 
Essex, would force the Phoebe to separate from the 
Cherub, unless Hillyar supinely acquiesced in his es- 
cape — an inadmissible supposition. If successful, he 
might yet have the single action he desired, and un- 
der conditions which would enable him to choose his 
distance and so profit by the qualities of his carron- 
ades. The Essex therefore hugged the wind ; but 
as she was thus passing the western point of the 
bay, under a press of sail, a violent squall came 
down from the highland above, bearing the vessel 
over on her side and carrying away the maintop- 
mast, which fell into the sea, drowning several of the 
crew. The loss of so important a part of her sail 
power made escape to sea impossible, and the Essex 
tried to regain the port. The wind, however, was 
adverse to the attempt in her crippled condition, so 
that she was only able to reach the east side of the 
bay, where she anchored about three miles from 
the city, but within pistol-shot of the shore, before 
the enemy could overtake her. As the conventional 
neutral line extends three miles from the beach, the 
Essex was here clearly under the protection of Chil- 
ian neutrality. Hillyar himself, in his official report 



40 



ADMIRAL FARRAGUT. 



of the action, says she was " so near the shore as to 
preclude the possibility of passing ahead of her with- 
out risk to His Majesty's ships." He seems, how- 
ever, to have satisfied his conscience by drawing a 
line between the neutrality of the port and the neu- 
trality of the country. The Essex was, he implies, 
outside the former. " Not succeeding in gaining 
the limits of the port, she bore up and anchored near 
the shore, a few miles to leeward of it." * At all 
events, having his adversary at such serious disad- 
vantage, he did not propose to imitate the weakness 
Porter had shown toward himself six weeks before. 

The crucial feature in the approaching action 
was that the Essex was armed almost entirely with 
carronades, and her principal enemy with long guns. 
The carronadC; now a wholly obsolete arm, was a 
short cannon, made extremely light in proportion to 
the weight of the ball thrown by it. The compara- 
tive lightness of metal in each piece allowed a 
greater number to be carried, but at the same time 
so weakened the gun as to compel the use of a small 
charge of powder, in consequence of which the ball 
moved slowly and had but short range. In compen- 
sation, within its range, it broke up the hull of an 
enemy's ship more completely than the smaller but 
swifter ball from a long gun of the same weight; 
for the same reason that a stone thrown by hand de- 
molishes a pane of glass, while a pistol-bullet makes 
a small, clean hole. It was this smashing effect at 
close quarters which gave the carronade favor in 
the eyes of one generation of seamen; but by 1812 
it was generally recognized that, unless a vessel was 

* Marshall's Naval Biography, article Hillyar, vol. iv, p, 861. 



CRUISE OF THE ESSEX. 



41 



able to choose her own position, the short range of 
carronades might leave her helpless, and, even when 
she had the greater speed, an enemy with long guns 
might cripple her as she approached. Porter had 
begged to change his carronades for long guns when 
he joined the Essex. The request was refused, and 
the ship in this action had forty thirty-two-pounder 
carronades and six long twelve -pounders. The 
Phoebe had twenty-six long eighteen - pounders, one 
long twelve, and one long nine, besides eight carron- 
ades. The Essex being crippled and at anchor. Cap- 
tain Hillyar, faithful, and most properly, to his prin- 
ciple of surrendering no advantage, chose his posi- 
tion beyond effective carronade range. The battle 
was therefore fought between the six long twelves 
of the Essex and the broadside of the Phoebe, con- 
sisting of thirteen long eighteens, one twelve, and 
one nine. Taking no account of the Cherub, the dis- 
parity of force is sufficiently obvious. 

Although, from the assurances Hillyar had made 
to him in conversation, Porter had hoped that the 
neutrality of the port might be regarded, the manner 
in which the enemy's vessels approached his new an- 
chorage gave serious reason to fear an attack. The 
ship was again got ready for action, and a spring put 
on the cable to enable the guns to be turned on the 
enemy in any position he might take. The desper- 
ateness of the situation was, however, manifest to 
all. " I well remember," wrote Farragut at a later 
day, " the feelings of awe produced in me by the 
approach of the hostile ships ; even to my young 
mind it was perceptible in the faces of those around 
me, as clearly as possible, that our case was hopeless. 
It was equally apparent that all were ready to die at 
4 



42 



ADMIRAL FARRAGUT. 



their guns rather than surrender ; and such I beUeve 
to have been the determination of the crew, almost 
to a man." A crippled ship, armed with carronades, 
was indeed in a hopeless plight. At six minutes be- 
fore four in the afternoon the attack began. The 
Essex riding to an anchor with a southerly wind, the 
Cherub took position on her starboard bow, or south- 
west from her ; the Phoebe north, under her stern. 
Both British ships began fighting under sail, not 
benig yet ready to anchor. The spring on the 
Essex's cable being shot away, she was unable to 
turn her broadside as was wished ; but the Ameri- 
cans ran out of the stern-ports three of their long 
guns, which were so well served as to cut away some 
of the most important of the Phoebe's ropes and sails, 
and Hillyar for a moment feared his ship would be 
drifted out of action. The Cherub also was forced 
to leave her first position and join the Phosbe. The 
latter's damages being repaired, she regained her 
ground and anchored; both she and her consort 
placing themselves on the starboard quarter of the 
Essex, a position on which the American guns, neither 
from the stern nor the broadside, could be brought to 
bear unless by the springs on the cables. These, un- 
fortunately, were three times shot away as soon as 
they had been placed. The first lieutenant of the 
Phoebe, a frank and gallant young Englishman, 
whose manly bearing had greatly attracted the offi- 
cers of the Essex, is said to have remarked to. his 
captain that it was no better than murder to go on 
killing men from such a position of safety, and to 
have urged him to close and make a more equal fight 
of it. Hillyar, so the story goes, replied that his 
reputation was established, and that as his orders 



CRUISE OF THE ESSEX. 43 

were peremptory to capture the Essex, he was deter- 
mined to take no risks. He might have added — prob- 
ably did — that it was open to the Americans to save 
their Hves by surrendering. The same view of the 
situation now impelled Porter, finding himself unable 
to give blow for blow, to try and close with his wary 
enemy. Only one light sail was left to him in con- 
dition for setting — the flying-jib. With it, the cable 
having been cut, the head of the Essex was turned 
toward the enemy ; and, fanned along by the other 
sails hanging loose from the yards, she slowly ap- 
proached her foes till her carronades at last could 
reach. The wary Englishman then slipped his cable 
and stood away till again out of range, when he re- 
sumed the action, choosing always his own position, 
which he was well able to do from the comparatively 
manageable condition of his ship. Finding it impos- 
sible to get into action. Porter next attempted to 
run the Essex aground, where the crew could escape 
and the vessel be destroyed. She was headed for 
the beach and approached within musket-shot of it, 
when a flaw of wind from the land cruelly turned her 
away. 

The engagement had lasted nearly two hours 
when this disappointment was encountered. As a 
last resort, Porter now ordered a hawser to be made 
fast to an anchor which was still left. This was let 
go in the hope that, the Essex being held by it 
where she was, the enemy might drift out of action 
and be unable to return when the wind fell with the 
approaching sunset. The hawser, however, parted, 
and with it the last hope of escape. Great numbers 
of the crew had already been killed and wounded by 
the relentless pounding the ship had received from 



44 ADMIRAL FARRAGUT. 

her enemies, for whom, toward the end, the affair 
became little more than safe target practice, with a 
smooth sea. As yet no voice had been raised in 
favor of submission ; but now entreaty was made to 
Porter to spare the lives of the remnant that was left, 
by ceasing a resistance which had become not only 
hopeless but passive, and which, however prolonged, 
could end only in the surrender of the ship. The lat- 
ter had already been on fire several times, and was 
now alarmingly so, the flames rushing up the hatch- 
ways and being reported to be near the magazine. 
Porter then gave permission for such of the crew as 
wished, to swim ashore ; the colors being still flying, 
they were not yet prisoners of war. He next called 
his officers together to inform him as to the condition 
of the ship in the different parts where they served, 
but one only of the lieutenants was able to answer 
the summons. After consultation with him, satisfied 
that nothing more remained to be done, the order 
was given at twenty minutes past six to lower the 
flag of the Essex, after an action which had lasted 
two hours and a half. She had gone into battle with 
two hundred and fifty-five men. Of these, fifty-eight 
were killed, sixty-six wounded, and thirty-one miss- 
ing. The last item is unusually large for a naval ac- 
tion, and was probably due to the attempt to escape 
to shore by swimming. 

Farragut lacked still three months of being thir- 
teen years old when he passed through this tremen- 
dous ordeal of slaughter, the most prolonged and the 
bloodiest of his distinguished career. At his tender 
years and in his subordinate position there could be, 
of course, no demand upon the professional ability 
or the moral courage which grapples with responsi- 



CRUISE OF THE ESSEX. 



45 



bility, of which he gave such high proof in his later 
life. In the Essex fight his was but to do and dare, 
perhaps it may rather be said to do and bear ; for 
no heavier strain can be laid upon the physical cour- 
age than is required by passive endurance of a dead- 
ly attack without the power of reply. In the cele- 
brated charge of the Six Hundred at Balaklava the 
magnificent display of courage was at least aided by 
the opportunity allowed for vehement action ; the 
extreme nervous tension excited by such deadly 
danger found an outlet in the mad impetus of the 
forward rush. Farragut has himself recorded a sin- 
gular instance in the Essex fight, which illustrates the 
sufficiently well-known fact that in the excitement 
of approaching action the sense of danger is sub- 
dued, even in a man who has not the strong nerves 
that endure the passive expectation of death. " On 
one occasion Midshipman Isaacs came up to the 
captain and reported that a quarter-gunner named 
Roach had deserted his post. The only reply of the 
captain, addressed to me, was : * Do your duty, sir ! ' 
I seized a pistol and went in pursuit of the fellow, 
but did not find him. It appeared subsequently 
that when the ship was reported to be on fire he had 
contrived to get into the only boat that could be 
kept afloat, and escaped, with six others, to the shore. 
The most remarkable part of this affair was that 
Roach had always been a leading man in the ship, 
and on the occasion previously mentioned, when the 
Phoebe seemed about to run into us in the harbor of 
Valparaiso and the boarders were called away, I 
distinctly remember this man standing in an exposed 
position on the cat-head, with sleeves rolled up and 
cutlass in hand, ready to board, his countenance ex- 



46 



ADMIRAL FARRAGUT. 



pressing eagerness for the fight ; which goes to 
prove that personal courage is a very peculiar vir- 
tue." 

Of his own courage the boy, in this his first ac- 
tion, gave the most marked proof. He was con- 
stantly under the captain's eye, and conducted him- 
self so entirely to the satisfaction of that gallant 
officer as to be mentioned particularly in the dis- 
patches. " Midshipmen Isaacs, Farragut, and Ogden 
exerted themselves in the performance of their re- 
spective duties, and gave an earnest of their value to 
the service." " They are too young," Porter added, 
" to recommend for promotion " — a phrase which 
Farragut thought had an ill-effect on his career, but 
which certainly implied that his conduct merited a 
reward that his years did not justify. During the 
action he was employed in the most multifarious 
ways, realizing the saying that whatever is nobody 
else's business is a midshipman's business ; or, to use 
his own quaint expression, " I was like ' Paddy in 
the catharpins ' — a man on occasions. I performed 
the duties of captain's aid, quarter-gunner, powder- 
boy, and, in fact, did everything that was required of 
me. I shall never forget the horrid impression made 
upon me at the sight of the first man I had ever 
seen killed. He was a boatswain's mate and was 
fearfully mutilated. It staggered and sickened me 
at first ; but they soon began to fall around me so 
fast that it all appeared like a dream and produced 
no effect upon my nerves. ' I can remember well, 
while I was standing near the captain just abaft of 
the mainmast, a shot came through the waterways 
and glanced upward, killing four men who were 
standing by the side of the gun, taking the last one 



CRUISE OF THE ESSEX. 



47 



in the head and scattering his brains over both of us. 
But this awful sight did not affect me half as much 
as the death of the first poor fellow. I neither 
thought of nor noticed anything but the working of 
the guns. . . . When my services were not required 
for other purposes, I generally assisted in working a 
gun; would run and bring powder from the boys and 
send them back for more, until the captain wanted 
me to carry a message ; and this continued to em- 
ploy me during the action." 

Although included in the report of the slightly 
wounded, Farragut received no serious injury, but 
he was not without the narrow escapes which must 
have been undergone by all the survivors of so des- 
perate an action. One has just been related ; and he 
has himself recorded two other incidents which came 
near making an end of him. "An old quartermaster 
named Francis Bland was standing at the wheel when 
I saw a shot coming over the fore yard in such a di- 
rection that I thought it would strike him or me; so 
I told him to jump, at the same time pulling him to- 
ward me. At that instant the shot took off his right 
leg, and I afterward found that my coat-tail had been 
carried away. I helped the old fellow below, and 
inquired for him after the action, but he had died 
before he could be attended to." At another time 
" some gun-primers were wanted and I was sent after 
them. In going below, while I was on the ward-room 
ladder, the captain of the gun directly opposite the 
hatchway was struck full in the face by an eighteen- 
pound shot and fell back on me ; we tumbled down 
the hatch together. I struck on my head, and, fortu- 
nately, he fell on my hips. I say fortunately, for, 
as he was a man of at least two hundred pounds' 



48 ADMIRAL FARRAGUT. 

weight, I would have been crushed to death if he had 
fallen directly across my body. I lay for some mo- 
ments stunned by the blow, but soon recovered con- 
sciousness enough to rush on deck. The captain, see- 
ing me covered with blood, asked if I were wounded, 
to which I replied : ' I believe not, sir.' * Then,' 
said he, ' where are the primers ? ' This brought me 
completely to my senses, and I ran below and carried 
the primers on deck. When I came up the second 
time I saw the captain fall, and in my turn ran up 
and asked if he were wounded. He answered me al- 
most in the same words : ' I believe not, my son ; but 
I felt a blow on the top of my head.' He must have 
been knocked down by the wind of a passing shot, as 
his hat was somewhat damaged." The bruises from 
this fall down the hatch were the only injuries Farra- 
gut received. 

When the surrender was determined, Farragut, at 
the captain's order, dropped the signal book over- 
board, watching it as it sank in the water till out of 
sight ; and then in company with another midshipman 
amused himself throwing overboard the pistols and 
other small arms, to keep them out of the enemy's 
hands. The following morning he went on board 
the Phoebe, where the mortification of defeat drew 
tears from his eyes; a state of dejection from which 
he was roused by seeing a pet pig belonging to the 
Essex in the custody of one of the Phoebe's midship- 
men. Farragut at once set up a claim to the porker 
as being private property, and as such to be respect- 
ed by all civilized nations. The claim was resisted 
by the new owner ; but his messmates, always ready 
for a lark, insisted that so doubtful a question must 
be decided by trial of battle. A ring being formed, 



CRUISE OF THE ESSEX. 



49 



Farragut, after a short contest, succeeded in thrash- 
ing his opponent and regaining the pig, and with it a 
certain amount of complacency in that one Briton at 
least had felt the pangs of defeat. His grief mas- 
tered him again soon afterward, when asked by Cap- 
tain Hillyar to breakfast with himself and Captain 
Porter. Hillyar, seeing his discomfiture, spoke to 
him with great kindness, saying : " Never mind, my 
little fellow, it will be your turn next perhaps"; to 
which, says Farragut, " I replied I hoped so, and left 
the cabin to hide my emotion." 

After the action Porter and Hillyar entered into 
an arrangement by which the Essex Junior was dis- 
armed and allowed to proceed to the United States 
as a cartel, under the charge of Lieutenant Downes, 
who had commanded her while a United States cruis- 
er. All the survivors of the Essex except two, whose 
wounds did not permit, embarked in her and sailed 
from Valparaiso on the 27th of April for the United 
States, arriving on the 7th of July in New York. 
On the 5th, off the coast of Long Island, she was 
stopped by a British ship-of-war, whose captain ques- 
tioned the right of Hillyar to give her the passports 
she carried, and indicated an intention of detaining 
her. Porter construed this violation of the stipula- 
tion between himself and his captor as releasing him 
from his obligations, and escaped to shore with a 
boat's crew. After a detention of nearly twenty-four 
hours the vessel was allowed to proceed; but was 
again overhauled by another British frigate as she 
approached Sandy Hook. There could be no seri- 
ous question of detaining a ship that had been given 
a safeguard, under such circumstances and with such 
deliberation, by so experienced an officer as Hillyar. 



so 



ADMIRAL FARRAGUT. 



But it is instructive to Americans, who are accus- 
tomed to see in tliewar of 1812 only a brilliant series 
of naval victories, to note that within a few hours' sail 
of their principal port British cruisers were lying in 
perfect security, stopping whom they would. 

The Essex, upon which Farragut made his maid- 
en cruise, and whose interesting career ended in so 
sad a catastrophe, remained, of course, in the hands 
of the victors. The little frigate was patched up 
and taken to England, where she was bought into 
the British Navy, and was borne on its register until 
1837, when she was sold. After that all trace of her 
history is lost. 

The Essex Junior, being a prize to the Essex and 
allowed to pass under Hillyar's safeguard, was sold 
in New York for the benefit of the captors. 

Note. — The spelling Chile (instead of Chili) used in this 
chapter is that adopted by the United States Board on Geographic 
Names, appointed by President Harrison, September 4, 1890, to 
settle a uniform usage for the Executive Departments of the 
Government. 



CHAPTER III. 

MIDSHIPMAN TO LIEUTENANT. 
1814-1825. 

In common with the other survivors of the Essex, 
Farragut landed in the United States as a paroled 
prisoner of war. Captain Porter took him at once 
to Chester and put him again to school, this time 
to an old gentleman named Neif, who had served in 
the guards of Napoleon. The method of instruction 
practiced by him seems to have been unsystematic 
and discursive ; but Farragut, who was ever atten- 
tive to make the most of such opportunities as 
offered for self-improvement, derived profit here also, 
and said afterward that the time thus passed had 
been of service to him throughout his life. Until 
very lately there were residents of that neighbor- 
hood who could recall the young midshipman as he 
was at Neif's school ; a lad short of stature and not 
very handsome in face, but who bore himself very 
erect because, as he often declared, he could not 
afford to lose a fraction of one of his scanty inches. 
There was, and still is, near the spot where he went 
to school a tavern called the Seven Stars, which has 
been a public house since the time of the Revolution, 
and which had sheltered Howe and Cornwallis as the 
British army advanced from the head of the Chesa- 



52 ADMIRAL FARRAGUT. 

peake toward Philadelphia, in 1777. Upon its porch 
Farragut spent much of his leisure time, and within 
its walls joined in the social gayeties of the neighbor- 
ing families, who afterward recalled with pride and 
interest this association with the young sailor be- 
fore whom lay such a brilliant but unforeseen future. 
In November, 1814, Farragut was exchanged, and 
at once ordered to New York to join the brig Spark, 
which was intended to form one of a squadron of 
small vessels to cruise against British commerce un- 
der the command of Captain Porter. He was here 
for the first time separated from his guardian and 
thrown wholly upon his own force of character to 
guide his steps ; and this beginning was made with a 
set of messmates with whom he was temporarily 
quartered on board the John Adams, among whom 
were several very wild young men. Farragut evi- 
dently felt the force of the temptation, for he speaks 
with warm thankfulness of the counter-influence of 
the first lieutenant, to which he attributed much of 
his deliverance from the dissipation by which he was 
surrounded. " When I have looked back with a feel- 
ing of horror to that period of my life," he wrote, 
" I have alw^ays remembered with gratitude Mr. 
Cocke's counsels and kind-hearted forbearance." It 
was indeed characteristic of the man that, while by 
no means insensible to the natural temptations of 
youth, he was ever more attracted to and influenced 
by the good than by the evil around him. Dur- 
ing the following year, on his cruise to the Medi- 
terranean, he was messmate with a midshipman 
named William Taylor, a young man of singularly 
fine character, which seems to have been the chief 
cause of the influence he exerted upon Farragut. 



MIDSHIPMAN TO LIEUTENANT. 



53 



" He took me under his charge, counseled me kindly, 
and inspired me with sentiments of true manliness, 
which were the reverse of what I might have learned 
from the examples I saw in the steerage of the John 
Adams. Never having had any real love for dissi- 
pation, I easily got rid of the bad influences which 
had assailed me in that ship." He noted also that, 
of the twelve or thirteen midshipmen there associated 
with him, in less than two years all but one, his old 
messmate Ogden, of the Essex, had disappeared from 
the navy. The habit of strict attention to duty 
which he had contracted under the rule of the Essex 
also contributed, by keeping him occupied and at- 
tentive, to deter him from yielding to practices in- 
compatible with its due discharge. 

The conclusion of peace put an end to the pro- 
posed cruise of the Spark, and Farragut was next or- 
dered, in March, 1815, to the Independence, a seventy- 
four-gun ship, or ship-of-the-line, as such were com- 
monly called. She was the flag-ship of a numerous 
squadron, composed mostly of small vessels, destined 
to act against Algiers, with whom war had recently 
been declared. Upon arriving in the Mediterranean 
it was found that Commodore Decatur had already 
brought the Dey to terms, so that Farragut saw here 
no more fighting, and the squadron returned home 
by winter. The following spring he was ordered to 
the Washington, also a seventy-four, about to sail 
for Naples, bearing on board Mr. William Pinkney, 
our minister to that court. This cruise gave our 
young midshipman an experience of a kind he had 
not before had, and which in more ways than one 
was useful to him. The Washington was one of 
those exceptional vessels which illustrated in the 



54 



ADMIRAL FARRAGUT. 



highest degree the kind and pitch of perfection to 
which, by unremitting severity and exaction, the 
appearance and drills of a ship-of-war could be 
brought. Her commander, Captain Creighton, had 
the reputation of being the greatest martinet in the 
navy ; and being seconded by a singularly efficient 
and active set of officers, the ship was made to real- 
ize the extreme' ideal of a naval officer of that day 
in smartness, order, and spotless cleanliness.* " But," 
says Farragut, *' all this was accomplished at the 
sacrifice of the comfort of every one on board. My 
experience in the matter, instead of making me a 
proselyte to the doctrine of the old officers on this 
subject, determined me never to have ' a crack ship* 
if it was only to be attained by such means." His 
feeling on the matter was doubtless somewhat quick- 
ened by the personal discomfort which he, in common 
with all subordinates, underwent under such a sys- 
tem, although he was rather a favorite with the cap- 
tain, whose aid he was ; but it shows independence 
of character to have thought so clearly for himself 
at such an age, and to have ventured to differ from 
standards which were then, and for a long time after- 
ward, implicitly accepted throughout the service. 
The tradition of those days, being mainly oral, has 
nearly disappeared ; but fragments of it remain here 

* The writer remembers to have heard in his early days in the 
service a tradition of a ship commanded by Creighton, which he 
believes to have been the Washington, and which illustrates the 
methods by which this extreme smartness was obtained. In each 
boat at the booms was constantly a midshipman in full dress, 
cocked hat included, so that no time might be lost in dropping 
alongside when called away. The full crew was probably also 
kept in her. 



MIDSHIPMAN TO LIEUTENANT. 



55 



and there in the minds of those who, as youngsters 
thirty or forty years ago, were brought in contact 
with men, then already elderly, who had had person- 
al experience of ships like the Washington. These 
stories, in their grotesque severities, have almost the 
air of an extravaganza. It must, however, be in 
justice remembered that they were the extrava- 
gances of a few among the men who had brought 
the United States Navy to the high efficiency in 
which it then was ; and to whom, and not to either 
the people or the Government of that day, was due 
the glorious record of 1812. A few of them added 
to their military ardor and efficiency an undue 
amount of that spirit of the good housekeeper which 
makes a home unbearable. Farragut was aided to 
his wise conclusion by his previous experience in the 
Essex, where a high state of efficiency was gained 
without wanton sacrifice of comfort ; for Porter, 
though a man of hasty temper, was ever considerate 
of his crew. But for the naval officers of that day 
Farragut throughout his life retained a profound ad- 
miration. Talking about them at his dinner-table 
in New Orleans fifty years later, but a few days be- 
fore his famous passage of the Mobile forts, he said : 
"We have no better seamen in the service to-day 
than those gallant fellows Bainbridge, Decatur, 
Hull, Perry, Porter, and Charles Stewart ; and," he 
added, " I must not forget to mention McDonough, 
and poor unlucky Lawrence, as splendid-looking a 
sailor as I ever saw. If I only had their chance and 
could lay the Hartford alongside of an English ship, 
I should like it better than fighting our own people." 
Some years later he again expressed the same feelings 
to the same friend, to whom the author is indebted 



56 



ADMIRAL FARRAGUT. 



for the communication of them. His own glorious 
career was then finished, and his Ufe's work lay open 
to the mature reflection of his declining years, when 
he thus acknowledged his obligations to the heroes 
of his boyhood. "Isaac Hull," he said, " was as good 
a seaman as ever sailed a ship. If I have done the 
country any service afloat, it is in no small degree 
owing to the ambition and enthusiasm he created in 
me, when I was a youngster, by his fair fight with 
and capture of an English frigate. I always envied 
Hull that piece of good work." It is to be suspected 
that the Admiral always felt that something was 
lacking to the fullness of his cup, in that he had 
only been allowed to fight forts, and not ships like 
his own ; and it is no small evidence of the gener- 
osity of his character that his enthusiasm was so 
aroused by the deeds of others. He spoke of the 
fight between the Kearsarge and the Alabama in as 
glowing terms as were aroused by his recollection 
of the Constitution and the Guerriere. " I had 
sooner have fought that fight," he wrote, " than any 
ever fought upon the ocean." 

The Washington stopped a few days at Gibraltar, 
where the rest of the squadron were then at anchor ; 
and then sailed with all of them in company to Na- 
ples. During the remainder of the year 1816 the 
ship cruised along the Barbary coast until the win- 
ter had fairly set in, when she with the other vessels 
repaired to Port Mahon. Although now so close to 
the spot where his race originated, Farragut's jour- 
nal betrays no interest in the fact. He was still too 
young for the sentimental considerations to weigh 
much in his mind ; and it was not till many years 
later, in the height of his glory as a naval com- 



MIDSHIPMAN TO LIEUTENANT. 



57 



mander, that he visited his father's birthplace, 
Ciudadela, the capital city of Minorca. In the fol- 
lowing spring the squadron resumed its cruising 
and made quite a round of the Mediterranean west 
of Italy; the journal mentioning visits to Gibraltar, 
Malaga, Leghorn, Naples, Sicily, and the cities on 
the Barbary coast. Farragut made full and intelli- 
gent use of the opportunities thus afforded him for 
seeing the world; and his assiduous habit of obser- 
vation did much to store his mind with information, 
which the circumstances of his early life had pre- 
vented his gaining in the ordinary ways of school 
and reading. He was fortunate also at this time in 
having the society of an intelligent and cultivated 
man, the chaplain of the Washington, Mr. Charles 
Folsom. The chaplain in those days was commonly 
the only schoolmaster the midshipmen had ; and 
their opportunities of learning from him depended 
very much upon the pressure exercised by the cap- 
tain to compel the attention of a set of boys. Mr. 
Folsom, however, was drawn to Farragut by the 
eager willingness of the latter to acquire, and by 
his sense of his deficiencies. The manly character 
which had resisted the temptations to low dissipation, 
and sought naturally the companionship of the bet- 
ter rather than the worse among his associates, also 
attracted him. The friendship thus formed became, 
through a series of incidents, the cause of an un- 
usual opportunity for improvement being offered to 
Farragut. In the autumn of 1817 Mr. Folsom re- 
ceived the appointment of consul to Tunis, which 
had just been vacated. The summer cruising of 
the squadron was drawing to an end, and the winter 
quarters at Port Mahon about to be resumed. There- 



5B ADMIRAL FARRAGUT. 

fore, while the Washington was lying in Gibraltar, 
Mr. Folsom wrote to the commander-in-chief, Com- 
modore Chauncey, asking permission to take the 
young midshipman to spend the winter with him in 
Tunis, to pursue his education under his care. In 
the letter he spoke very earnestly of his pupil's zeal 
for improvement, of his close attention, and ready 
response to ahy effort on the part of his instructor. 
The letter is interesting also in its recognition of 
Farragut's still existing relations to Captain Porter, 
" to whose wishes this request can not be repugnant." 
The letter was dated October 14, 1817; and, the re- 
quired permission being given, the two friends in 
the following month sailed from Gibraltar for Mar- 
seille as passengers in the sloop-of-war Erie. At 
Marseille a slight incident occurred which, while not 
quite creditable to our hero, may have interest as 
showing natural character. Spending the evening 
at the house of a Mr. Fitch, he was, much against his 
will, obliged to play whist, for which he had no fond- 
ness. " Not getting along very well with my hand, 
the party showed great impatience, and I thought 
were rather insulting in their remarks. One individ- 
ual went so far as to dash his cards on the table in 
derision of my play, when I. returned the compli- 
ment by throwing them at his head. I apologized 
to Mr. Fitch and retired, much mortified, but my 
temper had been sorely tried." The display of tem- 
per was scarcely more than the provocation justified; 
and it is noteworthy that during a period when duel- 
ing was so common Farragut, though quick to re- 
sent, appears never to have been involved in a seri- 
ous personal difficulty. 

Early in 1818 the Erie, carrying Mr. Folsom and 



MIDSHIPMAN TO LIEUTENANT. 



59 



his pupil, arrived in Tunis, where the latter re- 
mained for nine months, pursuing his studies on the 
site of the ancient maritime empire of Carthage, He 
mentions particularly the subjects of mathematics, 
English literature, French, and Italian. For lan- 
guages he had great natural aptitude, and in later 
life was able to converse in several. The monotony 
of study was varied by the society of the few but 
agreeable foreign families residing in Tunis, and by 
occasional excursions in the neighborhood ; when 
the interest of the present was happily blended, 
under the guidance of such a man as Mr. Folsom, 
with thoughts upon the past grandeur and history of 
the Carthaginian empire and the Roman province 
which had successively flourished on that soil. In 
one of these excursions Farragut received a partial 
stroke of the sun, from the effects of which he suf- 
fered for many years. 

The period of his stay in Tunis exceeded the 
original intention, but doubtless with the approval 
of the commodore. It was brought to a close in the 
fall of 1818 by an outbreak of the plague, which 
increased to such an alarming extent that Mr. Fol- 
som felt compelled to send his charge away just 
when the approach of another winter of comparative 
idleness for the squadron would have justified a longer 
stay. But deaths in Tunis had risen to a hundred a 
day, and all the families were living in a state of 
complete isolation, the houses being barricaded 
against outsiders ; therefore on the 9th of October 
Farragut departed in a Genoese brig for Leghorn. 
Thence, after a quarantine of forty days, he went to 
Pisa ; and from there to Messina, where the squad- 
ron had assembled for the winter of iSiS-'ip. 



6o admirtCl farragut 

The friendship between Farragut and Mr. Folsom 
did not end with this separation. The latter sur- 
vived to the end of the civil war, and was thus privi- 
leged to follow the successful and great career of 
the admiral to whom, while yet an unformed boy-, he 
had thoughtfully extended a helping hand. As late 
as 1865 letters passed between the two, showing that 
both cherished warm recollections of that early 
association ; Mr. Folsom dating his, as though care- 
ful to make the coincidence, on the anniversary of 
the day when he parted with his pupil in the harbor 
of Tunis and returned alone to the plague-stricken 
city. 

The officers of the United States squadron passed 
a gay winter in Messina in 1819. Farragut was not 
yet eighteen years of age, but his bodily develop- 
ment had kept pace with his mental, and he writes 
that he always held his own at this time in all ath- 
letic exercises. The succeeding spring and summer 
were again spent in routine cruising on board the 
Franklin, seventy-four, which had taken the place of 
the Washington. In the fall of 1819 the squadron 
was in Gibraltar ; and there, " after much opposition," 
Farragut was appointed an acting lieutenant on 
board the brig Shark. This promotion, coming at 
so early an age, he afterward looked upon as one of 
the most important events of his life. " It caused 
me to feel that I was now associated with men, on 
an equality, and must act with more circumspection. 
When I became first lieutenant, my duties were still 
more important, for in truth I was really commander 
of the vessel, and yet I was not responsible (as such) 
— an anomalous position which has spoiled some of 
our best officers. I consider it a great advantage to 



MIDSHIPMAN TO LIEUTENANT. Cl 

obtain command young, having observed, as a general 
rule, that persons who come into authority late in life 
shrink from responsibility, and often break down un- 
der its weight." This last sentence, coming from a 
man of such extensive observation, and who bore in 
his day the responsibility of such weighty decisions, 
deserves most serious consideration now, when com- 
mand rank is reached so very late in the United 
States Navy. 

After a short year in the Shark Farragut was 
ordered to return to the United States, to pass the 
examination required of all midshipmen before they 
could be confirmed to the rank of lieutenant. No 
opportunity offering for passage in a ship-of-war, he 
embarked in a merchant vessel called the America. 
On the passage he found himself, with the ship, con- 
fronted by an apparent danger, which occasioned a 
display of the fearlessness and energy always latent 
in his character. Those were days when piracy was 
rife upon the seas in the neighborhood of the West 
Indies and of the Spanish Main. The system was an 
outgrowth of the privateering carried on by French 
and Spanish marauders, for they were little better, 
against both British and neutral commerce during 
the wars of the French Revolution and Empire ; and 
it had received a fresh impulse from the quarrel then 
existing between Spain and her American colonies, 
which since 1810 had been in revolt against the 
mother country. Privateering, having booty as its 
sole motive, rapidly tends to indiscriminate robbery, 
if not held strictly responsible by the country using 
it; and the remote, extensive, and secluded shores 
of Cuba, Haiti, and the South American coast defied 
the careless supervision of the weak Spanish Govern- 



C2 ADMIRAL FARRAGUT. 

ment. When within a few days' sail of the United 
States, the America fell in with an armed brig showing 
the colors of the new Colombian republic ; but a flag 
was little guarantee for the character of a vessel if 
other signs told against her. Farragut describes both 
captain and crew of the America as being so over- 
whelmed with fear that, though expecting no mercy, 
they entertained no idea of resistance. Under the 
circumstances he took command ; and having, fortu- 
nately, as passengers two seamen from the squadron 
going home sick, these formed a nucleus around 
which rallied the courage of the others, paralyzed 
only through disuse. It was, however, the firmness 
of the lad of eighteen, supported by his position as 
an officer and acting upon the two men prepared to 
recognize him as such, that redeemed the others from 
imbecility to manhood. The incident had no results, 
the stranger proving to be a regularly commissioned 
cruiser, and treating them with civility. Farragut's 
thoughtful, not to say philosophical, turn of mind 
was shown in his recorded reflections upon the dif- 
ference between the conduct of the man-of-war's men 
and the merchant seamen, which he justly attributed 
not to inherent difference of natural courage, but to 
the habit of arms and of contemplating danger under 
a particular form. 

On the 2oth of November, 1820, Farragut again 
landed in the United States, having been absent four 
years and a half. He felt himself a stranger, having 
left as a mere boy, and knowing no one but Commo- 
dore Porter and his family. His examination soon 
followed, and was passed; but apparently not quite 
to his own satisfaction. A period of comparative 
quiet followed, spent principally in Norfolk, Virginia, 



MIDSHIPMAN TO LIEUTENANT. 



63 



during which he formed the attachment which re- 
sulted in his first marriage. In May, 1822, he was 
again ordered to sea in the sloop-of-war John Adams, 
in which he made a short cruise in the Gulf of Mex- 
ico and to Vera Cruz, where the Spanish power in 
Mexico was then making its last stand in the well- 
known fortress, San Juan de Ulloa. The ship re- 
turned to the United States early in December, 1822, 
when Farragut found the Mosquito fleet, as it was 
called, fitting out against the pirates of the Caribbean 
Sea. Learning that it was to be commanded by his 
old captain. Commodore David Porter, he asked for 
and obtained orders to the Greyhound, one of the 
small vessels composing it, commanded by Lieuten- 
ant John Porter, a brother of the commodore. 

Since the peace with Great Britain, Captain Por- 
ter had been a member of the Board of Navy Com- 
missioners; a body of three officers appointed by an 
act of Congress passed early in 1815, whose duties 
were to administer the affairs of the navy under the 
supervision of the Secretary. Meanwhile the suffer- 
ings, not only of American property but of the per- 
sons of American citizens, from the prevalence of 
piracy in the Caribbean Sea, had become unendura- 
ble. Ordinary naval vessels were, from their size, 
unable to enforce a repression for which it was 
necessary to follow the freebooters and their petty 
craft into their lairs among the lagoons and creeks 
of the West India islands. The general outcry 
rousing the Government to the necessity of further 
exertion, Captain Porter offered his services to extir- 
pate the nuisance; with the understanding that he 
was to have and fit out the kind of force he thought 
necessary for the service. He resigned his position 



64 ADMIRAL FARRAGUT. 

on the board on the 31st of December, 1822 ; but 
before that date he had bought and begun to equip 
eight Chesapeake schooners, of fifty to sixty tons 
burden, of which the Greyhound, Farragut's new 
vessel, was one. He also built five rowing barges, 
unusually large, pulling twenty oars With these, 
supported by the ordinary man-of-war schooners, of 
which several were already in the service, and by 
the sloops-of-war, he expected to drive the pirates 
not merely off the sea, but out of their hiding- 
places. 

The commodore put to sea with all his squadron 
on the 14th of February, 1823. A northeast gale was 
at once encountered, but the tiny vessels ran through 
it without any harm. For the next six months Farra- 
gut was actively employed in the operations of the 
little fleet, the Greyhound being one of the five 
which were sent through the Mona Passage, between 
Porto Rico and Haiti, and thence ransacked the 
southern shores of the latter island and of Cuba as 
far as Cape San Antonio, where Cuba ends. There 
were many encounters between the pirates and the 
squadron, sometimes afloat, sometimes ashore, in 
several of which our officer served, forcing his way 
with his party through marsh and chaparral and 
cactus — a service often perilous, always painful and 
exhausting. His health fortunately held out through 
it ; nor did he take the yellow fever, which, as the 
summer wore on, made sad havoc among both offi- 
cers and men. Toward the end of his time he ob- 
tained the command of one of the Mosquito schoon- 
ers, which, however, he held but for a short period ; 
for, not having yet received his lieutenant's commis- 
sion, he was relieved by the arrival of an officer of 



MIDSHIPMAN TO LIEUTENANT. gc 

that rank. An interesting incident of this cruise was 
a meeting with his brother William, then already a 
lieutenant, whom he had not seen for thirteen years. 
Soon after that he obtained permission to visit New 
Orleans ; and it is a curious coincidence that the 
vessel in which he took passage thither was carrying 
the first load of bricks to build Fort Jackson, one of 
the defenses of New Orleans, by the passage of 
which nearly forty years later he began his career as 
commander-in-chief. His father had then been many 
years dead ; but he met his sister, with whom he had 
to make acquaintance after so long a separation. 

The service of the Mosquito fleet was one of 
great exposure and privation. " I never owned a 
bed during my two years and a half in the West 
Indies," wrote Farragut, " but lay down to rest 
wherever I found the most comfortable berth." It 
was, however, effectual, both directly and indirectly, 
to the suppression of piracy ; seconded as it was by 
the navy of Great Britain, interested like our own 
country in the security of commerce. Driven off the 
water, with their lurking-places invaded, their plun- 
der seized, their vessels burned, their occupation 
afloat gone, the marauders organized themselves 
into bandits, and turned their predatory practices 
against the towns and villages. This roused the 
Spanish governors from the indolent complacency 
with which they had watched robberies upon for- 
eigners that brought profit rather than loss to their 
districts. When the evil was thus brought home, 
the troops were put in motion ; and the pirates, 
beset on both sides, gradually but rapidly disap- 
peared. 

This Mosquito war had, however, one very sad 



^S ADMIRAL FARRAGUT. 



result in depriving the navy of the eminent services 
of Commodore Porter. In 1824 a gratuitous insult, 
accompanied by outrage, offered to one of his offi- 
cers, led him to land a party at the town of Foxardo, 
in Porto Rico, and force an apology from the guilty 
officials. Although no complaint seems to have 
been made by Spain, the United States Government 
took exception to his action and brought him to 
trial by court-martial. Porter confidently expected 
an acquittal, having proof that the outrage was 
wanton, and that the officials had engaged in it to 
protect some piratical plunder which had been taken 
into the place. He argued also that the wording of 
his orders from the department authorized his ac- 
tion. The court, however, found him guilty of an 
offense which was charged as " disobedience of or- 
ders, and conduct unbecoming an officer," and sen- 
tenced him to six months' suspension. The sentence 
was accompanied by the expression that the court 
" ascribes the conduct of the accused which is deemed 
censurable to an anxious disposition, on his part, to 
maintain the honor and advance the interest of the 
nation and of the service." Indignant at the result. 
Porter resigned from the navy and took service with 
the Mexican Republic. After spending there four 
years of harassing disappointments, the election of 
General Jackson to the presidency gave him a friend 
in power. He returned to the United States in Oc- 
tober, 1829, under the encouragement of letters from 
persons closely connected with the new administra- 
tion. The President offered to nominate him to his 
old position in the navy, but Porter declined " to 
associate with the men who sentenced me for up- 
holding the honor of the flag." This, striking a 



1 



MIDSHIPMAN TO LIEUTENANT. 



6J 



kindred chord in Jackson's breast, elicited a warm 
note of approval, and he appointed the commo- 
dore Consul-General to Algiers. The conquest of 
that country by France put an end to the office 
before he could assume the duties. The Presi- 
dent then nominated him to be Charge d'Affaires 
to Turkey. He went there in August, 1831, be- 
came Minister Resident in 1839, and died in this 
post in 1843. 

After his return from the Mosquito fleet, Farra- 
gut married, on the 24th of September, 1823, Miss 
Susan C. Marchant, the daughter of a gentleman of 
Norfolk, Virginia. He was at this time far from 
well ; fever, which spared him while on that sickly 
service, having seized him upon arrival in a healthier 
climate. It was probably due in part to this that 
two years passed after his marriage before he again 
joined a ship. During this period he spent some 
weeks with his bride in the house of Commodore 
Porter, who had returned temporarily from his squad- 
ron to regain his strength after a severe attack of 
yellow fever. This was probably his last close per- 
sonal association with his early benefactor, whom 
the issue of the trial afterward separated from his 
country; but the correspondence between the two 
continued through life, Farragut maintaining to the 
last a grateful recollection of kindness shown to him 
by one whom he termed his "most venerated friend 
and commander." As late as 1835, waiting from Con- 
stantinople in reply to a letter received from his for- 
mer ward, Porter, then an ailing and broken man, 
notices this trait in him : " I have found in yours that 
treasure of a grateful heart which should be so much 
prized. I have never looked for any other return 



68 ADMIRAL FARRAGUT. 

than what my feelings gave me, and to find such sen- 
timents of gratitude from you, after all others had 
forgotten that they had received any benefits from 
me, is truly refreshing to the feelings." The rela- 
tions thus testified to are an honor to the memory 
of both. 



CHAPTER IV. 

LIEUTENANT. 
1825-184I. 

After the termination of his cruise in the Mos- 
quito fleet, and up to the beginning of the Civil War, 
the story of Farragut's life is for the most part but 
the record of the routine service of a naval officer 
in times of peace — periods of distant foreign cruising 
succeeding to, and being again succeeded by, periods 
of employment on shore in some of the many duties 
connected with the administration of the navy. But 
while in their superficial aspect there is little to dis- 
tinguish these monotonous years, with their occa- 
sional breaks of exceptional incident, from the or- 
dinary experiences of all naval officers, the journal 
of Farragut shows an activity of mind, a constant 
habit of observation, especially in professional mat- 
ters, and a painstaking diligence in embracing every 
passing opportunity for improvement, which reveal 
to some extent the causes of his subsequent great 
successes. It is not indeed always possible to trace 
the precise connection between this or that observa- 
tion, this or that course of study, and the later re- 
sults ; it is rather in the constant habit of doing the 
best at every moment, and in the gradual formation 
of mental character and correct professional knowl- 



70 



ADMIRAL FARRAGUT. 



edge, that are to be found the fruits of the strenuous 
exertion made throughout his life by Admiral Farra- 
gut. It is a noteworthy, though by no means un- 
precedented, circumstance that these characteristics 
obtained little or no recognition during his early and 
middle career. Unlike the great British admiral, 
Nelson, no war occurred to bring his high qualities 
into notice; and, when lacking but a year of Nel- 
son's age when he fell at Trafalgar, Farragut was 
vainly petitioning the Navy Department for the 
command of a sloop-of-war in the war with Mexico, 
although he alleged his intimate knowledge of the 
scene of operations, the close personal examination 
he had made of it, and the privilege he had had of 
witnessing an attack by a French squadron but a 
few years before. 

The early age at which he had left his home, the 
long absences of his youth, and the death of his fa- 
ther, had all contributed to sever his associations 
with New Orleans ; so that his marriage in Norfolk, 
as was the case with so many officers of his day, fixed 
that city as his place of residence when not at sea. 
It is worthy of remembrance, in connection with his 
firm determination at a later day to stand by the 
Union rather than by a section of the country, that 
the only home Farragut had known out of a ship-of- 
war was the Southern city where he had twice mar- 
ried, and where the general sentiment was contrary 
to the course he took. The interest of the fact lies not 
in its bearing upon the rights or wrongs of the great 
quarrel that all are now fain to forget, but in showing 
the rare strength of character which, sustained only 
by its own clear convictions, resisted the social and 
friendly influences that overcame so many others. 



LIEUTENANT. 



71 



In August, 1825, Farragut was promoted to be 
lieutenant, and at the same time ordered to the frig- 
ate Brandywine, chosen to carry back to France La- 
fayette, who was just drawing to a close his mem- 
orable visit to the United States. The ship sailed 
from the capes of the Chesapeake in September, 
reaching Havre after a passage of twenty-five days. 
From there she went to England, and thence to the 
Mediterranean, returning to New York in May, 1826. 
After his arrival Farragut was detached and went to 
New Haven with his wife, who had become a great 
sufferer from neuralgia and continued to be an in- 
valid during the remainder of their married life. 
While living in New Haven he availed himself of 
the opportunity to attend lectures at Yale College. 
After his wife's treatment was finished they returned 
to Norfolk, where he remained until October, 1828, 
attached to the receiving ship and living on board 
with Mrs. Farragut. Here the interest which he 
had showed in the improvement of his own mind was 
transferred to the ship's boys, most of whom did 
not even know their letters. Farragut organized a 
school for these waifs, who at that time were little 
accustomed to receive such care, and was gratified to 
find very tangible results in the improvement shown 
by them. He next received orders to the sloop-of-war 
Vandalia, which sailed from Philadelphia in the last 
days of 1828 for the Brazil station. On this cruise, 
which for him lasted but a year, he for the first time 
visited the Rio de la Plata and Buenos Ayres, and 
came in contact with the afterward celebrated dicta- 
tor of that country, Rosas. The different provinces, 
whose union is now known by the political name of 
the Argentine Republic, had, under the later days of 



72 



ADMIRAL FARRAGUT. 



Spanish rule, constituted with Bolivia, Paraguay and 
Uruguay the Viceroyalty of Buenos Ayres. On the 
25th of May, 1810, a declaration of independence 
was issued in the city of Buenos Ayres. A long pe- 
riod of disturbance, internal and external, followed. 
At the time of this first visit of Farragut a contest 
had for some time been going on between two par- 
ties, representing two opposite political ideas, and 
striving in arms for the control of the State. The 
ideal of one was a strong centralized government 
supported by a powerful standing army. This natu- 
rally found its most numerous constituents among 
the wealthy and educated inhabitants of the princi- 
pal city, Buenos Ayres. The province of the same 
name, however, and the other provinces generally, 
favored a looser form of confederation. The former 
party, known as the Unitarios, held a brief lease of 
power ; but their opponents found an able leader in 
Juan Manuel de Rosas, who personified the best and 
worst features of the gaucho of the pampas and ob- 
tained unbounded popularity and following among 
those wild herdsmen. In 1828 Rosas and his allies 
forced the Unitarian president to resign, and installed 
one of themselves, named Dorrego, as governor of 
Buenos Ayres. This success was but one step in the 
series of bloody struggles which ended in the estab- 
lishment of the dictator ; but it marked the point at 
which Farragut first saw Buenos Ayres and Rosas 
himself, with whom he was at a later date thrown in 
intimate contact and who at that moment was in the 
full flush of his early popularity. 

In December, 1829, Farragut's eyes were in such 
bad condition that it was found necessary to send 
him home. He arrived in February, 1830, and re- 



LIEUTENANT. 



n 



mained in Norfolk for a period of nearly three years, 
broken only by occasional absences. During a part 
of this time he was again attached to the receiving 
ship in the port ; and, as before, manifested an inter- 
est, unusual in those days, in those under his com- 
mand. One of these, then a midshipman, writer to 
the author that he still recalls, after the lapse of 
nearly sixty years, the kindness, consideration and 
hospitality shown him by the future admiral, who 
was then known through the service as the " Little 
Luff " Farragut — luff being a naval abbreviation, now 
obsolete, for lieutenant. But with all his kindness 
there was no relaxation in the enforcement of neces- 
sary duty. In December, 1832, he was again ordered 
to sea in the sloop-of-war Natchez, as her first lieu- 
tenant ; or, as the expression now is, as executive 
officer. It was the time of the nullification troubles 
in South Carolina, and the ship was first sent to an- 
chor near Charleston, where she would be prepared 
to support the authority of the United States Gov- 
ernment. Fortunately, no occasion arose for her to 
act ; and a stay which began with taking precautions 
against possible fire-ships from the city, ended in a 
series of balls and general exchanges of courtesy be- 
tween the officers and the citizens. In April, 1833, 
the Natchez returned to Hampton Roads ; and the 
following month sailed, carrying Farragut back again 
to the Brazils. On the 30th of July he was again at 
anchor, in his new ship, off Buenos Ayres. Since his 
former visit the country had passed through much 
trouble. A confederation had been formed between 
the principal provinces, in January, 1831, based upon 
the loosest ties of union ; but the army had become 
dissatisfied with the progress of changes which arose 
6 



74 ADMIRAL FARRAGUT. 



largely from jealousy of the military power, and had 
risen in revolt under the leadership of a general 
named Lavalle, who for a time had sided with Rosas. 
He met at first with success, defeated Dorrego and 
Rosas, and put the former to death ; but Rosas ral- 
lied again, defeated Lavalle, and became in his place 
head of the army and governor of Buenos Ayres. 
To this position he was re-elected in 1832, and by 
virtue of it he was, at the time of Farragut's second 
visit, in chief control of the external policy and in- 
ternal affairs of the confederation ; the principal 
and seaboard province inevitably taking the lead 
and representing the country under even the loosest 
form of combination. Disturbed though the internal 
state of affairs was, Rosas's strong hand appears to 
have so far preserved the safety of foreigners as to 
give no cause for the interference of their ships-of- 
war. Farragut's stay on the station was, however, 
again cut short. The schooner Boxer arrived in 
Rio Janeiro on her way home from the East Indies; 
and it becoming necessary to give her a new com- 
manding officer, he received orders to take her to 
the United States. He sailed in her on the 8th of 
June, 1834, and on the 25th of July reached Norfolk, 
where the vessel was put out of commission and he 
again returned to his family. A period of nearly 
four years of shore duty followed. During the latter 
two of these Farragut was a constant applicant for 
sea service, which he could not obtain. His wife 
was at this time becoming ever weaker and weaker. 
"I was necessarily confined very much to the house," 
he writes, " for my wife was so helpless I was obliged 
to lift her and carry her about like a child." His 
tender and untiring devotion to the suffering invalid 



1 

a I' 



LIEUTENANT. 



75 



was no less consprcuous than his careful attention 
to the other duties of life, and was the constant re- 
mark of those who were witnesses of this sorrowful 
period. 

In April, 1838, Farragut was again ordered to sea 
in the home squadron, and in the following August, 
though still only a lieutenant, took command, in Pen- 
sacola, of the sloop-of-war Erie; a position that could 
only be temporary, because belonging naturally to 
an officer of higher rank. It fell to him, however, 
at a period of peculiar interest — when France be- 
came involved with Mexico in one of those brief 
hostilities by which alone were broken the long 
years of peace between Waterloo and the Crimean 
War. The quarrel between the two was simply as to 
the reparation due to French subjects for injuries 
received during the long years of confusion through 
which Mexico then had been and still was passing. 
As a political question it possesses no present inter- 
est whatever ; but to a naval officer of Farragut's 
strong professional feeling and close habits of ob- 
servation it offered a peculiar opportunity for noting 
the silent progress made during the long peace by the 
material of war among the navies of Europe, where 
the necessity of constant preparation insures an ad- 
vance in which the United States then, as now, tended 
to lag behind. It supplied also a test, under certain 
conditions, of the much-vexed question of the power 
of ships against forts ; for the French squadron, 
though few in numbers, deliberately undertook to 
batter by horizontal fire, as well as to bombard, in 
the more correct sense of the word, with the vertical 
fire of mortars, the long renowned castle of San 
Juan de Ulloa, the chief defense of Vera Cruz. It 



76 



ADMIRAL FARRAGUT. 



was still the day of sailing-ships, both of war and of 
commerce. But a few years had elapsed since a man 
of considerable scientific attainment had pronounced 
the crossing of the Atlantic to be impossible to ves- 
sels depending upon steam power alone; and only in 
the same year as the French attack on Vera Cruz 
(1838) had been seen the falsification of the prediction 
by the passage of the Sirius and Great Western from 
England to New York. 

As a first means of compulsion, the French Gov- 
ernment had in 1837 established a blockade of the 
Atlantic ports of Mexico. In two months the Mexi- 
can treasury lost two million dollars in duties, which 
would have been collected if the ships turned away 
had been permitted to enter ; but the Government 
and people seemed little moved by a result that 
merely added one more to the many ills with which 
they were already afflicted. The question was then 
raised by the French authorities, diplomatic and 
military, whether the possession of the fortress of 
San Juan de UUoa, which commanded the city of 
Vera Cruz, the most important of the coast ports, 
would not also confer control of a great part of the 
seaboard, and thus enforce a security not otherwise 
obtainable for the persons and property of French 
subjects. Blockade, though a less extreme measure, 
was difficult, protracted, and productive of serious 
loss. The violent northerly gales of winter exposed 
the ships to peril, and the yellow fever of the sum- 
mer months was deadly to the crews. Moreover, the 
deprivation of commerce, though a bitter evil to a 
settled community whose members were accustomed 
to the wealth, luxury, and quiet life attendant upon 
uninterrupted mercantile pursuits, had been proved 



LIEUTENANT. 



n 



ineffective when applied to a people to whom quiet 
and luxuries were the unrealized words of a dream. 
The French Government speedily determined to aban- 
don the half-measure for one of more certain results; 
and in October, 1838, began to arrive the ships of an 
expedition destined to proceed to open hostilities, 
under the command of Admiral Baudin, a veteran of 
the Napoleonic wars. Appointed in the navy in 1799, 
immediately after the return from Egypt and the es- 
tablishment of the Consulate, by the direct interven- 
tion of Bonaparte, who was a friend of his father's, 
Baudin had served with distinction until the fall 
of the empire, losing his right arm in battle ; and 
after Waterloo it was he who made the proposition, 
familiar to all readers of Napoleon's life, to cover 
the escape of the Emperor from Rochefort by sacri- 
ficing the ships under his command in an heroic re- 
sistance to the English cruisers while the vessel 
bearing the fallen monarch escaped. " Sixteen years 
ago," said he, " my father died of joy upon learning 
the return from Egypt of General Bonaparte ; and I 
myself to-day would die of grief to see the Emperor 
leave France if I thought that by remaining he could 
again do aught for her. But he must leave her only 
to live honored in a free country, not to die a prison- 
er to our rivals." Such was that career, belonging to 
an early and singular generation, which here for a 
moment crossed and linked with that of the great 
naval hero of our own days. Farragut has recorded 
his impression of him. "Admiral Baudin," he writes, 
" would be undoubtedly a ra?'a avis in any navy. He 
is about fifty years of age (he was fifty-four), has 
lost his right arm, looks like a North of Europe man, 
has a fine address, and speaks English well. He has 



7^ 



ADMIRAL FARRAGUT. 



every mark of a polished seaman and officer, with 
the expression of great decision, with firmness and 
activity to execute his well-digested plans. These 
were my remarks the first time I saw him, and his 
subsequent conduct soon proved I was right." His 
French biographer makes a remark, commonplace 
enough, which yet notes the essential difference in 
the lot of the two gallant men who thus casually met. 
" For the few who allow occasions to escape them, 
how many could justly complain that a chance has 
never been offered them ? Admiral Baudin never had 
the opportunity to which his capacities suited him; 
all his aptitudes designated him for war on a great 
scale ; a man such as he, succeeding Latouche-Tre- 
ville, would have saved us the sorrows of Trafalgar." 
Farragut was fortunate, for in him the opportunity 
and the man met in happy combination. 

When he reached his station. Admiral Baudin 
suffered no time to be lost. The wintry gales were 
approaching, while, on the other hand, his first ex- 
perience showed the miseries of disease on that sickly 
coast. Of the two frigates there before he came, 
which had been blockading during the summer, one 
had buried forty-five seamen and five officers out of 
a ship's company of four hundred men ; the other, at 
the time of his arrival, had three hundred and forty- 
three sick among a crew of five hundred. With such 
conditions, trifling is out of place. An ultimatum 
was at once sent to the Mexican Government, a brief 
time only being allowed for a reply, because the 
claims of the French cabinet were already clearly 
understood. On the 25th of November the last of his 
squadron, two bomb-vessels, arrived. On the 21st he 
had given notice that he would wait till noon of the 



LIEUTENANT. 



79 



27th for the final decision. On the 28th the attack 
was made. 

The castle of San Juan de Ulloa lies half a mile 
east and to seaward of the city of Vera Cruz, which 
it commands, and from which it is separated by wa- 
ter averaging from fifteen to twenty feet deep. It 
is built on the inner extremity of a reef that extends 
from it a little over a mile to the eastward, in the 
general prolongation of the line connecting the castle 
and the town. This shoal being covered by a foot 
or two of water, the builders of the fort counted 
upon it for protection in that direction against ships, 
and against attack either by regular approaches or 
by escalade. The work itself was in general outline a 
parallelogram, with bastions at the four angles. The 
longer sides fronted the east and west ; and of these 
the former, facing the shoal and the open gulf, con- 
tained the gate of the fortress and was covered by a 
demi-lune and line of water batteries. There were 
mounted in the castle and dependent works, at the 
time of the French attacks, one hundred and eighty- 
six cannon. The strength of the fortifications, the 
number of the guns, and the character of the surround- 
ings, had all contributed to bestow upon San Juan de 
Ulloa the reputation of being the strongest position 
in Spanish America, It was, indeed, considered im- 
pregnable to naval attack, for the best hope of ships 
under such circumstances is to approach closely and 
drive the defenders from their guns by the superior 
number and weight of the pieces opposed to them ; 
but in San Juan this was forbidden by the extent and 
formation of the reef. Like most coral banks, this 
rises sheer from the bottom, making the approach 
very dangerous to vessels dependent only upon sail- 



8o ADMIRAL FARRAGUT. 

power ; and the ground about it, though not too deep 
for anchorage, is rocky and foul. 

Admiral Baudin, however, was thoroughly ac- 
quainted with the weak points of the fortress, through 
information obtained from Madrid ; where plans of 
the works, dating from the times of the Spanish 
occupancy, were on file. He possessed also two 
steamers, the first to cross the Atlantic under the 
French flag, by aid of which, though small and of 
weak power, he could count upon placing his sail- 
ing frigates exactly where he wished them. Finally, 
the wretched condition of the Mexican forces, de- 
moralized by years of irregular warfare and internal 
commotion, and miserably provided with material of 
war, gave additional chances of success. 

On the morning of November 28th the two 
steamers towed the bomb-vessels to the eastern ex- 
tremity of the reef, a little over a mile from the cas- 
tle. Next two of the frigates were taken by them 
and anchored close to the reef, southeast from the 
works and distant from them half a mile. The third 
frigate, using her sails alone, succeeded in taking 
position a little ahead of her consorts. These opera- 
tions were all completed before noon and were con- 
ducted under the eyes of the Mexicans, who were 
restrained from impeding them by the orders of their 
Government not to fire the first gun. A delay fol- 
lowed, owing to a flag of truce coming from the 
shore ; but the proposition brought by it proved un- 
acceptable, and the squadron opened fire at half-past 
two. Between that and sundown the three frigates, 
aided only by a small corvette which attacked under 
way, poured upon the castle 7,771 round shot and 
177 shell, the mortar-vessels at the same time throw- 



LIEUTENANT. gj 

ing in 302 bombs. At eight the fire ceased, and ne- 
gotiations began. The following day, at noon, the 
castle was delivered into the hands of the French, 
who placed a garrison in it. " It was high time," 
said Admiral Baudin ; " the wind was freshening, the 
sea getting up, and the anchors were breaking like 
glass upon the bottom, composed of sharp rocks." 
But the loss among the defenders had been so great, 
and the re-enforcements at hand were so few, that fur- 
ther resistance was impracticable. 

The terms of the convention made by the com- 
mander of the Mexican forces had stipulated that 
only a certain number of troops should constitute 
the garrison of Vera Cruz until the affairs between 
the two nations were settled ; but upon the 4th of 
December the French admiral learned, to his great 
indignation, that the Mexican Government had dis- 
avowed the action of the general, declared war 
against France, and was throwing re-enforcements 
into the city. He immediately took measures to dis- 
arm the works which might threaten his fleet at their 
anchorage, hoping at the same time, by surprising 
the enemy, to gain possession of Santa Anna, the new 
commander of the troops and then the most promi- 
nent man in Mexico. While the French were making 
their preparations in secret, Farragut went on shore 
and called upon Santa Anna, who promised to care for 
the persons and property of American citizens, add- 
ing : "Tell President Van Buren that we are all one 
family, and must be united against Europeans obtain- 
ing a foothold on this continent." 

The following morning, before daylight, the 
French embarked fifteen hundred seamen, accom- 
panied by a few engineer soldiers, in the boats of the 



82 ADMIRAL FARRAGUT. 

squadron ; and, being covered by a thick fog, landed 
at six o'clock upon the beach before Vera Cruz. 
Formed in three divisions and unseen by the enemy, 
they blew open the gates of the city and at the same 
time stormed the forts which at the north and south 
terminate the seaward wall. The Mexicans, taken 
wholly by surprise, retreated before the assailants. 
The center division of the French, which had entered 
by the gates, pursued rapidly toward the quarters of 
Santa Anna. A short, vigorous resistance by a part 
of his guard enabled the commander-in-chief to es- 
cape in shirt and trousers ; but General Arista was 
taken. Meanwhile the two flank divisions, having 
dismounted the guns in the forts and chopped the 
carriages in pieces, moved along the walls toward 
the gate. There they united with the center ; and 
the whole body, having accomplished its object in 
disarming the sea face of the town, fell back upon 
their boats lying along the mole. Most had already 
re-embarked when the Mexicans, led by Santa Anna 
in person, charged from' the gate and down the mole 
at double-quick. Admiral Baudin himself was still 
on shore, waiting to see the last man off. Though 
scarcely expecting this gallant return from a force 
that had been so badly worsted and was much in- 
ferior in numbers, the French were not unprepared. 
A six-pound gun on the extremity of the mole, be- 
longing to the Mexicans, had been turned so as to 
sweep the approach with grape ; and five of the 
boats of the squadron, mounting small carronades, 
were also disposed to repel attack. The admiral 
ordered the six-pounder fired, and entered his barge. 
The discharge swept away the head of the Mexican 
column, and Santa Anna himself fell with three 



LIEUTENANT. 



83 



wounds, from one of which he lost his left leg.. Some 
of the broken column fell back upon the town, from 
the loop-holes of whose walls a sharp fire of musketry 
began, while others continued down the mole and 
opened vigorously upon the retreating French, di- 
recting their aim especially upon the admiral's barge. 
The admiral himself escaped, but narrowly; his cock- 
swain and a midshipman standing by him being killed, 
and another midshipman wounded. " The Mexicans 
continued to fight with great gallantry," wrote Farra- 
gut ; and it was perhaps well for the assailants that 
the fog sweeping in again covered their further re- 
treat. 

Of all these incidents Farragut was a close and 
interested observer. Upon joining the Erie as her 
commander, he found that the ship was under orders 
to proceed with the utmost dispatch to the Mexican 
coast, to afford to American citizens and their prop- 
erty the protection so likely to be needed in event of 
active hostilities. On the 26th of August she was 
anchored under the island of Sacrificios, off Vera 
Cruz, which was then still undergoing the blockade 
which preceded recourse to stronger measures. Far- 
ragut remained there till the 19th of September, 
when he returned to Pensacola; but early in Novem- 
ber he was again off the Mexican coast at Tampico, 
where a revolution threatened, for Mexico at the 
time was not only menaced with foreign attack, but 
also a prey to the utmost internal disorder. On the 
17th of this month the Erie ran down again to Vera 
Cruz ; and learning there that the 27th was fixed as 
the day for a final conference and settlement of the 
questions at issue, her commander of course decided 
to remain throughout the affair, making preparations 



84 ADMIRAL FARRAGUT. 



1 



to receive on board Americans and their movable 
property in case tlie city was bombarded. 

In his journal, and afterward in a letter to Com- 
modore Barron, then the senior officer in the United 
States Navy, Farragut has preserved a very full and 
detailed account of the attack, the principal features 
of which have already been mentioned ; and it is in- 
teresting to note, as testifying to the care and accu- 
racy of his observations, that the account in his journal 
corresponds very closely with that given in the Life 
of Admiral Baudin, published in France within the 
last few years. He was particularly impressed with, 
and distinguishes as matters of principal importance, 
the utility of the small French steamers in towing 
the fighting ships into position, and the destructive 
effects of the shell upon the soft masonry of the fort. 
Admiral Baudin, in his reports, indulged in some of 
the pardonable grumbling of a seaman of the old 
school about the constant ailments of the little 
steam-vessels; but he was too capable an officer to 
ignore their value, " and never," wrote Farragut in 
his report, " was the utility of these vessels so ap- 
parent. Everything was done by them. The day 
was calm, or nearly so, and the ships had no sails to 
manage. As soon as the anchor was let go they 
were ready for action. The bomb-vessels were next 
placed (for which the range had been calculated), 
and two sloops took position at right angles with 
the range, to tell by signal the effect of the bombs. 
So you see all was arranged with science and skill 
and without the slightest interruption, for the Mexi- 
cans had given an order to the commander of the 
fort not on any account to fire the first gun." This 
order was, in Farragut's opinion, the principal cause 



LIEUTENANT. 85 

of the French sustaining so little loss. A well-di- 
rected fire from the fort would, he thought, have de- 
stroyed the steamers and prevented the frigates from 
gaining the carefully chosen position, where they 
were least exposed to the guns of the works. 

Immediately after the submission of the castle 
Farragut went ashore to examine and note the ef- 
fects of the fire, and especially of the horizontal 
shell fire ; which was then so much a novelty in na- 
val warfare that he speaks of the missiles continu- 
ously as shell-shot, apparently to distinguish them 
from the vertically thrown bombs. " Now it was 
seen for the first time that the material of which 
Ulloa is built (soft coral) was the worst substance in 
the world for protection against the modern shell. 
The French threw almost entirely shell-shot, which 
entered the wall twelve or eighteen inches and then 
exploded, tearing out great masses of stone, and in 
some instances rending the wall from base to top. 
The damage done by these shell-shot was inconceiv- 
ably greater than that by the shell from the bomb- 
vessels, owing to the former striking horizontally, 
while the latter fell vertically upon the bomb-proofs, 
doing but little damage. ... I am satisfied of one 
fact— viz., that they might have bombarded with the 
bomb-vessels for a month without success, while the 
frigates would in four hours more, with their shell- 
shot, have reduced the fort to a heap of ruins." 
This opinion as to the inefiicacy of bomb-firing to 
destroy a work anticipated the experience of the 
Civil War, where the conclusion was that it might 
wear out the endurance of the garrison by constant 
harassment, but not directly reduce the works them- 
selves. It is only just to say that his estimate of the 



^^ ADMIRAL FARRAGUT. 

effect of the horizontal fire upon the walls is more 
favorable than that of the French engineers, who did 
not consider that the damage done necessarily en- 
tailed a capitulation ; but seamen and engineers have 
rarely agreed in their opinions upon this subject. 

The same zeal which led Farragut to this minute 
inspection of the battered fortress carried him also 
on board one of the French ships, while she still re- 
mained cleared for action, to note matters of detail 
which differed from those then prevalent in his own 
service. Of these he made a very full representa- 
tion, and one much in disparagement of the United 
States Navy; which, since the glories of 1812 and 
the first re-organization and development procured 
for it by the popular favor consequent upon its vic- 
tories, had been allowed to drop into a state of back- 
wardness, as regards the material, similar to that 
which followed the Civil War, and from which it is 
but now beginning to emerge. The points which he 
noted, though most important to that rapidity and 
order upon which the efficient service of a ship's bat- 
teries depends, would have now no attraction for 
the unprofessional reader; nor for the professional, 
except as matters of antiquarian interest. They 
showed that spirit of system, of scientific calculation, 
of careful adaptation of means to ends, which have 
ever distinguished the French material for naval 
war, except when the embarrassments of the treasury 
have prevented the adoption of expensive improve- 
ments — a spirit which for over a century made the 
French ships the models which their usually victo- 
rious rivals were fain to copy. *' The English and 
ourselves may affect to despise the French by sea," 
wrote Farragut to Barron, '' but depend upon it, sir, 



LIEUTENANT. 



87 



they are in science far ahead of us both, and when 
England next meets France upon the ocean she will 
find a different enemy from that of the last war. 
Of all this I know you have seen much in theory, 
but I have seen it tested in practice." 

The substance of Farragut's letter to Barron 
deals w^th matters which the progress of time and 
the accompanying advances in naval science have 
now made obsolete ; but the spirit which inspired 
the letter and accumulated the materials for it can 
never become obsolete. It was then, and it is now, 
the indication of a man keeping abreast of his time 
and awake to its necessities ; it held then, as it does 
now, the promise of one who, when occasion arose, 
would have his faculties in readiness, by constant 
training, to exert all the powers with which nature 
had gifted him. The conditions of 1861 were very 
different from those of 1838; but the officer who 
was found awake to the first in their day would not 
be behind the others in theirs. The letter concluded 
with a pregnant observation, which deserves to be 
quoted as thoroughly characteristic of the writer : 
" I have already said too much for a letter to any 
other person of your rank ; but I flatter myself that 
I know your love of improvement, and that my in- 
tentions will be duly appreciated. If we who wan- 
der about the world do not keep those at home in- 
formed of the daily improvements in other navies, 
how can we hope to improve, particularly when we 
see men impressed with the idea that because they 
once gained a victory, they can do it again ? So 
they may, but I can tell them it must be with the 
means of 1838, and not those of 1812." This trans- 
mission of information concerning the progress of 



88 ADMIRAL FARRAGUT. 

Other navies, upon which Farragut laid such just 
stress, is now systematized and perfected under a 
particular branch of the Navy Department, known 
as the Office of Naval Intelligence. Upon every 
ship afloat there is an officer whose duty is to ob- 
serve and report to that office upon such matters, 
and upon all the experiences of foreign navies which 
are open to the examination of outsiders. 

After the French affair at Vera Cruz the Erie 
returned to Pensacola, and there on the 12th of 
January, 1839, Farragut gave up the command to an 
officer of senior rank and went home. Upon his 
arrival in Norfolk, finding his wife's health to be 
very precarious, he remained unemployed until her 
death, which occurred on the 27th of December, 
1840. "No more striking illustration of his gentle- 
ness of character," says his biography by his son, 
*^ is shown than in Farragut's attention to his invalid 
wife. His tenderness in contributing to her every 
comfort, and catering to every whim, through six- 
teen years of suffering, forms one of the brightest 
spots in the history of his domestic life. When not 
at sea, he was constantly by her side, and proved 
himself a faithful and skillful nurse. It was the sub- 
ject of remark by all who were thrown with him ; and 
a lady of Norfolk said, ' When Captain Farragut dies, 
he should have a monument reaching to the skies, 
made by every wife in the city contributing a stone.' " 



CHAPTER V. 

COMMANDER AND CAPTAIN. 
1841-1860. 

Immediately after the death of his wife Farragut 
applied for sea service; and on the 22d of February, 
1841, he was ordered to the Delaware, a ship-of-the- 
line, which was fitting for sea in Norfolk and des- 
tined to take him for the third time to the Brazil 
station. He was then among the senior lieutenants 
of the navy ; but as it was in accordance with cus- 
tom that a commander should be the executive offi- 
cer of a ship-of-the-line, his expected promotion would 
not, when it arrived, cause him to leave his position. 
Some time passed before the Delaware was fully 
ready for sea. Before sailing, she was sent up the 
Chesapeake to the mouth of the Severn River, where 
she was visited by numbers of people from the neigh- 
boring city of Annapolis, as well as by large parties 
of congressmen and public officials from Washington, 
among whom came the then Secretary of the Navy. 
It was while lying off Annapolis, on the 27th of Sep- 
tember, 1841, that Farragut received his commission 
as commander in the navy. His seniority as such 
was from September 8, 1841. A few days later the 
Delaware returned to Hampton Roads, and thence 
sailed for her station on the ist of November. On 
7 



90 ADMIRAL FARRAGUT. 

the 1 2th of January she anchored in Rio Janeiro. 
After a stay of six weeks there, the whole squadron 
sailed for the Rio de la Plata, the usual resort of the 
ships on that station during the summer months of 
the southern hemisphere, when the yellow fever is apt 
to be prevalent in Rio Janeiro. On the ist of June, 
1842, Farragut was ordered to command the Decatur, 
a small sloop-of-war, relieving Commander Henry 
W. Ogden ; who as a midshipman of the Essex had 
been his messmate nearly thirty years before, and 
was now compelled to leave his ship by an illness 
which never allov/ed him to resume the active pur- 
suit of his profession. The transfer of the command 
appears to have been made in the harbor of Rio Ja- 
neiro. In severing his connection with the Delaware, 
with his new rank, Farragut felt that he had parted 
finally with the subordinate duties of his calling; 
and, as rarely happens, he passed directly from the 
active exercise of the lower position to fill the higher. 
His journal records the fact with a characteristic 
comment : " Thus closed my service on board the 
Delaware as executive officer; to which I shall al- 
ways look back with gratification, as it was the last 
step in the ladder of subordinate duties, and I feel 
proud to think I performed it with the same zeal as 
the first." He was then nearly forty-one years old. 
On the 2d of July the Decatur sailed for the La 
Plata in company with the Delaware. Soon after 
reaching Montevideo, Commodore Morris embarked 
on board the former, and went in her to Buenos 
Ayres; ships of the size of the Delaware not being 
able to approach that city on account of the great 
distance to which very shoal water extends from 
it. After exchanging the usual official civilities and 



COMMANDER AND CAPTAIN. 



91 



transacting some business with Rosas, who then em- 
bodied in his own person all the powers of the state, 
the commodore returned to Montevideo ; but the 
Decatur was soon sent back, and Farragut spent 
most of the latter half of 1842 at Buenos Ayres, in 
constant intercourse, both official and social, with 
Rosas and his family. Of the latter he, in common 
with most American naval officers who visited the 
La Plata at that time, received very agreeable im- 
pressions ; and since, as commanding officer, his du- 
ties were less exacting and his time much more at 
his own command than as executive, he gave free 
play to the social disposition which was prominent 
in his character. Much of his journal during his 
stay is taken up with the accounts of social and of- 
ficial entertainments in which he shared. " During 
the month of September," he writes, "I made it a 
rule to spend two or three evenings a week at the 
governor's " (Rosas). " On the 5th of November I 
was invited to a ball at the Victoria Theatre, where, 
as on all similar occasions, I danced the first qua- 
drille with the charming 'Manuelita," the daughter of 
Rosas. The pleasant and familiar relations thus es- 
tablished enabled him to do many kind acts for the 
Unitarios, whose lives were in constant danger by 
political accusations, if not from actual offenses. 

Rosas himself was then in the full exercise of the 
dictatorial power with which he had been invested 
some years before, after refusing a re-election as 
governor of Buenos Ayres. His rule, which lasted 
under successive renewals of his office until 1852, was 
arbitrary and bloody ; but in the disorganized con- 
dition of the provinces at that period a man of his 
force of character seems to have been necessary, to 



92 



ADMIRAL FARRAGUT. 



avert the greater horrors of constant intestine strife. 
" We concluded from our observations," notes Farra- 
gut in his journal, " that he was a man of uncommon 
mind and energy, and, as a general thing, reason- 
able ; but on the subject of secret societies he was a 
madman, if we might judge from his furious denun- 
ciation of them." They constituted, indeed, the one 
resource of the cowed XJnitarios, and were the chief 
danger then threatening him. " We had an excellent 
opportunity to form an idea of his character, as he 
appeared to throw off all restraint while with us. 
But the commodore informed us that, as soon as he 
laid business matters before him, Rosas was a dif- 
ferent person ; he was calm and measured in manner 
and language." The ladies of the family were ami- 
able, intelligent and hospitable ; but, like all the 
women of Buenos Ayres at that time, were perforce 
ardent Federalists and detesters of the '' savage 
Unitarios." Farragut mentions an incident occur- 
ring at an official festivity in honor of Rosas, which 
shows the savagery that lay close under the surface 
of the Argentine character at that time, and easily 
found revolting expression in the constant civil 
strife and in the uncontrolled rule of the dictator. 
" In the ball-room was a picture which would have 
disgraced even barbarian society. It was a full- 
sized figure representing a Federal soldier, with a 
Unitarian lying on the ground, the Federal pressing 
his knees between the victim's shoulders, whose head 
was pulled back with the left hand, and the throat 
cut from ear to ear, while the executioner exultingly 
held aloft a bloody knife and seemed to be claiming 
the applause of the spectators. I am sure I do not 
err in saying that every one of our party felt an in- 



COMMANDER AND CAPTAIN. 



93 



voluntary shudder come over him when his eye fell 
upon this tableau; nor did we afterward recover our 
spirits, everything in the way of gayety on our part 
during the night was forced and unnatural." 

It is a matter of some, though minor, interest to 
note that Farragut has occasion at this time to men- 
tion Garibaldi, in connection with the wars then wag- 
ing. The Italian patriot, whose name was then far 
from having the celebrity it has since attained, had 
for some time been engaged on the popular side in 
revolutionary struggles in the southern provinces of 
Brazil. Thence he had passed into Uruguay, and 
become a teacher of mathematics in Montevideo. 
Rosas had the ambition to bring into the Argentine 
confederation all the provinces which once formed 
the viceroyalty of Buenos Ayres, of which Uruguay 
was one ; and, finding a pretext in the civil dissen- 
sions of the latter, had opened hostilities as the ally 
of one party in the State. Garibaldi, who began life 
as a seaman, had command of the Uruguayan naval 
forces, and in that capacity undertook to carry stores 
to Corrientes, an important point far up the river 
Parana. " As he met with many obstacles in his 
course," notes Farragut, "the Argentine admiral, 
Brown, was enabled to overtake him. Garibaldi ran 
his vessel into a creek and made a most desperate 
resistance ; fought until he had expended everything 
in the way of ammunition, then landed his crew and 
set his vessel on fire." On the 17th of October a 
grand ball was given in honor of this success, which 
Commander Farragut attended ; as he did all the 
other gayeties during his stay in Buenos Ayres. 

The Decatur had already been long on the station 
when Farragut assumed command, and the time had 



94 ADMIRAL FARRAGUT. 

now arrived for her to return home. After leaving 
Buenos Ayres she made short stops at Montevideo, 
Rio Janeiro, Maranham, and Para, the latter being 
the seaport of the Amazon River. On the i8th of 
February, 1843, she arrived in Norfolk, and Farragut 
was relieved. His health being delicate at this time, 
he spent the following summer at Fauquier Springs, 
Virginia. 

From the mountains he returned in the autumn to 
Norfolk ; and there on the 26th of December, 1843, 
he married Miss Virginia Loyall, the eldest daughter 
of Mr. William Loyall, a well-known and respected 
citizen of Norfolk. 

In April, 1844, Commander Farragut was ordered 
as executive officer to the receiving ship at Nor- 
folk, the Pennsylvania, of one hundred and twenty 
guns ; which, in the days of sailing ships, was by far 
the largest vessel the United States ever had, and 
one of the largest in the world. Some time later he 
was transferred to the navy yard at the same place, 
on which duty he was employed when the war with 
Mexico arose. 

As soon as the already existing difficulties with 
that country began to wear an ominous outlook, Farra- 
gut wrote to the Navy Department, asking for service 
in the Gulf. In his application he stated the qualifi- 
cations he thought he possessed, from his knowledge 
and close study of the ground, and from his ac- 
quaintance with the Spanish language. He in- 
stanced particularly the occasions on which he had 
been employed in that neighborhood, and the close 
study he had been privileged to make on the spot 
during Admiral Baudin's operations. Although the 
Secretary of the Navy at that time was the able and 



COMMANDER AND CAPTAIN. 



95 



enlightened Mr. George Bancroft, this letter received 
no reply ; and a second, sent after the beginning of 
the war, was barely acknowledged without any ac- 
tion being taken. After Mr. Bancroft left the De- 
partment, Farragut renewed his application, express- 
ing a decided opinion that the castle of San Juan de 
Ulloa could be taken either by artillery attack or by 
escalade : offering to undertake the task with the 
Pennsylvania and two sloops-of-war. If not thought 
to have rank enough for such a command, he was 
willing to go back to the position of executive officer 
of the Pennsylvania, in order, in that capacity, to 
organize the crew for the attack. The opinion thus 
expressed ran counter to the routine prejudices of 
the day, and, coming from an officer who had as yet 
had no opportunity to establish his particular claim 
to be heard, rather hurt than improved his chances 
for employment. It was not till February, 1847, 
nearly a year after the war began, and then with 
"much difficulty," that he obtained command of the 
sloop-of-war Saratoga ; but when he reached Vera 
Cruz in her, the castle had already passed into the 
hands of the United States, having surrendered to 
the forces under General Scott on the 26th of March. 
That this capture should have been made by the 
army rather than by the navy was a severe disap- 
pointment to Farragut, who had so long cherished 
the hope that its fall should have been the brilliant 
achievement of his own service. In his mortification 
he used an expression which, in the light of his own 
subsequent career, seems a twofold prophecy. " The 
navy would stand on a different footing to-day if our 
ships had made the attack. It was all we could do, 
and should have been done at all hazards. Commo- 



96 ADMIRAL FARRAGUT. 

dore Conner thought differently, however, and the 
old officers at home backed his opinion ; but they all 
paid the penalty — not one of them will wear an ad- 
miraVs Jlag, which they might have done if that castle 
had been taken by the navy, which must have been 
the result of an attack." It was to such enterprise 
at the hands of the men of his own time, among 
whom he was foremost, that the navy at a later 
day did obtain the admiral's flag which it had so 
long in vain desired. 

The frustration of this high ambition was not the 
only misfortune to Farragut arising out of the Mexi- 
can war. He contracted the yellow fever on the 
station, nearly losing his life ; and subsequently be- 
came involved in a controversy with the commodore 
of the squadron, who he believed had, in the assign- 
ment of duty, treated him and his ship with unfair 
discrimination, due to personal ill-will toward him- 
self. The correspondence had no results ; but such 
quarrels are rarely other than hurtful to the junior 
officer engaged. It is not singular, therefore, that 
he speaks of this cruise as the most mortifying of all 
the service he had seen since entering the navy. " I 
have little," he said again, '' to look back to with 
satisfaction or pleasure at this time, except the con- 
sciousness of having done my duty." Smarting under 
the belief that he was being imposed upon, he wrote 
to the Navy Department complaining of injustice, and 
asking that either he himself should be relieved or 
the ship sent home. He candidly admits that his 
letters were considered improper by the Secretary of 
the Navy, but the Saratoga was ordered to return to 
the United States, and was paid off at New York in 
February, 1848. In her short cruise there had been 



COMMANDER AND CAPTAIN. 



97 



one hundred cases of yellow fever in her crew of one 
hundred and fifty, and her commander had been 
obliged, to use his own expression, ^' to rid the serv- 
ice " of five of her junior officers, and on the last day 
to bring the first lieutenant to trial for drunkenness. 
Altogether, the Mexican war and the cruise of the 
Saratoga seem to have marked the lowest point of 
disappointment and annoyance that Farragut was 
called upon to encounter during his naval career. 

Immediately after leaving the Saratoga, Farragut 
was again ordered to duty in his former position at 
the Norfolk navy yard. Two years later he was 
called to Washington to draw up, in connection with 
some other officers, a book of Ordnance Regula- 
tions for the navy. This occupied him for eighteen 
months. As when in New Haven, twenty-five years 
before, he had improved the opportunity of hearing 
the lectures at Yale College, so at this later period he 
attended regularly those of the Smithsonian Institu- 
tion, losing, he records, but a single one. "You will 
rarely come away from such lectures," he adds, 
** without being somewhat wiser than you went in." 
Where precisely such knowledge might come into 
play he could not, indeed, foresee, but he acted always 
on the principle that any knowledge might at some 
time become useful ; just as, when at Vera Cruz, 
thouofh he did not at the time look forward to a war 
with Mexico, he closely examined every point of in- 
terest, for " I have made it a rule of my life to note 
these things with a view to the possible future." 

When the Ordnance Regulations were finished, 
in the spring of 1852, Farragut was again assigned 
to the Norfolk navy yard, and directed to utilize the 
experience he had gained in compiling them by giving 



98 



ADMIRAL FARRAGUT. 



weekly lectures on gunnery to the officers on the 
station. In prosecution of the same line of profes- 
sional work, he was soon after ordered to conduct a 
series of experiments at Old Point Comfort, near 
Norfolk, to determine certain questions connected 
with the endurance of iron cannon ; the discharges 
being continued with one or two of each class of 
service guns until they burst. Some very important 
results were obtained ; but the circumstance con- 
nected with this duty which has now most interest, 
is that in it Farragut was associated with Lieutenant 
Percival Drayton, who was afterward his flag-captain 
and chief-of-staff at the battle of Mobile Bay. The 
intimacy formed during this year of experimental 
duty at Old Point lasted throughout their lives. 

Soon after this the Crimean war broke out. Far- 
ragut's desire for his own professional improvement 
and for the progress of the service led him to make 
application to the Navy Department to be sent to the 
seat of war, " to visit the fleets of England and France, 
and ascertain whether in the outfits and preparation 
for war they possess any advantages over our own 
ships-of-war, and, if so, in what they consist." The 
utility of such a mission can not be doubted, and his 
occupations of the past few years particularly pre- 
pared him for such an inquiry. Had the Navy De- 
partment then had any systematic record of the 
aptitude shown by individual officers, and of the work 
done by them, it must have recognized Farragut's 
peculiar fitness for duties of this kind ; which have 
since his time been organized and given a most com- 
prehensive scope under the Intelligence Office of the 
Navy Department. As it was, his application re- 
ceived no other reply than a polite acknowledgment. 



COMMANDER AND CAPTAIN. 



99 



A commission, consisting of three officers of the En- 
gineer Corps of the army, was sent by the War De- 
partment to visit Europe and the seat of war, and 
upon its return made an elaborate report ; but at this 
critical period of naval progress, when sail was mani- 
festly giving place to steam, when the early attempts 
at iron-clad batteries were being made, and the vast 
changes in armament that have since taken place 
were certainly, though as yet dimly, indicated, it did 
not appear to the Government of the United States 
a matter of sufficient importance to inquire, on the 
spot, into the practical working of the new instru- 
ments under the test of war. 

Although doubtless not so intended, the Navy 
Department emphasized its decision not to send Far- 
ragut to the East by assigning him to duty as far 
west as the naval interests of the United States, with- 
in its own borders, then allowed. In August, 1854, 
four months after his application for the former em- 
ployment, he was ordered to California as first com- 
mandant of the navy yard at Mare Island. The site 
had been selected in the year 1852 by a commission 
of three officers, but as yet no navy yard existed. It 
was to be Farragut's particular duty to plan and 
build it up under the general instructions of the De- 
partment. His selection for this difficult and oner- 
ous, but at the same time very flattering, appointment 
was among the first evident results of the diligent, 
painstaking effort which had marked his professional 
career. By that, and by that only, had he as yet had 
any opportunity of marking himself above the or- 
dinary run of men ; but he stood high in the esteem 
of Commodore Joseph Smith, then and for many 
years both before and after, the chief of the Bureau 



100 ADMIRAL FARRAGUT. 

of Yards and Docks, under whose charge the man- 
agement and development of navy yards more par- 
ticularly came. At the critical period when the 
selection of an officer to command in the attack upon 
New Orleans had to be made, Smith, who had close 
confidential relations with the Secretary of the Navy, 
always held that Farragut was the man above all 
others for the place. 

The site of the new yard was in the extensive 
sheet of inland waters connected with the bay of 
San Francisco, and some thirty miles from the city. 
There being no accommodations upon the island, 
Farragut, with his family, for some seven months 
lived on board an old sloop-of-war anchored near by. 
He remained at this station for four years, during 
which great progress was made in the development 
of the yard ; but the duty, though most important 
and particularly responsible, because of the length 
of time required by correspondence to pass to and 
from Washington, was not fruitful of incident. These 
were the troublous early times of California — the days 
of the Vigilance Committee and the Law and Order 
Party. With these intestine troubles of a State the 
military officers of the United States had no proper 
concern ; but there was continually a possibility that 
they might be forced to take a stand by the interfer- 
ence of one side or the other with civil officials of 
the LTnited States Government, or might be induced, 
by a request from the authorities, to act upon the 
ground that there was no time to refer to Washing- 
ton for instructions. It is unnecessary to enter into 
any examination of Farragut's course during this 
period, although the affairs with which he had to deal 
became at times both critical and delicate. It will 



I 



COMMANDER AND CAPTAIN. iqe 

be sufficient to say that the Navy Department, after 
receiving his reports, approved his conduct as having 
been prudent and yet marked by a proper spirit. 

In July, 1858, Farragut returned to the East by 
the only route then available, the Isthmus of Pana- 
ma. During his absence, on the 14th of September, 
1855, he had been promoted to the rank of captain, 
which, prior to the Civil War, was the highest grade 
in the United States Navy ; the title commodore, 
then so frequently applied to the older officers of the 
service, being simply one of courtesy given to a cap- 
tain who had commanded a squadron of several 
vessels, but who did not thereby cease to be borne 
as a captain upon the Navy Register. Soon after his 
arrival Farragut was ordered to command the Brook- 
lyn, one of six steam sloops-of-war just being com- 
pleted. She belonged to that new navy of thirty 
years ago which the United States Government, 
most luckily for itself, had determined to build, and 
which became fairly available just in time for the 
exigencies of the Civil War. 

It has been said, and that on the floors of Congress 
by a politician conspicuous in his party, that past his- 
tory teaches that preparation for war is unnecessary to 
the United States, and the conditions precedent to the 
wars of 1812 and 1861 have been cited in support of 
the assertion. Certainly no one cognizant of the facts 
will deny that the United States was most miserably 
unprepared for either war as regards the size of her 
navy ; but it so happened on both occasions, more by 
good luck than good management, that what navy it 
did have was of remarkably fine quality, and, to the 
extent to which its numbers permitted it to be em- 
ployed, was generally perfectly adequate to the work 



102 ADMIRAL FARRAGUT. 

it had to do. It could not, however, begin to touch 
the full amount of service it ought to have done. In 
1812 it could not protect the Chesapeake nor the 
Mississippi ; it was blockaded in its own ports, es- 
caping only by evasion ; it could not protect Ameri- 
can commerce, which suffered more than did that of 
Great Britain. In 1861, had its numbers been at all 
adequate, it could by prompt action have forestalled 
the preparations of the enemy, and by prevention 
secured immediate advantages which were afterward 
achieved only by large expenditure of time and fight- 
ing. Such were the results of unpreparedness. It 
was to the preparation, scanty as it was — to the fine 
ships and superior armaments, both too few — that the 
successes of either era were due. The frigates and 
sloops of 1812 were among the finest of their class to 
be found anywhere, with powerful batteries and ex- 
cellently ofiicered ; while in the decade before the 
Civil War began there had been built eighteen or 
twenty new steamships, admirably efficient for their 
day, and with armaments of an advanced and power- 
ful type. Upon these fell the principal brunt of the 
naval fighting that ensued. These ships, and par- 
ticularly those of the Brooklyn class, were the back- 
bone of Farragut's fleet throughout all his actions, 
even in the last at Mobile in 1864. Had there been 
thrice as many, the work would have been sooner and 
therefore more cheaply done ; but had the lack of 
preparation in 1861 equaled that of 1851 or 1881, it 
may be questioned whether any of his successes could 
have been won. 

When Farragut took command of the Brooklyn, 
ten years had elapsed since he was last afloat — years 
pregnant with naval change. He had never before 



COMMANDER AND CAPTAIN. 



103 



served in a steamer, except for a very short time in 
a primitive one belonging to Porter's Mosquito fleet, 
in 1823. Tlie changes in the disposition and hand- 
ling of the guns had not been radical. They were 
still arranged " in broadside," along the two sides of 
the vessel ; nor were the pivot guns — which, as their 
name implies, could be pivoted to one side or the 
other, according to the position of an enemy — a new 
idea. In these matters there had been improvement 
and development, but not revolution. But while the 
mode of placing and handling was essentially the 
same, the guns themselves had greatly increased in 
size and received important modifications in pattern. 
The system then in vogue was that associated with 
the name of the late Admiral Dahlgren. The shape 
of the gun had been made to conform to the strains 
brought by the discharge upon its various parts, as 
determined by careful experiment; and in place of 
the 32-pounder, or six-inch gun, which had been the 
principal weapon of the earlier ships, the batteries of 
the new frigates and sloops were composed chiefly of 
nine-inch guns, with one or more pivots of ten- or 
eleven-inch bore. The shell-shot, whose destructive 
effects had excited Farragut's comments in 1838, were 
now the recognized type of projectile; and the new 
guns were spoken of distinctively as shell-guns, be- 
cause not expected to use solid shot under ordinary 
circumstances. The Brooklyn and her fellovv^s, among 
which was Farragut's future flag-ship, the Hartford, 
although screw steamers, had also the full sail power 
of the former sailing ship; and they were wooden, 
not iron vessels. 

The service of the Brooklyn, while under Farra- 
gut's command, was chiefly confined to his old cruis- 



I04 



ADMIRAL FARRAGUT, 



ing ground in the West Indies and in Mexico. In 
the latter country, since the termination of the war 
with the United States in 1848, there had been a 
constant succession of revolutions ; and at the time 
of the Brooklyn's cruise there was established in 
Vera Cruz a constitutional party, at whose head was 
Benito Juarez, the lawful claimant of the presidency. 
Opposed to this, in the city of Mexico, was the party 
headed by General Miramon, who had succeeded by 
force to the authority of Juarez's predecessor. The 
United States threw its influence on the side of 
Juarez ; and its minister, Robert McLane, was per- 
mitted to use the Brooklyn to carry him from point 
to point of the coast. While no force was exerted, 
the support given to the minister's remonstrances 
by the constant presence of a powerful ship-of-war 
served to emphasize the policy of the Government, 
which had recognized Juarez. This recognition was 
followed some time later by a similar step on the 
part of the ministers of England, France, and Spain. 
Mr. McLane continued with the Brooklyn during 
great part of 1859, and in December of that year re- 
turned in her to the Mississippi, where he was landed 
at a plantation below New Orleans. This visit to 
his early home was marked by a sad coincidence to 
Farragut. His elder brother, William, a lieutenant 
in the navy, had long been retired from active serv- 
ice, for which he was unfitted by rheumatism. In 
consequence he had not received promotion, remain- 
ing at the head of the list of lieutenants, and being 
assigned to duty at the naval rendezvous in New 
Orleans. When the Brooklyn entered the river he 
was lying at the point of death, but heard of his 
brother's approach, and expressed a hope that he 



II 



COMMANDER AND CAPTAIN. 



105 



might live long enough to see him again after so 
many years of separation. The wish was not to be 
fulfilled. Though ignorant of the danger, Captain 
Farragut hastened to the city, himself also looking 
forward with pleasure to the meeting ; but he ar- 
rived only in time to see his brother dead, and to 
follow him to the grave. 

Farragut remained attached to the Brooklyn for 
two years. In October, i860, he was relieved by 
Captain W. S. Walker, and returned to his home in 
Norfolk. This ended his sea service prior to the 
Civil War, and as the captain of a single ship. 
Thenceforward, during the brief but important rem- 
nant of his active career, he was to command great 
fleets. 



CHAPTER VI. 

THE QUESTION OF ALLEGIANCE. 

1 860-1 86 1. 

When Captain Farragut returned to Norfolk in 
October, i860, he was, albeit unconsciously, rapidly 
approaching the turning point of his life, the tide in 
his affairs which taken at the- flood should lead on 
to fortune. That he seized the opportunity was due to 
no dexterous weighing of the effects of either course 
upon his personal future, but to that preparedness of 
mind which has already been mentioned as one of 
his characteristic traits, and to the tenacity with 
which were held his convictions thus deliberately 
and maturely formed. For several years he had 
watched with unquiet mind the gathering clouds 
which preceded the approaching storm, and in com- 
mon with others had felt the distress and perplexity 
which would attend the rupture of the Union. He 
did not, however, remain a merely passive spectator, 
agitated as such by hopes and fears, but trusting 
withal to the chapter of accidents. He had con- 
sidered the effect of the alternatives before the 
country, and what his own duty should be in any 
case. He could not, in his modest position, control 
the course of events; but, whatever befell, he would 
be ready to take his stand, strengthened in so doing 



THE QUESTION OF ALLEGIANCE. 107 

by the settled principles to which his conscientious 
meditation had led him. Thus his fixed purpose, en- 
lightened by reason, had in it nothing of obstinacy; 
yet resisted those appeals to affection, to interest, or 
to prejudice, under which so many succumbed. 

Within a month after his leaving the Brooklyn, 
on the 6th of November, i860, the presidential elec- 
tion was held, and resulted, as had been expected, in 
the choice of Mr. Lincoln. On the 20th of Decem- 
ber South Carolina seceded, and her course was fol- 
lowed within the next six weeks by the other cotton 
States. In February, 186 1, delegates from these 
States met in convention at Montgomery, Alabama, 
adopted a constitution, and elected Jefferson Davis 
to be president of their confederation. On the i8th 
he was inaugurated, and the new government was 
thus formally constituted. 

Here for a moment the secession movement 
paused, and Farragut earnestly trusted would stop. 
Born in a Southern State, and passing his childhood 
in the extreme Southwest, his relations with both had 
been severed at too early an age to establish any 
lasting hold upon his affections; but, though he was 
to the end carried upon the Navy Register as a citi- 
zen of Tennessee, the tenderest and most enduring 
ties of his life had been formed in Virginia. No- 
where were local bonds stronger, nowhere State pride 
greater or more justified, than in the famous Common- 
wealth, which had stood in the center of the line in 
the struggle for independence, and had given to the 
nation so many illustrious men from Washington 
downward. It was impossible that Farragut — who at 
so early an age, and when attached to no other spot, 
had married in Norfolk, and thenceforward gone in 



I08 ADMIRAL FARRAGUT. 

and out among its people — should be insensible to 
these influences, or look without grief to a contin- 
gency which should force him to sunder all these 
associations and go forth, on the verge of old age, 
to seek elsewhere a new home. Nor is it possible 
to many, however conscious of right, to bear without 
suffering the alienation and the contempt visited 
upon those who, in times of keen political excite- 
ment, dare to differ from the general passion which 
sways the mass around them. 

Farragut therefore naturally hoped that this bit- 
ter trial might be spared him. The Virginian people 
had taken what seemed then to be a conservative 
attitude ; and, although he was determined to abide 
by the Union if it were severed by violent action, he 
was anxious to believe that his home might be saved 
to him. The Legislature of the State met early in 
January and recommended all the States to appoint 
deputies to a peace convention, which accordingly 
met on the 4th of February; but the propositions 
made by it were not such as the National Congress 
could accept. On the 13th of the same month there 
was assembled at Richmond a State convention, 
the majority of the delegates to which were Union 
men, in the then sense of the word in that State. 
This fact, and the character of some of the speeches 
made, tended to encourage the belief to which Farra- 
gut's wishes led him ; but this hope was soon damped 
by the passage of resolutions affirming the right of 
secession, and defining the grounds upon which Vir- 
ginia would be justified in exercising the right. 
Among these grounds were the adoption of any 
warlike measures by the United States Government, 
the recapture of the forts which had been seized by 



THE QUESTION OF ALLEGIANCE. 109 

the States already seceded, or any attempt to exact 
duties from them. True, this was followed during 
the first week in April by the rejection of a proposi- 
tion to secede by a vote of eighty-nine to forty-five; 
but, as Farragut held that the President would be 
justified in calling out troops when the forts and 
property of the nation had been violently taken from 
it, the contrary avowal of the Legislature of his State 
showed that he might soon be forced to choose be- 
tween it and the National Government. In that case 
his mind was fully made up; the choice was painful, 
but not doubtful. '' God forbid," he said, " that I 
should have to raise my hand against the South ! " 
but the words "^themselves showed that, however bit- 
ter the decision, he was ready to make it. If separa- 
tion between the sections came peacefully, by mutual 
consent, he would abide in the only home his man- 
hood had known, and cast his lot thenceforth with 
the people to whom he was allied and among whom 
his interests lay ; but if the rupture took the form 
of violent rebellion against the Central Government, 
whose claims he admitted and to which he owned 
allegiance, he w^as prepared to turn his arms even 
against those who in the other alternative would 
have been his countrymen. The attitude thus held 
during those long months of suspense and anxiety 
was honorable alike to his heart, which responded 
warmly to the calls of natural affection, and to his 
conscience, which subordinated the dictates of the 
heart to his convictions of right ; while the un- 
hesitating character of his resolution, amid the un-s 
certainties that unsettled so many men, must ,tee 
attributed to that habit of preparing for emergencies 
which characterized his career. 



no ADMIRAL FARRAGUT. 

On the i2th of April, 1861, the long period of 
waiting and watching was brought to an end by the 
attack upon Fort Sumter. On the 15th President 
Lincoln issued his proclamation formally announcing 
the condition of affairs which existed in the seceded 
States, the defiance of the Central Government, and 
the seizure of its property. In consequence he called 
for seventy-five thousand men from the militia of 
the various States, and avowed clearly that " the 
first service assigned to the forces hereby called 
forth will probably be to repossess the forts, places, 
and property which have been seized from the Union." 
This was clearly an appeal to arms, provoked finally 
by the assault upon Fort Sumter, but which the con- 
vention then sitting in Richmond had pronounced to 
be a lawful cause for secession. In the excitement 
of the hour the Union men, whose attitude toward 
the more violent party had been almost apologetic, 
were swept away by the current of feeling, and an 
ordinance of secession was passed by the convention 
on the 17th of April, 1861. 

During the previous winter Farragut had been 
residing in Norfolk, unemployed by the Government, 
but in daily association both with citizens and naval 
officers; many of whom, like himself, were married 
and settled there. He and his friends met daily at 
one of those common rendezvous which are to be 
found in every small town, and there discussed the 
news which each day brought of change and excite- 
ment. In this way Farragut became acquainted with 
the views of most of the resident officers, and real- 
ized, without being himself swayed by, the influences 
to which all of them, and especially those of Southern 
birth, were subjected. With the conservatism com- 



THE QUESTION OF ALLEGIANCE. m 

mon in seamen who have been for long periods sepa- 
rated by their profession from their native places, 
the great majority of these officers, already men of 
middle age, could not but feel keen sorrow at the 
prospect of changes, which would remove them from 
the navy and separate them from the flag which had 
hitherto stood to them for country. But, moved by 
feeling and prejudice, wrought upon by the strong 
appeals of those they loved, and unfortified by the 
well-reasoned convictions which made the strength 
of Farragut, it was equally impossible for the greater 
part of them to imitate his example. The sense of 
duty and official honor which they owed to their long 
training in a generous service stood by them, and 
few were the cases of men false to trusts actually in 
their charge ; but theirs was not that sense of per- 
sonal allegiance to the Government which gave the 
light of the single eye, and enabled Farragut's final 
decision to be as prompt as it was absolute. 

On the 1 8th of April, the day after the ordinance 
of secession had been passed, Farragut went as usual 
to the place of meeting, and saw, immediately upon 
entering, by the faces of those there, that a great 
change had passed over the relations between them. 
He spoke with his usual openness, and expressed his 
deliberate convictions. He did not believe that the 
action of the convention represented the sober judg- 
ment of the people. The State had been, as he 
phrased it, ^' dragooned " out of the Union ; and 
President Lincoln was perfectly justified in calling 
for troops after the seizure of the forts and arsenals. 
One of those present remarked impatiently that a 
person with such sentiments could not live in Nor- 
folk, and this feeling was evidently shared by the 



112 ADMIRAL FARRAGUT. 

bystanders; there was, indeed, some danger, in those 
excited moments, of personal violence to those who 
dared gainsay the popular passion. " Very well," re- 
plied Farragut, •' I can live somewhere else." No 
time was needed to take a decision already contin- 
gently formed, and for executing which he had, with 
his customary foresight, been accumulating the neces- 
sary funds. He at once went to his house and told 
his wife the time had come for her to decide whether 
she would remam with her own kinsfolk or follow 
him North. Her choice was as instant as his own, 
and that evening they, with their only son, left Nor- 
folk, never to return to it as their home. Mrs. Far- 
ragut's sister and her young family accompanied 
them in the steamer to Baltimore. Upon reaching 
the latter city they found it also boiling over with 
excitement. The attack upon the Massachusetts 
troops had just taken place, and the railroad bridges 
over the Susquehanna were then burning. The usual 
means of communication being thus broken off, Far- 
ragut and his party had to take passage for Philadel- 
phia in a canal boat, on which were crowded some 
three hundred passengers, many of them refugees 
like themselves. It is a curious illustration of the 
hardships attending a flight under such exigency, 
even in so rich a country as our own, that a baby in 
the company had to be fed on biscuit steeped in 
brandy for want of proper nourishment. 

From Philadelphia the journey to New York was 
easy, and Farragut there settled his family in a small 
cottage in the village of Hastings, on the Hudson 
River. Here he awaited events, hoping for employ- 
ment ; but it is one of the cruel circumstances at- 
tending civil strife that confidence is shaken, and the 



THE QUESTION OF ALLEGIANCE. 113 

suspicions that arise, however unjust, defy reason and 
constrain the Government to defer to them. No man 
could have given stronger proof than Farragut had 
of his perfect loyalty ; but all shades of opinion were 
known to exist among officers of Southern origin, 
even when they remained in the service, and there 
were those who, though refusing to follow the South, 
would willingly have avoided striking a blow against 
the seceding States. Men were heard to say that 
they would not go with their State, but neither 
would they fight against her; or that they would 
remain in the navy, but seek employment that might 
spare them the pain of taking part in such a contest. 
These illogical positions were soon abandoned as the 
spirit of war gained more and more hold upon the 
feelings of men, but for Farragut they never existed 
after the first blow was struck. Through whatever 
struggles with himself he may have passed in the 
earlier stages of the secession movement, his de- 
cision, when reached, admitted no half-measures, nor 
halted between two opinions. " He stood on no 
neutral ground, he longed to take an active part in 
the war." Nevertheless, the Government could not 
at once accept, as a title to full and implicit confi- 
dence, even the sacrifice of home and life-long asso- 
ciations which he had 'made to the cause of the 
Union. If given any duty, a man of Farragut's rank 
and attainments must needs have one involving much 
responsibility, failure in which would involve not 
only himself but those who had employed him. The 
cry of treachery was sure to follow, and prudent 
officers of Southern birth found it advisable to decline 
employments where they foresaw that delays were 
unavoidable, because they felt that what might be 



114 



ADMIRAL FARRAGUT. 



explained in the case of a Northern man would in 
them be stamped by public opinion as the result of 
disaffection. In Hastings and its neighborhood the 
most grotesque suspicions were spread concerning 
the Southern captain who had thus come to dwell 
among them, and who, for conscience and country, 
had given up more than had been demanded of those 
who thus distrusted him. Time was needed to allow 
men's minds to reach a more reasonable frame, and 
for the Government itself to sift and test, not merely 
the fidelity, but the heartiness and the probable ca- 
pacity of the officers at its command. 

Farragut's first employment was as a member of 
a board to recommend officers for retirement from 
active service, under an act approved August 3, 
1861. The object of this act was to assist the De- 
partment in the discrimination necessary to be made 
between the competent and those disabled by years 
or infirmity, for up to that time there had been no 
regular system of retirement, and men were retained 
on the active list past the period of efficiency, be- 
cause no provision for removing them existed. The 
duty, though most important with war actually exist- 
ing, was delicate and trying, and far from consonant 
to Farragut's active, enterprising character. More 
suitable employment was, however, fast approaching. 




PERATIONS, 1862-1864. 



CHAPTER VII. 

THE NEW ORLEANS EXPEDITION. 
1862. 

The necessity of controlling the Mississippi val- 
ley had been early realized by the United States 
Government. In its hands the great stream would 
become an impassable barrier between two large 
sections of the Southern Confederacy ; whereas in 
the possession of the latter it remained a link bind- 
ing together all the regions through which it flowed, 
or which were penetrated by any of its numerous 
tributaries. The extensive territory west of the 
river also produced a large part of the provisions 
upon which depended the Southern armies, whose 
main field of action was, nevertheless, on the eastern 
side. In a country habitually so unprepared for war 
as is the United States, and where, of course, such a 
contingency as an intestine struggle between the 
sections could not have been provided for, there 
seemed room to hope that the national forces might 
by rapid action seize the whole course of the river, 
before the seceding States were able to take ade- 
quate measures for its defense. The Government 
had the support of that part of the country which 
had received the largest manufacturing development, 
and could, therefore, most quickly prepare the ma- 




SUEKE OF Farragut's 0, 



PERATIONS, 1862-18C4. 



jl6 ADMIRAL FARRAGUT. 

terial for war, in which both sides were lamentably 
deficient ; and, what was yet more important, it pos- 
sessed in the new navy built since 1855 an efficient 
weapon to which the South had nothing to oppose. 
The hope was extravagant and doomed to disappoint- 
ment ; for to overrun and hold so extensive a terri- 
tory as the immediate basin of the Mississippi re- 
quired a development of force on the one side and 
a degree of exhaustion on the other which could 
not be reached so early in the war. The relative 
strengths, though unequal, were not yet sufficiently 
disproportioned to enable the gigantic work to be 
accomplished ; and the principal result of an effort 
undertaken without due consideration was to para- 
lyze a large fraction of a navy too small in numbers 
to afford the detachment which was paraded gal- 
lantly, but uselessly, above New Orleans. Nor was 
this the worst ; the time thus consumed in marching 
up the hill in order at once to march down again 
threw away the opportunity for reducing Mobile be- 
fore its defenses were strengthened. Had the navy 
been large enough, both tasks might have been at- 
tempted; but it will appear in the sequel that its 
scanty numbers were the reason which postponed 
the attack on Mobile from month to month, until it 
became the most formidable danger Farragut ever 
had to encounter. 

Despite the extensive sea-coast of the United 
States and the large maritime commerce possessed 
by it at the opening of the war, the navy had never, 
except for short and passing intervals, been regarded 
with the interest its importance deserved. To this 
had doubtless contributed the fixed policy of the 
Government to concentrate its attention upon the 



THE NEW ORLEANS EXPEDITION. 



117 



internal development of the country, and to concern 
itself little with external interests, except so far as 
they promoted the views of that section which de- 
sired to give extension to slaveholding territory. 
The avoidance of entangling alliances had become 
perverted to indifference to the means by which 
alone, in the last resort, the nation can assert and 
secure control in regions outside its borders, but 
vitally affecting its prosperity and safety. The power 
of. navies was therefore, then as now, but little 
understood. Consequently, when the importance of 
the Mississippi Valley was realized, as it immediately 
was, there was but one idea as to the means of con- 
trolling it, and that was by a land invasion from the 
great Western and Northwestern States. To this a 
navy was indeed to be adjoined, but in a manner so 
distinctly subsidiary that it was, contrary to all cus- 
tom, placed under the orders of the commander-in- 
chief of the Western army, and became simply a div- 
ision of the land forces. From this subordinate 
position it was soon raised by its own intrinsic value 
and the logic of facts ; but the transient experience 
is noteworthy, because illustrating the general ig- 
norance of the country as to the powers of the 
priceless weapon which lay ready, though unnoticed, 
to its hand. 

Happily, in the Navy Department itself juster 
views prevailed ; and the general indifference per- 
mitted it at least one compensation — to follow its 
own ways. The Secretary himself was not a profes- 
sional man, though he had had official connection 
with the service in the past ; but most fortunately 
there was called to his assistance one who had been 
for eighteen years in the navy, had passed while in 



IlS ADMIRAL FARRAGUT. 

it to the command of mail steamers, and only five 
years before the war had resigned and entered civil 
life. This gentleman, Mr. Gustavus V. Fox, thus 
combined with business experience and an extensive 
acquaintance with naval officers the capacities of a 
seaman. He knew what ships could do and what 
they could not; but to this common knowledge of 
sea officers, gained by the daily habit of sea life, he 
had added the results of study and reflection upon 
events passing elsewhere than under his own obser- 
vation. The experiences of the allied navies in the 
Crimean War had convinced him that, if the wooden 
sides of ships could not be pitted in prolonged stand- 
up fight against the stone walls of fortresses, they 
were capable of enduring such battering as they might 
receive in running by them through an unobstructed 
channel. This conviction received support by the 
results of the attacks upon Hatteras Inlet and Port 
Royal. He might, indeed, have gone much further 
back and confirmed his own judgment as a seaman 
by the express opinion of an eminent soldier. Nearly 
a hundred years before, AVashington, at the siege of 
Yorktown, had urged the French Admiral De Grasse 
to send vessels past Cornwallis's works to control the 
upper York River, saying : " I am so well satisfied by 
experience of the little effect of land batteries on 
vessels passing them with a leading breeze that, un- 
less the two channels near Yorktown should be found 
impracticable by obstructions, I should have the 
greatest confidence in the success of this important 
service."* 

In this conviction of Mr. Fox's lay the inception 

* Washington's Letters, October i, 1781. 



THE NEW ORLEANS EXPEDITION. 



119 



of the expedition against New Orleans. It was, in 
his view, to be a purely naval attack. Once over 
the bar at the mouth of the river, the channel as far 
as the city had no natural obstruction, was clearly 
defined, and easily followed, by day or night, without 
a pilot. The heavy current of the early spring 
months, while it would retard the passage of the 
ships and so keep them longer under fire, would 
make it difficult for the enemy to maintain in po- 
sition any artificial barrier placed by him. The 
works to be passed — the seaward defenses of New 
Orleans, Forts Jackson and St. Philip — were power- 
ful fortifications ; but they were ultimately dependent 
upon the city, ninety miles above them, for a support 
which could come only by the river. A fleet an- 
chored above the forts lay across their only line of 
communication, and when thus isolated, their fall 
became only a question of time. The work pro- 
posed to the United States Navy was, therefore, to 
turn the forts by passing their fire, seize their line of 
communications — the upper river — and their base. 
New Orleans, and then to give over the latter to the 
army, which engaged to furnish a force sufficient to 
hold the conquest. 

Having first taken the necessary, but strictly 
preliminary, step of seizing as a depot Ship Island, 
in Mississippi Sound, about a hundred miles from 
the mouth of the river, Mr. Fox's proposition, which 
had been adopted by the Secretary of the Navy, was 
submitted to the President. Mr. Lincoln, himself a 
Western man, unfamiliar with maritime matters and 
engrossed with the idea of invasion from the north, 
was disposed to be incredulous of success ; but with 
his usual open-mindedness consented to a full dis- 



I20 ADMIRAL FARRAGUT. 

cussion before him by experts from both services. 
A meeting was therefore held with General McClel- 
lan at his headquarters. There were present, besides 
the President, the Secretary of the Navy, Mr. Fox, 
and Commander David D. Porter, who had recently 
returned from service off the mouth of the Mississippi. 
The antecedents of General McClellan were those of 
an officer of the engineers, who are generally dis- 
posed to exaggerate the powers of forts as compared 
with ships, and to contemplate their reduction only 
by regular approaches ; just as an officer of the line 
of the army, looking to the capture of a place like 
New Orleans, will usually and most properly seek 
first a base of operations, from which he will project 
a campaign whose issue shall be the fall of the city. 
To this cause was probably due the preference ob- 
served by the Navy Department to exist in army 
circles, for an attack upon Mobile first. Being close 
to the sea, which was completely under the control 
of the navy, the necessary land operations would 
begin under far more favorable conditions, and could 
be more easily maintained than in the alluvial soil of 
the Mississippi delta. McClellan, who was an accom- 
plished master of his profession in all its branches, 
received at first the impression that regular mili- 
tary operations against New Orleans by way of the 
river were being proposed to him, and demurred; 
but, on learning that the only demand was for a force 
to hold the city and surroundings in case of success, 
he readily consented to detail ten or fifteen thousand 
troops for the purpose. Though more hazardous, 
the proposition of the Navy Department was in 
principle strategically sound. The key of the po- 
sition was to be struck for at once, and the outlying 



THE NEW ORLEANS EXPEDITION. 121 

defenses were expected then to fall by the severance 
of their communications. The general might have 
his own opinion as to the power of the navy to carry 
out the proposed passage of the forts, and as to 
whether its coal, when once above, would outlast the 
endurance of the hostile garrisons; but those were 
points upon which the Navy Department, which 
undertook the risk, might be presumed to have more 
accurate judgment than himself. 

The conference, which was held about the middle 
of November, 1861, resulted in the adoption of Mr. 
Fox's plan in its main outlines; but with an impor- 
tant addition, which threatened at one time to become 
a very serious modification. Commander Porter sug- 
gested that the naval vessels should be accompanied 
by a mortar flotilla, to subdue the fire of the forts by 
bombardment, and so to allow the fleet to pass with- 
out risk, or with risk much diminished. This propo- 
sition approved itself to the engineer instincts of 
McClellan, and was adopted. The general then 
designated Major Barnard, of the Engineer Corps, to 
represent him in adjusting the details of the expedi- 
tion. Barnard also took strong ground in favor of 
the mortars, and to this added the opinion — in which 
Porter concurred — that the forts should be not merely 
bombarded, but reduced before the passage. He 
summed up his conclusions in the following perfectly 
clear words: "To pass those works (merely) with a 
fleet and appear before New Orleans is merely a raid 
— no capture. New Orleans and the river can not 
be held until communications are perfectly estab- 
lished." The assertion of the last sentence can not 
be denied ; it admits of no difference of opinion. 
The point in dispute between the two arguments was 
Q 



122 ADMIRAL FARRAGUT. 



not this, but whether the fall of the city, which had 
no local defenses, would entail that of the forts, and 
so open the communications. Mr, Fox strongly held 
that it would; but although he stuck to his opinion, 
he had a deservedly high estimate of Porter's pro- 
fessional ability — so much so that, had the latter's 
rank justified, he would have urged him for the com- 
mand of the expedition. In this doubtful state of 
the argument, it will be seen of how great impor- 
tance was the choice of the officer to be put m charge 
of the whole undertaking. Had he also taken the 
view of Barnard and Porter in favor of the more 
cautious, but — as it proved — more dangerous course, 
it could scarcely have failed that Fox would have 
been overruled. 

The nomination of this officer could not be longer 
deferred. Secrecy and rapidity of action were large 
elements in the hoped-for achievement, and secrecy 
depends much upon the length of time the secret 
must be kept. Among the officers whose length of 
service and professional reputation indicated them as 
suitable for the position, there was little to guide the 
department to the man who would on emergency 
show the audacity and self-reliance demanded by the 
intended operations. The action proposed, though 
it falls within the limits of the methods which history 
has justified, and has, therefore, a legitimate place 
in the so-called science of war, was, nevertheless, 
as the opinions of Barnard and Porter show, con- 
trary to the more usual and accepted practice. It 
disregarded the safeguards commonly insisted upon, 
overleaped the successive steps by which military 
achievement ordinarily advances to its end, and, 
looking only to the exceptional conditions, resorted 



n 



THE NEW ORLEANS EXPEDITION. 



123 



fearlessly to exceptional methods. For such a duty 
the department needed a man of more than average 
determination and vigor. 

Farragut's name was necessarily among those con- 
sidered ; but the final choice appears to have been de- 
termined by the impression made upon Mr. Fox, and 
through him upon the department, by his course in 
leaving Norfolk at the time and in the way he did. 
This, Fox argued, showed "great superiority of 
character, clear perception of duty, and firm resolu- 
tion in the performance of it." His conspicuous 
ability was not then recognized, could not be until 
revealed by war ; but it was evident that he stood 
well above the common run of simply accomplished 
officers. Still, further tests were required ; in a mat- 
ter of so much importance the department had need 
to move warily. That Farragut was faithful could 
not be doubted ; but was his heart so far in the con- 
test that he could be depended upon to exert his 
abilities to the full ? Commander Porter was ordered 
to go to New York on duty connected with the mor- 
tar flotilla, and while there to make an opportunity 
to visit Farragut. There had been, as is known, a 
close relation between the two families, and to him 
Farragut was likely to show how hearty he was in 
the cause. Porter's account was most favorable, and 
it then remained only to judge whether he was in 
sympathy with the military plan of the proposed ex- 
pedition. 

For this object Farragut was ordered to report 
at the department, and Fox undertook to meet him 
at the train and talk over the matter informally. 
He arrived in Washington on the 21st of Decem- 
ber, was met as arranged, and taken to the house 



124 



ADMIRAL FARRAGUT. 



of the Postmaster-General, Montgomery Blair. The 
latter was brother-in-law to Fox, and the three break- 
fasted together. " After breakfast. Fox laid before 
Farragut the plan of attack, the force to be employed, 
and the object to be attained, and asked his opinion. 
Farragut answered unhesitatingly that it would suc- 
ceed. Fox then handed him the list of vessels being 
fitted out, and asked if they were enough. Farragut 
replied he would engage to run by the forts and capt- 
ure New Orleans with two thirds the number. Fox 
told him more vessels would be added, and that he 
would command the expedition. Farragut's delight 
and enthusiasm were so great that when he left us 
Fox asked if I did not think he was too enthusiastic, 
I replied I was most favorably impressed with him, 
and sure he would succeed."* There could be no 
question, at any rate, that his whole heart was in the 
war and in the expedition ; whether he would rise 
equal to his task still remained to be seen. He said, 
however, frankly, that had he been previously con- 
sulted, he would have advised against the employ- 
ment of the mortar flotilla. He had no faith in the 
efficacy of that mode of attack since his observations 
of the results at San Juan de Ulloa, twenty-three 
years before. He was convinced that the fleet could 
run by the forts, and anticipated nothing but delay 
from the bombardment. Nevertheless, since the ar- 
rangements had been made, he was willing to give 
the bombs a trial. " He was never profuse in prom- 
ises," writes Mr. Welles, the Secretary of the Navy, 
"but he felt complimented that he was selected, and 
I saw that in modest self-reliance he considered him- 

* Montgomery Blair, in The United Service^ January, iS8l. 



THE NEW ORLEANS EXPEDITION. 



125 



self equal to the emergency and to the expectation 
of the Government,"* To his home he wrote: 
" Keep your lips closed and burn my letters, for per- 
fect silence is to be observed — the first injunction of 
the Secretary. I am to have a flag in the Gulf, and 
the rest depends upon myself. Keep calm and silent. 
I shall sail in three weeks." 

On the 23d of December, 1861, Farragut received 
preparatory orders, and on the 9th of the following 
January was formally appointed to command the West- 
ern Gulf Blockading Squadron ; the limits of which, 
on the coast of the Confederacy, were defined as from 
St. Andrew's Bay to the mouth of the Rio Grande. 
The coasts of Mexico and Yucatan were also embraced 
in them. The steam sloop-of-war Hartford was se- 
lected for his flag-ship. On the 20th of January final 
orders were issued to him. These were somewhat dis- 
creetly worded, and, literally understood, must be con- 
ceded to take from the department the credit of boldly 
adhering to, and assuming the responsibility of, the 
original plan — a credit Mr. Welles seems desirous to 
claim. " When you are completely ready," they read, 
"you will collect such vessels as can be spared from 
the blockade, and proceed up the Mississippi River 
and reduce the defenses which guard the approaches to 
New Orleans, 7vhen you will appear off that city and 
take possession of it under the guns of your squad- 
ron." Understood according to the plain meaning 
of the words, these orders prescribed the reduction 
of the works as a condition precedent to appearing 
off the city, and so recur to the fears expressed by 
both Barnard and Porter as to the consequences of 

* Gideon Welles, in the Galaxy, November, 1 871. 



126 ADMIRAL FARRAGUT. 

leaving the forts unreduced. There is not in them 
even "the latitude and discretion in the employment 
of the means placed under his command " which Mr. 
Welles claimed.* Had Farragut, after leaving the 
forts unreduced, as he did, met with serious disaster, 
it can scarcely be doubted that the phrase quoted 
would have been used to acquit the Government. 

The steam-sloop Hartford, upon which Farragut 
now hoisted his flag, and in which he continued 
throughout the war, was a nearly new vessel, having 
sailed on her first cruise to China in the summer of 
1859. She belonged to the early period of the tran- 
sition from sails to steam for the motive power of 
vessels; the steam being regarded as auxiliary only, 
and giving her a speed of but eight knots per 
hour, while the spars and sail area were those of a 
full-rigged ship. The deficiency of horse-power was 
a serious drawback in such an operation as passing 
forts, especially when, as in the Mississippi, the cur- 
rent was strong and always adverse to vessels as- 
cending the river. The Hartford had, on the other 
hand, a powerful battery of the best existent type. 
She carried twenty-two Dahlgren nme-inch shell 
guns, eleven on each side ; and, owing to the lowness 
of the river banks, these guns would be on a level 
with or even above those in the lower tier of the 
batteries opposed to her. The Pensacola, Brooklyn, 
and Richmond were vessels of the same type as the 
Hartford, and built at the same time. 

On the 2d of February, 1862, the Hartford sailed 
from Hampton Roads, and on the 20th reached Ship 
Island. The following day Farragut took over the 



* Gideon Welles, in the Galaxy, December, 1871. 



to^r^^ 



<^' 



rt ST PHILIP 




BA T TLRY 



First 'D\\\?,io-fi— Leading vnder command of 
Captain Theodorus Bailey. 

1. Cayuga. Flair-Ciunboat. Lieut. -Com. Harrison. 

2. Pc'iLsacola. Captain H. W. Morris. 

3. Mi.'isissipi)!, Captain M. Smitli. 

4. Oneida, Commander S. P. Lee. 

5. Varuna, Commander C. S. Bojrgs. 

6. Katahdin, Lieut. -Com. G. H. Preble. 

7. Kineo. Lieut. -Com. Ransom. 

8. Wissahickon, Lieut.-Com. A. N. Smith. 

Center Division— .lc?m?ra/ Farragut. 

9. Hartford, Commander Wainwright. 
10. Brooiclyn. Captain T. T. Craven, 
n. Kichmond, Coiumauder J. Alden. 

Third Division— C'a^j/ain H. II. Bell. 

12. Sciota. Lieut.-Com. Edward Donaldson. 

13. Iroquois, Com. John De Camp. 

14. Kennebec, Lieut.-Com. John H. Russell. 
1.5. Pinola, Lieut.-Com. P. Crosby. 

16. Itasca, Lieut.-Com. C. H. B. Caldwell. 

17. Winona, Lieut.-Com. E. T. Nichols. 

18. Commander Porter's Gunboats. 

19. Sloop Portsmouth, Commander S. Swartwout. 

Passage of Forts Jackson and St. Philip, April 24, 1863. 
Order of Attack. 



THE NiiW ORLEANS EXPEDITION. 127 

command of his district and squadron from Flag 
Officer McKean, who up to that time had had charge 
of both the East and West Gulf. None of the other 
vessels of the expedition were yet there ; but they 
came in one by one and were rapidly assembled at 
the Southwest Pass, then the principal entrance to 
the river. Much difficulty was encountered in get- 
ting the heavier ships over the bar, two weeks' work 
being needed to drag the Pensacola inside ; but on 
the 7th of April she floated in the river, and Farragut 
found his force complete. It then consisted, inde- 
pendently of the steamers attached to the mortar 
flotilla, of four steam sloops-of-war of about two 
thousand tons each, three of half that size, one 
large side-wheel ship-of-war, the Mississippi, of seven- 
teen hundred tons, and nine gun-boats of five hun- 
dred. The latter had been hurriedly built to meet 
the special exigencies of this war, and were then 
commonly known as the *' ninety -day " gunboats. 
Each carried one eleven -inch shell-gun and one 
thirty-pounder rifle. The aggregate batteries of the 
seventeen vessels composing the squadron, excluding 
some light brass pieces, amounted to one hundred 
and fifty-four cannon, of which one hundred and 
thirty-five were thirty-two pounders or above. 

The two forts which constituted the principal de- 
fenses of New Orleans against a naval attack from 
the sea were at Plaquemine Bend, about twenty miles 
above the Head of the Passes ; by which name is 
known the point where the main stream of the Mis- 
sissippi divides into several channels, called passes, 
through which its waters find their way to the Gulf. 
The river, whose general course below New Orleans 
is southeast, turns at Plaquemine Bend northeast 



128 ADMIRAL FARRAGUT. 

for a mile and three-quarters, and then resumes its 
previous direction. The heavier of the two works, 
Fort Jackson, is on the right bank, at the lower angle 
of the Bend. It was a casemated brick structure, 
pentagonal in form, carrying in barbette over the 
casemates twenty-seven cannon of and above the 
size of thirty-two pounders, besides eleven twenty- 
four pounders. In the casemates were fourteen of 
the latter caliber. Attached to this fort, but below 
it, was a water battery carrying half a dozen heavy 
cannon. Fort St. Philip was nearly opposite Fort 
Jackson, but somewhat below it, so as to command 
not only the stream in its front, but also the stretch 
down the river, being thus enabled to rake vessels 
approaching from below before they came abreast. 
It comprised the fort proper and two water batteries, 
w^hich together mounted forty-two guns. The sites 
of these fortifications had been skillfully chosen ; but 
their armaments, though formidable and greatly su- 
perior to those of the fleet — regard being had to the 
commonly accepted maxim that a gun ashore is 
equivalent to four afloat — were not equal to the de- 
mands of the situation or to the importance of New 
Orleans. Out of a total of one hundred and niq.e 
pieces,* of which probably over ninety could be used 
against a passing fleet, fifty-six, or more than half, 
were of the very old and obsolete caliber of twenty- 
four pounders. 

This inadequate preparation, a year after the 
attack upon Fort Sumter and the outbreak of hos- 
tilities, is doubtless to be attributed to surprise. 
The Southern authorities, like those of the National 

* There were some guns bearing inland and some flanking 
howitzers, besides those already enumerated. 



THE NEW ORLEANS EXPEDITION. 



129 



Government, were firmly possessed with the idea 
that the Mississippi, if subdued at all, must be so by 
an attack from the north. Despite the frequency of 
spies and treason along the border line of the two 
sections, the steps of the Navy Department were 
taken so quietly, and followed so closely upon the 
resolve to act, that the alarm was not quickly taken ; 
and when intimations of attack from the sea did 
filter through, they had to encounter and dislodge 
strong contrary preoccupations in the minds of the 
Southern leaders. Only the Confederate general 
commanding the military division and his principal 
subordmates seem to have been alive to the danger 
of New Orleans, and their remonstrances had no 
effect. Not only were additional guns denied them 
and sent North, but drafts were made on their 
narrow resources to supply points considered to 
be in greater danger. A striking indication of the 
prepossessions which controlled the authorities at 
Richmond was elicited by Commodore Hollins, of 
the Confederate Navy. That gallant veteran was 
ordered to take to Memphis several of the rams 
extemporized at New Orleans. He entreated the 
Navy Department to allow him to remain, but the 
reply was that the main attack upon New Orleans 
would be from above, not from below. After the 
fleet entered the river he telegraphed from Mem- 
phis for permission to return, but received the an- 
swer that the proposition was wholly inadmissible. 
Before the Court of Inquiry upon the loss of New 
Orleans, he testified that the withdrawal of his ships 
was the chief cause of the disaster.* 

* Official Records of the War of the Rebellion, Series I, vol. vi; 
p. 610. 



j^Q ADMIRAL FARRAGUT. 

While the heavy ships were being dragged over 
the bar at the Southwest Pass, the mortar flotilla had 
entered the river under the command of Commander 
Porter. No time was avoidably lost, though there 
were inevitable delays due to the magnitude of the 
preparations that in every quarter taxed the energies 
of the Government. On the i6th of April, less than 
ten days after the Pensacola got safely inside, the 
fleet was anchored just out of range of the forts. 
On the i8th the mortar vessels were in position, and 
at lo A. M. the bombardment by them began, con- 
tinuing throughout the succeeding days till the pas- 
sage of the fleet, and being chiefly directed upon 
Fort Jackson. From daylight to dark a shell a 
minute was fired, and as the practice was remarkably 
good a great proportion of these fell within the fort. 
As Farragut had predicted, they did not in the 
course of six days' bombardment do harm enough to 
compel a surrender or disable the work ; but they 
undoubtedly harassed the garrison to an extent that 
exercised an appreciable effect upon the fire of Jack- 
son during the passage. 

While the bombardment was progressing, the 
lighter vessels of the squadron were continuously 
engaged by detachments in protecting the mortar 
flotilla, steaming up above it and drawing upon 
themselves the fire of the forts. A more important 
duty was the removal of the obstructions that the 
enemy had thrown across the river, below the works, 
but under their fire. Opinions differed, both in the 
United States squadron and in the counsels of the 
enemy, as to the power of the ships to pass the forts ; 
but it was realized on both sides that any barrier to 
their passage which should force them to stop under 



THE NEW ORLEANS EXPEDITION. 131 

fire, or should throw confusion into their order, 
would materially increase the chances against them. 
Whatever the blindness or neglect of the Confederate 
Government, the Confederate officers of the depart- 
ment had not been remiss in this matter. The con- 
struction of a floating barrier had early engaged 
their attention, and, despite the difficulties presented 
by so rapid a current, a formidable raft had been 
placed early in the winter. It consisted of cypress 
logs forty feet long and four or five feet in diameter, 
lying lengthwise in the river, with an interval of 
three feet between them to allow drift to pass. The 
logs were connected by two and a half inch iron 
cables, stretching underneath from one side of the 
stream to the other ; and the whole fabric was held 
up against the current by some thirty heavy anchors 
and cables. So long as it stood, this constituted a 
very grave difficulty for an attacking fleet ; but the 
water was deep and the holding ground poor, so that 
even under average conditions there was reason to 
fear its giving way. The fleet arrived in the early 
spring, the season when the current, swollen by the 
melting snows about the head waters of the Mis- 
sissippi and its tributaries, is at its strongest ; and in 
1862 the spring rise was greater than for many years. 
In February the raft began to show signs of yielding 
under the pressure of the drift wood accumulating 
on it from above, and on the loth of March the 
cables had parted, the sections on either side being 
swept against the banks and leaving about a third of 
the river open. The gap was filled by anchoring in 
it eight heavy schooners of about two hundred tons 
burden. They were joined together as the cypress 
logs had been, but with lighter chains, probably be- 



132 



ADMIRAL FARRAGUT. 



cause no heavy ones were at hand ; and, as a further 
embarrassment to the assailants, their masts were 
unstepped and allowed to drag astern with the 
rigging attached, in the hopes that by fouling the 
screws the ascending vessels might be crippled. 

This central barrier of schooners was not intrin- 
sically strong, but it was not to be despised, con- 
sidering the very moderate speed possessed by the 
ships and the strength of the current which they had 
to stem. It was doubtful whether they could break 
through with so little loss of way as to produce no 
detention ; and the mere presence of so many hulls 
on a dark night and under the added gloom of the 
battle's smoke was liable to increase a confusion 
which could redound only to the advantage of the 
defense. It became necessary, therefore, to remove 
the schooners in whole or in part. This was ef- 
fected in a very daring manner by two gunboats, 
the Itasca and Pinola, Captains Caldwell and 
Crosby ; the fleet captain, Henry H. Bell, an officer 
in whom Farragut had the most unbounded confi- 
dence, being placed in command of both. The 
work had to be done, of course, within range of 
the hostile batteries, which, through some culpable 
negligence, failed to molest it. The Pinola carried 
an electrician with a petard, by which it was hoped 
to shatter the chains. This attempt, however, failed, 
owing to the wires of the electrical battery parting 
before the charge could be exploded. The Itasca, 
on the other hand, ran alongside one of the schooners 
and slipped the chains; but, unfortunately, as the 
hulk was set adrift without Captain Caldwell being 
notified, and the engines of the gunboat were going 
ahead with the helm a-port, the two vessels turned 



THE NEW ORLEANS EXPEDITION. 



133 



inshore and ran aground under fire of the forts. In 
this critical position the Itasca remained for some 
time, until the Pinola could be recalled to her assist- 
ance; and then several attempts had to be made be- 
fore she finally floated. Caldwell then did an ex- 
ceedingly gallant thing, the importance of which 
alone justified, but amply justified, its temerity. In- 
stead of returning at once to the squadron, satisfied 
with the m.easure of success already attained, he de- 
liberately headed up the river ; and then, having 
gained sufficient ground in that direction to insure 
a full development of his vessel's speed, he turned 
and charged full upon the line of hulks. As she 
met the chains, the little vessel rose bodily three or 
four feet from the water, sliding up on them and 
dragging the hulks down with her. The chains 
stood the strain for an instant, then snapped, and 
the Itasca, having wrought a practicable breach, 
sped down to the fleet. 

While these various accessory operations were 
going on, Admiral Farragut's mind was occupied 
with the important question of carrying out the ob- 
ject of his mission. The expedient of reducing or 
silencing the fire of the enemy's forts, in which he 
himself had never felt confidence, was in process of 
being tried ; and the time thus employed was being 
utilized by clearing the river highway and preparing 
the ships to cut their way through without delay, in 
case that course should be adopted. Much had been 
done while at the Head of the Passes, waiting for 
the Pensacola to cross the bar ; but the work was 
carried on unremittingly to the last moment. The 
loftier and lighter spars of all the vessels had al- 
ready been sent ashore, together with all unneces- 



134 



ADMIRAL FARRAGUT. 



sary encumbrances, several of the gunboats having 
even unstepped their lower masts ; and the various 
ordinary precautions, known to seamen under the 
name of " clearing ship for action," had been taken 
with reference to fighting on anchoring ground. 
These were particularized in a general order issued 
by the admiral, and to them he added special instruc- 
tions, rendered necessary by the force of the current 
and its constancy in the same direction. " Mount 
one or two guns on the poop and top-gallant fore- 
castle," he said ; ^' in other words, be prepared to 
use as many guns as possible ahead and astern to 
protect yourself against the enemy's gunboats and 
batteries, bearing in mind that you will always have 
to ride head to the current, and can only avail your- 
self of the sheer of the helm to point a broadside 
gun more than three points (thirty-four degrees) 
forward of the beam. . . . Trim your vessel also a 
few inches by the head, so that if she touches the 
bottom she will not swing head down the river," 
which, if the stern caught the bottom, would infal- 
libly happen, entailing the difficult manoeuvre and 
the perilous delay of turning round under the 
enemy's fire in a narrow river and in the dark. The 
vessels generally had secured their spare iron cables 
up and down their sides in the line of the boilers and 
engines ; and these vital parts were further protected 
by piling around them hammocks, bags of sand or 
ashes, and other obstructions to shot. The outsides 
of the hulls were daubed over with Mississippi mud, 
to be less easily discerned in the dark ; while the 
decks were whitewashed, so as to throw in stronger 
relief articles lying upon them which needed to be 
quickly seen. 



THE NEW ORLEANS EXPEDITION. 



135 



Having given his general instructions, the flag 
officer could intrust the details of preparation to 
his subordinates ; but no one could relieve him of 
the momentous decision upon which the issues of the 
campaign must turn. The responsibility of rejecting 
one course of action and adopting another was his 
alone ; and as has already been remarked, the word- 
ing of the department's order, literally understood, 
imposed upon him the task of reducing the forts be- 
fore approaching the city. The questions involved 
were essentially the same as those presented to 
every general officer when the course of a cam- 
paign has brought him face to face with a strong 
position of the enemy. Shall it be carried by direct 
attack, and, until so subdued, arrest the progress of 
the army ? or can it be rendered impotent or un- 
tenable by severing its communications and by 
operations directed against the district in its rear, 
which it protects, and upon which it also depends ? 
The direct attack may be by assault, by investment, 
or by regular siege approaches ; but whatever the 
method, the result is the same — the assailant is de- 
tained for a longer or shorter time before the po- 
sition. During such detention the post fulfills its 
mission of securing the region it covers, and permits 
there the uninterrupted prosecution of the military 
efforts of every character which are designed to im- 
pede the progress of the invader. 

To such cases no general rule applies ; each turns 
upon particular conditions, and, although close simi- 
larities may exist between various instances, probably 
no two are entirely identical. It is evident, however, 
that very much will depend upon the offensive power 
shut up in the position under consideration. If it be 



136 



ADMIRAL FARRAGUT. 



great walled town, such as are found on the Continent 
of Europe, behind whose defenses are sheltered nu- 
merous troops, the assailant who advances beyond it 
thereby exposes his communications to attack ; and, 
to guard against this danger, must protect them by 
a force adequate to hold the garrison in check. If, 
again, there be but a single Ime by which the com- 
munications can be maintained, by which supplies 
and re-enforcements can go forward, and that line 
passes close under the work and is commanded by 
it, the garrison may be small, incapable of external 
action, and yet may vitally affect the future opera- 
tions of the venturesome enemy who dares to leave 
it unsubdued behind him. Such, to some extent, was 
the Fort of Bard, in the narrow pass of the Dora 
Baltea, to Napoleon's crossing of the St. Bernard in 
1800; and such, to some extent, would be Forts 
Jackson and St. Philip to Farragut's fleet after it 
had fought its way above. The Mississippi was the 
great line of communication for the fleet ; no other 
was comparable to it — except as a by-path in a 
mountain is comparable to a royal highway — and 
the forts commanded the Mississippi. Their own 
offensive power was limited to the range of their 
guns ; their garrisons were not fitted, either by their 
number or their aptitudes, for offensive action upon 
the water; but so long as their food and ammu- 
nition lasted, though an occasional vessel might run 
by them, no steady stream of supplies, such as every 
armed organization needs, could pass up the Missis- 
sippi. Finally, though the garrison could not move, 
there lay behind or under the forts a number of armed 
vessels, whose precise powers were unknown, but con- 
cerning which most exaggerated rumors were current. 



THE NEW ORLEANS EXPEDITION. 



n7 



The question, therefore, looming before Farragut 
was precisely that which had been debated before 
the President in Washington ; precisely that on 
which Fox had differed from Porter and Barnard. 
It was, again, closely analogous to that which divided 
Sherman and Grant when the latter, a year after 
Farragut ran by the forts, made his famous decision 
to cut adrift from his communications by the upper 
Mississippi, to march past Vicksburg by the west 
bank of the river, to cross below the works, and so 
cut off the great stronghold of the Mississippi from 
the country upon which it depended for food and re- 
enforcements.* But as Grant's decision rested upon 

* The following is Grant's account of a matter which, but for 
Sherman's own zeal in proclaiming the merits of his commander- 
in-chief, would probably have always remained unknown. It 
would be difficult to find a closer parallel to the difference of 
judgment existing between Farragut and Porter at New Orleans : 
" When General Sherman first learned of the move I proposed to 
make, he called to see me about it. I was seated on the piazza, 
engaged in conversation with my staff, when he came up. After 
a few moments' conversation, he said he would like to see me 
alone. We passed into the house together and shut the door after 
us. Sherman then expressed his alarm at the move I had ordered, 
saying that I was putting myself voluntarily in a position which 
an enemy would be glad to manoeuvre a year — or a long time — to 
get me in. I was going into the enemy's country, with a large 
river behind me, and the enemy holding points strongly fortified 
above and below. He said that it was an axiom in war that 
when any great body of troops moved against an enemy they 
should do so from a base of supplies which they would guard as 
the apple of the eye, etc. He pointed out all the difficulties that 
might be encountered in the campaign proposed, and stated in 
turn what would be the true campaign to make. This was, in 
substance, to go back until high ground could be reached on the 
east bank of the river, fortify there and establish a depot of sup- 
plies, and move from there, being always prepared to fall back 
lO 



138 ADMIRAL FARRAGUT. 

a balance of arguments applicable to the problem 
before him, so did Farragut's upon a calculation of 
the risks and advantages attendant, respectively, 
upon the policy of waiting for the forts to fall, or of 
speeding by them to destroy the resources upon 
which they depended. 

The reasons in favor of waiting for the fall of the 
works were ably presented by Commander Porter in 
a paper which he asked to have read in a council of 
commanding officers of the fleet, assembled on board 
the flag-ship on the third day of the bombardment, 
April 20. Farragut was already familiar with the 
arguments on both sides, and Porter's paper can be 
regarded only as an expression of views already ut- 
tered, but now invested with a formality becoming 
the seriousness of the occasion. In its finality it 
has somewhat the character of a protest, though in- 
direct and couched in perfectly becoming language, 
against a decision which Farragut had now reached 
and which Porter had always combated. The latter 

upon it in case of disaster. I said this would take us back to 
Memphis. Sherman then said that was the very place he should 
go to, and would move by railroad from Memphis to Granada. 
To this I replied, the country is already disheartened over the 
lack of success on the part of our armies, . . . and if we went 
back so far as Memphis, it would discourage the people so much 
that bases of supplies would be of no use ; neither men to hold 
them nor supplies to put in them would be furnished. The prob- 
lem was to move forward to a decisive victory, or our cause was 
lost. . . . Sherman wrote to my adjutant-general embodying his 
views of the campaign that should be made, and asking him to 
advise me at least to get the views of my generals upon the sub- 
ject. Rawlins showed me the letter, but I did not see any rea- 
sons for changing my plans." — Personal Afe??ioirs of U.S. Grants 
vol. i, p. 542 (note). 



THE NEW ORLEANS EXPEDITION. 



139 



does not appear to have doubted the ability of the 
fleet to pass the works, but he questioned the utility 
and expediency of so doing. His words were as 
follows : * 

"The objections to running by the forts are 
these: It is not likely that any intelligent enemy 
would fail to place chains across above the forts, and 
raise such batteries as would protect them against 
our ships. Did we run the forts we should leave an 
enemy in our rear, and the mortar vessels would 
have to be left behind. We could not return to 
bring them up without going through a heavy and 
destructive fire. If the forts are run, part of the 
mortars should be towed along, which would render 
the progress of the vessels slow against the strong 
current at that point. If the forts are first captured, 
the moral effect would be to close the batteries on 
the river and open the way to New Orleans ; where- 
as, if we don't succeed in taking them, we shall have 
to fight our way up the river. Once having posses- 
sion of the forts. New Orleans would be hermetically 
sealed, and we could repair damages and go up on 
our own terms and in our own time. . . . Nothing 
has been said about a combined attack of army and 
navy. Such a thing is not only practicable, but, if 
time permitted, should be adopted. Fort St. Philip 
can be taken with two thousand men covered by the 
ships, the ditch can be filled with fascines, and the 
wall is easily to be scaled with ladders. It can be 
attacked in front and rear." 

In summoning his captains to meet him on this 
occasion, Farragut had no idea of calling a council- 

* The paper being long, only those parts are quoted which 
convey the objections to running by. 



140 ADMIRAL FARRAGUT. 

of-war in the sense which has brought that name 
into disrepute. He sent for them, not because he 
wanted to make up his mind, but because it was 
made up, and he wished at once to impart to them 
his purposes and receive the benefit of any sugges- 
tion they might make. Bell, the chief-of-staff^ who 
was present, has left a memorandum of what passed, 
which is interesting as showing that the members 
were not called to express an opinion as to the pro- 
priety of the attack, but to receive instructions as to 
the method, on which they could suggest improve- 
ments. 

'' April 20, 10 A. M. Signal was made for all cap- 
tains commanding to repair on board the flag-ship. 
All being present except the three on guard to-day, 
viz., Commander De Camp and Lieutenants-Com- 
manding Nichols and Russell, the flag-officer un- 
folded his plan of operations, assigning the places for 
every vessel in the fleet in the attack, and exhibited his 
charts of the river and of the forts. Some discussion 
was had thereupon, and Commander Alden read 
a written communication to the flag-officer from 
Commander Porter at his request, expressing his 
views as to the operation against the forts. Having 
read them, Commander Alden folded up the paper 
and returned it to his pocket, whereupon I suggested 
the propriety of the document being left with the 
flag-officer, and the paper was accordingly left in his 
hands. It was therein stated that the boom being a 
protection to the mortars against attacks of all kinds 
from above, the boom should not be destroyed until 
the forts were reduced. Upon this the flag-officer 
remarked that the commander had this morning as- 
sented to the propriety of the boom being broken tO' 



THE NEW ORLEANS EXPEDITION. 



141 



night — which I heard — and, again, that the fleet 
should not go above the forts, as the mortar fleet 
would be left unprotected. The flag-officer thought 
the mortars would be as well protected above as be- 
low the forts, and that co-operation with the army, 
which entered into the plans of both parties, could 
not be effectual unless some of the troops were intro- 
duced above the forts at the same time that they are 
below. Once above, he intended to cover their land- 
ing at Quarantine, five miles above, they coming to 
the river through the bayou there. Once above, the 
forts were cut off and his propellers intact for as- 
cending the river to the city. And in passing the 
forts, if he found his ships able to cope with them, 
he should fight it out. Some of the captains and 
commanders considered it a hazardous thing to go 
above, as being out of the reach of supplies. To 
this it may be said that the steamers can pass down 
at the rate of twelve miles an hour. The flag-officer 
remarked that our ammunition is being rapidly con- 
sumed without a supply at hand, and that something 
must be done immediately. He believed in celerity. 
It was proposed by myself and assented to by the 
flag-officer, that three steamers should go up the 
river shortly after dark, under my own guidance, to 
break the boom." 

It appears from this account, supported by the 
general order issued immediately after it and given 
a few pages further on, that Farragut had definitely 
determined not to await the reduction of the forts, 
because the bombardment so far did not indicate 
any probability of effectual results. It was his de- 
liberate opinion that the loss of time and the waste 
of effort were entailing greater risks than would be 



JA2 ADMIRAL FARRAGUT. 

caused by cutting adrift from his base and severing 
his own communications in order to strike at those 
of the enemy. It is commonly true that in the ef- 
fort to cut the communications of an opponent one 
runs the risk of exposing his own ; but in this case 
the attacking force was one pre-eminently qualified 
to control the one great medium of communication 
throughout that region — that is, the water. Also, 
although in surrendering the river Farragut gave 
up the great line of travel, he kept in view that the 
bayou system offered an alternative, doubtless greatly 
inferior, but which, nevertheless, would serve to 
plant above the forts, under the protection of the 
navy, such troops as should be deemed necessary; ^ 
and that the combined efforts of army and navy 
could then maintain a sufficient flow of supplies 
until the forts fell from isolation. Finally, a fleet 
is not so much an army as a collection of floating 
fortresses, garrisoned, provisioned, and mobile. It 
carries its communications in its hulls, and is not in 
such daily dependence upon external sources as is the 
sister service. 

In deciding, therefore, against awaiting the re- 
duction of the forts by direct attack, and in favor of 
attempting the same result' by striking at the inter- 
ests they defended and the base on which they rested, 
Farragut was guided by a calculation of the com- 
parative material risks and advantages of the two 
courses, and not mainly by consideration of the 
moral effect produced upon the defenders by a suc- 
cessful stroke, as has been surmised by Lord Wolse- 
ley. This eminent English authority attributes the 
success of the expedition against New Orleans to 
three causes. " First, the inadequate previous prep- 



THE NEW ORLEANS EXPEDITION. 



143 



aration of the naval part of the New Orleans de- 
fenses ; second, the want of harmonious working be- 
tween the Confederate naval and military forces ; 
and, lastly, Farragut's clear appreciation of the rr.oral 
effect he would produce by forcing his way past the 
defenses of Fort Jackson and Fort St. Philip, and by 
his appearance before New Orleans. For, after all, 
the forts were never captured by actual attack. . . 
This brilliant result is a striking instance of the due 
appreciation by a commander of the effect which 
daring achievements exert on men's minds, although, 
as in this case, those daring acts do not actually, directly^ 
or materially make certain the end or surrender they 
may have secured." And, again, in another place : 
" Admiral Farragut's success was mainly due to the 
moral effect produced by his gallant passage of the 
forts. . . . He never reduced the forts, and seems to 
have done them but little harm."* 

The moral effect produced in war upon men's 
minds, and through the mind upon their actions, is 
undeniable, and may rightly count for much in the 
calculations of a commander; but when it becomes 
the sole, or even the chief reliance, as in Bonaparte's 
advance into Carinthia in 1797, the spirit displayed 
approaches closely to that of the gambler who 
counts upon a successful bluff to disconcert his op- 
ponent. The serious objection to relying upon 
moral effect alone to overcome resistance is that 
moral forces do not admit of as close knowledge 
and measurement as do material conditions. The 
insight and moral strength of the enemy may be 
greater than 3^ou have means of knowing, and to 



* Lord Wolseley in North American Review, vol. cxlix, pp. 32- 
34, 597. The italics are the author's. 



144 ADMIRAL FARRAGUT. 

assume that they are less is to fall into the danger- 
ous error of despising your enemy. To attribute to 
so dubious a hope, alone, the daring act of Admiral 
Farragut in passing the forts and encountering the 
imperfectly known dangers above, is really to de- 
tract from his fame as a capable as well as gallant 
leader. That there were risks and accidents to be 
met he knew full well ; that he might incur disaster 
he realized ; that the dangers above and the power 
of the enemy's vessels might exceed his expectations 
was possible ; war can not be stripped of hazard, and 
the anxiety of the doubtful issue is the penalty 
the chieftain pays for his position. But Farragut 
was convinced by experience and reflection that his 
fleet could force its passage ; and he saw that once 
above the material probabilities were that army and 
navy could be combined in such a position of van- 
tage as would isolate the forts from all relief, and so 
*' actually, directly, and materially make certain their 
surrender," and secure his end of controlling the 
lower Mississippi. There was only one road practi- 
cable to ships to pass above, and that led openly and 
directly under the fire of the forts ; but having passed 
this, they were planted across the communications as 
squarely as if they had made a circuit of hundreds 
of miles, with all the secrecy of Bonaparte in 1800 
and in 1805. Are strongholds never "captured " un- 
less by " actual attack " ? Did Ulm and Mantua 
yield to blows or to isolation ? 

Such, certainly, was the opinion of the able offi- 
cers who conducted the Confederate defense, and 
whose conduct, except in matters of detail, was 
approved by the searching court of inquiry that 
passed upon it. "In my judgment," testified Gene- 



THE NEW ORLEANS EXPEDITION. 



145 



ral M. L. Smith, who commanded the interior line 
of works and was in no way responsible for the 
fall of Forts St. Philip and Jackson, *' the forts 
were impregnable so long as they were in free and 
open communication with the city. This communica- 
tion was not endangered while the obstruction ex- 
isted. The conclusion, then, is briefly this : While the 
obstruction existed the city was safe ; when it was 
swept away, as the defenses then existed, it was in 
the enemy's power."* General Lovell, the com- 
mander-in-chief of the military department, stated 
that he had made preparations to evacuate New Or- 
leans in case the fleet passed the fort by sending out 
of the city several hundred thousand rations and 
securing transport steamers. He continued: "In 
determining upon the evacuation of the city I neces- 
sarily, as soon as the enemy's fleet had passed the 
forts, regarded the position the same as if both their 
army and navy were present before the city, making due 
allowance simply for the time it would take them to 
transport their army up. Inasmuch as their ships 
had passed Forts Jackson and St. Philip, they could 
at once place themselves in open and unifiterrupted com- 
munication with their army at points fro7n six to twenty 
miles above the forts through vai'ious small ivater com- 
munications from the Gulf, made more available by the 
extraordinary height of the river, and which, while 
they (we ?) were in possession of the latter, I had 
easily and without risk defended with launches and 
part of the river-defense fleet. I had also stationed 
Szymanski's regiment at the Quarantine for the same 
object. These were, however, all destroyed or capt- 

* Official Records of the War of the Rebellion. Series I, vol. 
vi, p. 583- 



146 ADMIRAL FARRAGUT. 

ured by the enemy's fleet after they got possession 
of the river between the forts and the city."* 
Colonel Szymanski testified : " After the forts had 
been passed, it was practicable for the enemy to 
transport his army through the bayous and canals to 
New Orleans, without encountering the forts. A 
portion of the enemy did come that way. I have for 
many years owned a plantation fifteen miles below 
the city, and am very familiar with the whole 
country. I have never known the river as high as it 
was in 1862. Also, above English Turn (five miles 
below the city) there is water communication through 
Lake Borgne with the Gulf of Mexico by other 
bayous and canals of the same character." f 

It is evident, therefore, that competent military 
men on the spot, and in full possession of all the 
facts, considered, as did Farragut, that with the 
passage of the forts by the fleet the material proba- 
bilities of success became in favor of the United 
States forces. The only moral effect produced was 
the mutiny of the half-disciplined alien troops that 
garrisoned the forts ; and surely it will not be con- 
tended that any such wild anticipation as of that 
prompted Farragut's movement. The officers of the 
forts were trained and educated soldiers, who knew 
their duty and would not be crushed into submission 
by adverse circumstances. They would doubtless 
have replied, as did the commander of Fort Mor- 
gan two years later, that they looked upon the 
United States fleet above them as their prisoners, 
and they would have held out to the bitter end; but 
the end was certain as soon as the fleet passed above 

* Official Records of the War of the Rebellion, Series I, vol. vi, 
p. 566. f Ibid., p. 578. 



THE NEW ORLEANS EXPEDITION. 



147 



them. They had provisions for two months; then, 
if not reduced by blows, they must yield to hunger. 

Immediately after the conference with his cap- 
tains, Farragut issued the following general order, 
from which it appears that, while his opinion re- 
mained unchanged as to the expediency of running 
by the forts, he contemplated the possibility, though 
not the probability, of their being subdued by the 
fire of the fleet, and reserved to himself freedom to 
act accordingly by prescribing a simple signal, which 
would be readily understood, and would convert the 
attempt to pass into a sustained and deadly effort to 
conquer: 

" United States Flag-ship Hartford, 

Mississippi River, April 10, 1862. 

*'The flag-officer, having heard all the opinions 
expressed by the different commanders, is of the 
opinion that whatever is to be done will have to be 
done quickly, or we shall be again reduced to a 
blockading squadron, without the means of carrying 
on the bombardment, as we have nearly expended 
all the shells and fuses and material for making car- 
tridges. He has always entertained the same opinions 
which are expressed by Commander Porter — that is, 
there are three modes of attack,* and the question 
is, which is the one to be adopted ? His own opin- 
ion is that a combination of two should be made, 
viz., the forts should be run, and when a force is once 
above the forts to protect the troops they should be landed 
at Quarantine from the Gulf side by bringing them 
through the bayou, and then our forces should move 

* Those three were : First, a direct naval attack upon the 
works ; second, running by the works ; third, a combined attack 
by army and navy. 



148 



ADMIRAL FARRAGUT. 



Up the river, mutually aiding each other as it can be 
done to advantage. 

" When in the opinion of the flag-officer the pro- 
pitious time has arrived, the signal will be made to 
weigh and advance to the conflict. If, in his opin- 
ion, at the time of arriving at the respective positions 
of the different divisions of the fleet we have the ad- 
vantage, he will make the signal for close action, 
No. 8, and abide the result — conquer or be conquered 
— drop anchor or keep under way, as in his opinion 
is best. 

" Unless the signal above mefitioned is 7?iade, it will 
be understood that the first order of sailing will be 
formed after leaving Fort St. Philip, and we will pro- 
ceed up the river in accordance with the original opi7iion 
expressed. 

" The programme of the order of sailing accom- 
panies this general order, and the commanders will 
hold themselves in readiness for the service as indi- 
cated. D. G. Farragut, 

Flag-officer Western Gulf Blockading Squadron." 

Nothing can be clearer than that the opinion ex- 
pressed and maintained by the flag-officer from the 
beginning was the one carried out, resulting in a 
complete success. 

The bombardment by the mortar flotilla was con- 
tinued three days longer, at the end of which time 
the provision of bombs immediately obtainable was 
becoming exhausted. Enough, however, remained to 
sustain a very vigorous fire during the period of the 
passage, and as the cover of darkness was desired 
the delay was not without its advantages, for the 
waning moon grew daily less and rose an hour later 



THE NEW ORLEANS EXPEDITION. 



149 



each succeeding night. On the 23d notice was given 
to the ships that the attempt to pass would be made 
that night, and that, as half-past three was the hour 
of moon-rise, the signal, two red lights, would be 
hoisted at 2 a. m. During that afternoon Farragut 
personally visited each ship, in order to know pos- 
itively that each commander understood his orders 
for the attack, and to see that all was in readi- 
ness. 

The original intention of the flag-officer was to 
attack in two parallel columns, a more compact for- 
mation than one long one, less liable to straggling, 
and in which the heavy batteries of the larger ships 
would more effectually cover the lighter vessels by 
keeping down the fire of the enemy. In this ar- 
rangement, which remained unaltered until the 23d, 
the second in command. Captain Theodorus Bailey, 
whose divisional flag was flying in the gunboat 
Cayuga, would have had the right column, and the 
flag-officer himself the left in the Hartford. The 
latter was to be followed by the Brooklyn and Rich- 
mond, and upon these three heavy ships would fall 
the brunt of the engagement with Fort Jackson, the 
more powerful of the enemy's works. The right col- 
umn also had its heaviest ships in the lead ; the ex- 
ceptional station of the Cayuga being due to some 
natural unwillingness on the part of other command- 
ing officers to receive on board, as divisional com- 
mander and their own superior, an officer whose po- 
sition in the fleet was simply that of captain of a 
single ship.* The Cayuga led, not in virtue of her 

* Captain Bailey commanded the Colorado frigate, which drew 
too much water to cross the bar. Anxious to share in the fight, 
he obtained from the flag-officer the divisional appointment. 



150 ADMIRAL FARRAGUT. 

armament, but because she bore on board the com- 
mander of one column. 

On the 23d Farragut, considering the narrowness 
of the opening in the obstructions through which the 
fleet must pass, decided that the risk of collision 
with the hulks on either side, or between the columns 
themselves, would be too great if he adhered to his 
written programme ; and he accordingly gave a verbal 
order that the right column should weigh first, and 
be followed closely by the other under his own 
guidance. To facilitate the departure and avoid 
confusion, the ships of the right shifted their berth 
after dark to the east side of the river, anchoring in 
the order prescribed to them. 

As some doubts had been expressed as to the 
actual rupture of the chains between the hulks on 
either side the breach, although they had evidently 
been dragged from their position by the efforts made 
on the night of the 20th, Lieutenant Caldwell was 
again chosen, at his own request, to make an exami- 
nation of the actual conditions. This he did in the 
early part of the night, before the ships got under 
way; and it is a singular confirmation of the slack- 
ness and inefiiciency that has been charged against 
the water service of the Confederates that he effected 
this duty thoroughly and without molestation. Twice 
he pulled above the hulks and thence allowed his 
boat to drift down between them, a heavy lead with 
sixty feet of line hanging from her bows. As this 
line caught on nothing it was clear that within the 
narrow limits of the breach no impediment to the 
passage of a vessel existed. By 11 p. m. Caldwell 
was on his return with this decisive and encouraging 
report. 



THE NEW ORLEANS EXPEDITION. 



151 



At 2 A. M. the appointed signal was made, and at 
once was heard in every direction the clank-clank of 
the chains as the seamen hove the anchors to the 
bows. The strength of the current and the tenacity 
of the bottom in some spots made this operation 
longer than had been expected, and not till half-past 
three did the leading vessel reach the line of hulks, 
followed closely by the rest of her division. There 
is something singularly impressive in the thought of 
these moments of silent tension, following the act- 
ive efforts, of getting under way and preceding the 
furious strife, for whose first outburst every heart on 
board was waiting ; and the impression is increased by 
the petty size of the little vessel in the lead, which 
thus advanced with steady beating of the engines to 
bear the first blast of the storm. Favored partly by 
her size, and yet more by the negligence of those 
among the enemy whose duty it was to have kept 
the scene alight with the numerous fire-rafts pro- 
vided for that very purpose, the Cayuga passed the 
hulks and was well on her way up river before she 
was seen. " Although it was a starlight night," 
wrote Lieutenant Perkins, who by her commander's 
direction was piloting the ship, " we were not dis- 
covered until well under the forts ; then they opened 
upon us a tremendous fire." It was the prelude to a 
drama of singular energy and grandeur, for the Con- 
federates in the forts were fully on their guard^ and 
had anticipated with unshaken courage, but with 
gloomy forebodings, an attack during that very 
night. " There will be no to-morrow for New Or- 
leans," had said the undaunted commander of Fort 
Jackson the day before, '' if the navy does not at 
once move the Louisiana to the position assigned to 



152 



ADMIRAL FARRAGUT. 



her," close to the obstructions. The Louisiana was 
a powerful ironclad battery, not quite complete 
when Farragut entered the river. She had been 
hurried down to the forts four days before the pas- 
sage of the fleet, but her engines could not drive her, 
and the naval commander refused to take up the 
position, asked of him by the military authorities, 
below St. Philip, where he would have a cross fire 
with the forts, a close command of the line of ob- 
structions, and would greatly prolong the gantlet 
of fire through which the fleet must run. To sup- 
port the movement of the latter by drawing the fire 
and harassing the gunners of the enemy, Com- 
mander Porter moved up with the steamers of the 
mortar flotilla to easy range of the water battery 
under Fort Jackson, which he engaged ; while the 
mortar schooners, as soon as the flash of the 
enemy's guns showed that the head of the column 
had been discovered, opened a furious bombardment, 
keeping two shells constantly in the air. Except for 
the annoyance of the bombs, the gunners of the forts 
had it much their own way until the broadsides of 
the Pensacola, which showed eleven heavy guns on 
either side, drew up abreast of them. '^ The Cayuga 
received the first fire," writes Perkins, " and the air 
was filled with shells and explosives which almost 
blinded me as I stood on the forecastle trying to see 
my v^ay, for I had never been up the river before. 
I soon saw that the guns of the forts were all aimed 
for midstream, so I steered close under the walls of 
Fort St. Philip ; and although our masts and rigging 
got badly shot through our hull was but little dam- 
aged." Small as she was — five hundred tons — and 
with the scanty top hamper of a schooner, the 



THE NEW ORLEANS EXPEDITION. 153 

Cayuga was struck forty - two times, below and 
aloft. 

"After passing the last battery," continues Per- 
kins, " and thinking we were clear, I looked back 
for some of our vessels, and my heart jumped up 
into my mouth when I found I could not see a single 
one. I thought they all must have been sunk by the 
forts." This seeming desertion was due to the fact 
that the heavy ships — the Pensacola, Mississippi, and 
Oneida — had been detained by the resolute manner in 
which the first stopped to engage Fort St. Philip. 
Stopping to fire, then moving slowly, then stopping 
again, the reiterated broadsides of this big ship, de- 
livered at such close range that the combatants on 
either side exchanged oaths and jeers of defiance, 
beat down the fire of the exposed barbette batteries, 
and gave an admirable opportunity for slipping by 
to the light vessels, which brought up the rear of 
the column and were wholly unfit to contend with 
the forts. The Mississippi and Oneida keeping close 
behind the Pensacola and refusing to pass her, the 
Cayuga was thus separated from all her followers. 

The isolation of the Cayuga was therefore caused 
by her anomalous position at the head of the col- 
umn, a post proper only to a heavy ship. It was 
impossible for her petty battery of two guns to pause 
before the numerous pieces of the enemy ; it w^as 
equally impossible for the powerful vessels following 
her to hasten on, leaving to the mercy of the Con- 
federates the gunboats of the same type that suc- 
ceeded them in the order. That the Cayuga was 
thus exposed arose from the amiable desire of the 
admiral to gratify Bailey's laudable wish to share in 
the battle, without compelling an officer of the same 
II 



154 



ADMIRAL FARRAGUT. 



grade, and junior only in number, to accept a su- 
perior on his own quarter-deck in the day of battle, 
when the harvest of distinction is expected to repay 
the patient sowing of preparation. The commander 
of the Cayuga, who was only a lieutenant, had rec- 
onciled these conflicting claims by volunteering to 
carry Bailey's divisional flag. As there is no reason 
to suppose that Farragut deliberately intended to 
offer the gunboat up as a forlorn hope by draw- 
ing the first fire of the enemy, always the most 
deadly, and thus saving the more important vessels, 
the disposition of her constitutes the only serious 
fault in his tactical arrangements on this occasion — 
a fault attributable not to his judgment, but to one 
of those concessions to human feelings which cir- 
cumstances at times extort from all men. His first 
intention, an advance in two columns, the heavy 
ships leading and closely engaging the forts with 
grape and canister, while the two-gun vessels 
slipped through between the columns, met the tac- 
tical demands of the proposed operation. The de- 
cision to abandon this order in favor of one long, 
thin line, because of the narrowness of the opening, 
can not be challenged. This formation was distinctly 
weaker and more liable to straggling, but nothing 
could be so bad as backing, collision, or stoppage 
at the obstructions. In such an attack, however, as 
in all of Farragut's battles, it seems eminently fit- 
ting that the commander of the column should lead. 
The occasion is one for pilotage and example ; and 
inasmuch as the divisional commander can not con- 
trol, except by example, any ship besides the one 
on board which he himself is, that ship should be 
the most powerful in his command. These conclu- 



THE NEW ORLEANS EXPEDITION. 



155 



sions may hereafter be modified by conditions of 
submarine warfare, though even under them it seems 
likely that in forcing passage into a harbor the van 
ship should carry the flag of the officer commanding 
the leading division ; but under the circumstances 
of Farragut's day they may be accepted as repre- 
senting his own convictions, first formed by the 
careful deliberation of a man with a genius for 
war, and afterward continually confirmed by his 
ever-ripening experience. 

Left thus unsupported by the logical results of 
her false position, the Cayuga found herself exposed 
to an even greater danger than she had already run 
from the guns of the stationary works. " Looking 
ahead," says Perkins's letter, already quoted, '' I saw 
eleven of the enemy's gunboats coming down upon 
us, and it seemed as if we were 'gone' sure." The 
vessels thus dimly seen in the darkness of the night 
were a heterogeneous, disorganized body, concerning 
which, however, very imperfect and very exaggerated 
particulars had reached the United States fleet. 
They were freely spoken of as ironclad gunboats 
and ironclad rams, and the Confederates had done 
all in their power to increase the moral effect which 
was attendant upon these names, then new to mari- 
time warfare. None of them had been built with 
any view to war. Three only were sea-going, with 
the light scantling appropriate to their calling as 
vessels for freight and passenger traffic. Another 
had been a large twin-screw tugboat that began her 
career in Boston, and thence, shortly before the war, 
had been sent to the Mississippi. After the out- 
break of hostilities she had been covered with an 
arched roof and three-quarter-inch iron ; a nine-inch 



156 



ADMIRAL FARRAGUT. 



gun, capable only of firing directly ahead, had been 
mounted in her bows, and, thus equipped, she passed 
into notoriety as the ram Manassas. With the mis- 
erable speed of six knots, to which, however, the 
current of the river gave a very important addition, 
and with a protection scarcely stronger than the 
buckram armor of the stage, the Manassas, by her 
uncanny appearance and by the persistent trump- 
eting of the enemy, had obtained a very formidable 
reputation with the United States officers, who could 
get no reliable information about her. 

The remainder of the force were river steam- 
boats, whose machinery was protected with cotton, 
and their stems shod with one-inch iron, clamped in 
place by straps of the same material extending a few 
feet aft. Thus strengthened, it was hoped that with 
the sharpness of their bows and the swiftness of the 
current they could, notwithstanding the exceeding 
lightness of their structure, penetrate the hulls of 
the United States ships. Resolutely and vigorously 
handled, there can be little doubt that they might 
have sunk one or two of their assailants; but there is 
no probability that they could under all the circum- 
stances have done more. The obscurity of the night, 
the swiftness of the stream, and the number of actors 
in the confusing drama being played between the 
two banks of the Mississippi, would have introduced 
into the always delicate fencing of the ram extraor- 
dinary difficulties, with which the inexperience of 
their commanders was in no degree qualified to deal. 
The generally steady approach, bows on, of the 
United States ships, presented the smallest target to 
their thrust and gave to the threatened vessel the 
utmost facilities for avoiding the collision or con- 



THE NEW ORLEANS EXPEDITION. 



157 



verting it into a glancing blow; while, as for round- 
ing-to, to ram squarely on the beam of a ship stem- 
ming the current, the assailant, even if he displayed 
the remarkable nicety of judgment required, was not 
likely to find the necessary room. 

These difficulties received illustration by the ca- 
reer of the Manassas that night. Her commander, 
Lieutenant Warley, was a former officer of the United 
States Navy, and he handled her with judgment and 
the utmost daring. Rushing nearly bows on upon the 
Pensacola, the thrust was wholly avoided by the quick 
moving of the latter's helm, which Warley character- 
ized as beautiful ; while the attempt made immediately 
afterward upon the Mississippi resulted in a merely 
glancing blow, which took a deep and long shaving 
out of the enemy's quarter, but did no serious damage. 
Not till a much later period of the action did the 
Manassas find an opportunity to charge squarely upon 
the beam of the Brooklyn. She did so across the cur- 
rent, striking therefore only with her own speed of six 
knots. But little shock was felt on board the rammed 
ship, and no apprehension of damage was experi- 
enced ; but it was afterward found that the enemy's 
stem had entered between two frames, and crushed 
both the outer and inner planking. A few moments 
earlier the Brooklyn had been thrown across the cur- 
rent by the chances of the night. Had the ram then 
struck her in the same place, carrying the four knots 
additional velocity of the current, it is entirely pos- 
sible that the mortification of the Confederate defeat 
would have derived some consolation from the sink- 
ing of one of Farragut's best ships. Such were the 
results obtained by a man of singular and resolute 
character, who drove his tiny vessel through the 



158 ADMIRAL FARRAGUT. 

powerful broadsides of the hostile fleet, and dared 
afterward to follow its triumphant course up the 
river, in hopes of snatching another chance from the 
jaws of defeat. 

Another example, equally daring and more suc- 
cessful, of the power of the ram, was given that 
same night by Kennon, also an ex-officer of the 
United States Navy ; but the other ram command- 
ers did not draw from their antecedent training and 
habits of thought the constancy and pride, which 
could carry their frail vessels into the midst of ships 
that had thus victoriously broken their way through 
the bulwarks of the Mississippi. The River-Defense 
Fleet, as it was called, was a separate organization, 
which owned no allegiance and would receive no 
orders from the navy ; and its absurd privileges were 
jealously guarded by a government whose essential 
principle was the independence of local rights from 
all central authority. Captains of Mississippi River 
steamboats, their commanders held to the full the 
common American opinion that the profession of 
arms differs from all others in the fact that it requires 
no previous training, involves no special habits of 
thought, is characterized by no moral tone which 
only early education or years of custom can impart. 
Rejecting all suggestion and neglecting all prepara- 
tion, they cherished the most inordinate confidence 
in the raw native valor which they were persuaded 
would inspire them at the critical moment ; and, in- 
credible as it would seem, some of the men who in 
the battle could find no other use for their boats but 
to run them ashore and burn them, ventured to tell 
Warley the night before that their mission was to 
show naval officers how to fight. They did not lack 



THE NEW ORLEANS EXPEDITION. 159 

courage, but that military habit upon whose influence 
Farragut had so acutely remarked when a youth, re- 
turning in 1820 from the European station.* "Had 
regular naval officers," said Kennon bitterly, " in- 
stead of being kept in the mud forts on the creeks in 
Virginia, and in the woods of Carolina cutting tim- 
bers to build ironclads, been sent to command these 
vessels, even at the eleventh hour, they would have 
proved very formidable." 

Steaming into the midst of such as these, the 
peril of the Cayuga, real enough, was less than it 
seemed ; but she had to do at once with Warley's 
Manassas and with the Governor Moore, the ves- 
sel that Kennon commanded, and which afterward 
sunk the Varuna. "Three made a dash to board 
us," records Lieutenant Perkins, agreeing therein 
with the official reports of Captain Bailey and of 
his own commander, Lieutenant Harrison ; " but a 
heavy charge from our eleven-inch gun settled 
the Governor Moore, which was one of them. A 
ram, the Manassas, in attempting to butt us just 
missed our stern, and we soon settled the third fel- 
low's ' hash.' Just then some of our gunboats which 
had passed the forts came up, and then all sorts of 
things happened." This last expression is probably 
as terse and graphic a summary of a itiele'e, which to 
so many is the ideal of a naval conflict, as ever was 
penned. " There was the wildest excitement all 
round. The Varuna fired a broadside into us instead 
of into the enemy. Another of our gunboats at- 
tacked one of the Cayuga's prizes; I shouted out, 
' Don't fire into that ship, she has surrendered.' 

* See page 62. 



j6o admiral farragut. 

Three of the enemy's ships had surrendered to us 
before any of our vessels appeared; but when they 
did come up we all pitched in, and settled the eleven 
rebel vessels in about twenty minutes." Besides the 
eleven armed boats known to have been above, there 
were several unarmed tugs and other steamers, some 
of which probably shared in this wild confusion. 
One at least came into conflict with the Hartford. 

The second column, led by the flag-ship, was 
promptly away and after the first ; following, indeed, 
so closely that the head of the one lapped the rear 
of the other. The Brooklyn and Richmond, close 
behind the Hartford, formed with her a powerful 
'' body of battle," to use the strong French expres- 
sion for the center of a fleet. Though called sloops- 
of-war, the tonnage and batteries of these ships were 
superior to those of the medium ships-of-the-line of 
the beginning of this century, with which Nelson 
fought his celebrated battles. As the flag-ship 
reached the hulks the night, which, though very 
dark, was fairly clear, had become obscured by the 
dense clouds of smoke that an almost breathless at- 
mosphere suffered to settle down upon the water. 
Only twenty minutes had elapsed since the forts 
opened upon the Cayuga, when Farragut's flag en- 
tered the battle. Soon after passing the obstructions, 
and when about to sheer in toward Fort Jackson, 
upon which was to be concentrated her own battery 
and that of her two formidable followers, a fire-raft 
was observed coming down the river in such a way 
as to make contact probable if the course w^ere not 
changed. Heading across the river, and edged grad- 
ually over by the raft continuing to work toward 
her, the ship took the ground a little above Fort 



THE NEW ORLEANS EXPEDITION. i6l 

St. Philip, but still under its b'atteries. While in 
this dangerous position, the raft, whose movements 
proved to be controlled not by the current but by a 
small tugboat, was pushed against her port quarter. 
The flames caught the side of the ship, spread swiftly 
along it, leaped into the rigging and blazed up to- 
ward the tops. The danger was imminent, and ap- 
peared even more so than it was ; for the body of 
heat, though great, was scarcely sufficient to account 
for such a rapid spread of the flames, which was 
probably due mainly to the paint. The thoroughly 
organized fire department soon succeeded in quench- 
ing the conflagration, its source being removed by 
training some of the after-guns upon the daring 
pygmy, which with such reckless courage had well- 
nigh destroyed the commander-in-chief of her enemy's 
fleet. The tug received a shot in her boilers and 
sunk. The Hartford backed clear, but in so doing 
fell off broadside to the stream, thereby affording an- 
other chance to the hostile rams, had there been one 
prepared to dare the hazard. Watson, the flag-lieu- 
tenant, remarks that the flag-officer stood during this 
critical period giving his orders and watching the 
ship slowly turn, referring occasionally to a little 
compass which was attached to his watch-chain. 
During most of the engagement, however, he was 
forward observing the conflict. 

The Brooklyn and Richmond, with the Sciota and 
the Iroquois, which followed immediately after them, 
fought their way through with more or less of ad- 
venture, but successfully reached the river above the 
forts. It is to be observed, however, that these, as 
well as the Hartford, suffered from the embarrass- 
ment of the smoke, which had inconvenienced the 



l52 ADMIRAL FARRAGUT. 

ships of the first column to a much less degree. 
This was to be expected, and doubtless contributed 
to the greater loss which they suffered, by delaying 
their progress and giving uncertainty to their aim ; 
the result of the latter being naturally to intensify 
the action of the hostile gunners. Four gunboats 
brought up the rear of the column, of which but one 
got through, and she with a loss greater than any 
vessel of her class. The three last failed to pass. 
Blinded by smoke and further delayed by the tend- 
ency to open out, which is observable in all long col- 
umns, they came under the fire of the forts at a time 
when, the larger vessels having passed, they were no 
longer covered or supported by their fire, and when 
day was about to break. The Itasca, commanded 
by the gallant Caldwell, who had so nobly broken 
through the obstructions, opposing only her puny 
battery to the concentrated wrath of the forts, was 
knocked about by them at will, received a shot 
through her boiler and drifted down the river out of 
action. The Winona likewise encountered almost 
alone, or perhaps in company with the Itasca, the 
fire of the enemy. After nearly running ashore in 
the smoke, daylight surprised her while still under 
fire below the works; and her commander very prop- 
erly decided not to risk the total destruction and 
possible capture of his vessel for the sake of adding 
her insignificant force to that above. Admirably as 
the gunboats were officered, perhaps their most use- 
ful service on this night was to demonstrate again 
the advantage of big ships, as of big battalions. 

Thirteen out of his seventeen vessels having ral- 
lied around his flag above the forts, and the three 
below being of the least efficient type, the flag-officer 



THE NEW ORLEANS EXPEDITION. 163 

could congratulate himself upon a complete victory, 
won with but little loss. One vessel only was sacri- 
ficed, and she to that inconsiderate ardor which in so 
many cases of pursuit leads men, without any neces- 
sity, out of reach of support. The Varuna, the fifth 
in the order, and the only merchant-built vessel in 
the fleet, after clearing the forts had steamed rapidly 
through the Confederate flotilla, firing right and left, 
but not stopping. She soon passed above it, and 
getting sight of a small steamer heading for New 
Orleans, sped away after her. Kennon, in the Gov- 
ernor Moore, happened to have noticed this move- 
ment ; and, finding by the rapid accessions to the 
number of his enemies that he was likely to be soon 
overwhelmed, he determined to follow this one which, 
whatever her strength, he might tackle alone. Steal- 
ing out of the melee he started up the river, hoisting 
lights similar to those he had observed the enemy's 
ships to carry. Deceived by this ruse, the Varuna 
at the first paid no attention to her pursuer, some 
distance behind whom followed one of the River- 
Defense boats, the Stonewall Jackson. When Ken- 
non at last opened fire, the Varuna, having by then 
run down her steam in her headlong speed, was being 
rapidly overtaken. The second shot from the Moore 
raked the Varuna's deck, killing and wounding 
twelve men. The Union vessel's helm was then put 
hard-a-port, swinging her broadside to bear upon 
her approaching foe, who was naturally expected to 
imitate the movement, opposing side to side to avoid 
being raked. Instead of so doing Kennon kept 
straight on, and, while receiving a deadly raking fire 
from his antagonist's battery, which struck down 
many of his men, he succeeded in driving the sharp 



164 ADMIRAL FARRAGUT. 

Stem of the Moore through the side of the Varuna. 
A few moments after the Stonewall Jackson coming 
up also rammed the disabled enemy, whose com- 
mander then drove her ashore on the east side of 
the river, where she sank. By this time the corvette 
Oneida had made out the state of the case. Steam- 
ing rapidly ahead, she overhauled the Confederate 
vessels; which, finding they could not escape, ran 
ashore, the Jackson on the west bank, the Moore on 
the east, and in those positions they were surren- 
dered. 

Farragut had undertaken this daring exploit with 
the expectation that, after passing the forts, he could 
obtain the co-operation of the army, and that the 
action of the two services, combined in mutual sup- 
port, would suffice to force the way to New Orleans. 
The occupation of the land by the army, and of the 
water by the navy, interposing by the nature of their 
operations betw^een the city and the forts, would ef- 
fectually isolate the latter. In accordance with this 
plan he at once sent Captain Boggs, of the Varuria, 
through the Quarantine Bayou with messages to 
Commander Porter and General Butler. The latter 
was notified that the way was now clear to land his 
troops through the bayou, in accordance with the 
previous arrangements, and that gunboats would be 
left there to protect them against those of the 
enemy, of which three or four were seen to be still 
at the forts. Boggs passed successfully through the 
country and streams which a day before had been in 
quiet possession of the enemy, though it took him 
twenty-six hours to do so ; but General Butler, 
who from a transport below had witnessed the suc- 
cess of the fleet, had waited for no further tidings. 



THE NEW ORLEANS EXPEDITION. 165 

Hurrying back to his troops, he collected them at 
Sable Island, twelve miles in rear of Fort St. Philip, 
whence they were transported and landed at a point 
on the river five miles above the work, where the 
Kineo and Wissahickon awaited them. 

During the remainder of the 24th the fleet stayed 
at anchor off the Quarantine station, to repose the 
crews after the excessive labor and excitement of 
the previous night. Early the next morning all got 
under way except the two gunboats left to support 
Butler's troops, and moved up stream ; but slowly, 
owing to the indifferent speed of some and to want 
of knowledge of the river. At half-past ten they 
reached English Turn, five miles below the city ; the 
point where the British forces had in 1815 been so 
disastrously repelled in their assault upon the earth- 
works held by Jackson's riflemen. The Confederates 
had fortified and armed the same lines on both sides 
of the Mississippi, as part of the interior system of 
defenses to New Orleans; the exterior line being con- 
stituted by Forts Jackson and St. Philip, together 
with several smaller works at different points, com- 
manding the numerous subsidiary approaches through 
the Mississippi delta. The interior lines at English 
Turn, known as the Chalmette and McGehee bat- 
teries, were, however, intended only to check an ap- 
proach of troops from down the river. Their gen- 
eral direction was perpendicular to the stream ; and 
along its banks there ran only a short work on either 
side to protect the main entrenchments from an en- 
filading fire by light vessels, which might, in com- 
pany with an invading army, have managed to turn 
the lower forts by passing through the bayous. 
These river batteries, mounting respectively nine 



l66 ADMIRAL FARRAGUT. 

and five guns, were powerless to resist the ships that 
had successfully passed the main defenses of the 
city. After a few shots, fired rather for the honor of 
the flag than in any hope of successful result, the 
guns were forsaken ; and both lines of entrenchments, 
being turned and taken in the rear, were abandoned. 
Meanwhile, in New Orleans a scene of fearful 
confusion was growing hourly more frenzied. What- 
ever the fears of the military commanders as to the 
result of the attack upon the forts, they had very 
properly concealed them from the inhabitants ; and 
these, swayed by the boastful temper common to 
mobs, had been readily led to despise the efforts of 
the enemy and to trust implicitly in the power of 
their defenses. General Lovell, commanding the de- 
partment, had gone down to the forts the evening 
before the attack, and was still there when the United 
States fleet was breaking its way through ; he was, 
in fact, on board the little steamer, the pursuit of 
which lured the Varuna into the isolation where she 
met her fate. The news of the successful forcing of 
the exterior and principal defenses thus reached the 
city soon after it was effected ; and at the same time 
Lovell, satisfied from the first that if the forts were 
passed the town was lost, prepared at once to evac- 
uate it, removing all the Government property. This 
in itself was a service of great difficulty. New Or- 
leans is almost surrounded by water or marsh ; the 
only exit was to the northward by a narrow strip of 
dry land, not over three quarters of a mile wide, 
along the river bank, by which passed the railroad to 
Jackson, in the State of Mississippi. As has already 
been said, Lovell had by this road been quietly re- 
moving army rations for some time, but had ab- 



THE NEW ORLEANS EXPEDITION. 167 

Stained from trying to carry off any noticeable ar- 
ticles by which his apprehensions would be betrayed 
to the populace. The latter, roused from its slum- 
ber of security with such appalling suddenness, gave 
way to an outburst of panic and fury ; which was the 
less controllable because so very large a proportion 
of the better and stronger element among the men 
had gone forth to swell the ranks of the Confederate 
army. As in a revolution in a South American city, 
the street doors were closed by the tradesmen upon 
the property in their stores ; but without began a 
scene of mad destruction, which has since been for- 
cibly portrayed by one, then but a lad of fourteen 
years, who witnessed the sight. 

Far down the stream, and throughout their ascent, 
the ships were passing through the wreckage thus 
made. Cotton bales, cotton-laden ships and steamers 
on fire, and working implements of every kind such 
as are used in ship-yards, were continually encount- 
ered. On the piers of the levees, where were huge 
piles of hogsheads of sugar, and molasses, a mob, com- 
posed of the scum of the city, men and women, broke 
and smashed without restraint. Toward noon of the 
25th, as the fleet drew round the bend where the Cres- 
cent City first appears in sight, the confusion and de- 
struction were at their height. " The levee of New 
Orleans," says Farragut in his report, " was one scene 
of desolation. Ships, steamers, cotton, coal, etc., 
were all in one common blaze, and our ingenuity was 
much taxed to avoid the floating conflagration. The 
destruction of property was awful." Upon this pan- 
demonium, in which the fierce glare of burning prop- 
erty lit up the wild passions and gestures of an in- 
furiated people, the windows of heaven were opened 



l68 ADMIRAL FARRAGUT. 

and a drenching rain poured down in torrents. The 
impression produced by the ships as they came in 
sight around the bend has been graphically described 
by the boy before mentioned, who has since become 
so well-known as an author — Mr. George W. Cable. 
" I see the ships now, as they come slowly round 
Slaughter House Point into full view, silent, grim, 
and terrible ; black with men, heavy with deadly 
portent, the long-banished Stars and Stripes flying 
against the frowning sky. Oh ! for the Mississippi ! 
for the Mississippi ! " (an iron-clad vessel nearly 
completed, upon which great hopes had been based 
by the Confederates). ^' Just then she came down. 
But how ? Drifting helplessly, a mass of flames. 

"The crowds on the levee howled and screamed 
with rage. The swarming decks answered never a 
word ; but one old tar on the Hartford, standing 
lanyard in hand beside a great pivot gun, so plain to 
view that you could see him smile, silently patted its 
big black breech and blandly grinned. And now 
the rain came down in torrents." 

That same morning, as though with the purpose 
of embarrassing the victor whom he could not op- 
pose, the Mayor of New Orleans had ordered the 
State flag of Louisiana to be hoisted upon the City 
Hall. His secretary, who was charged with this 
office, waited to fulfill it until the cannonade at 
English Turn had ceased, and it was evident the 
fleet had passed the last flimsy barrier and would 
within an hour appear before the city. The flag was 
then run up ; and the Mayor had the satisfaction of 
creating a position of very unnecessary embarrass- 
ment for all parties by his useless bravado. 

To Captain Bailey, the second in command, who 



THE NEW ORLEANS EXPEDITION. 169 

had so gallantly led both in the first assault and in 
the attack at Chalmette, was assigned the honor of 
being the first to land in the conquered city and to 
demand its surrender. It was no barren honor, but 
a service of very sensible personal danger to which 
he was thus called. General Lovell having to devote 
his attention solely to his military duties, the city 
which had so long been under martial law was es- 
caping out of the hands of the civil authorities and 
fast lapsing into anarchy. Between one and two in 
the afternoon Bailey landed, accompanied by Per- 
kins, the first lieutenant of the Cayuga; who, having 
shared his former perils, was permitted to accompany 
him in this one also. " We took just a boat and a 
boat's crew," writes Perkins, " with a flag of truce, 
and started off. When we reached the wharf there 
were no officials to be seen ; no one received us, al- 
though the whole city was watching our movements, 
and the levee was crowded in spite of a heavy rain- 
storm. Among the crowd were many women and 
children, and the women were shaking rebel flags 
and being rude and noisy. They were all shouting 
and hooting as we stepped on shore. ... As we ad- 
vanced the mob followed us in a very excited state. 
They gave three cheers for Jeff Davis and Beau- 
regard and three groans for Lincoln. Then they 
began to throw things at us, and shout * Hang them ! ' 
' Hang them ! ' We both thought we were in a bad 
fix, but there was nothing for us to do but just to go 
on." Mr. Cable has given his description of the 
same scene : " About one or two in the afternoon, I 
being in the store with but one door ajar, came a 
roar of shoutings and imprecations and crowding 
feet down Common Street. * Hurrah for Jeff Davis ! ' 



170 



ADMIRAL FARRAGUT. 



' Shoot them ! ' ' Kill them ! ' ' Hang them ! ' I locked 
the door of the store on the outside and ran to the 
front of the mob, bawling with the rest, ' Hurrah for 
Jeff Davis ! ' About every third man had a weapon 
out. Two officers of the United States navy were 
walking abreast, unguarded and alone, not looking 
to the right or left, never frowning, never flinching, 
while the mob screamed in their ears, shook cocked 
pistols in their faces, cursed, crowded, and gnashed 
upon them. So through those gates of death those 
two men walked to the City Hall to demand the 
town's surrender. It was one of the bravest deeds I 
ever saw done." 

Farragut's demand, made through Bailey, was 
that the flag of Louisiana should be hauled down 
from the City Hall, and that of the United States 
hoisted over the buildings which were its property, 
namely, the Custom House, Post Office, and Mint. 
This the Mayor refused to do ; and, as Farragut had 
no force with which to occupy the city, it became a 
somewhat difficult question to carry on an argument 
with the authorities of a town protected by the pres- 
ence of so many women and children. The situation 
was for three days exceedingly critical, from the 
temper and character of the mob and from the ob- 
stinacy and powerlessness of the officials. It was 
doubtless as much as the life of any citizen of the 
place was worth to comply with the admiral's de- 
mands. On the other hand, while there could be no 
difficulty in hoisting the United States flag, there 
would be much in protecting it from insult with the 
means at the flag-officer's disposal ; for to open fire 
upon a place where there were so many helpless 
creatures, innocent of any greater offense than be- 



THE NEW ORLEANS EXPEDITION. 



171 



having like a set of spoiled children, was a course 
that could not be contemplated unless in the last 
necessity, and it was undesirable to provoke acts 
which might lead to any such step. The United 
States officers who were necessarily sent to commu- 
nicate with the authorities did so, in the opinion of 
the authorities themselves, at the peril of their lives 
from a mob which no one on shore could control. 
On the 28th of April, however. Forts Jackson and 
St. Philip surrendered to Commander Porter in con- 
sequence of a mutiny in their garrisons, which re- 
fused to fight any longer, saying further resistance 
was useless ; and the following day Farragut sent 
ashore a body of two hundred and fifty marines with 
two howitzers manned by seamen from the Hartford, 
the whole under the command of the fleet-captain. 
Captain Henry H. Bell. The force was formally 
drawn up before the City Hall, the howitzers pointing 
up and down the street, which was thronged with 
people. Fearing still that some rash person in the 
crowd might dare to fire upon the men who were 
hauling down the flag, the Mayor took his stand be- 
fore one of the howitzers ; a sufficient mtimation to 
the mob that were murder done he would be the 
first victim to fall in expiation. The United States 
flag was then hoisted over the Custom House, and 
left flying under the protection of a guard of ma- 
rines. 

Thus was timely and satisfactorily completed an 
act, by which Farragut signalized and sealed the fact 
that the conquest of New Orleans and of its de- 
fenses, from the original conception of the enterprise 
to its complete fulfillment by the customary tokens of 
submission and taking possession, was wholly the 



1/2 



ADMIRAL FARRAGUT. 



work of the United States Navy ; of which he, by his 
magnificent successes, became the representative 
figure. It was a triumph won over formidable diffi- 
culties by a mobile force, skillfully directed and gal- 
lantly fought. By superior promptitude and a cor- 
rect appreciation of the true strategic objective had 
been reduced to powerlessness obstacles not to be 
overcome by direct assault, except by a loss of time 
which would have allowed the enemy to complete 
preparations possibly fatal to the whole undertaking. 
Forts Jackson and St. Philip, which the fleet could 
not have reduced by direct attack, fell by the sev- 
erance of their communications. 

It is not to be questioned that the moral effect 
of the passage of the forts, succeeded, as it was, 
by the immediate fall of the great city of the Mis- 
sissippi, was very great ; but it was not upon the 
forts themselves, nor in the unexpected mutiny of 
the garrison, that that effect was chiefly manifested. 
Great as was the crime of the men, they showed by 
their act a correct appreciation of those results to 
the forts, from the passage of the fleet, which some 
have sought to ignore — results physical, undeniable, 
fatal. It was not moral effect, but indisputable rea- 
soning which sapped the further resistance of men 
— brave till then — to whom were wanting the habit 
of discipline and the appreciation of the far-reach- 
ing effects upon the fortunes of a campaign pro- 
duced by a prolonged, though hopeless, resistance. 
They saw that the fate of the forts was sealed, 
and beyond that they recognized no duties and no 
advantages. On the scene of his exploit Farragut 
reaped the material fruits of the celerity in which 
he believed ; and which he had reluctantly for a space 



THE NEW ORLEANS EXPEDITION. 



^73 



postponed, at the bidding of superior authority, in 
order to try the effect of slower methods. These 
being exhausted, he owed to the promptness of his 
decision and action that the Louisiana, on whose re- 
pairs men were working night and day, did not take 
the advantageous position indicated to her by the 
officers of the forts ; and that the Mississippi, the 
ironclad upon which not only the designers, but 
naval officers, founded extravagant hopes, was neither 
completed nor towed away, but burned where she lay. 
The flaming mass, as it drifted hopelessly by the 
Hartford, was a striking symbol of resistance 
crushed — of ascendency established over the mighty 
river whose name it bore ; but it was a symbol not 
of moral, but of physical victory. 

It was elsewhere, far and wide, that were felt the 
moral effects which echoed the sudden, unexpected 
crash with which the lower Mississippi fell — through 
the length and breadth of the South and in the cabi- 
nets of foreign statesmen, who had believed too readi- 
ly, as did their officers on the spot, that the barrier 
was not to be passed — that the Queen City of the 
Confederacy was impregnable to attack from the sea. 
Whatever may have been the actual purposes of that 
mysterious and undecided personage, Napoleon III, 
the effect of military events, whether on sea or 
shore, upon the question of interference by foreign 
powers is sufficiently evident from the private corre- 
spondence which, a few months after New Orleans, 
passed between Lords Palmerston and Russell, then 
the leading members of the British Cabinet.* For- 
tunately for the cause of the United States, France 

* See Walpole's Life of Lord John Russell, vol. ii, pp. 349-351. 



174 



ADMIRAL FARRAGUT. 



and Great Britain were not of a mind to combine 
their action at tiie propitious moment ; and tlie moral 
effect of the victory at New Orleans was like a cold 
plunge bath to the French emperor, at the time when 
he was hesitating whether to act alone. It produced 
upon him even more impression than upon the Brit- 
ish Government ; because his ambitions for French 
control and for the extension of the Latin races on 
the American continent were especially directed to- 
ward Louisiana, the former colony of France, and 
toward its neighbors, Texas and Mexico. 

The sympathies, however, of the classes from 
whom were chiefly drawn the cabinets of the two 
great naval States were overwhelmingly with the 
South ; and the expressions alike of the emperor and 
of his prmcipal confidants at this time were design- 
edly allowed to transpire, both to the Southern com- 
missioners and to the British Government. On the 
very day that Porter's mortar schooners opened on 
Fort Jackson, Louis Napoleon unbosomed himself to 
a member of the British Parliament, who visited him 
as an avowed partisan of the Confederate cause. He 
said that while he desired to preserve a strict neu- 
trality, he could not consent that his people should 
continue to suffer from the acts of the Federal Gov- 
ernment. He thought the best course would be to 
make a friendly appeal to it, either alone or concur- 
rently with England, to open the ports ; but to accom- 
pany the appeal with a proper demonstration of force 
upon our coasts, and, should the appeal seem likely 
to be ineffectual, to back it by a declaration of his 
purpose not to respect the blockade. The taking of 
New Orleans, which he did not then anticipate, 
might render it inexpedient to act ; that he would 



THE NEW ORLEANS EXPEDITION. 



175 



not decide at once, but would wait some days for 
further intelligence.* Similar semi-official assurances 
came from different persons about the emperor ; and 
the members of the Cabigset, with a single exception, 
showed little reserve in their favorable expressions 
toward the Confederacy. 

A few weeks later Mr. Slidell had a conversation 
with M. Billault, the minister sans portefeuille, one of 
the most conservative and cautious men in the Cabi- 
net, who represented the Government in the Chambers 
upon all subjects connected with foreign affairs. Sli- 
dell read a note which he had received from Sir Charles 
Wood, a leading Southern sympathizer in England, de- 
nying that the British Government was unwilling to 
act in American affairs — a denial to which some color 
is given by the correspondence of Palmerston and 
Russell before mentioned. In answer, M. Billault de- 
clared that the French Cabinet, with the possible ex- 
ception of M. Thouvenel, had been unanimously in 
favor of the South, and added that if New Orleans had 
not fallen its recognition would not have been much 
longer delayed ; but, even after that disaster, if de- 
cided successes were obtained in Virginia and Ten- 
nessee, or the enemy were held at bay for a month 
or two, the same result would follow. After an in- 
terview with M. Thouvenel, about the same time, 
Slidell reported that, though that minister did not di- 
rectly say so, his manner gave fair reason to infer that 
if New Orleans had not been taken, and no very serious 
reverses were suffered in Virginia and Tennessee, rec- 
ognition would very soon have been declared. f 



* North AmeHcan Review^ vol. cxxix, p. 347. 
f Ibid., vol. cxxix, p. 348. 



1^6 ADMIRAL FARRAGUT. 

In its moral effect, therefore, the fall of the river 
forts and of New Orleans, though not absolutely and 
finally decisive of the question of foreign interven- 
tion, corresponded to one of those telling blows, by 
which a general threatened by two foes meets and 
strikes down one before the other comes up. Such 
a blow may be said to decide a campaign ; not be- 
cause no chance is left the enemy to redeem his mis- 
fortune, but because without the first success the 
weaker party would have been overwhelmed by the 
junction of his two opponents. The heart-rending 
disasters to our armies during the following summer 
does but emphasize the immense value to the Union 
cause of the moral effect produced by Farragut's 
victory. Those disasters, as it was, prompted the 
leaders of the British ministry to exchange confi- 
dences in which they agreed on the expediency of 
mediation. They did not carry all their colleagues 
with them ; but who can estimate the effect, when 
the scales were thus balancing, if the navy had been 
driven out of the Mississippi as the army was from 
Virginia .'' 



CHAPTER VIII. 

THE FIRST ADVANCE ON VICKSBURG. 
1862. 

The purpose of the Navy Department, as ex- 
pressed in the original orders to Farragut, had been 
to send his squadron up the river immediately after 
the capture of New Orleans. The words were : " If 
the Mississippi expedition from Cairo shall not have 
descended the river, you will take advantage of the 
panic to push a strong force up the river to take all 
their defenses in the rear." When New Orleans fell, 
the Cairo expedition, more commonly known as the 
Mississippi flotilla, so far from having descended the 
river to the neighborhood of New Orleans, was still 
detained before Fort Pillow, one of the outlying de- 
fenses of Memphis, forty miles above the latter city 
and over eight hundred from New Orleans. It was 
not until the end of May that the evacuation of 
Corinth by the Confederates made Memphis unten- 
able, leading to the abandonment of the forts on the 
4th of June and the surrender of the city on the fol- 
lowing day. It became therefore incumbent upon 
Farragut, after turning over the command of New 
Orleans to Butler on the ist of May, to go up the 
river as soon as he possibly could. 

Although the flag-officer seems to have acquiesced 



178 ADMIRAL FARRAGUT. 

in this programme in the beginning, it was probably 
with the expectation that the advance, up river and 
against the current, required of his heavy-draught and 
slow-moving ships would not be very far ; that the 
Cairo expedition, which at the date of the orders 
quoted, January 20th, had not begun to move, would, 
from the character of the vessels composing it, many 
being ironclad, and from the advantage of the 
current, have progressed very far by the time he 
had taken New Orleans. Moreover, at that date the 
upper river flotilla was still a branch of the army, 
and its prospective movements were to be in combi- 
nation with, and a part of, a great military enter- 
prise, securing control both of the stream and of the 
land ; whereas Farragut's was a purely naval opera- 
tion, to which the army contributed only a force 
sufficient to hold the points which were first reduced 
by the fleet. 

Under the actual conditions, the proposed ascent 
of the river bore a very different aspect to the com- 
manding naval officer on the spot from that which 
presented itself to the fond imaginations of the of- 
ficials in Washington. The question now was not 
one of fighting batteries, for there was no reason as 
yet to expect anything heavier than the fleet had al- 
ready overcome with ease ; it was the far more 
difficult matter of communications, in the broadest 
scope of the word, to be maintained over a long, 
narrow, tortuous, and very difficult road, passing in 
many places close under the guns of the enemy. 
** As I stated in my last dispatch," wrote Farragut to 
the department after his first visit to Vicksburg, 
** the dangers and difficulties of the river have proved 
to us, since we first entered it, much greater impedi- 



THE FIRST ADVANCE ON VICKSBURG. 



179 



merits to our progress, and more destructive to our 
vessels, than the enemy's shot. Between getting 
aground, derangement of the machinery, and want 
of coal, the delays in getting up the river are great." 
To take the defenses in the rear, and in their then 
state to drive the enemy out of them, was one thing ; 
but to hold the abandoned positions against the re- 
turn of the defenders, after the fleet had passed on, 
required an adequate force which Butler's army, cal- 
culated by McClellan for a much narrower sphere, 
could not afford. Coal and supply ships, therefore, 
must either run the gantlet for the four hundred 
miles which separated Vicksburg from New Orleans, 
or be accompanied always by armed vessels. The 
former alternative was incompatible with the neces- 
sary security, and for the latter the numbers of the 
fleet were utterly inadequate. In fact, to maintain the 
proposed operations, there would be needed so many 
ships to guard the communications that there would 
be none left for the operations to which they led. 

It must also be observed that not only was this 
line of communications four times as long as that 
which led from the sea to New Orleans, and of far 
more difficult pilotage, but that the natural character 
of the enemy's positions upon it was essentially dif- 
ferent. They were as yet undeveloped by art ; but 
by nature they were high and commanding bluffs, 
having secure land communications with an exten- 
sive enemy's country in their rear over which our 
troops exercised no control whatever — where they 
had not even been seen. To speak of " taking them 
in the rear " was to beg the question — to assume 
that their front was then, as in June, 1863, toward 
an enemy investing them on the land side. New 



130 ADMIRAL FARRAGUT. 

Orleans and the region below, including its defenses 
and the communications therewith, were low-lying and 
intersected with numerous water-courses ; over such 
a navy naturally exercises a preponderating control. 
Above New Orleans the low delta of the Mississippi 
extends, indeed, on the west bank as far as the Red 
River, if it may not be said to reach to Vicksburg 
and beyond ; but on the east bank it ceases one 
hundred and fifty miles from the city. From thence 
to Vicksburg, a distance of two hundred and fifty 
miles, the stream is bordered by a series of bluffs 
backing on a firm country of moderate elevation. 
Such positions are not to be reduced from the water 
alone. On the contrary, if the water be a narrow 
strip swept by their guns, they command it ; while, 
from the extent of country in their rear, they are not 
susceptible of isolation by fleets above and below, 
as were Forts Jackson and St. Philip. 

This series of bluffs became, therefore, the line 
upon which the Confederates based their control of 
the Mississippi and maintained their vital communi- 
cations with Texas and the Red River region. It 
could be reduced only by a military force; and to 
think of subduing it by a fleet taking advantage of 
the panic following the fall of New Orleans, was 
truly to rely upon moral effect without adequate 
physical force to support it. It is due to the Navy 
Department to say that they expected the army 
from the North to advance more rapidly than it 
did ; but, without seeking to assign the blame, the 
utterly useless penetration of the United States 
fleet four hundred miles into the heart of the 
enemy's country and its subsequent mortifying 
withdrawal, when contrasted with the brilliant sue- 



THE FIRST ADVANCE ON VICKSBURG. i8l 

cess resulting from Farragut's dash by the forts, 
afford a very useful lesson in the adaptation of 
means to ends and the selection of a definite object- 
ive, upon compassing which something happens. 
The object of the United States Government being 
to control the lower Mississippi, that was effected 
by means of isolating its defenses, which then fell. 
When the further object was sought of controlling 
the course of the stream above, the mere perambu- 
lation of a body of ships effected nothing, because it 
aimed at nothing in particular, and could have no 
effect upon the decisive points. 

Of all these considerations Farragut was fully 
sensible ; and, while he obeyed his orders, he showed 
in his dispatches to the Department, and in private 
letters of the same period, how much against his 
judgment were operations conceived on such erro- 
neous military principles and undertaken with such 
inadequate force. The Department was forward to 
press him on, and as early as the 17th of May sent a 
dispatch intimating that he had forgotten his orders 
on the subject; and he was urged and required to 
open up the Mississippi to Flag-officer Davis's com- 
mand (the Mississippi flotilla), then still above Mem- 
phis, This and other letters of the same date must 
have been peculiarly exasperating; for they were re- 
ceived early in June, when he had been up the river 
as far as Vicksburg and satisfied himself that with- 
out an adequate force of troops nothing could 
be accomplished. "The Department," he replies, 
"seems to have considered my fleet as having es- 
caped all injury, and that when they arrived off New 
Orleans they were in condition to be pushed up the 
river. This was not the case ; but, the moment the 



1 82 ADMIRAL FARRAGUT. 

vessels could be gotten ready, the gunboats were all 
sent up under the command of Commander S. P. 
Lee, with directions to proceed to Vicksburg, take 
that place, and cut the railroad. . . . From all I 
could hear it was not considered proper, even with 
pilots, to risk the ships beyond Natchez. ... By the 
trnie Commander Lee arrived at Vicksburg (May 
i8th) he was satisfied that the force of the enemy 
was too great for him to venture to take the town, 
or even to pass it. The land in the rear of Vicks- 
burg is about two hundred feet high, on which are 
placed some eight and ten inch columbiads, which are 
perfectly secure from our fire. ... I determined to 
get the heavy ships up there if possible, which I did 
a day or two after. General Williams arrived in the 
mean time with fifteen hundred men, when I pro- 
posed to him, if he could carry the battery on the 
hill, I would attack the town. He made a careful 
reconnaissance, and returned to me in the afternoon, 
when I had all the (naval) commanders assembled. 
He reported that it would be impossible for him to 
land, and that he saw no chance of doing anything 
with the place so long as the enemy were in such 
force, having at their command thirty thousand 
men within one hour by railroad. A large ma- 
jority of the commanders concurred with him in the 
opinion." 

Writing to his home about this council, in which, 
contrary to his independent decision when below 
Fort Jackson, he yielded to the advice of his cap- 
tains, he said: "I did not pass Vicksburg; not 
because it was too strongly fortified ; not because 
we could not have passed it easily enough, but we 
would have been cut off from our supplies of coal and 



THE FIRST ADVANCE ON VICKSBURG. 183 

provisions. We would have been placed between two 
enemies (Vicksburg and Memphis), and so the cap- 
tains advised me not to do it. I was very sick at 
the time, and yielded to their advice, which I think 
was good ; but I doubt if I would have taken it had 
I been well," Here is seen, transpiring vividly 
enough, the uncertainty and indecision arising from 
the conflict between the orders of the Department 
and his own sounder judgment. He would fain 
obey ; yet no orders could override, though they 
might cruelly embarrass, the responsibility of the 
officer in command on the spot. " Fighting is noth- 
ing," he adds, " to the evils of the river — getting on 
shore, running foul of one another, losing anchors, 
etc." " The army," he resumes in his dispatch to 
the Department, " had been sent up early with a few 
days' rations, and I was compelled to supply them 
from the squadron, thereby reducing our own sup- 
plies, which were barely sufficient to bring the ships 
back to New Orleans, making allowance for probable 
delays. The river was now beginning to fall, and I 
apprehended great difficulty in getting down should 
1 delay much longer. In the mean time coal vessels 
had been towed up the river just above Natchez (a 
hundred miles below Vicksburg), which vessels I was 
obliged to bring down and keep in company with the 
vessels of war, for fear of their being captured by 
the guerrilla bands which appear to infest almost the 
entire banks of the river wherever there are rapids 
and bluffs." 

Such were some of the difficulties being experi- 
enced when the Assistant-Secretary of the Navy 
was writing : " The only anxiety we feel is to know 
if you have followed up your instructions and 



1 84 ADMIRAL FARRAGUT. 

pushed a strong force up the river to meet the 
Western flotilla." " I had no conception," replied 
Farragut, ^' that the Department ever contemplated 
that the ships of this squadron were to attempt to 
go to Memphis, above which the Western flotilla 
then was ; nor did I believe it was practicable for 
them to do so, unless under the most favorable cir- 
cumstances, in time of peace, when their supplies 
could be obtained along the river. The gunboats 
are nearly all so damaged that they are certainly 
not in condition to contend with ironclad rams 
coming down upon them with the current. . . . We 
consider the advantage entirely in favor of the ves- 
sel that has the current added to her velocity." In 
conclusion he adds : " I arrived in New Orleans with 
five or six days' provisions and one anchor, and am 
now trying to procure others. As soon as provisions 
and anchors are obtained we will take our departure 
for up the river, and endeavor to carry out, as far as 
practicable, the orders conveyed in your different 
dispatches." Writing home, he expressed himself 
more freely and unmistakably : " They will keep us 
in this river until the vessels break down and all the 
little reputation we have made has evaporated. The 
Government appears to think that we can do any- 
thing. They expect me to navigate the Mississippi 
nine hundred miles in the face of batteries, ironclad 
rams, etc., and yet with all the ironclad vessels they 
have North they could not get to Norfolk or Rich- 
mond. . . . Well, I will do my duty to the best of 
my ability, and let the rest take care of itself. . . . ' 
They can not deprive me and my officers of the his- 
torical fact that we took New Orleans. Now they 
expect impossibilities." 



THE FIRST ADVANCE ON VICKSBURG. 185 

Enough has been quoted to show that Farragut 
was in no way responsible for, nor approved of, the 
ill-timed tenacity with which the Government held 
to its original plan, when the conditions had turned 
out entirely different from those at first expected. 
The Secretary of the Navy at a later date endeavored 
to throw the blame of failure entirely upon the War 
Department, which was either unwilling or unable to 
support the naval movement with adequate troops. 
It is not necessary, in a life of the admiral, to at- 
tempt to decide upon the degree of remissness, if 
any, shown by the military service, nor upon whose 
shoulders it falls. It is sufficient to point out that 
the Navy Department required of Farragut to go up 
to meet the Western flotilla when it was near nine 
hundred miles from the mouth of the Mississippi, 
for no better reason, apparently, than that it had de- 
termined upon the junction at a time when it sup- 
posed it would be effected much lower down. In so 
doing it left nothing to the judgment of the officer 
commanding on the spot. " I think," said Farragut 
quietly, "that more should have been left to my dis- 
cretion ; but I hope for the best, and pray God to 
protect our poor sailors from harm." His own opin- 
ion was that Mobile should be the next point at- 
tacked. The difficulties there were not so great as 
those encountered at the Mississippi forts ; and his 
success at the latter might not improbably have con- 
siderable moral effect upon the other works, whose 
position had some strong features of resemblance to 
those already subdued, and which were not yet in the 
strong state of defense which they afterward reached. 
The blockade of the coast was part of his charge; 
and in no way did he think it could be so thoroughly 
13 



1 86 ADMIRAL FARRAGUT. 

maintained as by occupying the harbors themselves, 
or their entrances. 

In obedience to his peremptory orders Farragut 
again started up the river, with the apprehension 
that if he once got above Vicksburg he would not be 
able to return before the next spring rise ; for the 
season of lowest water in the Mississippi was now at 
hand. The Hartford did run ashore on the way up, 
and remained hard and fast for the better part of 
twenty-four hours. " It is a sad thing to think of 
having your ship on a mud bank, five hundred miles 
from the natural element of a sailor," wrote the flag- 
officer ; " but I knew that I had done all I could to pre- 
vent her being up the river so high, and was com- 
manded to go." She had to take out her coal and 
shot, and had even removed two guns before she 
floated. 

On the i8th of June the squadron was assembled 
just below Vicksburg, having in company also seven- 
teen schooners of the mortar flotilla, still under 
Porter's command. These were placed as rapidly 
as possible in suitable positions on the two sides 
of the river, opened fire on the 26th, and con- 
tinued it through the 27th. Upon the evening of the 
latter day Porter notified the flag-ofiicer that he was 
ready to cover, by a steady bombardment, the in- 
tended passage of the fleet before the batteries. 

Vicksburg is situated on the first high land met 
on the east bank of the Mississippi after leaving 
Memphis, from which it is four hundred miles dis- 
tant. The position was one of peculiar strength and 
importance for commanding the navigation of the 
river. Not only was it exceptionally lofty, and on 
one flank of that series of bluffs which has before 



HARTFORU, 

RICHMOND. 
BROOHLYN. 

IROqUO/S. 
ON CI DA. 
WISSAHICKOfil 
SC/0 TA. 
WINONA. 
PIN OLA. 
KENNCBEC. 

poflT£/fs GUN ems 

9 MOffTAR BOATS, 




Passage of Vicksburg Batteries, June 28, 1863. 
Order of Attack. 



THE FIRST ADVANCE ON VICKSBURG. 187 

been mentioned as constituting the line upon which 
the Confederate grip of the stream was based, but 
the tortuous character of the channel gave particular 
facilities for an enfilading fire on vessels both before 
and after they came abreast the works. They were 
thus exposed to a longer and more dangerous can- 
nonade than is the case where the stream flows 
straight past the front of a battery. The channel 
has now changed; but in 1862 the river, which from 
Memphis had pursued its winding course through 
an alluvial country, made when abreast of Vicksburg 
a sharp turn to the northeast, as though determined 
to reach the bluffs but four miles distant. As it 
neared them it swung round with a sharp turn to 
the southwest, parallel to its recent direction, flow- 
ing for the most part close to the foot of the hills. 
Between the two reaches, and formed by them, im- 
mediately opposite the town, there was a low tongue 
of land, or promontory, four miles long and less 
than one wide. The squadron, being below, had to 
steam up through the lower reach against the cur- 
rent, make the sharp turn at the bend, and then pass 
through the upper reach. In the bend it was fol- 
lowed by a fire from the highest part of the bluffs, 
to which it could make no reply. 

At 2 A. M. of June 28th the signal was given, and 
at three the squadron was under way — eleven ves- 
sels, of which three were the heavy ships Hartford, 
Richmond, and Brooklyn ; two, the corvettes Iroquois 
and Oneida ; and six gunboats. At four, the ships in 
their slow progress, stemming the current, had passed 
the mortar schooners ; and the latter then opened 
fire, as did the steamers connected with them, which 
were not to attempt the passage. Owing to a mis- 



1 88 ADMIRAL FARRAGUT. 

understanding, the three vessels which formed the 
rear of the column, the Brooklyn and two gunboats, 
did not get by. The others, at 6 a. m., anchored 
above Vicksburg. Though exposed much of the 
time to a raking fire, to which they were not able to 
reply, the vessels suffered less than would have been 
expected, owing to the enemy falling into the com- 
mon mistake of giving too much elevation to his 
guns. Having thus accomplished his instructions, 
Farragut reported coldly to the Department that, in 
obedience to the orders ^' and the command of the 
President, I proceeded up to Vicksburg with the 
Brooklyn, Richmond, and Hartford, with the deter- 
mination to carry out my instructions to the best of 
my ability. . . . The Department will perceive from 
this report that the forts can be passed, and we have 
done it, and can do it again as often as may be required 
of us. It will not, however, be an easy matter for 
us to do more than silence the batteries for a time, 
as long as the enemy has a large force behind the 
hills to prevent our landing and holding the place." 
" I am satisfied," he says again, " it is not possible 
to take Vicksburg without an army of twelve or 
fifteen thousand men. General Van Dorn's division 
(Confederate) is here, and lies safely behind the hills. 
The water is too low for me to go over twelve or 
fifteen miles above Vicksburg." The last sentence 
reveals clearly enough the madness of attempting to 
take three of the best ships of the navy to the upper 
river in falling water. Fortunately the insufficient 
depth now was above — not below — them, and they 
were not utterly cut off from the sea. Commander 
Porter, however, who started down river a week later, 
in compliance with orders summoning him to Wash- 



THE FIRST ADVANCE ON VICKSBURG. 



189 



ington, and than whom the navy had no more active 
nor enterprising officer, wrote back to the flag-officer 
that if the big ships did not soon return he feared 
they would have to remain till next year. 

Three days after Farragut passed the batteries of 
Vicksburg, on the ist of July, the Mississippi flotilla, 
under the command of Flag-officer Charles H. Davis, 
joined him from above; having left Memphis only 
two days before, but favored in their voyage by the 
current, by competent pilots, and by a draught suited 
to the difficulties of river navigation. The united 
squadrons continued together until the 15th of July, 
lying at anchor near the neck of the promontory op- 
posite Vicksburg ; with the exception of the Brook- 
lyn and the two gunboats which had not passed up 
on the 28th of June. These remained below the 
works, and on the opposite side of the promontory. 

The position of the two flag-officers was about 
four miles below the mouth of the Yazoo River, a 
tributary of the Mississippi, which enters the main 
stream on the east side not far above Vicksbursf. It 
was known to them that there was somewhere in the 
Yazoo an ironclad ram called the Arkansas ; which, 
more fortunate than the Mississippi at New Orleans, 
had been hurried away from Memphis just before 
that city fell into the hands of the United States 
forces. She was a vessel of between eight hundred 
and a thousand tons burden, carrying ten guns, 
which were protected by three inches of railroad 
iron, backed by bales of compressed cotton firmly 
braced. Her most dangerous weapon, however, was 
her ram ; but, owing to the lightness and bad con- 
struction of the engines, this was not as formidable as 
it otherwise might have been to the enemy's ships. 



190 



ADMIRAL FARRAGUT. 



So little injury had thus far been done to the 
United States vessels by the rams of the Confed- 
erates that the two flag-officers were probably lulled 
into a state of over-security, and they allowed their 
squadrons to lie with too low fires. To this doubt- 
less contributed the more powerful motive of the 
difficulty to the coal supply incurred by the excess- 
ively long line of exposed communications, im- 
posed upon both squadrons by the stubborn persist- 
ence of the Navy Department in hurrying the fleets 
far in advance of any support by the army. Beyond 
the reach of their guns they could not control the 
river banks ; and, unless they could be present every- 
where along the eight hundred miles which separated 
Memphis from New Orleans, even the narrow strip 
on either side swept by their cannon was safe at any 
point only while they were abreast it. The moral 
effect of their promenade up and down and of their 
meeting at Vicksburg was accurately weighed by the 
enemy; and, however it may have imposed upon the 
Northern people, did nothing to insure the safety 
of the unarmed vessels upon which supplies de- 
pended. This essentially vicious military situation 
resulted necessarily in a degree of insecurity which 
could have but one issue — a retreat by both squad- 
rons toward their respective bases, which soon after 
followed. 

Convinced of the inutility of his own presence at 
Vicksburg, and preoccupied with the risks threatening 
his squadron from the unguarded state of the river 
and its dangerous navigation, it is not wonderful 
that Farragut, who was the senior of the two flag- 
officers, thought little of the single ironclad vessel 
in his neighborhood. He was not prone to exag- 



THE FIRST ADVANCE ON VICKSBURG. 



191 



gerate danger, and his experience had not led him 
to entertain any high opinion of the enemy's rams. 
To these circumstances he owed one of the most 
mortifying incidents of his career. 

On the 15th of July a reconnoitering expedition 
was sent into the Yazoo, composed of two vessels 
of Davis's squadron, accompanied by one of the 
rams which at that time formed an independent or- 
ganization upon the upper Mississippi under the 
command of Colonel Ellet. It was a fortunate 
move, for to this circumstance was due that the 
squadrons had any notice of the approach of the 
Arkansas. The detached vessels met her about six 
miles within the Yazoo, when a running fight ensued 
between her and the Carondelet, to the disadvantage 
of the United States vessel; but the sustained can- 
nonade attracted betimes the attention of the fleet, 
and the Tyler, a small unarmored boat, after sup- 
porting the Carondelet to the best of her ability 
through the action, preceded the combatants down 
stream, bringing tidings of the ram's approach. 
There was not time to raise steam — only to cast 
loose the guns for action. When the Arkansas 
reached the fleet her smoke-stack had been so often 
perforated by the Carondelet's shot that her boilers 
could scarcely supply any steam. Her speed was 
thereby reduced to one knot, powerless to ram and 
scarcely sufficient to steer. At that rate, with the 
favor also of the current, she passed through the 
United States vessels, suffering from their successive 
fires much injury, though not of a vital kind, and 
took refuge under the guns of Vicksburg. It was 
a most gallant exploit, fairly comparable in dar- 
ing to the passage of the Mississippi forts, but re-. 



JQ2 ADMIRAL FARRAGUT. 

suiting in no decisive effect upon the issues of 
the war. 

It became immediately advisable for Farragut to 
rejoin the three ships which lay below the town, and 
were consequently in a condition favoring an attack 
by the ram, whose apparent immunity under the 
fire of the two squadrons showed her an enemy not 
to be despised. He determined to follow her down 
at once, again passing the batteries, and endeavor- 
ing to destroy her with the guns of his squadron as 
it went by. The execution of the plan was set 
for the late afternoon, and the Mississippi flotilla 
took up a position to support the movement by en- 
gaging the upper batteries. Unfortunately, time 
was lost in forming the order of battle, and the pas- 
sage was effected in the dark. The uncertainty of 
aim thus caused was increased by the precaution of 
the enemy, who shifted his position after nightfall. 
Two shots only found her, injuring several of her 
people and setting fire to the cotton bulwarks. Be- 
yond this she received no injury at this time, but 
she had been severely shaken by the hammering of 
the morning. A week later, on the 226. of July, 
Davis sent down the Essex, one of his heavy iron- 
clads, accompanied by one of Ellet's rams, to attack 
the Arkansas at her moorings. The effort was un- 
successful, although the enemy's vessel received 
some further injury. The ram rejoined the upper 
squadron ; but the Essex, from her indifferent speed, 
was unable to return against the current, exposed 
unsupported to the fire of all the batteries. She 
therefore became thenceforth a member of the lower 
squadron, together with a ram called the Sumter, 
which had run down with Farragut on the 15th. 



THE FIRST ADVANCE ON VICKSBURG. 



193 



On the 20th of the month Farragut had received 
orders from the Navy Department, dated July 14th, 
directing him to get the part of his fleet above Vicks- 
burg below that place with as little injury and loss 
of life as possible. The circumstances that have 
been narrated caused him to receive this dispatch 
below the town ; and on the 24th, two days after the 
descent of the Essex, he departed for New Orleans. 
Davis assured him that the Essex and Sumter should 
look out for the river between Vicksburg and Baton 
Rouge. To them were joined three of Farragut's 
gunboats ; and the five vessels took an active part in 
supporting the garrison of Baton Rouge when an at- 
tack was made upon the place by the Confederates 
on the 5th of August. In this the Arkansas was to 
have co-operated with the enemy's troops, and she 
left Vicksburg on the 3d for that purpose; but her 
machinery broke down, and while lying helpless 
against the river bank the Essex came in sight. Re- 
sistance in her then plight was hopeless. She was 
set on fire by her commander, the crew escaping to 
the shore. Farragut himself reached Baton Rouge 
shortly after this happened. He had with much 
difficulty succeeded in getting the heavier ships to 
New Orleans on the 28th of July ; and there he had 
lingered, unwilling to leave the river, though desirous 
of doing so, until affairs seemed on a reasonably se- 
cure basis. The chief element of anxiety was the 
Arkansas, concerning whose power to harm quite 
exaggerated notions prevailed. While thus lying be- 
fore New Orleans word was brought him of the at- 
tack on Baton Rouge, and he at once retraced his 
steps with the Hartford, Brooklyn, and some smaller 
ships. On the 7th he reached the scene of action. 



194 



ADMIRAL FARRAGUT. 



and learned the destruction of the Confederate ves- 
sel. The same day he wrote to the Department : " It 
is one of the happiest moments of my life that I am 
enabled to inform the Department of the destruction 
of the ram Arkansas ; not because I held the iron- 
clad in such terror, but because the community did." 
It must have been an additional element of satisfac- 
tion to him that the disappearance from the waters 
of the Mississippi of the last hostile vessel capable 
of offensive action released him from the necessity 
of remaining himself, or of keeping a large force 
there, during the unhealthy season. 

Before leaving Vicksburg the crews of the fleet 
had suffered severely from the sickness common in 
that climate. The Brooklyn had sixty-eight sick out 
of a total of three hundred ; and as this proportion 
was less than in the upper river flotilla, where the 
sick numbered forty per cent of the total force, it is 
probable that it fairly represents the general con- 
dition of Farragut's ships. Among the troops ac- 
companying the expedition there were but eight hun- 
dred fit for duty out of over three thousand. It was 
not considered well to maintain for a longer time in 
Baton Rouge the small garrison hitherto stationed 
there. It had honorably repulsed the enemy's at- 
tack ; but, in the general cessation of offensive move- 
ments by the United States army, the Confederates 
were continually strengthening their forces on the 
line of bluffs south of Vicksburg, to the importance 
of which their attention, never entirely diverted, had 
been forcibly drawn by the advance of the fleet in 
the previous months. Fruitless as that ill-judged 
advance had been, it reminded the enemy of the 
serious inconvenience they would suffer if the United 



THE FIRST ADVANCE ON VICKSBURG. 



195 



States ships could freely patrol that part of the Mis- 
sissippi, and impressed upon them the necessity of 
securing a section of it, by which they could have 
undisturbed communication between the two shores. 
This could be done by fortifying two points in such 
strength that to pass them from either direction 
would involve a risk too great to be lightly under- 
taken. The points chosen were Vicksburg and Port 
Hudson, two hundred miles apart, and embracing 
between them the mouth of the Red River. The 
latter is the great artery of the region west of the 
Mississippi, and also, by means of the Atchafalaya 
Bayou, offers direct communication for light-draught 
vessels with the Gulf of Mexico. Port Hudson being 
less than twenty miles from Baton Rouge, the pres- 
ence in the latter of a small garrison, which could 
undertake no offensive movement and which there 
were no troops to re-enforce, became purposeless. On 
the i6th of August, 1862, the post was abandoned, 
and the troops occupying it withdrew to New Or- 
leans. 



CHAPTER IX. 

THE BLOCKADE AND PORT HUDSON. 
1862-1863. 

Operations in the Mississippi having now tem- 
porarily ceased, Farragut was at liberty to give his 
undivided attention for a time to the coast block- 
ade. The important harbor of Pensacola had been 
evacuated by the Confederates in May, less than a 
month after the capture of New Orleans. Its aban- 
donment was due to want of troops to garrison it 
properly ; the pressure of the United States armies 
in Kentucky and Tennessee, after the fall of Fort 
Donelson in the previous February, having necessi- 
tated the withdrawal of all men that could be spared 
from other points. Before the war Pensacola had 
been the seat of a well-equipped navy yard with a 
good dry-dock, the only naval station of the United 
States in the Gulf of Mexico. At the time of the 
evacuation the buildings in the yard had been de- 
stroyed and the dry-dock injured; but the fine har- 
bor, the depth of water — twenty-two feet — that could 
be carried over the bar, and the nearness of the port 
to Mobile, the most important center of blockade 
running, all combined to make it the headquarters of 
the fleet for repairs and supplies. Farragut arrived 
there on the 20th of August. Just before leaving 



THE BLOCKADE AND PORT HUDSON. 



197 



New Orleans he received his commission as rear 
admiral, dated July 16, 1862. Three other officers 
were promoted at the same time to the active list of 
this grade, which had never before existed in the 
United States ; but as Farragut was the senior in 
rank of the four, he may be said to have been the 
first officer of the navy to hoist an admiral's flag. 

The admiral remained in Pensacola for three 
months, superintending from there the affairs of his 
squadron. During this period the harbors of Gal- 
veston and of various other smaller ports on the 
coast of Texas and Lousiana were occupied by de- 
tachments of vessels, as the surest way of enforcing 
the blockade. The admiral had early announced 
that he should carry on the blockade as far as pos- 
sible inside ; and these successes enabled him to say 
in December, 1862, that he now held the whole coast 
except Mobile. During his stay in Pensacola he re- 
ceived a visit from his son, who found him in the 
best of spirits, all having gone well on the coast ; 
the only mishap having been the success of a Con- 
federate cruiser, the Oreto, in running into Mobile. 
She had availed herself of her close resemblance to 
some of the British cruisers in the Gulf to hoist the 
British flag; and as visits of these vessels to the block- 
aded ports were authorized and not infrequent, the 
ruse induced the United States ship that overhauled 
her to withhold its fire for a few critical moments. 
During these the Oreto gained so far on the other 
that, although struck three times by heavy project- 
iles, she received no vital injury and succeeded in 
gaining the shelter of the forts. 

The period of the admiral's stay in Pensacola was 
one of the deepest depression to the Union cause, 



198 



ADMIRAL FARRAGUT. 



and his letters bear evidence of the anxiety which he 
shared with all his fellow-countrymen in that time of 
distress. The reverses of McClellan in the penin- 
sula, followed by the withdrawal of his army from 
thence and its transference to northern Virginia, the 
defeats suffered by Pope, and the first invasion of 
Maryland, occurred either immediately before or 
during the time that Farragut was in Pensacola. His 
own bootless expedition up the Mississippi and sub- 
sequent enforced retirement conspired also to swell 
the general gloom; for, although thinking military 
men could realize from the first that the position 
into which the fleet was forced was so essentially 
false that it could not be maintained, the unreflecting 
multitude saw only the conversion into repulse and 
disaster of a substantial success, of a conquest as 
apparently real as it was actually phantasmal. In 
the West, Grant was so stripped of troops that he 
feared the possibility of the Union forces being 
obliged to withdraw behind the Ohio, as they had in 
the East recrossed the Potomac. "The most anxious 
period of the war to me," he afterward wrote, " was 
during the time the army of the Tennessee was 
guarding the territory acquired by the fall of Cor- 
inth and Memphis, and before I was sufficiently 
re-enforced to take the offensive" — from July 15 to 
October 15, 1862. 

The Confederate forces which confronted Grant 
in northern Mississippi during these anxious months 
interposed between him and Vicksburg, and belonged 
to the department charged with the defenses of the 
Mississippi river. As they touched Grant, therefore, 
on the one side, on the other they were in contact 
with Farragut's command. The summer passed in 



THE BLOCKADE AND PORT HUDSON. 



199 



Vfirious movements by them, threatening Grant's 
position at Corinth, which culminated on the 3d of 
October in an attack in force. This was repulsed 
after hard fighting, and re-enforcements to Grant 
beginning to come in, the Confederates themselves 
were thrown on the defensive. The approach of 
winter, bringing with it higher water and healthier 
weather on the line of the Mississippi, warned them 
also that the time was at hand when they might have 
to fight for the control of the water communications, 
upon which they no longer had, nor could hope to 
have, a naval force. Reports therefore began to 
reach the admiral in Pensacola, from the senior 
naval officer in the river, that the Confederates were 
with renewed energy building batteries above Baton 
Rouge and strongly fortifying Port Hudson. 

As there seemed no speedy prospect of obtaining 
the land force, without whose co-operation an attack 
upon Mobile would be a fruitless enterprise, Farra- 
gut felt his proper position was now in the Missis- 
sippi itself. Important as was the blockade service, 
it was of a character safely to be trusted to a subor- 
dinate ; whereas the strictly military operations of 
the approaching campaign, whatever shape they 
might finally take, would be for the control of the 
river. It therefore behooved the commander-in- 
chief of the naval forces to be at hand, ready to 
support in any way that might offer the effort to 
obtain control of a region of which the water com- 
munications were so characteristic a feature. To 
push far up a narrow and intricate river a force of 
ships, whose numbers are insufficient even to protect 
their own communications and insure their coal sup- 
plies, is one thing; it is quite another to repair to 



200 ADMIRAL FARRAGUT. 

the same scene of action prepared to support tjje 
army by controlling the water, and by establishing 
in combined action a secure secondary base of opera- 
tions from which further advances can be made with 
reasonable certainty of holding the ground gained. 
There was no inconsistency between Farragut's re- 
luctance of the spring and his forwardness in the 
autumn. The man who, to secure New Orleans and 
compass the fall of the forts, had dared to cut adrift 
from his base and throw his communications to the 
winds, because he had an object adequate to the 
risk, was the same who, six weeks later, had testified 
his anxiety about communications stretched too far 
and to no purpose ; and now, half a year after that 
reluctant ascent of the river against his better judg- 
ment, we find him eagerly planning to go up again, 
establishing under the protection of the army an 
advanced base, from which, with the supplies accu- 
mulated at it, further movements may be contem- 
plated with a good chance of final success. 

On the 14th of November Farragut reported to 
the Navy Department his return to New Orleans. The 
Government, however, had taken warning by the 
fiasco of the previous season ; and, far from urging 
the admiral on, now sought to impress him with the 
need for caution. As the great object of opening the 
Mississippi and obtaining control of it remained, and 
necessarily must remain, the first of the Govern- 
ment's aims in the Southwest, the result of these in- 
structions was to give Farragut the discretion which 
had before been denied him. He retained fully his con- 
victions of the summer. " I am ready for anything," 
he writes to the Department, "but desire troops 
to hold what we get. General Butler urges me to 



THE BLOCKADE AND PORT HUDSON. 201 

attack Port Hudson first, as he wishes to break up 
that rendezvous before we go outside. It will take 
at least five thousand men to take Port Hudson." 
In the same spirit he writes home, " I am still doing 
nothing but waiting for the tide of events, and doing 
all I can to hold what I have "; and again, a week 
later, "As Micawber says, I am waiting for some- 
thing to turn up, and in the mean time having 
patience for the water to rise." Readiness to 
act, but no precipitation ; waiting for circum- 
stances, over which he had no control, to justify 
acting, may be described as his attitude at this 
moment. 

On the i6th of December the arrival from the 
north of General Banks to relieve General Butler — 
an event which took Farragut much by surprise — 
gave him the opportunity to show at once his own 
ideas of the proper military steps to be taken. Banks 
had brought re-enforcements with him ; and three 
days after his coming the admiral writes to the De- 
partment: "I have recommended to General Banks 
the occupation of Baton Rouge. ... It is only 
twelve or fifteen miles from Port Hudson, and is 
therefore a fine base of operations. He has ap- 
proved of the move, and ordered his transports to 
proceed directly to that point. I ordered Commander 
James Alden, in the Richmond, with two gunboats, 
to accompany them and cover the landing." Baton 
Rouge is on the southernmost of the bluffs which in 
rapid succession skirt the Mississippi below Vicks- 
burg. With an adequate garrison it became a base 
of operations from which the army could move 
against Port Hudson when the time came ; and under 
its protection the colliers and supplies necessary for 
1+ 



202 ADMIRAL FARRAGUT. 

the naval vessels in the advance could safely re- 
main. 

While waiting for the new commander of the 
army to get fairly settled to work and ready for the 
combined movement which Farragut was eager to 
make, the latter was called upon to endure some 
sharp disappointments. On the ist of January, 1863, 
the military forces in Galveston were attacked by 
Confederate troops, and the naval vessels by a num- 
ber of river steamboats barricaded with cotton to 
resist shells fired against them, and loaded with rifle- 
men. The garrison was captured, one of the gun- 
boats blown up by her own officers, and another sur- 
rendered after her captain and first lieutenant had 
been killed on her decks. The other vessels aban- 
doned the harbor. The affair was not only a dis- 
aster ; it was attended with discreditable circum- 
stances, which excited in the admiral indignation as 
well as regret. Shortly afterward, two sailing ves- 
sels of the squadron, charged with the blockade of 
Sabine Pass, were also taken by cotton-clad steamers ; 
which to attack availed themselves of a calm day, 
when the ships were unable to manoeuvre. An un- 
successful attempt was made after this to take Sabine 
Pass ; but both that place and Galveston remained 
in the power of the enemy, and were not regained 
until the final collapse of the Confederacy. Farragut 
dispatched one of his most trusted and capable of- 
ficers, Commodore Henry H. Bell, formerly his chief- 
of-staff, to re-establish the blockade of Galveston. 
Arriving off the port toward night. Bell sent one of 
his detachment, the Hatteras, a light side-wheel iron 
steamer bought from the merchant service, to over- 
haul a sail in the ofiing. Unfortunately, the stranger 



THE BLOCKADE AND PORT HUDSON. 



203 



proved to be the Confederate steamer Alabama, far 
superior in force to the Hatteras, and after a short 
engagement the latter was sunk. 

All this bad news came in rapid succession, and 
was closely followed by tidings of the escape from 
Mobile of the Oreto, which a few months before had 
eluded the blockading squadron through the daring 
ruse practiced by her commander. Known now as 
the Florida, and fitted as a Confederate cruiser, she 
ran out successfully during the night of January 15th. 
Here again, though the discredit was less than at 
Galveston, the annoyance of the admiral was in- 
creased by the knowledge that carelessness, or, at the 
best, bad judgment, had contributed to the enemy's 
success. From a letter written home at this time by 
his son, who had not yet returned from the visit begun 
at Pensacola, it appears that in the intimacy of family 
life he admitted, and showed by his manner, how 
keenly he felt the discredit to his command from 
these events. Though conscious that they were not 
due to failure on his part to do his utmost with the 
force given to him, and seeing in the escape of the 
Oreto a further justification of his own opinion that 
the lower harbor of Mobile should have been early 
seized, he nevertheless was " very much worried." 
This inside view of the effect, visible to those from 
whom he had no concealments, is supplemented by 
the description of the admiral's bearing under these 
reverses given by Captain (now Rear-Admiral) Jen- 
kins, who at this time became his chief-of-staff. 
" These disasters," he writes, " were sore trials to the 
admiral, and a less well-poised man would have given 
way ; but they seemed only to give him greater 
strength of will and purpose. ... I myself had the 



204 ADMIRAL FARRAGUT. 

misfortune, after months of watching, to see the 
Oreto run out the first night after I had been re- 
lieved of the command of the Oneida and ordered 
to report to the admiral as his fleet-captain. I had 
to bear him these bad tidings. Though no stoic, 
he bore the news as one accustomed to misfortune." 
It may seem, indeed, that these events, considered 
individually, were but instances of the hard knocks 
to be looked for in war, of which every general of- 
ficer in every campaign must expect to have his 
share; and this view is undoubtedly true. Never- 
theless, occurring in such rapid succession, and all 
in that part of his extensive command, the blockade, 
to which at that moment it seemed impossible to 
give his principal attention, the effect was naturally 
staggering. His first impulse was to leave the river 
and repair in person to the scene of disaster in Texas ; 
but reflection soon convinced him that, however un- 
fortunate the occurrences that had taken place there 
and elsewhere on the coast, they had not the same 
vital bearing on the issues of the war as the control 
of the Mississippi, and therefore not an equal claim 
upon the commander-in-chief. 

At the same time, the effect was to intensify the 
desire to act — to redeem by success the blot which 
failures had brought upon his command ; and the 
state of affairs elsewhere on the river was becoming 
such as to justify enterprise by the reasonable hope 
of substantial results. A series of circumstances 
which have been often narrated, and nowhere in a 
more interesting manner than by General Grant in 
his personal memoirs, had led to the abandonment of 
the movement by land upon Vicksburg by the Army 
of the Tennessee, following the Mississippi Central 



THE BLOCKADE AND PORT HUDSON. 



205 



Railroad. Instead of this original plan of campaign, 
the Mississippi River was now adopted as the line of 
advance and of communications. The first move 
along this new line had been made by General Sher- 
man, who brought with him 32,000 troops, and on 
the 26th of December, 1862, had landed on the low 
ground between the mouth of the Yazoo and Vicks- 
burg. On the 29th the army assaulted the works on 
the hills before them, but were repulsed. Sherman, 
satisfied that the position there was too strong to be 
carried, had determined to change his point of attack 
to the extreme right of the enemy's line, higher up 
the Yazoo ; but the heavy rains which characterized 
the winter of 1862-6^ in the Mississippi Valley made 
untenable the ground on which the troops were, and 
it became necessary to re-embark them. The trans- 
ports were then moved out into the Mississippi, 
where they were joined by General McClernand, the 
senior general officer in the department under Grant 
himself. 

McClernand now decided to attack Arkansas 
Post, on the Arkansas River, which enters the Mis- 
sissippi from the west about two hundred miles 
above Vicksburg. The Post was primarily intended 
to close the Arkansas and the approach to the capital 
of the State of the same name ; but although fifty 
miles from the mouth of the river, it was, by the 
course of the stream, but fifteen by land from the 
Mississippi. The garrison, being five thousand 
strong, was thus dangerously placed to threaten the 
communications by the latter river, upon which the 
army was to depend during the approaching cam- 
paign ; and it had already given evidence of the fact^ 
by the capture of a valuable transport. This post 



2o6 ADMIRAL FARRAGUT. 

was reduced on the nth of January, and McClernand 
next day started troops up the White River, a tribu- 
tary of the Arkansas. From this ex-centric move- 
ment, which seemed wholly to ignore that Vicksburg 
and the Mississippi were the objective of the cam- 
paign, McClernand was speedily and peremptorily 
recalled by Grant. The latter, having absolutely no 
confidence in the capacity of his senior subordinate, 
could dispossess him of the chief command only by 
assuming it himself. This he accordingly did, and 
on the 30th of January joined the army, which was 
then encamped on the levees along the west bank of 
the river above Vicksburg. 

Serious action on the part of the army, directed 
by a man of whose vigorous character there could 
be no doubt, though his conspicuous ability was not 
yet fully recognized, was evidently at hand; and 
this circumstance, by itself alone, imparted a very 
different aspect to any naval enterprises, giving them 
reasonable prospect of support and of conducing 
substantially to the great common end. Never in 
the history of combined movements has there been 
more hearty co-operation between the army and 
navy than in the Vicksburg campaign of 1863, under 
the leadership of Grant and Porter. From the nature 
of the enemy's positions their forcible reduction was 
necessarily in the main the task of the land forces ; 
but that the latter were able to exert their full 
strength, unweakened, and without anxiety as to 
their long line of communications from Memphis to. 
Vicksburg, was due to the incessant vigilance and 
activity of the Mississippi flotilla, which grudged 
neither pains nor hard knocks to support every 
movement. But, besides the care of our own com- 



THE BLOCKADE AND PORT HUDSON. 



207 



munications, there was the no less important service 
of harassing or breaking up those of the enemy. Of 
these, the most important was with the States west of 
the Mississippi. Not to speak of cereals and sugar, 
Texas alone, in the Southwest, produced an abun- 
dance of vigorous beef cattle fit for food ; and from 
no other part of the seceded States could the armies 
on the east banks of the Mississippi be adequately 
supplied. Bordering, moreover, upon Mexico, and 
separated from it only by a shoal river into which the 
United States ships could not penetrate, there poured 
across that line quantities of munitions of war, which 
found through the Mexican port of Matamoras a 
safe entry, everywhere else closed to them by the 
sea-board blockade. For the transit of these the 
numerous streams west of the Mississippi, and 
especially the mighty Red River, offered, peculiar 
facilities. The principal burden of breaking up these 
lines of supply was thrown upon the navy by the 
character of the scene of operations — by its numer- 
ous water-courses subsidiary to the great river itself, 
and by the overflow of the land, which, in its del- 
uged condition during the winter, effectually pre- 
vented the movement of troops. Herein Farragut 
saw his opportunity, as well as that of the upper 
river flotilla. To wrest the control of the Missis- 
sippi out of the enemy's hands, by reducing his po- 
sitions, was the great aim of the campaign ; until that 
could be effected, the patrol of the section between 
Vicksburg and Port Hudson would materially con- 
duce to the same end. 

Over this Farragut pondered long and anxiously. 
He clearly recognized the advantage of this service, 
but he also knew the difficulties involved in main- 



2o8 ADMIRAi; FARRAGUT. 

taining his necessary communications, and, above 
all, his coal. At no time did the enemy cease their 
annoyance from the river banks. Constant brushes 
took place between their flying batteries and the dif- 
ferent gunboats on patrol duty ; a kind of guerrilla 
warfare, which did not cease even with the fall of 
Vicksburg and Port Hudson, but naturally attained 
its greatest animation during the months when their 
fate was hanging in the balance. The gunboats 
could repel such attacks, though they were often 
roughly handled, and several valuable officers lost 
their lives; but not being able to pursue, the mere 
frustration of a particular attack did not help to 
break up a system of very great annoyance. Only 
a force able to follow — in other words, troops — could 
suppress the evil. "You will no doubt hear more," 
the admiral writes on the ist of February, 1863, "of 
* Why don't Farragut's fleet move up the river?' 
Tell them, Because the army is not ready. Farragut 
waits upon Banks as to when or where he will go." 

Still, even while thus dancing attendance upon a 
somewhat dilatory general, his plans were maturing; 
so that when occasion arose he was, as always, ready 
for immediate action — had no unforeseen decision to 
make. " The evening of the day (about January 
20th) that I reported to him at New Orleans," writes 
Admiral Jenkins, " he sent everybody out of the 
cabin, and said : ' I wish to have some confidential 
talk with you upon a subject which I have had in mind 
for a long time. ... I have never hinted it to any 
one, nor does the department know anything of my 
thoughts. The first object to be accomplished, which 
led me to think seriously about it, is to cripple the 
Southern armies by cutting off their supplies from 



THE BLOCKADE AND PORT HUDSON. 209 

Texas. Texas at this time is, and must continue to 
the end of the war to be, their main dependence for 
beef cattle, sheep, and Indian corn. If we can get a 
few vessels above Port Hudson the thing will not be 
an entire failure, and I am pretty confident it can be 
done.' " Jenkins naturally suggested that the co- 
operation of the army by an active advance at the 
same time would materially assist the attempt. To 
this, of course, the admiral assented, it being in en- 
tire conformity with his own opinion ; and several 
interviews were held, without, however, their lead- 
ing to any definite promise on the part of General 
Banks. 

Meantime Admiral Porter, who after leaving the 
mortar flotilla had been appointed to the command 
of the Mississippi squadron, with the rank of acting 
rear-admiral, realized as forcibly as Farragut the 
importance of placing vessels in the waters between 
Vicksburg and Port Hudson. In the middle of De- 
cember he was before Vicksburg, and had since then 
been actively supporting the various undertakings 
of the land forces. Three days after Grant joined 
the army, on the 2d of February, the ram Queen of 
the West ran the Vicksburg batteries from above, 
and successfully reached the river below. Ten days 
later. Porter sent on one of his newest ironclads, the 
Indianola, which made the same passage under cover 
of night without being even hit, although twenty 
minutes under fire. The latter vessel took with her 
two coal barges ; and as the experiment had already 
been successfully tried of casting coal barges loose 
above the batteries, and trusting to the current to 
carry them down to the Queen of the West, the 
question of supplies was looked upon as settled. 



2IO ADMIRAL FARRAGUT. 

The Indianola was very heavily armed, and both the 
admiral and her commander thought her capable of 
meeting any force the enemy could send against her. 

Unfortunately, on the 14th of February, two days 
only after the Indianola got down, the Queen of the 
West was run ashore under a battery and allowed to 
fall alive into the hands of the enemy. The latter at 
once repaired the prize, and, when ready, started in 
pursuit of the Indianola with it and two other steamers ; 
one of which was a ram, the other a cotton-protected 
boat filled with riflemen. There was also with them 
a tender, which does not appear to have taken part 
in the fight. On the night of February 24th the pur- 
suers overtook the Indianola, and a sharp action 
ensued ; but the strength of the current and her own 
unwieldiness placed the United States vessel at a 
disadvantage, which her superior armament did not, in 
the dim light, counterbalance. She was rammed six 
or seven times, and, being then in a sinking condition, 
her commander ran her on the bank and surrendered. 
This put an end to Porter's attempts to secure that 
part of the river by a detachment. The prospect, 
that had been fair enough when the Queen of the 
West was sent down, was much marred by the loss 
of that vessel ; and the subsequent capture of the In- 
dianola transferred so much power into the hands of 
the Confederates, that control could only be con- 
tested by a force which he could not then afford to 
risk. 

The up-river squadron having failed to secure the 
coveted command of the river, and, besides, trans- 
ferred to the enemy two vessels which might become 
very formidable, Farragut felt that the time had come 
when he not only might but ought to move. He 



THE BLOCKADE AND PORT HUDSON. 21I 

was growing more and more restless, more and more 
discontented with his own inactivity, when such an 
important work was waiting to be done. The news 
of the Queen of the West's capture made him still 
more uneasy; but when that was followed by the loss 
of the Indianola, his decision was taken at once. 
"The time has come," he said to Captain Jenkins; 
" there can be no more delay. I must go — army or 
no army." Another appeal, however, was made to 
Banks, representing the assistance which the squadron 
would derive in its attempt to pass the batteries from 
a demonstration made by the army. The permanent 
works at Port Hudson then mounted nineteen heavy 
cannon, many of them rifled ; but there were reported 
to be in addition as many as thirty-five field-pieces, 
which, at the distance the fleet would have to pass, 
would be very effective. If the army made a serious 
diversion in the rear, many of these would be with- 
drawn, especially if Farragut's purpose to run by 
did not transpire. The advantage to be gained by 
this naval enterprise was so manifest that the gen- 
eral could scarcely refuse, and he promised to make 
the required demonstration with eight or ten thou- 
sand troops. 

On the 12th of March, within a fortnight after 
hearing of the Indianola affair, Farragut was off 
Baton Rouge. On the 14th he anchored just above 
Profit's Island, seven miles below Port Hudson, 
where were already assembled a number of the mor- 
tar schooners, under the protection of the ironclad 
Essex, formerly of the upper squadron. The ad- 
miral brought with him seven vessels, for the most 
part essentially fighting ships, unfitted for blockade 
duty by their indifferent speed, but carrying heavy 



212 ADMIRAL FARRAGUT. 

batterieSc If the greater part got by, they would 
present a force calculated to clear the river of every 
hostile steamer and absolutely prevent any consider- 
able amount of supplies being transferred from one 
shore to the other. 

For the purpose of this passage Farragut adopted 
a somewhat novel tactical arrangement, which he 
again used at Mobile^ and which presents particular 
advantages when there are enemies only on one side 
to be engaged. Three of his vessels were screw 
steamers of heavy tonnage and battery ; three others 
comparatively light. He directed, therefore, that 
each of the former should take one of the latter on 
the side opposite to the enemy, securing her well 
aft, in order to have as many guns as possible, on 
the unengaged side, free for use in case of necessity. 
In this way the smaller vessels were protected with- 
out sacrificing the offensive power of the larger. 
Not only so ; in case of injury to the boilers or en- 
gines of one, it was hoped that those of her consort 
might pull her through. To equalize conditions, to 
the slowest of the big ships was given the most 
powerful of the smaller ones. A further advantage 
was obtained in this fight, as at Mobile, from this 
arrangement of the vessels in pairs, which will be 
mentioned at the time of its occurrence. The sev- 
enth ship at Port Hudson, the Mississippi, was a very 
large side-wheel steamer. On account of the incon- 
venience presented by the guards of her wheel- 
houses, she was chosen as the odd one to whom no 
consort was assigned 

Going up the river toward Port Hudson the course 
is nearly north ; then a bend is reached of over ninety 
degrees, so that after making the turn the course 




Order of Attack on Batteries at Port Hudson, March 14, 1863. 

A. Hartford (flae-ship). Captain James S. Palmer, a. Albatross, Lieut.-Com. John 
E. Hart. B. Richmond, Commander James Alden. h. Genesee. Commander W. H. Ma- 
comb. C. Monon^ahela, Captain J. P. McKinstry. c. Kineo, Lieut.-Com. John Waters. 
D. Mississippi, Captain Melancton Smith. E. Essex, Commander C. H. B. Caldwell. 
P. Sachem, Act. Vol. Lieut. Amos Johnson. G. G. Mortar schooners. H. Spot where 
Mississippi grounded. 



THE BLOCKADE AND PORT HUDSON. 213 

for some distance is west-southwest. The town is 
on the east side, just below the bend. From it the 
batteries extended a mile and a half down the river, 
upon bluffs from eighty to a hundred feet high. 
Between the two reaches, and opposite to the town, 
is a low, narrow point, from which a very dangerous 
shoal makes out. The channel runs close to the east 
bank. 

The squadron remained at its anchorage above 
Profit's Island but a few hours, waiting for the cover 
of night. Shortly before 10 p. m. it got under way, 
ranged as follows : Hartford, Richmond, Mononga- 
, hela, each with her consort lashed alongside, the 
Mississippi bringing up the rear. Just as they were 
fairly starting a steamer was seen approaching from 
down the river, flaring lights and making the loud 
puffing of the high-pressure engines. The flag-ship 
slowed down, and the new arrival came alongside 
with a message from the general that the army was 
then encamped about five miles in rear of the Port 
Hudson batteries. Irritated by a delay, which served 
only to attract the enemy's attention and to assure 
himself that no diversion was to be expected from 
the army, the admiral was heard to mutter : " He 
had as well be in New Orleans or at Baton Rouge for 
all the good he is doing us." At the same moment 
the east bank of the river was lit up, and on the op- 
posite point huge bonfires kindled to illumine the 
scene — a wise precaution, the neglect of which by 
the enemy had much favored the fleet in the passage 
of the lower forts. 

The ships now moved on steadily, but very 
slowly, owing to the force of the current. At 11 
p. M. the Hartford had already passed the lower 



214 



ADMIRAL FARRAGUT. 



batteries, when the enemy threw up rockets and 
opened fire. This was returned not only by the ad- 
vancing ships, but also by the ironclad Essex and 
the mortar schooners, which had been stationed to 
cover the passage. The night was calm and damp, 
and the cannonade soon raised a dense smoke which 
settled heavily upon the water, covering the ships 
from sight, but embarrassing cheir movements far 
more than it disconcerted the aim of their opponents. 
The flag-ship, being in the advance, drew somewhat 
ahead of the smoke, although even she had from 
time to time to stop firing to enable the pilot to see.- 
Her movements were also facilitated by placing the 
pilot in the mizzen-top, with a speaking tube to com- 
municate with the deck, a precaution to which the 
admiral largely attributed her safety ; but the vessels 
in the rear found it impossible to see, and groped 
blindly, feeling their way after their leader. Had 
the course to be traversed been a straight line, the 
difficulty would have been much less ; but to make 
so sharp a turn as awaited them at the bend was no 
easy feat under the prevailing obscurity. As the 
Hartford attempted it the downward current caught 
her on the port bow, swung her head round toward 
the batteries, and nearly threw her on shore, her 
stem touching for a moment. The combined powers 
of her own engine and that of the Albatross, her con- 
sort, were then brought into play as an oarsman uses 
the oars to turn his boat, pulling one and backing the 
other ; that of the Albatross was backed, while that 
of the Hartford went ahead strong. In this way their 
heads were pointed up stream and they went through 
clear ; but they were the only ones who effected the 
passage. 



THE BLOCKADE AND PORT HUDSON. 21$ 

The Richmond, which followed next, had reached 
the bend and was about to turn when a plung- 
ing shot upset both safety valves, allowing so much 
steam to escape that the engines could not be 
efficiently worked. Thinking that the Genesee, her 
companion, could not alone pull the two vessels by, 
the captain of the Richmond turned and carried 
them both down stream. The Monongahela, third 
in the line, ran on the shoal opposite to the town 
with so much violence that the gunboat Kineo, 
alongside of her, tore loose from the fastenings. 
The Monongahela remained aground for twenty-five 
minutes, when the Kineo succeeded in getting her 
off. She then attempted again to run the batteries, 
but when near the turn a crank-pin became heated 
and the engines stopped. Being now unmanageable, 
she drifted down stream and out of action, having 
lost six killed and twenty-one wounded. The Mis- 
sissippi also struck on the shoal, close to the bend, 
when she was going very fast, and defied every 
effort to get her off. After working for thirty-five 
minutes, finding that the other ships had passed off 
the scene leaving her unsupported, while three bat- 
teries had her range and were hulling her con- 
stantly, the commanding officer ordered her to be 
set on fire. The three boats that alone were left 
capable of floating were used to land the crew on 
the west bank; the sick and wounded being first 
taken, the captain and first lieutenant leaving the 
ship last. She remained aground and in flames 
until three in the morning, when she floated and 
drifted down stream, fortunately going clear of the 
vessels below. At half-past five she blew up. Out 
of a ship's company of two hundred and ninety- 



2i6 ADMIRAL FARRAGUT 

seven, sixty four were found missing, of whom 
twenty-five were believed to be killed. 

In his dispatch to the Navy Department, written 
the second day after this affair, the admiral lamented 
that he had again to report disaster to a part of 
his command. A disaster indeed it was, but not of 
the kind which he had lately had to communicate, 
and to which the word *' again " seems to refer ; for 
there was no discredit attending it. The stern 
resolution with which the Hartford herself was 
handled, and the steadiness with which she and her 
companion were wrenched out of the very jaws of 
destruction, offer a consummate example of profes- 
sional conduct ; while the fate of the Mississippi, de- 
plorable as the loss of so fine a vessel was, gave rise 
to a display of that coolness and efficiency in the 
face of imminent danger which illustrate the annals 
of a navy as nobly as do the most successful deeds of 
heroism. 

Nevertheless, it must be admitted that the failure 
to pass the batteries, by nearly three fourths of the 
force which the admiral had thought necessary to 
take with him, constituted a very serious check to 
the operations he had projected. From Port Hud- 
son to Vicksburg is over two hundred miles ; and 
while the two ships he still had were sufficient to 
blockade the mouth of the Red River— the chief line 
by which supplies reached the enemy — they could not 
maintain over the entire district the watchfulness 
necessary wholly to intercept communication between 
the two shores. Neither could they for the briefest 
period abandon their station at the river's mouth, 
without affording an opportunity to the enemy ; who 
was rendered vigilant by urgent necessities which 



THE BLOCKADE AND PORT HUDSON. 



217 



forced him to seize every opening for the passage of 
stores. From the repulse of five out of the seven 
ships detailed for the control of the river, it resulted 
that the enemy's communications, on a line abso- 
lutely vital to him, and consequently of supreme 
strategic importance, were impeded only, not broken 
off. It becomes, therefore, of interest to inquire 
whether this failure can be attributed to any over- 
sight or mistake in the arrangements made for forc- 
ing the passage — in the tactical dispositions, to use 
the technical phrase. In this, as in every case, those 
dispositions should be conformed to the object to be 
attained and to the obstacles which must be over- 
come. 

The purpose which the admiral had in view was 
clearly stated in the general order issued to his cap- 
tains : " The captains will bear in mind that the ob- 
ject is to run the batteries at the least possible damage to 
our ships, and thereby secure an efficient force above, 
for the purpose of rendering such assistance as may 
be required of us to the army at Vicksburg, or, if not 
required there, to our army at Baton Rouge." Such 
was the object, and the obstacles to its accomplish- 
ment were twofold, viz., those arising from the diffi- 
culties of the navigation, and those due to the prep- 
arations of the enemy. To overcome them, it was 
necessary to provide a sufficient force, and to dis- 
pose that force in the manner best calculated to in- 
sure the passage, as well as to entail the least ex- 
posure. Exposure is measured by three principal 
elements — the size and character of the target offered, 
the length of time under fire, and the power of the 
enemy's guns ; and the last, again, depends not 
merely upon the number and size of the guns, but 
IS 



2i8 ADMIRAL FARRAGUT. 

also upon the fire with which they are met. In this 
same general order Farragut enunciated, in terse and 
vigorous terms, a leading principle in warfare, which 
there is now a tendency to undervalue, in the 
struggle to multiply gun-shields and other defensive 
contrivances. It is with no wish to disparage de- 
fensive preparations, nor to ignore that ships must 
be able to bear as well as to give hard knocks, that 
this phrase of Farragut's, embodying the experience 
of war in all ages and the practice of all great cap- 
tains, is here recalled, '' The best protection against 
the enemy's fire is a well-directed fire from our own 
guns." 

The disposition adopted for the squadron was 
chiefly a development of this simple principle, com- 
bined with an attempt to form the ships in such an 
order as should offer the least favorable target to 
the enemy. A double column of ships, if it presents 
to the enemy a battery formidable enough to subdue 
his fire, in whole or in part, shows a smaller target 
than the same number disposed in a single column ; 
because the latter order will be twice as long in 
passing, with no greater display of gun-power at a 
particular point. The closer the two columns are to- 
gether, the less chance there is that a shot flying 
over the nearer ship will strike one abreast her ; 
therefore, when the two are lashed side by side this 
risk is least, and at the same time the near ship pro- 
tects the off one from the projectile that strikes her- 
self. These remarks would apply, in degree, if all the 
ships of the squadron had had powerful batteries ; 
the limitation being only that enough guns must be 
in the near or fighting column to support each other, 
and to prevent several of the enemy's batteries being 



THE BLOCKADE AND PORT HUDSON. 



219 



concentrated on a single ship — a contingency depend- 
ent upon the length of the line of hostile guns to be 
passed. But when, as at Port Hudson, several of the 
vessels are of feeble gun-power, so that their pres- 
ence in the fighting column w^ould not re-enforce its 
fire to an extent at all proportionate to the risk to 
themselves, the arrangement there adopted is doubly 
efficacious. 

The dispositions to meet and overcome the dif- 
ficulties imposed by the enemy's guns amounted, 
therefore, to concentrating upon them the batteries 
of the heavy ships, supporting each other, and at the 
same time covering the passage of a second column 
of gunboats, which was placed in the most favorable 
position for escaping injury. In principle the plan 
was the same as at New Orleans — the heavy ships 
fought while the light were to slip by ; but in appli- 
cation, the circumstances at the lower forts would 
not allow one battery to be masked as at Port Hud- 
son, because there were enemy's works on both sides. 
For meeting the difficulties of the navigation on this 
occasion, Farragut seems not to have been pleased 
with the arrangement adopted. " With the excep- 
tion of the assistance they might have rendered the 
ships, if disabled, they were a great disadvantage," 
he wrote. The exception, however, is weighty ; and, 
taken in connection with his subsequent use of the 
same order at Mobile, it may be presumed the sen- 
tence quoted was written under the momentary 
recollection of some inconvenience attending this 
passage. Certainly, with single-screw vessels, as 
were all his fleet, it was an inestimable advantage, 
in intricate navigation or in close quarters, to have 
the help of a second screw working in opposition to 



220 ADMIRAL FARRAGUT. 

the first, to throw the ship round at a critical instant. 
In the supreme moment of his military life, at Mobile, 
he had reason to appreciate this advantage, which he 
there, as here, most intelligently used. 

Thus analyzed, there is found no ground for ad- 
verse criticism in the tactical dispositions made by 
Farragut on this memorable occasion. The strong 
points of his force were utilized and properly com- 
bined for mutual support, and for the covering of 
the weaker elements, which received all the protec- 
tion possible to give them. Minor matters of detail 
were well thought out, such as the assignment to the 
more powerful ship of the weaker gunboat, and the 
position in which the small vessels were to be se- 
cured alongside. The motto that '' the best protection 
against the enemy's fire is a well-directed fire by our 
own guns " was in itself an epitome of the art of 
war ; and in pursuance of it the fires of the mortar 
schooners and of the Essex were carefully combined 
by the admiral with that of the squadron. Com- 
mander Caldwell, of the Essex, an exceedingly cool 
and intelligent officer, reported that " the effect of 
the mortar fire (two hundred bombs being thrown in 
one hundred and fifty minutes, from eleven to half- 
past one) seemed to be to paralyze the efforts of the 
enemy at the lower batteries ; and we observed that 
their fire was quite feeble compared to that of the 
upper batteries." Nor had the admiral fallen into 
the mistake of many general officers, in trusting too 
lightly to the comprehension of his orders by his 
subordinates. Appreciating at once the high impor- 
tance of the object he sought to compass, and the 
very serious difficulties arising from the enemy's po- 
sition at Port Hudson and the character of the navi- 



THE BLOCKADE AND PORT HUDSON. 221 

gation, he had personally inspected the ships of his 
command the day before the action, and satisfied 
himself that the proper arrangements had been made 
for battle. His general order had already been 
given to each commanding officer, and he adds : 
" We conversed freely as to the arrangements, and I 
found that all my instructions were well understood 
and, I believe, concurred in by all. After a free 
interchange of opinions on the subject, every com- 
mander arranged his ship in accordance with his own 
ideas." 

In this point the admiral appears to have made 
a mistake, in not making obligatory one detail 
which he employed on board the flag-ship. *' I had 
directed a trumpet fixed from the mizzen-top to the 
wheel on board this ship, as I intended the pilot to 
take his station in the top, so that he might see over 
the fog, or smoke, as the case might be. To this 
idea, and to the coolness and courage of my pilot, 
Mr. Carrell, I am indebted for the safe passage of 
this ship past the forts." It may be that the admiral 
counted upon the vessels being so closed up that the 
flag-ship would practically serve as the pilot for all. 
If so, he reckoned without his host, and in this small 
oversight or error in judgment is possibly to be found 
a weak point in his preparations ; but it is the only 
one. The failure of the Richmond, his immediate 
follower, was not in any way due to pilotage, but to 
the loss of steam by an accidental shot ; and it is 
still a matter of doubt whether the Genesee, her con- 
sort, might not have pulled her by. The third in the 
order, the Monongahela, also failed finally from the 
heating of a bearing; but as this occurred after 
being aground for half an hour, with the vigorous 



222 ADMIRAL FARRAGUT. 

working of the engines that naturally ensues under 
such circumstances, it seems as if her failure must 
ultimately be traced to the smoke. '' The firing had 
so filled the atmosphere with smoke," wrote her cap- 
tain, '* as to prevent distinguishing objects near by." 
The loss of the Mississippi was due entirely to an 
error of the pilot, whatever may have been the 
cause. 

The effect of the appearance above Port Hudson 
of the Hartford and Albatross is abundantly testified 
in the correspondence of the day, both Union and 
Confederate, and justifies beyond dispute this fine 
conception of Farragut's and the great risk which he 
took entirely upon his own responsibility. He found, 
indeed, a ground for his action in an order of the 
Department dated October 2, 1862,* directing him 
" to guard the lower part of the Mississippi, es- 
pecially where it is joined by the Red River," until 

* The full text of this order was as follows. It committed the 

department to nothing. 

" Navy Deparitwent, October 2, 1862. 
" Sir : While the Mississippi River continues to be blockaded 
at Vicksburg, and until you learn from Commander D. D. Porter, 
who will be in command of the Mississippi squadron, that he has, 
in conjunction with the army, opened the river, it will be necessary 
for you to guard the lower part of that river, especially where it is 
joined by the Red River, the source of many of the supplies of the 
enemy. I am respectfully, etc.. 

"GmEON Wf.lles. 

" Secretaiy of the Navy." 

That five months elapsed between the date of this order and 
Farragut's action, without anything more definite, shows clearly 
that the department took no responsibility. On the other hand, it 
is right to say that it showed a generous appreciation of the effort, 
and did not complain about the losses. 



THE BLOCKADE AND PORT HUDSON. 



223 



he heard from Admiral Porter that the latter, in con- 
junction with the army, had opened the river ; but 
he distrusted the consent of the Secretary to his 
running the great risk involved in the passage of 
Port Hudson. As Grant was ordered to take Vicks- 
burg, so was Farragut ordered to blockade the Red 
River ; and as Grant did not notify the commander- 
in-chief of his final great resolve to cut loose from 
his base, until it was too late to stop him, so did 
Farragut keep within his. own breast a resolve upon 
which he feared an interdict. For even after two 
years of war the department was embarrassed for 
ships, and the policy of economy, of avoiding risks, 
the ever fatal policy of a halting warfare, was forced 
upon it — an impressive illustration of the effect ex- 
erted by inadequate preparation upon the operations 
of war. For lack of ships. Mobile was in 1863 still 
in the hands of the enemy. "I would have had it 
long since or been thrashed out of it," wrote Farra- 
gut six weeks before Port Hudson. *' I feel no fears 
on the subject ; but they do not wish their ships risked^ 
for fear we might not be able to hold the Mississippi'* 
A similar reluctance might be anticipated to expose 
such valuable vessels as attacked Port Hudson, when 
their loss was so hard to repair; for only men of the 
temper of Farragut or Grant — men with a natural 
genius for war or enlightened by their knowledge of 
the past — can fully commit themselves to the hazard 
of a great adventure — can fully realize that a course 
of timid precaution may entail the greatest of risks. 
" Your services at Red River," wrote Admiral 
Porter to Farragut upon hearing of his arrival above 
Port Hudson, "will be a godsend ; it is worth to us 
the loss of the "Mississippi," and i§ at this moment 



224 



ADMIRAL FARRAGUT. 



the severest blow that could be struck at the South. 
They obtain all their supplies and ammunition in 
that way. . . . The great object is to cut off supplies. 
For that reason I sent down the Queen of the West 
and the Indianola. I regret that the loss of the 
Indianola should have been the cause of your present 
position." These utterances, which bespeak the re- 
lief afforded him at the moment by Farragut's bold 
achievement, are confirmed by the words written 
many years later in his History of the Navy. "Far- 
ragut in the Hartford, with the Albatross, reached 
the mouth of the Red River, and Port Hudson was 
as completely cut off from supplies as if fifty gun- 
boats were there. ... It was soon seen that the ob- 
ject aimed at had been gained — the works at Port 
Hudson were cut off from supplies and the fate of 
the garrison sealed." " I look upon it as of vast 
importance," wrote General Grant, "that we should 
hold the river securely between Vicksburg and Port 
Hudson " ; and he undertook to contribute anything 
that the army could furnish to enable vessels from 
above to run by Vicksburg, and so supply to Farra- 
gut the numbers he needed through the repulse of 
his own ships. 

" The Mississippi is again cut off," wrote to 
Richmond the Confederate General Pemberton, who 
commanded the district in which are Vicksburg 
and Port Hudson, " neither subsistence nor ord- 
nance can come or go " ; and the following day, 
March 20th, the sixth after Farragut's passage, 
he sends word to General Richard Taylor, on the 
west shore, " Port Hudson depends almost entirely 
for supplies upon the other side of the river." 
" Great God ! how unfortunate ! " writes, on March 



THE BLOCKADE AND PORT HUDSON. 225 

17th, a Confederate commissary in Taylor's depart- 
ment. " Four steamers arrived to-day from Shreve- 
port. One had 300,000 pounds of bacon ; three 
others are reported coming down with loads. Five 
others are below with full cargoes designed for Port 
Hudson, but it is reported that the Federal gunboats 
are blockading the river." As to passing by other 
pomts, " it is doubtful whether many cattle ever get 
through the swamps and bayous through which they 
are required to pass on this side. As the water de- 
clines, I think likely cattle in large quantities can be 
crossed by swimming, but at present your prospect of 
getting supplies from this side is gloomy enough'' "Early 
in February," writes Pemberton again, " the enemy 
succeeded in passing two of his gunboats by our 
batteries at Vicksburg " (the Indianola and Queen of 
the West). " This at once rendered the navigation of 
the Mississippi and Red River dangerous, and from 
that time it was only by watching opportunities, and 
at great risk of capture, that supplies could be 
thrown into Port Hudson and Vicksburg. Never- 
theless, large amounts were successfully introduced 
into both places." 

This success, partial as it was, was due, first, to 
the capture of Porter's detachment, which opened the 
river again until Farragut came ; and, secondly, to the 
repulse of so large a portion of the latter's squadron. 
The Hartford and Albatross, though they could close 
the Red River, could not multiply themselves to cover 
the great stretch which the admiral had purposed to 
occupy with seven vessels. Neither was the Albatross 
of sufficient force to be left by herself at the mouth 
of the Red River, Farragut therefore moved slowly 
up the Mississippi, destroying a quantity, of stores 



226 ADMIRAL FARRAGUT. 

accumulated upon the levees awaiting transportation, 
as well as a number of flat-boats ; and on the after- 
noon of the 19th of March he anchored twelve miles 
below Vicksburg. The following day he moved fur- 
ther up and communicated with General Grant, in- 
forming him of the events that had just befallen him 
and offernig any assistance in the power of the two 
ships. If not needed, he purposed returning to Red 
River, and asked for coal from either army or navy. 
Porter was then absent on the Deer Creek expedi- 
tion, an attempt to get the Mississippi gunboats 
through the bayou of that name into the Yazoo; 
whereby, if successful, the Confederate position at 
Vicksburg would be turned. Grant accordingly un- 
dertook to send down coal, which was done by turn- 
ing adrift in the current of the Mississippi a barge 
carrying some four hundred tons. This floated by 
night clear of the enemy's positions, and was picked 
up by boats from the Hartford. 

Farragut had written to Porter of his wish to re- 
ceive some vessels from above, specifying two rams 
and an ironclad, with which and his own two vessels 
he could better carry out his purpose of closing the 
whole stretch in which he was. He intimated this wish 
to Grant, who highly approved of it. "I see by 
Southern papers received yesterday," he wrote to Far- 
ragut, ''that Vicksburg must depend upon Louisiana, 
or west of the Mississippi, for supplies. Holding Red 
River from them is a great step in the direction of pre- 
venting this, but it will not entirely accomplish the 
object. New Carthage (twenty miles below Vicks- 
burg, on the west bank) should be held, and it seems 
to me that in addition we should have sufficient ves- 
sels below to patrol the whole river from Warrenton 



THE BLOCKADE AND PORT HUDSON. 



227 



(ten miles below Vicksburg) to the Red River. I will 
have a consultation with Admiral Porter on this sub- 
ject. I am happy to say the admiral and myself 
have never yet disagreed upon any policy." In the 
absence of Porter, General EUet determined to send 
down two of the Ellet rams, which made their dash 
on the morning of March 25, displaying all the dar- 
ing, but unfortunately also much of the recklessness, 
which characterized that remarkable family. Start- 
ing near dawn, on a singularly clear night, they were 
surprised by daylight still under fire. One, being 
very rotten, was shattered to pieces by a shell ex- 
ploding her boilers. The other was disabled, also 
by a shell in the boilers, but, being stronger, drifted 
down with the current and reached Farragut safely. 
She was soon repaired, and was an addition to his 
force. 

While lying below Vicksburg the admiral trans- 
ferred to Porter's care, for passage north by the 
Mississippi River^ his son and only child, who had 
been with him since the summer stay in Pensacola. 
They had passed the batteries at Port Hudson to- 
gether, the bearing of the boy in that hot contest 
approving itself to the father, who, despite his anx- 
iety, could not brmg himself to accept the surgeon's 
suggestion to send him below, out of harm's way. 
" I am trying to make up my mind to part with 
Loyall," he wrote to his wife, " and to let him go 
home by way of Cairo. I am too devoted a father 
to have my son with me in troubles of this kind. 
The anxieties of a father should not be added to 
those of the commander." 

On the 27th of March the Hartford started again 
down river, accompanied by the Albatross and the 



228 ADMIRAL FARRAGUT. 

Ellet ram Switzerland. On the 2d of April the little 
squadron anchored off the mouth of the Red River, 
having on its passage down again destroyed a number 
of skiffs and fiat-boats used for transporting stores. 
Warned by the fate of the Indianola, the admiral 
left nothing undone to ensure the absolute safety of 
the flag-ship ; for, though her powerful armament 
and numerous crew gave her a great superiority over 
any number of river vessels, granting her room to 
manoeuvre, the difficulties of the river and the great- 
ness of the stake to both parties made it imperative 
to take no needless risks. As a protection against 
rams, large cypress logs were hung around the ship 
about a foot above the water line, where they would 
both resist penetration and also give time for the 
elasticity of the frame of a wooden vessel to take up 
the blow. Against boarding, elaborate preparations 
were made, which would prevent a steamer attempt- 
ing it from getting nearer than twenty feet to the 
side, where she would remain an easy victim to the 
shell and grape of the Hartford's guns. 

From the 2d to the 30th of April Farragut re- 
mained in the neighborhood of the Red River, be- 
tween its mouth and Port Hudson. Cut off by the 
batteries of the place, and by the prevalence of guer- 
rillas on the west bank, from all usual means of com- 
munication with General Banks and his own squad- 
ron, he contrived to get a letter down by the daring 
of his secretary, Mr. Edward C. Gabaudan ; who was 
set adrift one night in a skiff ingeniously covered 
with drift brush, and, thus concealed, floated undis- 
covered past the enemy's guards. The small number 
of his vessels prevented his extending his blockade 
as far as he wished ; but in closing the Red River he 



THE BLOCKADE AND PORT HUDSON. 



22^ 



deprived the enemy of by far the best line they 
possessed, and he destroyed a quantity of stores and 
boats. 

In the mean time diverse and important events 
were concurring to release him from his position of 
isolation. Toward the end of March General Grant, 
who had for some time abandoned all expectation of 
turning Vicksburg by its right flank, began the cele- 
brated movement down the west side of the Missis- 
sippi ; whence he crossed to the east bank at Bruins- 
burg, and fought the campaign which ended by shut- 
ting up Pemberton and his army within the lines of 
the place. In furtherance of this plan. Porter him- 
self, with a large body of his ships, ran the batteries 
at Vicksburg on the night of April i6. The fleet 
then kept pace with the necessarily slow progress 
of the army, encumbered with trains, through the 
roads heavy with the mire of the recent overflow. 
On the 29th of April the Mississippi squadron fought 
a sharp engagement with the Confederate batteries 
at Grand Gulf, which they could not reduce ; and 
the following day Grant's army crossed the river. 

While these events were bringing the Mississippi 
squadron into that part of the river which Farragut 
had aimed to control, other movements were leading 
to his assistance some of the lighter vessels of his 
own command. After the naval action at Port Hud- 
son, Banks had temporarily abandoned his designs 
upon that post in favor of operations west of the 
Mississippi by the Bayous Teche and Atchafalaya, 
the latter of which communicates with the Red River 
a few miles above its mouth. This movement was 
accompanied by a force of four gunboats, under the 
command of Lieutenant-Commander A. P. Cooke, of 



230 



ADMIRAL FARRAGUT. 



the Estrella, which captured a post on the Atchafa- 
laya called Butte a la Rose, on the 20th of April, 
the same day that Opelousas, sixty miles from Alex- 
andria, was entered by the army. The latter pressed 
on toward Alexandria, while the gunboats pushed 
their way up the Atchafalaya. On the first of May 
two of them, the Estrella and Arizona, passed into 
the Red River, and soon afterward joined the Hart- 
ford. 

Three days later Admiral Porter arrived with 
several of his fleet and communicated with Farragut. 
The next day. May 5th, Porter went up the Red 
River and pushed rapidly toward Alexandria, which 
was evacuated, its stores being removed to Shreve- 
port, three hundred and fifty miles farther up. 

Farragut now felt that his personal presence 
above Port Hudson was no longer necessary. The 
Mississippi was ultimately to become the command 
of Porter, whose vessels were especially fitted for its 
waters ; and that admiral was now at liberty to give 
his full attention below Vicksburg. On the other 
hand, his own squadron in the lower river and on the 
blockade demanded a closer attention than he could 
give from his isolated station. Accordingly, on the 
6th of May he transferred the command to Commo- 
dore Palmer, of the Hartford, with whom he left the 
Albatross, Estrella, and Arizona to intercept com- 
munications between the two banks of the Mississippi 
below Red River; while he himself returned by one 
of the bayous to New Orleans, reaching there on 
the nth. 

Thus ended Farragut's brilliant strategic move- 
ment against the communications of Vicksburg and 
Port Hudson, and through them against the inter- 



THE BLOCKADE AND PORT HUDSON. 



231 



course of the Confederacy with its great Western 
storehouse, over which the two fortresses stood 
guard. It was a movement which, though crippled 
from the beginning by a serious disaster on the 
battle-field, was conceived in accordance with the 
soundest principles of the art of war. Its signifi- 
cance has been obscured and lost in the great enter- 
prise initiated a month later by General Grant, and 
solidly supported by the navy under Porter ; whose 
co-operation, Grant avows, was absolutely essential 
to the success — nay, even to the contemplation of 
such an undertaking.* In this combined movement, 
identical in principle with that of Farragut, Porter, 
in executing his part, had the current with instead of 
against him. Had circumstances delayed or pre- 
vented Grant's advance by the west bank of the Mis- 
sissippi — had he, for instance, been enabled by one 
of the abortive bayou expeditions to penetrate north 
of Vicksburg — Farragut's action would have been no 
more sound nor bold, but its merits would have been 
far more perceptible to the common eye. Re-enforce- 
ments must have been sent him ; and around his flag- 
ship would have centered a force that would have 
choked the life out of Vicksburg and Port Hudson. 

Because rightly aimed, this daring campaign was 
not frustrated even by the disasters of the night 
action. It is distinguished from the unhappy fiasco of 
the year before by all the difference between a fitting 
and an unfitting time — by all that separates a clear 
appreciation of facts from a confused impression of 
possibilities. In 1862 Farragut was driven up the 
river against his own judgment, seeing no prospect 

* Personal Memoirs of U. S. Grant, vol. i, p. 461. 



232 



ADMIRAL FARRAGUT. 



of tangible or permanent results. In 1863 he went 
on his own responsibility, because he saw that in the 
then condition of affairs, with the armies gathering at 
both ends of the line, the movement he made would 
not only be successful in itself, but would materially 
conduce to the attainment of the common end. It 
is significant of his true military insight that neither 
depreciation nor disaster shook his clear convictions 
of the importance of his work. " Whether my get- 
ting by Port Hudson was of consequence or not," 
he wrote chaffingly in reference to some slighting 
comments in a Southern newspaper, "if Pollard's 
stomach were as tightly pinched for food as theirs 
at Port Hudson and Vicksburg have been since I 
shut up Red River, he would know how to value 
a good dinner and a little peace." In soberer style 
he wrote to his home : " We have done our part of 
the work assigned to us, and all has worked well. 
My last dash past Port Hudson was the best thi?ig I ever 
did^ except taking New Orleans. It assisted materi- 
ally in the fall of Vicksburg and Port Hudson," 

Farragut remained but a short time in New Or- 
leans, and was soon again at the front; joining the 
vessels of his squadron lying near, but below. Port 
Hudson. After entering Alexandria on the 7th of 
May, General Banks moved down with his army to 
the Mississippi, which he crossed five or six miles 
above Port Hudson. General Augur, of his com- 
mand, at the same time moved up from Baton Rouge, 
the two divisions meeting on the 23d of May, and 
immediately investing Port Hudson. An assault was 
made on the 27th ; but proving unsuccessful, regular 
siege operations were begun. The mortar schooners 
and the Essex supported them by constant bombard- 



THE BLOCKADE AND PORT HUDSON. 



233 



ment, and the navy furnished and manned a battery 
of four nine-inch Dahlgren guns. 

While contributing thus conspicuously to the im- 
mediate furtherance of the siege, the most essential 
work of the navy, here as in the upper Mississippi, was 
in the maintenance of the communications, which were 
wholly by the river, as well as in assuring the safety 
of New Orleans, then stripped of all the troops that 
could be spared. The danger of two points like 
Vicksburg and Port Hudson, both of such vital im- 
portance, and both being besieged at the same time, 
aroused every latent energy of the Confederacy, 
and set in motion every armed man of whom it 
could dispose. To divert and distract the attention 
of the Union generals, to induce them to abandon 
their efforts or dimmish the forces at the front, no 
means were so ready nor so sure as an attack upon 
their communications, or a threat directed against 
their base. To make these insecure, is like mining the 
foundations of a building. Here the navy removed 
every substantial cause of anxiety by its firm support, 
and by the rapidity with which its heavy guns were 
brought to sustain every point attacked. Under 
such diligent guardianship the barrier of the Missis- 
sippi remained impassable; and although a trans- 
port might now and again be arrested and forced to 
surrender, such an occasional annoyance could not 
by the most uneasy general be magnified into a seri- 
ous menace to his communications, The active Con- 
federate general, Richard Taylor, in command of the 
district west of the river, stripped all his posts to 
concentrate an effort along the right bank, which, by 
disturbing Banks, might make a favorable diversion 

for Port Hudson ; and loud talk was made of an at- 
16 



234 



ADMIRAL FARRAGUT. 



tack upon New Orleans itself, favored by a rising 
among the citizens, still heartily attached to the 
Southern cause. The powerful vessels kept before 
the city by Farragut effectually disposed of any 
chance of such an attempt, although much anxiety 
was felt by General Emory, in command of the 
station, and confident expectation was plainly dis- 
cernible on the faces of the towns-people. The Con- 
federates, however, did for a season control the west 
side of the river, appearing before Donaldsonville 
and Plaquemine, where were posts of United States 
troops. These were saved by the prompt appearance 
of gunboats, which followed the movements of the 
enemy ; but the report of them brought Farragut 
down in person, and elicited from him a remonstrance 
to Banks for leaving upon the west bank, inadequately 
sustained, heavy guns which, if they fell into the 
hands of the Confederates, might convert a menace 
into a serious embarrassment. A few days later, at 
midnight of June 27th, the enemy attacked Donald- 
sonville in force. The storming party succeeded in 
entering the works, but the three gunboats which 
Farragut had stationed there opened so heavy a fire 
upon the supports that these broke and fled ; and 
those in advance, being unsustained, were made pris- 
oners. 

A few days later Farragut summoned his chief-of- 
staff, Captain Thornton A. Jenkins, to relieve him at 
Port Hudson, as he felt his owm presence necessary 
at New Orleans. Jenkins started up in the Monon- 
gahela, a heavy corvette commanded by Captain 
Abner Read, having in company two small trans- 
ports with needed supplies. The enemy, despite the 
repulse at Donaldsonville, remained in the neighbor- 



THE BLOCKADE AND PORT HUDSON. 



235 



hood, and had established a battery of field-guns a 
few miles below at a bend in the river. By these 
the Monongahela was attacked and pretty severely 
handled for a few moments. Her captain, an officer 
of distinguished courage and enterprise, was mortally 
wounded, and Captain Jenkins slightly so. These 
two affairs sufficiently indicate the character of the 
enemy's operations on the west bank of the Missis- 
sippi at this time. They did not in the least succeed 
in shaking the grip of the Union army before Port 
Hudson, nor did they entirely cease with the sur- 
render of the place. That they did so little harm, 
with the enemy in nearly undisputed command in 
the regions west of the river, was due to the navy, 
whose mobility exceeded that of their troops. 

Vicksburg surrendered on the 4th of July, 1863, 
and its fall was followed by that of Port Hudson on 
the 9th of the same month. Farragut then wrote to 
Porter, and turned over to him the command in all the 
Mississippi Valley above New Orleans. On the ist of 
August Porter himself arrived off the city in his flag- 
ship, and the two admirals had an interview on the 
scene of their former exploits. The same afternoon 
Farragut sailed in the Hartford for the North, to 
enjoy a brief respite from his labors during the ener- 
vating autumn months of the Gulf climate. Though 
now sixty-two years old, he retained an extraordinary 
amount of vitality, and of energy both physical and 
moral ; but nevertheless at his age the anxieties and 
exposure he had to undergo tell, and had drawn from 
him, soon after his return from above Port Hudson, 
the expressive words, " I am growing old fast, and 
need rest." On the loth of August the flag-ship an- 
chored in New York, after a passage of nine days. 



236 



ADMIRAL FARRAGUT. 



The admiral remained in the North until the 
first of the following year. His own ship, and her 
powerful sisters, the Richmond and Brooklyn, were 
in need of extensive repairs before they could be 
considered again fit for winter service in the Gulf. 
The Hartford was in better condition than the other 
two, being uninjured below the water line, but the 
severe actions through which she had passed were 
proved by the scars, two hundred and forty in num- 
ber, where she had been struck by shot or shell. 



CHAPTER X. 

MOBILE. 
1864. 

By the fall of the last and most powerful of the 
Confederate strongholds upon the Mississippi, and 
the consequent assertion of control by the United 
States Government over the whole of the great water 
course, was accomplished the first and chief of the 
two objects toward which Farragut was to co- 
operate. After manifold efforts and failures, the 
combined forces of the United States had at last 
sundered the Confederacy in twain along the prin- 
cipal one of those natural strategic lines which inter- 
sected it, and which make the strength or the weak- 
ness of States according as they are able or unable to 
hold them against an enemy. Of the two fragments, 
the smaller was militarily important only as a feeder 
to the other. Severed from the body to which they 
belonged, the seceded States west of the Mississippi 
sank into insignificance ; the fire that had raged 
there would smoulder and die of itself, now that a 
broad belt which could not be passed interposed be- 
tween it and the greater conflagration in the East. 

It next became the task of the Union forces to 
hold firmly, by adequate defensive measures, the line 
they had gained ; while the great mass of troops here- 



238 



ADMIRAL FARRAGUT. 



tofore employed along the Mississippi in offensive 
operations were transferred farther east, to drive yet 
another column through a second natural line of 
cleavage from Nashville, through Georgia, to the Gulf 
or to the Atlantic seaboard. How this new work was 
performed under the successive leadership of Rose- 
crans. Grant, and Sherman, does not fall within the 
scope of the present work. Although the light 
steamers of the Mississippi squadron did good and 
often important service in this distant inland region, 
the river work of Farragut's heavy sea-going ships 
was now over. In furtherance of the great object of 
opening the Mississippi, they had left their native 
element, and, braving alike a treacherous navigation 
and hostile batteries, had penetrated deep into the 
vitals of the Confederacy. This great achievement 
wrought, they turned their prows again seaw^ard. 
The formal transfer to Admiral Porter of the com- 
mand over the whole Mississippi and its tributaries, 
above New Orleans, signalized the fact that Farra- 
gut's sphere of action was to be thenceforth on the 
coast; for New Orleans, though over a hundred 
miles from the mouth of a tideless river, whose 
waters flow ever downward to the sea, was neverthe- 
less substantially a sea-coast city. 

As the opening of the Mississippi was the more 
important of the two objects embraced in Farragutls 
orders, so did it also offer him the ampler field for 
the display of those highest qualities of a general 
officer which he abundantly possessed. The faculty 
of seizing upon the really decisive points of a situa- 
tion, of correctly appreciating the conditions of the 
problem before him, of discerning whether the proper 
moment for action was yet distant or had already 



MOBILE. 



239 



arrived, and of moving with celerity and adequate 
dispositions when the time did come — all these dis- 
tinctive gifts of the natural commander-in-chief had 
been called into play, by th,e difificult questions arising 
in connection with the stupendous work of breaking 
the shackles by which the Confederates held the 
Mississippi chained. The task that still remained 
before him, the closing of the Confederate seaports 
within the limits of his command, though arduous 
and wearisome, did not make the same demand upon 
these more intellectual qualities. The sphere was 
more contracted, more isolated. It had fewer rela- 
tions to the great military operations going on else- 
where, and, being in itself less complex, afforded less 
interest to the strategist. It involved, therefore, less 
of the work of the military leader which was so con- 
genial to his aptitudes, and more of that of the 
administrator, to him naturally distasteful. 

Nevertheless, as the complete fulfilment of his 
orders necessitated the reduction of a fortified sea- 
port, he found in this undertaking the opportunity for 
showing a degree of resolution and presence of mind 
which was certainly not exceeded — perhaps not even 
equaled — in his previous career. At Mobile it was 
the tactician, the man of instant perception and 
ready action, rather than he of clear insight and 
careful planning, that is most conspicuous. On the 
same occasion, with actual disaster incurred and 
imminent confusion threatening his fleet, combined 
with a resistance sturdier than any he had yet en- 
countered, the admiral's firmness and tenacity rose 
equal to the highest demand ever made upon them. 
In the lofty courage and stern determination which 
plucked victory out of the very jaws of defeat, the 



240 



ADMIRAL FARRAGUT. 



battle of Mobile Bay was to the career of Farragut 
what the battle of Copenhagen was to that of 
Nelson. Perhaps we may even say, borrowing the 
words of an eloquent French writer upon the latter 
event, the battle of Mobile will always be in the eyes 
of seamen Farragut's surest claim to glory.* 

Up to the time of Farragut's departure for the 
North, in August, 1863, the blockade of the Gulf 
sea-coast within the limits of his command, though 
technically effective, had for the most part only been 
enforced by the usual method of cruising or anchor- 
ing off the entrances of the ports. Such a watch, 
however, is a very imperfect substitute for the iron 
yoke that is imposed by holding all 'the principal 
harbors, the gateways for communication with the 
outer world. This was clearly enough realized ; and 
the purpose of Farragut, as of his Government, had 
been so to occupy the ports within his district. At 
one time, in December, 1862, he was able to say 
exultingly that he did so hold the whole coast, ex- 
cept Mobile; but the disasters at Galveston and 
Sabine Pass quickly intervened, and those ports re- 
mained thenceforth in the hands of the enemy. On 
the Texas coast, however, blockade-running properly 
so called — the entrance, that is, of blockaded Confed- 
erate harbors — was a small matter compared with the 
flourishing contraband trade carried on through the 
Mexican port Matamoras and across the Rio Grande. 
When Farragut's lieutenant, Commodore Henry H. 

* " The campaign of the Baltic will always be in the eyes of 
seamen Nelson's fairest claim to glory. He alone was capable of 
displaying such boldness and such perseverance ; he alone could 
face the immense difificulties of that enterprise and triumph over 
them." — Jurien de la Graviere, Guerres Mai-i times. 



MOBILE. 



241 



Bell, visited this remote and ordinarily deserted spot 
in May, 1863, he counted sixty-eight sails at anchor 
in the offing and a forest of smaller craft inside the 
river, some of which were occupied in loading and 
unloading the outside shipping; to such proportions 
had grown the trade of a town which neither pos- 
sessed a harbor nor a back country capable of sus- 
taining such a traffic. Under proper precautions by 
the parties engaged, this, though clearly hostile, was 
difficult to touch ; but it also became of compara- 
tively little importance when the Mississippi fell. 

Not so with Mobile. As port after port was 
taken, as the lines of the general blockade drew closer 
and closer, the needs of the Confederacy for the ap- 
proaching death-struggle grew more and more cry- 
ing, and the practicable harbors still in their hands 
became proportionately valuable and the scenes of 
increasing activity. After the fall of New Orleans 
and the evacuation of Pensacola, in the spring of 
1862, Mobile was by far the best port on the Gulf 
coast left to the Confederates. Though admitting 
a less draught of water than the neighboring harbor 
of Pensacola, it enjoyed the advantage over it of 
excellent water communications with the interior; 
two large rivers with extensive tributary systems 
emptying into its bay. Thanks to this circumstance, 
it had become a place of very considerable trade, 
ranking next to New Orleans in the Gulf; and its 
growing commerce, in turn, reacted upon the com- 
munications by promoting the development of its 
railroad system. The region of which Mobile was 
the natural port did not depend for its importance 
only upon agricultural products; under somewhat 
favorable conditions it had developed some manu- 



242 ADMIRAL FARRAGUT. 

facturing interests in which the Southern States were 
generally very deficient, and which afterward found 
active employment in the construction of the Ten- 
nessee, the most formidable ironclad vessel built by 
the Confederates. 

For all these reasons the tenure of Mobile be- 
came a matter of serious consequence to the enemy ; 
and, as Farragut had from the first foreseen, they 
made active use of the respite afforded them by 
the unfortunate obstinacy of the Navy Department 
in refusing him permission to attack after New Or- 
leans fell. The enterprise then was by no means 
as difficult as the passage of the Mississippi forts 
just effected; and once captured, the holding of 
the harbor would require only the small number of 
troops necessary to garrison the powerful masonry 
fort which commanded the main ship channel, sup- 
ported by a naval force much less numerous than 
that required to blockade outside. The undertaking 
was therefore not open to the objection of unduly 
exposiiig the troops and ships placed in unfortified 
or poorly fortified harbors, which received such a 
sad illustration at Galveston ; but it was dropped, 
owing, first, to the preoccupation of the Government 
with its expec4;ations of immediately reducing the 
Mississippi, and afterward to the fear of losing ships 
which at that time could not be replaced. Hesitation 
to risk their ships and to take decisive action when 
seasonable opportunity offers, is the penalty paid by 
nations which practise undue economy in their prepa- 
rations for war. When at last it became urgent to 
capture Mobile before the powerful ironclad then 
building was completed, the preparations of the de- 
fense were so far advanced that ironclad vessels were 



MOBILE. 



243 



needed for the attack ; and before these could be, or 
at least before they were, supplied, the Tennessee, 
which by rapid action might have been forestalled 
like the similar vessel at New Orleans, was ready for 
battle. Had she been used with greater wisdom by 
those who directed her movements, she might have 
added very seriously to the embarrassment of the 
United States admiral. 

When Farragut, after an absence of nearly six 
months, returned to his station in January, 1864, it 
was with the expectation of a speedy attack upon 
Mobile. On his way to New Orleans he stopped off 
the bar, and on the 20th of January made a recon- 
naissance with a couple of gunboats, approaching to 
a little more than three miles from the forts com- 
manding the entrance. He then reported to the de- 
partment that he was satisfied that, if he had one 
ironclad, he could destroy the whole of the enemy's 
force in the bay, and then reduce the forts at leisure 
with the co-operation of about five thousand troops. 
" But without ironclads," he added, " we should not 
be able to fight the enemy's vessels of that class with 
much prospect of success, as the latter would lie on 
the flats, where our ships could not get at them. By 
reference to the chart you will see how small a space 
there is for the ships to manoeuvre. Wooden vessels 
can do nothing with the ironclads, unless by getting 
within one or two hundred yards, so as to ram them 
or pour in a broadside." He repeats the informa- 
tion given by a refugee, that the ironclad Nashville 
would not be ready before March, and that the Con- 
federate admiral announced that when she was he 
would raise the blockade. " It is depressing," he 
adds, " to see how easily false reports circulate, and 



244 



ADMIRAL FARRAGUT. 



in what a state of alarm the community is kept by 
the most absurd rumors. If the Department could 
get one or two ironclads here, it would put an end to 
this state of things and restore confidence to the 
people of the ports now in our possession. I feel no 
apprehension about Buchanan's raising the blockade ; 
but, with such a force as he has in the bay, it would 
be unwise to take in our wooden vessels without the 
means of fighting the enemy on an equal footing." 
Having made this reconnaissance, he went on to New 
Orleans, arriving there January 22d. 

It appears, therefore, that, regarded as a naval 
question, Farragut considered the time had gone by 
for an attempt to run the forts of Mobile Bay, and 
that it would not return until some ironclads were 
furnished him by the Department. The capture of 
the forts he at no time expected, except by the same 
means as he had looked to for the reduction of those 
in the Mississippi — that is, by a combined military 
and naval operation. In both cases the navy was 
to plant itself across the enemy's communications, 
which it could do by running the gantlet of his guns. 
It then remained for the land forces either to com-, 
plete the investment and await their fall by the slow 
process of famine, or to proceed with a regular siege 
covered by the fleet. Without the protection of the 
ships in the bay, the army would be continually 
harassed by the light gunboats of the enemy, and 
very possibly exposed to attack by superior force. 
Without the troops, the presence of the ships inside 
would be powerless to compel the surrender of the 
works, or to prevent their receiving some supplies. 
But in the two years that had very nearly elapsed 
since Farragut, if permitted his own wish, would 



MOBILE. 



245 



have attacked, the strengthening of the works and 
the introduction of the ironclads had materially 
altered the question. He was, it is true, misinformed 
as to the readiness of the latter. The vessels that 
were dignified by that name when he first returned 
to his station, took no part in the defense, either of 
the bay or, later, of the city. He was deceived, 
probably, from the fact that the Confederates them- 
selves were deceived, with the exception of a few 
who had more intimate knowledge of their real 
value ; and consequently the reports that were 
brought off agreed in giving them a character which 
they did not deserve. 

An attack upon Mobile had been a cherished 
project with General Grant after the fall of Vicks- 
burg. It was to that — and not to the unfortunate 
Red River expedition of 1864 — that he would have 
devoted Banks's army in the Southwest ; moving it, 
of course, in concert with, so as to support and be 
supported by, the other great operations which took 
place that year — Sherman's advance upon Atlanta 
and his own against Richmond. It was to Mobile, 
and not to Savannah, that he first looked as the 
point toward which Sherman would act after the 
capture of Atlanta; the line from Atlanta to Mobile 
would be that along which, by the control of the 
intervening railroad systems, the Confederacy would 
again be cleft in twain, as by the subjugation of the 
Mississippi. For this reason chiefly he had, while 
still only commander of the Army of the Tennessee, 
and before he succeeded to the lieutenant-generalship 
and the command of all the armies, strenuously op- 
posed the Red River expedition ; which he looked 
upon as an ex-centric movement, tending rather to 



246 



ADMIRAL FARRAGUT. 



keep alive the war across the Mississippi, which 
would fade if left alone, and likely to result in the 
troops engaged not getting back in time or in con- 
dition to act against Mobile. 

As Grant feared, so it happened. The expedi- 
tion being already organized and on the point of 
starting when he became commander-in-chief, he 
allowed it to proceed ; but it ended in disaster, and 
was the cause of forty thousand good troops being 
unavailable for the decisive operations which be- 
gan two months later. Not until the end of July 
could a force be spared even for the minor task of 
reducing the Mobile forts; and until then Farra- 
gut had to wait in order to attack to any purpose. 
By the time the army in the Southwest, in the 
command of which General Canby relieved Banks 
on the 20th of May, was again ready to move, Sher- 
man had taken Atlanta, Hood had fallen upon his 
communications with Chattanooga, and the famous 
march to the sea had been determined. Farragut's 
battle in Mobile Bay therefore did not prove to 
be, as Grant had hoped, and as his passage of the 
Mississippi forts had been, a step in a series of grand 
military operations, by which the United States 
forces should gain control of a line vital to the Con- 
federacy, and again divide it into two fragments. It 
remained an isolated achievement, though one of 
great importance, converting Mobile from a mari- 
time to an inland city, putting a stop to all serious 
blockade-running in the Gulf, and crushing finally 
the enemy's ill-founded hopes of an offensive move- 
ment by ironclads there equipped. 

The city of Mobile is itself some thirty miles 
from the Gulf, near the head of a broad but gener- 




JiraUley .j- J'oatcs t,nijrs, S. 1 



Scene of Farragut's Oi 



^ . 






MOBILE. 



247 



ally shallow bay which bears the same name. The 
principal entrance from the Gulf is between Mobile 
Point — a long, narrow, sandy beach which projects 
from the east side of the bay — and Dauphin Island, 
one of a chain which runs parallel to the coast of 
Mississippi and encloses Mississippi Sound. At the 
end of Mobile Point stands Fort Morgan, the prin- 
cipal defense of the bay, for the main ship channel 
passes close under its guns. At the eastern end of 
Dauphin Island stood a much smaller work, called 
Fort Gaines. Between this and Fort Morgan the 
distance is nearly three miles; but a bank of hard 
sand making out from the island prevents vessels of 
any considerable size approaching it nearer than two 
miles. Between Dauphin Island and the mainland 
there are some shoal channels, by which vessels of 
very light draft can pass from Mississippi Sound into 
the bay. These were not practicable for the fighting 
vessels of Farragut's fleet ; but a small earthwork 
known as Fort Powell had been thrown up to com- 
mand the deepest of them, called Grant's Pass. 

The sand bank off Dauphin Island extends 
south as well as east, reaching between four and 
five miles from the entrance. A similar shoal 
stretches out to the southward from Mobile Point. 
Between the two lies the main ship channel, varying 
in width from seven hundred and fifty yards, three 
miles outside, to two thousand, or about a sea mile, 
abreast Fort Morgan. Nearly twenty-one feet can 
be carried over the bar ; and after passing Fort 
Morgan the channel spreads, forming a hole or 
pocket of irregular contour, about four miles deep 
by two wide, in which the depth is from twenty to 
twenty-four feet. Beyond this hole, on either side 




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U !lsll1llt-h|il I 

ii'. l?ISi!i!iH?|f ^' 
£ I III 111 



248 ADMIRAL FARRAGUT. 

the bay and toward the city, the water shoals grad- 
ually but considerably, and the heavier of Farra- 
gut's ships could not act outside of its limits. The 
Confederate ironclad Tennessee, on the contrary, 
drawing but fourteen feet, had a more extensive field 
of operations open to her, and, from the gradual 
diminution of the soundings, was able to take her 
position at a distance where the most formidable of 
her opponents could neither follow her nor penetrate 
her sides with their shot. 

Between the city and the lower bay there were 
extensive flats, over which not even the fourteen 
feet of the Tennessee could be taken ; and these in 
one part, called Dog River Bar, shoaled to as little 
as nine feet. To bring the Tennessee into action 
for the defense of the entrance and of the lower 
bay, it was necessary to carry her across these flats 
—an undertaking requiring both time and mechani- 
cal appliances, neither of which would be availa- 
ble if an enemy were inside to molest the opera- 
tions. As the Tennessee was distinctly the most 
formidable element in the dangers Farragut had 
to encounter, and as the character of the sound- 
ings gave her a field of action peculiarly suited to 
utilize her especial powers, which consisted in the 
strength of her sides and. the long range of her 
heavy rifled guns, it was particularly desirable to 
anticipate her crossing the upper bar by the fleet 
itself crossing the lower. That done, the Tennessee 
was reduced to impotence. It was not done, for 
two reasons. First, the Navy Department did not 
send the ironclads which Farragut demanded ; and 
second, the army in the Southwest, having wasted 
its strength in a divergent operation, was unable 



MOBILE. 



249 



to supply the force necessary to reduce Fort Mor- 
gan. That the delay was not productive of more 
serious consequences was due to the impatience or 
recklessness of the Confederate admiral, and to the 
energy with which Farragut seized the opportunity 
afforded by his mistake. 

Six months passed before the moment for de- 
cisive action arrived. Though devoid of military 
interest, they were far from being months of idleness 
or enjoyment. The administrative duties of so large 
a command drew heavily upon the time and energies 
of the admiral, and, as has been said, they were not 
congenial to him. When the Tennessee crossed Dog 
River Bar, which she did on the i8th of May, Farra- 
gut felt that he must be on the spot, in case she 
attempted to execute her threat of coming out to 
break up the blockade ; but up to that time he was 
moving actively from point to point of his command, 
between New Orleans on the one side, and Pensacola, 
now, become his principal base, on the other. From 
time to time he was off Mobile, and for more than 
two months preceding the battle of the Bay he lay 
off the port in all the dreary monotony of blockade 
service. The clerical labor attaching to the large 
force and numerous interests entrusted to him was 
immense. Every mail brought him, of course, nu- 
merous communications from the Department. " I 
received your letter last evening," he writes to a 
member of his family, *' but at the same time re- 
ceived so many from the Department that my eyes 
were used up before I came to yours, so that mine 
to you will be short and badly written." A very 
large part of this correspondence consisted of let- 
ters from United States consuls abroad, forwarded 
17 



250 



ADMIRAL FARRAGUT. 



through the State Department, giving particulars 
of vessels fitting or loading for the Confederacy or 
to break the blockade. " Nearly all my clerical 
force is broken down," he writes on another occa- 
sion. "The fact is, I never saw so much writing; 
and yet Drayton, who does as much as any of 
them, says it is all necessary. So I tell them to go 
on. I do not mind signing my name. Although 
I write all my own letters, some one has to copy 
them. My fleet is so large now that it keeps us all 
at work the whole time." 

But while he spoke thus lightly of his own share 
in these labors, the confinement, the necessary at- 
tention to and study of larger details, even while he 
intrusted the minor to others, and the unavoidable 
anxieties of a man who had so many important irons 
in the fire, and at the same time was approaching his 
sixty-fourth year, told upon him. To this he bore 
witness when, after the capture of the Mobile forts, 
the Department desired him to take command of the 
North Atlantic fleet, with a view to the reduction of 
Wilmington, North Carolina. '' They must think I 
am made of iron," he wrote home. " I wrote the 
Secretary a long letter, telling him that my health 
was not such as to justify my going to a new station 
to commence new organizations; that I must have 
rest for my mind and exercise for my body ; that I 
had been down here within two months of five years, 
out of six, and recently six months on constant block- 
ade off this port, and my mind on the stretch all the time; 
and now to commence a blockade again on the At- 
lantic coast ! Why, even the routine of duty for a 
fleet of eighty sail of vessels works us all to death; 
and but that I have the most industrious fleet-captain 



MOBILE. 



251 



and secretary, it would never be half done. It is dif- 
ficult to keep things straight." "I know," he writes 
on another occasion, '' that few men could have gone 
through what I have in the last three years, and no 
one ever will know except yourself perhaps. . . . 
What the fight was to my poor brains^ neither you 
nor any one else will ever be able to comprehend. 
Six months constantly watching day and night for 
an enemy ; to know him to be as brave, as skilful, 
and as determined as myself ; who was pledged to 
his Government and the South to drive me away and 
raise the blockade, and free the Mississippi from our 
rule. While I was equally pledged to my Govern- 
ment that I would capture or destroy the rebel." 

Besides his labors and the official anxieties due to 
his individual command, he again, as in 1862, felt 
deeply the misfortunes with which the general cam- 
paign of 1864 opened, and especially in the South- 
west. There was continually present to the minds 
of the leaders of the United States forces during the 
war the apprehension that the constancy of the 
people might fail; that doubtful issues might lead 
to a depression that would cause the abandonment 
of the contest, in which success was nevertheless as- 
sured to perseverance and vigor. Grant's memoirs 
bear continual testimony to the statesmanlike regard 
he had, in planning his greater military operations, to 
this important factor in the war, the vacillation 
under uncertainty of that popular support upon 
which success depended. The temperament of Far- 
ragut reflected readily the ups and downs of the 
struggle, and was saddened by the weaknesses and 
inconsistencies of his own side, which he keenly ap- 
preciated. " I am depressed^'' he writes, " by the bad 



252 



ADMIRAL FARRAGUT. 



news from every direction. The enemy seem to be 
bending their whole soul and body to the war and 
whipping us in every direction. What a disgrace 
that, with their slender means, they should, after 
three years, contend with us from one end of the 
country to the other! . . . I get right sick^ every now 
and then, at the bad news." "The victory of the 
Kearsarge over the Alabama," on a more auspicious 
occasion, "raised me up. I would sooner have 
fought that fight than any ever fought on the 
ocean " ; and his exultation was the greater that the 
first lieutenant of the Kearsarge had been with him 
in the same capacity when the Hartford passed the 
Mississippi forts. 

But, while thus sensitive to the vicissitudes of his 
country's fortunes, he did not readily entertain the 
thought of being himself defeated. " As to being 
prepared for defeat," he wrote before New Orleans, 
" I certainly am not. Any man who is prepared for 
defeat would be half defeated before he commenced. 
I hope for success ; shall do all in my power to se- 
cure it, and trust to God for the rest." And again: 
" The officers say I don't believe anything. I cer- 
tainly believe very little that comes in the shape of 
reports. They keep everybody stirred up. I mean 
to be whipped or to whip my enemy, and not to be 
scared to death." "I hope for the best results," he 
wrote a week before forcing the passage into Mobile 
Bay, " as I am always hopeful ; put my shoulder to 
the wheel with my best judgment, and trust to God 
for the rest " ; or, in more homely language : " Every- 
thing has a weak spot, .and the first thing I try to 
do is to find out where it is, and pitch into it with 
the biggest shell or shot that I have, and repeat 



MOBILE. 



253 



the dose until it operates." " The Confederates at 
Fort Morgan are making great preparations to re- 
ceive us. That concerns me but little " — words used 
not in a spirit of mere light-heartedness, but because 
it was a condition he had from the first accepted, 
and over which he hoped to triumph ; for he con- 
tinues, " I know they will do all in their power to 
destroy us, and we will reciprocate the compliment. 
I hope to give them a fair fight if once I get inside. 
I expect nothing from them but that they will try to 
blow me up if they can." 

Amid such cares and in such a spirit were spent 
the six months of monotonous outside blockade pre- 
ceding the great victory that crowned his active 
career. The only relief to its weariness was a 
bombardment of Fort Powell, undertaken by the 
light-draft steamers of the squadron from Mississippi 
Sound in February, to create a diversion in favor of 
Sherman's raid from Vicksburg upon Meridian, which 
was then in progress. The boats could not get 
nearer to the work than four thousand yards, and 
even then were aground ; so that no very serious 
effect was produced. A greater and more painful 
excitement was aroused by the misfortunes of the 
Red River expedition in April and May. Begun on 
unsound military principles, but designed politically 
to assert against French intrigues the claim of the 
United States to Texas, that ill-omened enterprise 
culminated in a retreat which well-nigh involved the 
Mississippi squadron in an overwhelming disaster. 
The Red River was unusually low 'for the season, 
and falling instead of rising. There was not, when 
the army retired, water enough to enable the gun- 
boats which had ascended the river to repass the 



2S4 



ADMIRAL FARRAGUT. 



rapids at Alexandria. The army could delay but 
for a limited time, at the end of which, if the boats 
had not passed, they must be left to their fate. Far- 
ragut, who was in New Orleans when the news ar- 
rived, wrote bitterly about the blunders made, and 
was sorely distressed for the issue to the navy. " I 
have no spirit to write," he says. " I have had such 
long letters from Porter and Banks, and find things 
so bad with them that I don't know how to help 
them. I am afraid Porter, with all his energy, will 
lose some of his finest vessels. I have just sent him 
some boats to help him." The boats, however, were 
saved by the skill and energy of Colonel Joseph Bailey, 
the chief-of-engineers in Franklin's corps of Banks's 
army; by whom was thrown across the river a dam, 
which raised the water on the shoals sufficiently for 
the boats to cross. 

A more pleasant incident occurred to vary the 
sameness of the blockade days, in the presentation 
to the admiral, by the Union League Club of New 
York, of a very handsome sword, with scabbard of 
massive gold and silver, the hilt set in brilliants. 
The gift was accompanied by a letter expressive of 
the givers' appreciation of the brilliant services ren- 
dered to the nation, and was a grateful reminder to 
Farragut, then watching before Mobile for his last 
grapple with the enemy in his front, that his fellow- 
countrymen in their homes were not wanting in 
recognition of the dangers he had incurred, nor of 
those he was still facing on their behalf. 

The time was now close at hand when the weary 
and anxious waiting, which the admiral afterward so 
feelingly described, was to be exchanged for the 
more vigorous action he had so long desired. The 



MOBILE. 



255 



co-operation of a division from Canby's army was 
assured toward the end of July; and at the same 
time the long-promised, long-delayed monitor iron- 
clads began to arrive. As the want of these and the 
presence of the enemy's ironclads had been the rea- 
sons which, in Farragut's opinion, had made neces- 
sary the postponement of the purely naval part of 
the combined operation, a short description of the 
vessels which formed so potent an element in his cal- 
culations will not be out of place. 

The idea of the monitor type of ironclads, which 
was then the prevalent one in the United States 
Navy, was brought by John Ericsson from his home 
in Sweden^ where it had been suggested to him by 
the sight of the rafts with a house upon them cross- 
ing the waters with which he was familiar. In its 
conception, the monitor was simply a round fort» 
heavily plated with iron, resting upon a raft nearly 
flush with the water, and provided with the motive 
power of steam. The forts, or turrets, as they are 
commonly called, might be one or more in number ; 
and each carried usually two heavy guns, standing 
side by side and pointing in exactly the same direc- 
tion, so that if discharged together the projectiles 
would follow parallel courses. Within the turret the 
guns could be turned neither to the right nor to the 
left ; if such a change of aim were wished, the turret 
itself was revolved by steam machinery provided for 
the purpose. When loading, the port through which 
the gun was fired was turned away from the enemy ; 
so that if a shot happened to strike at that time it 
fell on the solid armor. Above the gun-turret there 
was a second of much smaller diameter, which did 
not revolve. It was also heavily plated and designed 



256 ADMIRAL FARRAGUT. 

to shelter the commanding officer and those charged 
with the steering of the ship. So much inconven- 
ience was, however, experienced from smoke and from 
concussion when these steering turrets were struck, 
and their dimensions were so contracted, that many 
captains preferred to remain outside, where they 
could see better, their orders being transmitted to 
the helmsmen through the sight-holes pierced in the 
armor. Of these ironclads, four accompanied Farra- 
gut in his attack upon Mobile Bay. Two, the Te- 
cumseh and Manhattan, came from the Atlantic 
coast, and were sea-going monitors. They had each 
but one turret, in which they carried two fifteen-inch 
guns, the heaviest then in use afloat. The other two 
were river monitors, built at St. Louis for service in 
the Mississippi. They were consequently of light 
draught, so much so that to obtain the necessary mo- 
tive power they each had four screw propellers of 
small diameter, and they carried four eleven-inch 
guns in two turrets. Their names were the Winne- 
bago and the Chickasaw. The armor of the two 
single-turreted monitors was ten inches thick, and 
that of the river monitors eight and a half inches. 

The Tennessee, to which these were to be op- 
posed, was a vessel of different type, and one to 
which the few ironclads built by the Confederates 
for the most part conformed— called commonly the 
broadside ironclad, because the guns, like those of 
ships-of-war generally, were disposed chiefly along 
the sides. Her hull was built at Selma, on the Ala- 
bama River, and thence towed to Mobile to be plated ; 
it being desirable to take her down the river while 
as light as possible. She was two hundred and nine 
feet long and forty-eight feet wide, drawing, as has 



MOBILE. 



257 



been said, fourteen feet when loaded. Upon her 
deck, midway between the bow and the stern, was a 
house seventy-nine feet long, whose sides and ends 
sloped at an angle of thirty-four degrees and were 
covered with iron plating, six inches thick on the 
forward end and five inches thick on the other end 
and the sides. With the inclination given, a cannon 
ball striking would be likely to be turned upward by 
the iron surface, instead of penetrating. The slop- 
ing sides of the house were carried down beyond the 
point where they met those of the vessel, until two 
feet below the water. There they turned and struck 
in at the same angle toward the hull, which they 
again met six or seven feet under water. Thus was 
formed all round the ship a knuckle, which, being 
filled in solid and covered with iron, was a very per- 
fect protection against any but the most powerful 
ram. The Tennessee herself was fitted with a beak 
and intended to ram, but, owing to the slender re- 
sources of the Confederacy, her engines were too 
weak to be effective for that purpose. She could 
only steam six knots. Her battery, however, was 
well selected and powerful. She carried on each 
side two six-inch rifles, and at each end one seven- 
inch rifle — six guns in all. There were, besides the 
Tennessee, three wooden gunboats, and Farragut 
was informed that there were also four ironclads; 
but this, as regards the lower bay at least, was a mis- 
take. 

It will be seen from this account, and from the 
description before given of Mobile Bay, that the ad- 
vantages of the Tennessee were her great protective 
strength, a draught which enabled her to choose her 
own position relatively to the heaviest of the enemy's 



258 ADMIRAL FARRAGUT. 

ships, and the superior range and penetrative power 
of her guns, being rifles; for while there were can- 
non of this type in the United States fleet, the great 
majority of them were smooth bores. The ironclads 
opposed to her had only smooth-bore guns, incapable 
of penetrating her side, and therefore only able to 
reduce her by a continued pounding, which might 
shake her frame to pieces. The chief defects of the 
Tennessee as a harbor-defense ship, for which she 
was mainly intended, were her very inferior speed, 
and the fact that, by an oversight, her steering chains 
were left exposed to the enemy's shot. This com- 
bination of strong and weak points constituted her 
tactical qualities, which should have determined the 
use made of her in the impending battle. 

Although the ironclads were, as Farragut es- 
teemed them, the controlling factors in the defense 
and attack, the Tennessee was by no means the only 
very formidable obstacle in the way of his success. 
Except the ironclads, the fleet he carried into Mobile 
Bay was not substantially stronger than that with 
which he fought his way up the Mississippi ; but 
since that time the enemy had done much to 
strengthen the works which he now had to en- 
counter. The number of heavy guns in Fort Morgan 
bearing upon the channel was thirty-eight. In Fort 
Jackson, excluding the obsolete caliber of twenty- 
four pounders, there were twenty-seven, and in St. 
Philip twenty-one — total, forty-eight ; but in caliber 
and efficiency those of Morgan were distinctly su- 
perior to those of the river forts, and it may be con- 
sidered an advantage that the power was here con- 
centrated in a single work under a single hand. The 
gunners of Fort Morgan, moreover, had not been 



MOBILE. 



259 



exposed to the exhausting harassment of a most 
efficient bombardment, extending over the six days 
prior to the final demand upon their energies. They 
came fresh to their work, and suffered during its con- 
tinuance from no distraction except that caused by 
the fire of the fleet itself. While, therefore, Fort 
Gaines could not be considered to support Morgan 
by any deterrent or injurious influence upon the 
United States fleet, the latter work was by itself su- 
perior in offensive power to the two Mississippi 
forts. 

To the general defense the Confederates had 
here brought two other factors, one of a most im- 
portant and as yet unknown power. As the sand 
bank extending eastward from Dauphin Island was 
to some extent passable by light gunboats, a line of 
piles was driven in the direction of Fort Morgan 
nearly to the edge of the channel. Where the piles 
stopped a triple line of torpedoes began, following 
the same general course, and ending only at a hun- 
dred yards from Fort Morgan, where a narrow 
opening was left for the passage of friendly vessels 
— blockade runners and others. Had the electrical 
appliances of the Confederacy been at that time more 
highly developed, this narrow gap would doubtless 
also have been filled with mines, whose explosion de- 
pended upon operators ashore. As it was, the torpedo 
system employed at Mobile, with some few possible 
exceptions, was solely mechanical ; the explosion 
depended upon contact by the passing vessel with 
the mine. To insure this, the line was triple ; those 
in the second and third rows not being in the align- 
ment of the first, but so placed as to fill the inter- 
stices and make almost impracticable the avoid- 



26o ADMIRAL FARRAGUT. 

ance of all three torpedoes belonging to the same 
group. 

These arrangements were sufficiently well known 
to Farragut through information brought by refu- 
gees or deserters. They — the power of the works, 
the disposition of the torpedoes, the Tennessee and 
her companions — constituted the elements of the 
problem which he had to solve to get his fleet safely 
past the obstacles into the bay. Although not dis- 
posed to lay as much stress as others upon the tor- 
pedoes, which were then but an imperfectly devel- 
oped weapon, prudence dictated to him the necessity 
of passing between them and the fort ; and this was 
fortunately in accordance with the sound policy 
which dictates that wooden vessels engaging per- 
manent works, less liable than themselves to pene- 
tration, should get as close as possible to the enemy, 
whose fire they may then beat down by the rapidity 
of their own. There were certain black buoys float- 
ing across the channel, between the piles and Fort 
Morgan, and it was understood that these marked 
the position of the torpedoes. The admiral's flag- 
lieutenant. Lieutenant (now Captain) John C. Wat- 
son, had examined these buoys in several nightly 
reconnaissances; but, although he had not been able 
to discover any of the mines, the assurances of their 
existence could not be disregarded. His examina- 
tion doubtless had some effect upon the admiral's 
instant determination, in the unforeseen emergency 
that arose during the action, to pass over the spot 
where the hidden dangers were said to lie ; but in the 
dispositions for battle the order was given for the 
fleet to pass eastward of the easternmost buoy, where 
no torpedoes would be found. 



MOBILE. 261 

The closeness of this approach, however, and the 
fact that the line of the channel led in at right angles 
to the entrance, had the disadvantage of obstructing 
the fire of the broadside wooden vessels, in which the 
offensive strength of the fleet, outside the monitors, 
consisted. The guns of those ships, being disposed 
along the sides, were for the most part able to bear 
only upon an enemy abreast of them, with a small 
additional angle of train toward ahead or astern. It 
was not, therefore, until nearly up with the fort that 
these numerous cannon would come into play, and 
exercise that preponderating effect which had driven 
off the gunners at Forts St. Philip and Jackson, 
This inconvenience results from the construction of 
such ships, and can only be overcome by a move- 
ment of the helm causing the ship to diverge from 
her course; a resort which led a witty Frenchman to 
say that a ship-of-war so situated is like a shark, 
that can only bite by turning on its back. The 
remedy, however applicable under certain circum- 
stances and in the case of a single ship, causes de- 
lay, and therefore is worse than the evil for a fleet 
advancing to the attack of forts, where the object 
must be to close as rapidly as possible. There are, 
however, on board such vessels a few guns, mounted 
forward and called chase guns, which, from the 
rounding of the bows, bear sooner than the others 
upon the enemy toward whom they are moving. To 
support these and concentrate from the earliest mo- 
ment as effective a fire as possible upon the works, 
Farragut brought his ironclads inside of the wooden 
vessels, and abreast the four leaders of that column. 
The heavy guns of the monitors could fire all around 
the horizon, from right ahead to right astern ; and 



262 ADMIRAL FARRAGUT. 

the disposition had the additional great advantage 
that, in the critical passage inside the torpedo buoys, 
these all-important vessels would be on the safer 
side, the wooden ships interposing between them and 
the sunken dangers, which threatened an injury far 
more instantaneous and vital than any to be feared 
from the enemy's shot and shell. 

The position of the ironclads being determined 
by these considerations, the arrangement of the 
wooden ships for the attack conformed to the ad- 
miral's principle, that the greatest security was to be 
found in concentrating upon the enemy the heaviest 
fire attainable from his own guns. As at Port Hud- 
son, a large proportion of the fourteen vessels he 
purposed to take in with him were of the gunboat 
class, or a little above it. Resort was accordingly 
again had to the double column adopted there; the 
seven ships that had the most powerful batteries 
forming the right column to engage Fort Morgan. 
The lighter ones were distributed in the other col- 
umn, and lashed each to one of the heavier ships, in 
an order probably designed, though it is not ex- 
pressly so stated, to make the combined steam power 
of the several pairs as nearly equal as possible. 
Among the gunboats there were three that had side- 
wheel engines, the machinery of which is necessarily 
more above water, and so more exposed than that of 
a screw — a condition which, although their batteries 
were powerful for their tonnage, emphasized the ne- 
cessity of sheltering them behind other ships during 
the furious few minutes of passing under the guns of 
the fort. 

The sum of these various considerations thus 
resulted in the fleet advancing into action in a 



MOBILE. 263 

column of pairs, in which the heaviest ships led in 
the fighting column. To this the admiral was prob- 
ably induced by the reflection that the first broad- 
sides are half the battle, and the freshest attack of 
the enemy should be met by the most vigorous re- 
sistance on his own part ; but it is open to doubt 
whether one of these powerful vessels would not 
have been better placed in the rear. Upon a reso- 
lute enemy, the effect of each ship is simply to drive 
him to cover while she passes, to resume his activity 
when relieved from the pressure of her fire. The 
case is not strictly similar to the advance of a column 
of troops upon a fortified position, where the head 
does the most of the fighting, and the rear mainly 
contributes inertia to the movement of the mass. It 
is at least open to argument that a fire progressively 
diminishing from van to rear is not, for the passage 
of permanent works, a disposition as good as a 
weight of battery somewhat more equally distributed, 
with, however, a decided preponderance in the van. 
The last of the ships in this column received a shot 
in the boiler, which entirely disabled her — an acci- 
dent that may have been purely fortuitous, and to 
which any one of her predecessors was in a degree 
liable, but also possibly due to the greater activity 
of the enemy when no longer scourged by the more 
powerful batteries which preceded. She was saved 
from the more serious results of this disaster, and 
the squadron spared the necessity of rallying to her 
support, by the other admirable precautions dictated 
by Farragut's forethought. 

Subjected thus to analysis, there seems much to 
praise and very little to criticise in the tactical dis- 
positions made by the admiral on this momentous 



264 



ADMIRAL FARRAGUT. 



occasion. But the tactical dispositions, though most 
important, are not the only considerations ; it is the 
part of the commander-in-chief to take advantage of 
any other circumstances that may make in his 
favor. Until the forts were passed the character of 
the bottom left Farragut no choice as to the direc- 
tion of his attack. There was but one road to 
take, and the only other question was the order in 
which to arrange his ships. But there were two 
conditions not entirely within his control, yet sure 
to occur in time, which he considered too advan- 
tageous to be overlooked. He wanted a flood tide, 
which would help a crippled vessel past the works ; 
and also a west wmd, which would blow the smoke 
from the scene of battle and upon Fort Morgan, 
thereby giving to the pilots, upon whom so much de- 
pended, and to the gunners of the ships, the advan- 
tage of clearer sight. The time of the tide, in most 
quarters a matter of simple calculation, is in the 
Gulf often affected by the wind. The wind, on the 
other hand, in the summer months, blows from the 
south during the early morning, and then works 
round to the westward ; so that the chances were in 
favor of his obtaining his wishes. 

The dispositions taken by the Confederates to 
meet the assault which they saw to be impending were 
more simple ; they having but a small mobile force, 
and their fortifications being tied to their places. A 
seaport liable to attack is a battle-field, in utilizing 
whose natural features, so as to present the strongest 
tactical combination against entrance or subjection 
by an enemy, the skill of the engineer is shown ; 
but, unlike battle-fields in general, much time and 
study is allowed to develop his plans. In the case 



MOBILE. 265 

of Mobile Bay, the narrow and direct character of 
the approach by the main ship channel left little op- 
portunity for skill to display itself. To place at the 
end of Mobile Point the heaviest fort, enfilading the 
channel, and to confine the latter to the narrowest 
bed, compelling the assailant into the most unfavor- 
able rout©, were measures too obvious to escape the 
most incapable. To obtain the utmost advantage 
from this approach of the enemy, the little naval 
force was advanced from Mobile Point, so as to 
stretch at right angles across the channel just within 
the torpedo line. There, without being incommoded 
by the fire of the fort, or in any way embarrassing it, 
they secured a clear sweep for their guns, raking 
their opponents; who, being for the time unable to 
deviate from their course, could not reply to this 
galling attack. By gradually retiring, the Confed- 
erate gunboats could retain this superiority during 
the advance of their foes, until the latter reached 
the wide hole within, where there was room to ma- 
noeuvre. This position and the subsequent course of 
action described comprise the tactical management 
of the Southern vessels during the engagement. It 
was well devised, and made probably the best use of 
the advantages of the ground possible to so inferior 
a force. The Tennessee took position with them, 
but her after action was different. 

As the day of the last and, with the exception of 
the Essex fight of his boyhood, the most desperate 
battle of his life drew near, a certain solemnity — one 
might almost say depression — is perceptible in the 
home letters of the admiral. Had the action proved 
fatal to him it could scarcely have failed to attract 
the attention which is similarly arrested by the 



266 ADMIRAL FARRAGUT. 

chastened tone of Nelson's life and writing immedi- 
ately before Trafalgar; and although there is cer- 
tainly none of that outspoken foreboding which 
marked the last day of the English hero, Farragut's 
written words are in such apparent contrast to the 
usual buoyant, confident temper of the man, that 
they would readily have been construed into one of 
those presentiments with which military annals 
abound. " With such a mother," he writes to his son 
a week before the battle, " you could not fail to have 
proper sentiments of religion and virtue. I feel that 
I have done my duty by you both, as far as the 
weakness of my nature would allow. I have been 
devoted to you both, and when it pleases God to 
take me hence I shall feel that I have done my 
duty. I am not conscious of ever having wronged 
any one, and have tried to do as much good as I 
could. Take care of your mother if I should go, and 
may God bless and preserve you both ! " The day 
before the action he wrote the following letter to his 
wife, which, as his son remarks in his Life of the 
admiral, shows that he appreciated the desperate 
work before him : 

" Flag-ship Hartford, 

"Off Mobile, August 4, 1864. 
" My dearest Wife : I write and leave this letter 
for you. I am going into Mobile in the morning, if 
God is my leader, as I hope he is, and in him I place 
my trust. If he thinks it is the proper place for me 
to die, I am ready to submit to his will in that as in 
all other things. My great mortification is that my 
vessels, the ironclads, were not ready to have gone 
in yesterday. The army landed last night, and are 



MOBILE. 267 

in full view of us this morning, and the Tecumseh 
has not yet arrived from Pensacola. 

" God bless and preserve you, my darling, and 
my dear boy, if anything should happen to me ; and 
may his blessings also rest upon your dear mother, 
and all your sisters and their children. 

*' Your devoted and affectionate husband, who 
never for one moment forgot his love, duty, or 
fidelity to you, his devoted and best of wives, 

'' D. G. Farragut." 

A more touching and gratifying testimony of un- 
wavering attachment, after more than twenty years 
of marriage, no wife could desire. It was an attach- 
ment also not merely professed in words, but evi- 
denced by the whole course of his life and conduct. 
Infidelity or neglect of a wife was, in truth, in the 
estimation of Admiral Farragut, one of the most 
serious of blots upon a man's character, drawing out 
always his bitterest condemnation. 

A pleasing glimpse is at this same period afforded 
of his relations to the surviving members of his 
father's family, who still remained in or near New 
Orleans, and from whom by the conditions of his pro- 
fession he had been separated since his childhood. 
" My dear sister," he writes, " has sent me a Holy 
Virgin like the one Rose gave me. She said it was 
blessed by the archbishop, who said I was good to 
the priests. I only tell you this," adds the admiral 
dryly, " to show you that they did not succeed in 
impressing the bishop with the idea that I had 
robbed the church at Point Coupee." This is not 
the only mention of his sister during this time, and 
it is evident that two years' occupation of New Or- 



268 ADMIRAL FARRAGUT. 

leans by the Union forces had done much to mollify 
public sentiment ; for immediately after the sur- 
render he had written home, " It is a strange thought 
that I am here among my relatives, and yet not one 
has dared to say ' I am happy to see you.' " 

On the 8th of July General Canby, accompanied 
by General Granger, who was to have immediate 
charge of the land operations against the Mobile 
forts, had called upon the admiral to make the pre- 
liminary arrangements. Somewhat later Canby sent 
word that he could not spare men enough to invest 
both Gaines and Morgan at the same time ; and at 
Farragut's suggestion it was then decided to land 
first upon Dauphin Island, he undertaking to send a 
gunboat to cover the movement. Granger visited 
him again on the ist of August, and as the admiral 
then had reason to expect the last of his monitors by 
the 4th, that day was fixed for the attack and land- 
ing. Granger was up to time, and his troops were 
put ashore on the evening of the 3d; but the Te- 
cumseh had not arrived from Pensacola. The other 
three had been on hand since the ist, anchored 
under the shelter of Sand Island, three miles from 
Fort Morgan. 

To Farragut's great mortification he was unable 
to carry out his part of the programme; but on the 
evening of the 4th the Tecumseh arrived, together 
with the Richmond, which had been for a few days 
at Pensacola preparing for the fight. " I regret to 
have detained you, admiral," said Craven, the com- 
mander of the monitor, " but had it not been for 
Captain Jenkins (of the Richmond), God knows 
when I should have been here. When your order 
came I had not received an ounce of coal." In his 



MOBILE. 



269 



report of the battle, Farragut warmly acknowledged 
the zeal and energy of Jenkins, to which he owed 
the seasonable arrival of this important re-enforce- 
ment. "He takes," he said, " as much interest in the 
fleet now as formerly when he was my chief-of-staff. 
He is also commanding officer of the second division 
of my squadron, and as such has shown ability and 
the most untiring zeal. ... I feel I should not be 
doing my duty did I not call the attention of the 
Department to an officer who has performed all his 
various duties with so much zeal and fidelity." Far- 
ragut has been charged with failure to notice ade- 
quately the services of those under him; but the 
foregoing words, which are not by any means un- 
paralleled in his dispatches, show that he could 
praise cordially when he saw fitting occasion. 

The night of August 4th was quiet, the sea 
smooth, with a light air just rippling the surface of 
the water. At sundown it had been raining hard, 
but toward midnight cleared off, the weather be- 
coming hot and calm. Later on a light air again 
sprang up from the southwest. The admiral was not 
well, and slept restlessly. About three in the morn- 
ing he called his servant and sent him to find out 
how the wind was. Learning that it was from the 
quarter he wished, he said, " Then we will go in in 
the morning." Between four and five the lighter ves- 
sels got under way and went alongside those to 
which they were to be lashed. When daybreak was 
reported Farragut was already at breakfast with the 
captain of the Hartford, Percival Drayton, and the 
fleet-surgeon. Dr. James C. Palmer, who had left his 
usual post at the hospital in Pensacola to superin- 
tend the care of those wounded in the approaching 



2/0 



ADMIRAL FARRAGUT. 



battle. It was then about half-past five ; the couples 
were all formed, and the admiral, still sipping his 
tea, said quietly, " Well, Drayton, we might as well 
get under way." The signal was made and at once 
acknowledged by the vessels, which had all been 
awaiting it, and the seamen began to heave round 
on the cables. The taking their assigned positions 
in the column by the different pairs consumed some 
time, during which the flag-ship crossed the bar, at 
ten minutes past six. At half-past six the column of 
wooden vessels was formed, and the monitors were 
standing down from Sand Island into their stations, 
in gaining which some little further delay was 
caused. At this time all the ships hoisted the United 
States flag, not only at the peak where it commonly 
flies, but at every mast-head as well. 

It had been the intention of the admiral to lead 
the column of wooden vessels with his own ship ; but 
at the earnest request of many officers, who thought 
the fleet should not incur the greater risk consequent 
upon having its commander in so exposed a position, 
he reluctantly consented to waive his purpose, and 
the Brooklyn was appointed to this post of honor. 
To this selection contributed also the fact that the 
Brooklyn had more than the usual number of chase 
guns, the advantage of which has been explained, 
and also an arrangement for picking up torpedoes. 
Bitterly afterward did Farragut regret his yielding 
on this occasion. " I believe this to be an error," 
he wrote in his offlcial report of the battle; "for, 
apart from the fact that exposure is one of the 
penalties of rank in the navy, it will always be the 
aim of the enemy to destroy the flag-ship, and, as 
will appear in the sequel, such attempt was very 



MOBILE. 



271 



persistently made." " The fact is," he said in one 
of his letters home, " had I been the obstinate man 
you sometimes think me, I would have led in the 
fleet and saved the Tecumseh " — meaning, doubtless, 
that, by interposing between that important vessel 
and the buoy which marked the torpedo line, he 
would have prevented the error which caused her 
loss. Some notes upon the action found afterward 
among his papers contain the same opinion, more 
fully and deliberately expressed. "Allowing the 
Brooklyn to go ahead was a great error. It lost 
not only the Tecumseh, but many valuable lives, by 
keeping us under the fire of the forts for thirty min- 
utes ; whereas, had I led, as I intended to do, I 
would have gone inside the buoys, and all would 
have followed me." The Hartford took the second 
place in the column, having secured on her port or 
off side the side-wheel gunboat Metacomet, Lieu- 
tenant-Commander James E. Jouett. 

While the monitors were taking their stations, 
the Tecumseh, which led their column, fired two 
shots at the fort. At five minutes before seven, the 
order of battle now being fully formed, the fleet 
went ahead. Ten minutes later Fort Morgan opened 
fire upon the Brooklyn, which at once replied with 
her bow guns, followed very soon by those of the 
fighting column of wooden ships; a brisk cannonade 
ensuing between them, the monitors, and the fort. In 
order to see more clearly, and at the same time to 
have immediately by him the persons upon whom he 
most depended for governing the motions of the 
ship, Farragut had taken his position in the port 
main-rigging. Here he had near him Captain Jouett, 
standing on the wheel-house of the Metacomet, and 



272 ADMIRAt FARRAGUT. 

also the pilot, who, as at Port Hudson, had been sta- 
tioned aloft, on this occasion in the maintop, so as 
to see well over the smoke. As this increased and 
rose higher, Farragut went up step by step until he 
was close under the maintop. Here, without losing 
touch with Jouett, he was very near the pilot, had 
the whole scene of battle spread out under his eyes, 
and at the same time, by bracing himself against the 
futtock shrouds, was able to use his spy-glass more 
freely. Captain Drayton, however, being alarmed 
lest he might be thrown to the deck, directed a sea- 
man to carry a lashing aloft and secure him to the 
rigging, which the admiral, after a moment's remon- 
strance, permitted. By such a simple and natural 
train of causes was Farragut brought to and secured 
in a position which he, like any other commander-in- 
chief, had sought merely in order better to see the 
operations he had to direct ; but popular fancy was 
caught by the circumstance, and to his amusement 
he found that an admiral lashed to the rigging was 
invested with a significance equivalent to that of 
colors nailed to the mast. " The illustrated papers 
are very amusing," he wrote home. " Leslie has me 
lashed up to the mast like a culprit, and says, * It is 
the way officers will hereafter go into battle, etc' 
You understand, I was only standing in the rigging 
with a rope that dear boy Watson had brought me 
up," (this was later in the action, when the admiral 
had shifted his position), " saying that if 1 would stand 
there I had better secure myself against falling; and 
I thanked him for his consideration, and took a turn 
around and over the shrouds and around my body 
for fear of being wounded, as shots were flying 
rather thickly." 



MOBIEE. 



273 



Shortly after the monitors and the bow guns of 
the fleet began firing, the enemy's gunboats and the 
Tennessee moved out from behind Morgan and took 
their position enfilading the channel. Twenty min- 
utes later, through the advance of the column, the 
broadsides of the leading ships began to bear upon 
the fort ; and as these heavy batteries vomited 
their iron rain the fire of the defense visibly 
slackened. Amid the scene of uproar and slaughter, 
in which the petty Confederate flotilla, thanks to its 
position of vantage, was playing a deadly part quite 
out of proportion to its actual strength, the Tecum- 
seh alone was silent. After the first two shots fired 
by her, which were rather the signal of warning than 
the opening of the battle, she had loaded her two 
guns with steel shot, backed by the heaviest charge 
of powder allowed, and, thus prepared, reserved her 
fire for the Tennessee alone. " I believe," wrote 
Farragut in a private letter, " that the Tecumseh 
would have gone up and grappled with and captured 
the Tennessee. Craven's heart was bent upon it." 

The two columns, of ironclads and of wooden 
vessels lashed together in pairs, were now approach- 
ing the line of torpedoes and the narrow entrance 
through which lay the path of safety ; and the broad- 
sides of the heavy sloops which led — the Brooklyn, 
the Hartford, the Richmond — supported by the less 
numerous but still powerful batteries following, and 
by the guns of the turreted ironclads, overbore the 
fire of the works. All promised fairly, provided the 
leaders of the two columns pushed rapidly and un- 
hesitatingly in the direction assigned them. But 
almost at the same moment doubt seized them both, 
and led to a double disaster. As Craven, leading the 



274 



ADMIRAL FARRAGUT. 



monitor column, and then about three hundred yards 
in advance of the Brooklyn, drew up to the buoy, to 
the eastward of which he had been directed to go, 
he saw it so nearly in line with the point beyond 
that he could not believe it possible to pass. " It is 
impossible that the admiral means us to go inside 
that buoy," he said to the pilot ; " I can not turn my 
ship." Just then the Tennessee moved a little ahead, 
to the westward ; and Craven, under the double im- 
pulse of his doubt and of his fear lest the hostile 
ironclad should escape him, changed his course to 
the left and pushed straight for her, the Tecumseh 
heading to pass the buoy on the wrong side. 

The movement thus indicated, if followed by the 
succeeding monitors, would throw that column across 
the path of the wooden ships if the latter endeavored 
to obey their orders to pass east of the buoy. At the 
same moment there were seen from the Brooklyn, in 
the water ahead, certain objects which were taken 
to be buoys for torpedoes. The ship was at once 
stopped and backed, coming down upon the Hart- 
ford, her next astern, which also stopped, but did 
not reverse her engines. The Richmond followed 
the Hartford's movements, and the two ships drifted 
up with the young flood tide, but with their heads 
still pointed in the right direction, toward the Brook- 
lyn ; the stern of the latter vessel, as she backed, 
coming up into the wind so that her bows turned 
toward the fort. Fortunately, the rear ships were 
some little distance off; but Farragut, ignorant of 
the cause of the Brooklyn's action, saw his line of 
battle doubling up and threatened with an almost in- 
extricable confusion, in the most difficult and exposed 
part of the passage, under a cross-fire from the fort 



MOBILE. 



275 



and the enemy's vessels. Immediately upon this 
frightful perplexity succeeded the great disaster of 
the day. Craven, pursuing his course across the sus- 
pected line of danger, had reached within two hun- 
dred yards of the Tennessee, and the crews of both 
vessels were waiting with tense nerves for the ex- 
pected collision, when a torpedo exploded under the 
Tecumseh, then distant a little over five hundred 
yards from the Hartford. From his elevated post of 
observation Farragut saw her reel violently from 
side to side, lurch heavily over, and then go down 
head foremost, her screw revolving wildly in the air 
as she disappeared. 

It was the supreme moment of his life, in which 
the scales of his fortunes wavered in the balance. 
All the long years of preparation, of faithful devo- 
tion to obscure duty awaiting the opportunity that 
might never come — all the success attending the two 
brief years in which his flag had flown — all the glories 
of the river fights — on the one side ; and on the other, 
threatening to overbear and wreck all, a danger he 
could not measure, but whose dire reality had been 
testified by the catastrophe just befallen under his 
own eyes. Added to this was the complication in 
the order of battle ahead of him, produced by the 
double movements of the Brooklyn and Tecumseh, 
which no longer allowed him to seize the one open 
path, follow his own first brave thought, and lead his 
fleet in person through the narrow way where, if at 
all, safety lay. The Brooklyn, when she began to 
back, was on the starboard bow of the flag-ship, dis- 
tant one or two hundred yards, and falling off to 
starboard lay directly in the way athwart the chan- 
nel. The second monitor, Manhattan, of the same 



2^6 ADMIRAL FARRAGUT. 

class as the Tecumseh, had passed ahead ; but the 
two light-draughts, the Winnebago and Chickasaw, 
were drawing up abreast of the three ships thus 
massed together. As they passed, the admiration of 
the officers of the flag-ship was stirred to see Cap- 
tain Stevens, of the Winnebago, pacing calmly from 
turret to turret of his unwieldy vessel, under the full 
fire of the fort; while of Perkins, in the Chickasaw, 
the youngest commander in the fleet, and then about 
twenty-seven years of age, an officer of high position 
in the flag-ship says, " As he passed the Hartford he 
was on top of the turret, waving his hat and dancing 
about with delight and excitement." 

But as they went thus gallantly by, the position 
of these vessels, combined with that of the Brook- 
lyn felatively to the flag-ship, forbade the latter's 
turning in that direction unless at the risk of add- 
ing to a confusion already sufficiently perilous. A 
signal was made and repeated to the Brooklyn to 
go ahead ; but that vessel gave no sign of mov- 
ing, her commander being probably perplexed be- 
tween his orders to pass east of the buoy and the 
difficulty of doing so, owing to the position into 
which his ship had now fallen and the situation of 
the monitors. But to remain thus motionless and 
undecided, under the fire of the fort with the 
other ships coming up to swell the size of the 
target offered to its gunners and to increase the 
confusion, was out of the question. To advance or 
to recede seemed alike dangerous. Ahead lay the 
dreaded line of torpedoes ; behind was the possibility 
of retreat, but beaten, baffled, and disastrous. All 
depended upon the prompt decision of the admiral. 
If he failed himself, or if fortune failed him now, 



MOBILE. 



277 



his brilliant career of success ended in the gloom of 
a defeat the degree of which could not be foreseen. 
In later days, Farragut told that in the confusion of 
these moments, feeling that all his plans had been 
thwarted, he was at a loss whether to advance or re- 
treat. In this extremity the devout spirit that ruled 
his life, and so constantly appears in his correspond- 
ence, impelled him to appeal to Heaven for guid- 
ance, and he offered up this prayer : " O God, who 
created man and gave him reason, direct me what to 
do. Shall I go on?" "And it seemed," said the 
admiral, " as if in answer a voice commanded, ' Go 
on!'" 

To such a prompting, his gallant temper and 
clear intuitions in all matters relating to war were 
quick to respond. Personal danger could not deter 
him ; and if it was necessary that some one ship 
should set the example and force a way through the 
torpedo line by the sacrifice of herself, he was pre- 
pared by all his habits of thought to accept that 
duty for the vessel bearing his flag. Describing the 
spirit in which he began an arduous enterprise, after 
once deciding that it should be undertaken, he said: 
" I calculate thus : The chances are that I shall lose 
some of my vessels by torpedoes or the guns of the 
enemy, but with some of my fleet afloat I shall 
eventually be successful. I can not lose all. I will 
attack, regardless of consequences, and never turn 
back." To a mind thus disciplined and prepared, 
the unforeseen dilemma presented before the barriers 
of Mobile Bay caused but a passing perplexity. Like 
the Puritan soldier who trusted in God and kept his 
powder dry, Farragut met the overthrow of his care- 
fully arranged plans and the sudden decision thrust 



278 



ADMIRAL FARRAGUT. 



upon him with the calm resolution of a man who has 
counted the cost and is strengthened by a profound 
dependence upon the will of the Almighty. He re- 
solved to go forward. 

The Hartford was now too near the Brooklyn 
to go clear by a simple movement of her helm. 
Backing hard, therefore, the wheels of the Meta- 
comet, while turning her own screw ahead, her 
bows were twisted short round, as in a like strait 
they had been pointed fair under the batteries of 
Port Hudson ; then, going ahead fast, the two ships 
passed close under the stern of the Brooklyn and 
dashed straight at the line of the buoys. As they 
thus went by the vessel which till then had led, a 
warning cry came from her that there were tor- 
pedoes ahead. " Damn the torpedoes ! " shouted 
the admiral, in the exaltation of his high purpose. 
" Four bells ! * Captain Drayton, go ahead ! Jouett, 
full speed ! " The Hartford and her consort crossed 
the line about five hundred yards from Mobile Point, 
well to the westward of the buoy and of the spot 
where the Tecumseh had gone dowm. As they 
passed between the buoys, the cases of the torpe- 
does were heard by many on board knocking against 
the copper of the bottom, and many of the primers 
snapped audibly, but no torpedo exploded. The 
Hartford went safely through, the gates of Mobile 
Bay were forced, and as Farragut's flag cleared the 
obstructions his last and hardest battle was virtually 
won. The Brooklyn got her head round, the Rich- 
mond supporting her by a sustained fire from her 

* The signal in the United States Navy for the engines to be 
driven at high speed. 



MOBILE. 



279 



heavy broadside ; and, after a delay which allowed 
the flag-ship to gain nearly a mile upon them, the 
other ships in order followed the Hartford, " believ- 
ing," wrote the admiral in his dispatch, " that they 
were going to a noble death with their commander- 
in-chief." 

After the flag-ship had passed the torpedo line 
the enemy's three gunboats began retreating slowly 
up the bay, keeping ahead and on her starboard 
bow, where her guns could not bear while their own 
raked her. The conditions of the channel did not 
yet allow her to deviate from her course in order to 
return their fire. At no period of the battle did the 
Hartford suffer so much as during the fifteen min- 
utes she had to endure this galling punishment. The 
Tennessee, being inferior in speed to her consorts 
as well as to the Hartford, could not accompany this 
movement ; and, moreover, Buchanan, the Confed- 
erate admiral, had set his heart upon ramming the 
vessel that bore the flag of his old friend Farragut. 
The Tennessee therefore stood toward the Hartford, 
but failed in her thrust, the Union vessel avoiding it 
easily with a movement of her helm. The ram then 
fired two shots at very short range, but singularly 
enough both missed. " I took no further notice of 
her," wrote Farragut, " than to return her fire." The 
Tennessee followed some little distance up the bay, 
and then, changing her mind, turned toward the 
column of wooden vessels that was now approach- 
ing, with the three monitors covering their right 
flank and somewhat in the rear ; these having delayed 
to engage the fire of the fort while their more vul- 
nerable companions went by. The Confederate iron- 
clad passed along the column from van to rear, ex- 



28o ADMIRAL FARRAGUT. 

changing shots with most of the vessels in it. The 
Monongahela attempted to ram her, but, being em- 
barrassed by the gunboat lashed alongside, suc- 
ceeded only in giving a glancing blow ; while the 
Oneida, the ship on the fighting side of the rear 
couple, already completely disabled in her motive 
power by a shot through the boiler, received a rak- 
ing broadside, by which her captain, Mullany, lost an 
arm. 

At the time the Tennessee went about to en- 
counter the remaining vessels of the fleet, which 
was about eight o'clock, the course of the channel 
enabled the Hartford to turn sufficiently to bring 
her broadside to bear on her puny assailants. By 
the fire she then opened, one, the Gaines, was so 
much injured as to be with difficulty kept afloat 
until she could take refuge under Fort Morgan, 
where she was that night burned by her commander. 
All three retreated rapidly toward the shoal water 
on the east side of the bay. Farragut then signaled 
for the gunboats of his fleet to chase those of the 
enemy. Jouett, being alongside, received the order 
by word of mouth, and the admiral often afterward 
spoke with enthusiasm of the hearty '* Ay, ay, sir ! " 
he received in reply, and of the promptness with which 
the fasts were cut, the men being already by them, 
hatchet in hand. The Metacomet backed clear at 
once and started rapidly in pursuit. The gunboats 
in the rear followed as soon as the signal was made 
out ; but, both from their position and from the in- 
evitable delay in reading signals, they were at a dis- 
advantage. A thick rain squall coming up soon 
after hid both pursuers and pursued from each 
other's sight. The Morgan and the Gaines took ad- 



MOBILE. 281 

vantage of it to change their course for Fort Mor- 
gan ; the third Confederate, the Selma, kept straight 
on, as did the Metacomet. When the squall cleared, 
the latter found herself ahead of her chase. One 
shot was fired, killing the first lieutenant and some 
of the crew of the Selma, whose flag was then hauled 
down. The Morgan made good her retreat under 
the fort, and that night succeeded in escaping up the 
bay to the city, although she was seen and fired upon 
by several of Farragut's vessels. 

At half-past eight o'clock, three hours after the 
first signal was made to get under way and an hour 
and a half after the action began, the flag-ship an- 
chored in the upper part of the deep pocket into 
which the channel expands after passing the en- 
trance. She was then about four miles from Fort 
Morgan, and the crew were sent to breakfast. The 
admiral had come down from his post in the main 
rigging and was standing on the poop, when Captain 
Drayton came up to him and said : " What we have 
done has been well done, sir ; but it all counts for 
nothing so long as the Tennessee is there under the 
guns of Morgan." "I know it," replied Farragut, 
" and as soon as the people have had their breakfasts 
I am going for her." These words were exchanged 
in the hearing of the first lieutenant of the Hartford, 
now Rear-Admiral Kimberly, and at present the senior 
officer upon the active list of the United States 
Navy. In writing home a few weeks later, the ad- 
miral said : " If I had not captured the Tennessee as 
I did, I should have taken her that night with the 
monitors, or tried it." The latter undoubtedly rep- 
resents the more deliberate opinion, that would have 
guided him had Buchanan not played into his hands 
19 



282 ADMIRAL FARRAGUT- 

by attacking the fleet ; for if the Tennessee had re- 
mained under Morgan and there been sought by the 
monitors, the fight would have been at such close 
quarters that in the darkness the fort could scarcely 
have joined without imminent risk of hurting friend 
as well as foe. 

As it was, the Confederate admiral seems never 
to have contemplated any more prudent or saga- 
cious course than a single-handed free fight with 
the fleet. As soon as the Tennessee had passed 
the rear of the enemy's column, Buchanan said to 
the captain of the ram : " Follow them up, Johnston ; 
we can't let them off that way." In turning, the 
Tennessee took much room, appearing from the fleet 
to have gone back under the guns of Fort Morgan ; 
and the various ships, as they came up, were anchor- 
ing near the Hartford, expecting a few quiet hours. 
They were soon undeceived. The brief conversation 
above reported between Farragut and his flag-cap- 
tain had scarcely ended when the ram was seen to 
be moving out from under the fort. Captain Dray- 
ton reported the fact to the admiral, saying that she 
was going outside to attack the United States ves- 
sels still remaining there. "Then," said Farragut, 
" we must follow him out." The remark indicates 
an alternative to the course actually adopted by 
Buchanan, and one whose issue would depend less 
upon the United States commander-in-chief than 
upon the conduct of the vessels outside. If these 
were so imprudent as not to retire, Farragut might 
have been forced to run twice again the gantlet of 
Fort Morgan and of the torpedo line — once to pro- 
tect them, and afterward to regain the position he 
had just achieved. 



MOBILE. 283 

It must be admitted that the question before the 
Confederate admiral, what to do with one unwieldy 
though powerful vessel opposed to fourteen enemies, 
was hard to solve ; nor did he have, in a precise 
knowledge of the speed, battery, and other qualities 
of his opponents, the data needed for an accurate 
solution. In a general way, however, he must have 
known that the guns of the United States fleet were 
mainly smooth-bores, with but moderate penetrative 
power upon iron-plating such as the Tennessee's; 
and during the morning's encounter he had acquired 
experimental knowledge of their impotence against 
her sides, unless by a continuous pounding such as 
he was now about to invite. He knew also that sev- 
eral of the hostile vessels were of too heavy draught 
to take any efficient part, if he refused, as was in his 
power, to enter the pocket in which they were now 
anchored ; while the general gentle shelving of the 
bottom enabled a foot's difference in draught to 
secure a very considerable separation in distance. 
Every wooden ship was vulnerable to him and impo- 
tent against him at the ranges which his rifles per- 
mitted him to use. 

With the monitors Buchanan had not yet come 
into collision ; but one of the most formidable was 
sunk, and until he had learned something about their 
endurance and the power of their guns relatively 
to those of his own vessel, it would seem that his 
action, though immediate, should have been only 
tentative. If it proved on trial that the speed of 
the Tennessee was greater than that of the moni- 
tors, she might yet prove master of the situation. 
Despite the beak, which her wretched speed and 
exposed steering chains rendered untrustworthy, her 



284 



ADMIRAL FARRAGUT. 



great defensive strength and the fact of carrying 
rifled guns indicated that long range, and not close 
quarters, was the first game of the Tennessee. There 
she could hurt, and she could not be hurt. Had she, 
for instance, hovered at a distance, firing deliberately 
at the Union vessels, Farragut must have attacked ; 
and she could then have retired either into shoaler 
water, retaining her advantage in range, or else 
under the guns of Morgan, which would have 
strongly re-enforced her fight. The fact that Farra- 
gut, whose instinct for war was commonly accurate, 
proposed to attack her at close quarters and by 
night, is the best argument that Buchanan should 
have sought long range and daylight for his action. 
As it was, his headlong charge into the Union fleet 
was a magnificent display of inconsiderate bravery, 
in which such advantages as he had were recklessly 
thrown away. Its purpose is not clear. If, as Far- 
ragut thought, it was to sink his flag-ship, it can 
only be replied that an admiral's flag is not a red 
rag for a bull to charge. Had the Hartford been 
sunk when the column doubled up an hour or so 
before, the loss of the leader at so critical a mo- 
ment might have decided the day ; but to sink her 
in the melee within would have been a barren, though 
brilliant, feat of arms. 

As soon as it was ascertained" that the Tennessee 
was really coming up to attack, the mess-gear was 
hurried aside and the orders given to get under way. 
Some of the fleet had not yet anchored, and the 
monitors were not yet arrived at the place where 
the others were gathered. Dr. Palmer, the fleet 
surgeon, was just leaving the flag-ship in a steam- 
launch, for the purpose of making a round among 



MOBILE. 



285 



the other vessels to see to the condition of their 
wounded. Farragut called him alongside and directed 
him to go to the monitors with orders to attack the 
Tennessee. These Palmer delivered in person to 
each ironclad. " Happy as my friend Perkins (of 
the Chickasaw) habitually is," he wrote in his diary, 
" I thought he would turn a somersault overboard 
with joy when 1 told him, ' The admiral wants you to 
go at once and fight that Tennessee.' " The wooden 
vessels at the same time were directed to charge the 
ram, bows on, at full speed, as well as to attack her 
with their guns. 

The monitors being, like the Tennessee herself, 
very slow, the ramming contest first began. The 
first to reach the hostile ironclad was the Monon- 
gahela, Captain Strong, which struck her squarely 
amidships on the starboard side, when she was still 
four hundred yards distant from the body of the 
fleet. Five minutes later the Lackawanna, Captain 
Marchand, going at full speed, delivered her blow 
also at right angles on the port side, abreast the 
after end of the armored superstructure. As they 
swung round, both United States vessels fired such 
guns as would bear, but the shot glanced harmlessly 
from the armor ; nor did the blow of the ships them- 
selves produce any serious injury upon the enemy, 
although their own stems were crushed in for sev- 
eral feet above and below the water line. Upon 
them followed the Hartford, approaching, like the 
Lackawanna, on the port side ; but toward her the 
Tennessee turned, so that the two met nearly, though 
not exactly, bows on. The Hartford's anchor, which 
there had not been time to cat, was hanging at the 
water's edge; it took the brunt of the collision, 



286 ADMIRAL FARRAGUT. 

which doubled it up, and the two antagonists scraped 
by, their port sides touching. At that close range 
seven nine-inch guns were discharged against the 
sloping sides of the ironclad, but without effect. 
The admiral had clambered again into the rigging, 
on this occasion into the port mizzen-rigging, whence 
he watched the effects of this encounter. Both the 
Lackawanna and the Hartford now made a circuit to 
get a position whence they could again charge the 
enemy ; but in the midst of their sweep the Lacka- 
wanna ran square into the flag-ship, striking near 
where Farragut stood, and cutting the vessel down 
to within two feet of the water. The immediate im- 
pression among the ship's company was that the 
injury was fatal ; and the general cry that arose, 
'' Save the admiral ! Get the admiral on board the 
Lackawanna ! " by its ignoring of their own danger, 
testified how Farragut's martial and personal quali- 
ties had won a way into the affections of his sub- 
ordinates. With an activity for which he had been 
remarkable in middle life, and retained even now 
when in his sixties, the admiral jumped into the 
chains to ascertain the extent of the injury ; then, 
finding that the ship was in no present danger, he 
ordered her again to be headed for the Tennessee. 

Meanwhile the monitors had come up, and the 
battle had begun between them and the enemy. One 
of the Manhattan's fifteen-inch guns had been dis- 
abled ; and the slow firing of those unwieldy 
weapons, with the imperfect mechanical appliances 
then used for loading them, prevented her doing the 
injury that might have been expected. One shot 
struck square, breaking through the port side of the 
armor ; but even so the missile itself did not enter 



MOBILE. 



287 



the vessel, a strong evidence of the power of the 
Tennessee to resist a single shot. But she was not 
equally invulnerable to the sustained and continuous 
hammering of even lighter projectiles. The Winne- 
bago's turrets, being out of order, could not be 
turned, and consequently the guns could be brought 
to bear only by moving the helm ; a circumstance 
which materially reduced her fire. The Chickasaw, 
however, was in better case. Lieutenant-Commander 
Perkins got her into position under the stern of the 
Tennessee just after the latter's collision with the 
Hartford ; and there he stuck to the end, never over 
fifty yards distant, and keeping up a steady rapping 
of eleven-inch shot upon the fabric which they could 
not at once penetrate, but which they visibly shook. 
Fifty-two of these projectiles were fired from the 
Chickasaw in the short half-hour of her attack. The 
exposed rudder-chains were shot away, and at nearly 
the same time the smoke-stack came down. Admiral 
Buchanan was wounded by an iron splinter, which 
broke his leg and otherwise injured it to such an ex- 
tent that the limb was with difficulty saved. He 
turned over the command to Captain Johnston, who 
stood the pounding for twenty minutes longer and 
then reported to his superior that the ship was help- 
less, could not be steered, and that for half an hour 
he had not been able to bring a gun to bear. "Well," 
replied Buchanan, '' if you can not do them any fur- 
ther damage you had better surrender." 

The Tennessee's flag had been several times shot 
away, and was now fiying from a boat-hook. Not 
being very conspicuous, its removal was not immedi- 
ately noticed, and Johnston had to show a white fiag 
to put a stop to the firing. " She was at this time sore 



288 ADMIRAL FARRAGUT. 

beset," said Farragut in his dispatch to the Navy 
Department; "the Chickasaw was pounding away 
at her stern, the Ossipee was approaching her at full 
speed, and the Monongahela, Lackawanna, and Hart- 
ford were bearing down upon her, determined upon 
her destruction. Her smoke-stack had been shot 
away, her steering chains were gone, compelling a 
resort to her relieving tackles, and several of her 
port shutters were jammed. Indeed, from the time 
the Hartford struck her until her surrender she 
never fired a gun." No stronger evidence can be 
offered than this last sentence, which Johnston's ac- 
count corroborates, of how completely Buchanan 
miscalculated, or disregarded, the capabilities of the 
important vessel he controlled. Great as was her 
power to resist a single shot, or the end-on charge 
of a heavy vessel, when she surrendered nearly all 
the plating on the after side of the casemate was 
found to be started, and the after gun-carriage was 
disabled ; there being distinct marks of nine eleven- 
inch solid shot having struck within a few square 
feet of that port. Three of her port shutters also 
were so damaged that their guns could not be 
fired. 

Thus ended the great battle of Mobile Bay, the 
crowning achievement of Farragut's naval career ; 
" one of the hardest-earned victories of my life," 
to quote his own words, "and the most desperate 
battle I ever fought since the days of the old 
Essex." "You may pass through a long career and 
see many an action," he remarked to one of the 
junior officers of the Hartford, in the interval be- 
tween first anchoring and the conflict with the Ten- 
nessee, "without seeing as much bloodshed as you 



MOBILE. 289 

have this day witnessed." The loss of the flag-ship 
herself had been twenty-five killed and twenty-eight 
wounded out of a ship's company of some three 
hundred souls. The Brooklyn, a ship of the same 
force, had almost exactly the same number of cas- 
ualties — eleven killed and forty-three wounded. Con- 
trasting the equal suffering of the latter — delayed 
so long under the numerous guns of the fort, but 
supported by the fire of the other vessels — with that 
of the flag-ship, inflicted by the batteries of the 
enemy's gun-boats, few in number, but worked for 
the time with impunity, we find an excellent illus- 
tration of Farragut's oft-repeated maxim, that " to 
hurt your enemy is the best way to keep him from 
hurting you." The total loss of the United States 
fleet in the battle was three hundred and thirty- 
five ; of whom one hundred and thirteen were at the 
bottom of the bay, coffined in the iron hull of the 
Tecumseh. 

Not quite three hours elapsed from the time that 
Morgan fired its first gun to the moment when the 
Tennessee hauled down her flag and confessed the 
United States fleet mistress of the bay. The forts 
still stood with the Confederate flag flying from 
them in defiance; and it is reported that the com- 
mander of Morgan retorted to a summons to sur- 
render, that he looked upon Farragut's fleet as prac- 
tically prisoners in a port whose keys he held. If 
so, it was the high-hearted resolve of a man deter- 
mined to hold his charge to the last, and not the 
sober conviction of a soldier, that spoke. Like the 
river forts when Farragut's fleet forced its way past 
and stood between them and their base of supplies, 
the defenses of Mobile were isolated by the results 



290 



ADMIRAL FARRAGUT. 



■y 



of the morning's fight, and their fall became but a 
question of time. There was no mutiny of the gar- 
rison, as on the former occasion, for the stern ex- 
perience of war had better taught the men the 
business of a soldier; but it was at once practi- 
cable here to begin siege operations, which in the 
river would perhaps have been for a time postponed, 
owing to the overflowed state of the country. The 
preparations for these were pushed with vigor, and 
the navy also took a hand against the works. Four 
hours after the surrender of the Tennessee, the 
Chickasaw weighed her anchor and steamed down 
toward Grant's Pass to shell Fort Powell. Built to 
resist an attack from Mississippi Sound, the work 
was weak in the direction of the bay. "The iron- 
clad's fire," reported the officer in command, "made 
it impossible to man the two guns in the rear, and 
I made no attempt to do so." That night the fort 
was evacuated and blown up. The following day 
the Chickasaw threw some shells into Fort Gaines, 
in consequence of which, and of the progress made 
by General Granger in his approaches, that work was 
surrendered on the 7th of August. Morgan still 
standing out, the army was transferred from Dauphin 
Island to Mobile Point, batteries were constructed, 
and on the 17th a siege train from New Orleans was 
landed. On the 22d, at daylight, the siege guns, the 
three monitors, the captured Tennessee, and the ships, 
both outside and inside the bay, opened together. 
The following day Fort Morgan capitulated. 

A gratifying feature in these operations, as well 
as in all Farragut's official association with the army, 
was the cordial good feeling and co-operation which 
existed between the two services, and which were 



MOBILE. 



291 



equally manifested in the upper Mississippi between 
Grant and Porter. General Butler, Farragut's first 
colleague in the Gulf and at New Orleans, but who 
had long since left the department, wrote him a 
most enthusiastic letter of congratulation upon re- 
ceiving the news of the battle of Mobile Bay; and 
General Granger, in concluding his report of the 
siege operations against Gaines and Morgan, said : 
" I am pleased to record the perfect harmony exist- 
ing between these two branches of the service. For 
my own part, I can not sufficiently acknowledge the 
assistance rendered by the fleet and the admiral in 
command in transporting and disembarking the 
troops, guns, and materials employed by me in the 
operations. In brief, during all our relations, the 
officers of the fleet, with their distinguished com- 
mander, displayed in a high degree those qualities 
which mark their gallant service." To the officers 
of the navy the testimonies thus given can not but 
be most grateful ; not merely as acknowledgments 
of the important part played by a service whose 
work is too often ignored by historians, but chiefly 
as giving an added lustre to the brilliant reputation 
of its two most distinguished representatives, who 
successively filled the high position of admiral of the 
navy. 

After the capitulation of the forts. Admiral Far- 
ragut remained in Mobile Bay until the following 
November. The lower bay was cleared of torpe- 
does and reconnoissances made toward Mobile ; but 
he wrote adversely to any attempt against the city, 
now that it was sealed as a port to blockade runners. 
" It would be an elephant," he wrote, "and take an 
army to hold it. And besides, all the traitors and 



292 



ADMIRAL FARRAGUT. 



rascally speculators would flock to that city and 
pour into the Confederacy the wealth of New York." 
He confesses also his dislike to operations in very 
shoal water. " I am in no way diffident about going 
anywhere in the Hartford, but when I have to leave 
her and take to a craft drawing six feet of water I 
feel badly." 

The admiral's health was now suffering much 
from the combined effects of his labors, his anxieties, 
and the climate. " I am as well as a man can be 
who can neither sit, walk, nor stand five minutes at a 
time on account of Job's comforters. But, thank 
God (I have so much to be thankful for that I am 
thanking him all the time), I am otherwise in pretty 
good condition." Despite this brave effort at cheer- 
fulness, his letters from time to time began to show 
symptoms of depression, and he longed for rest. 
" This is the last of my work," he said, "and I ex- 
pect a little respite." His enfeebled condition drew 
the attention and excited the alarm of those about 
him. " I was talking to the admiral to-day," wrote 
Perkins, of the Chickasaw, the day after Morgan sur- 
rendered, " when all at once he fainted away. He is 
not very well and is all tired out. It gave me quite 
a shock, and shows how exhausted he is, and his 
health is not very good, any way. He is a mighty 
fine old fellow." Captain Drayton also wrote home 
to his family that, if the admiral remained longer in 
the Gulf, he feared for the consequences. 

Under these circumstances an order from the 
Navy Department, dated the 5th of September, as- 
signing him to the command of the Fort Fisher ex- 
pedition, greatly upset him. He had about a week 
before written to the Secretary to say that his 



MOBILE. 293 

Strength was almost exhausted. " I am willing," he 
concluded, " to do the bidding of the department as 
long as I am able to the best of my abilities. I fear, 
however, that my health is giving way. I have now 
been down in the Gulf five years out of six, with the 
exception of the short time at home last fall; the 
last six months have been a severe drag upon me, 
and I want rest, if it is to be had." 

To so reasonable a request, after such distin- 
guished and valuable service, the department could 
not have closed its ears had it been so disposed. 
Farragut was authorized to leave his squadron in 
charge of Commodore James S. Palmer, a very gal- 
lant and efficient officer, and to come north in the 
Hartford. On the 30th of November, 1864, he sailed 
from Pensacola, and on the 12th of December the 
flag-ship again anchored in New York Harbor. 



CHAPTER XI. 

LATER YEARS AND DEATH. 
1864-1870. 

With the strong national and patriotic feeling 
tirat had been aroused throughout the Northern 
States by the war of secession, Farragut had no 
cause to complain of ingratitude or indifference on 
the part either of the Government or of his fellow- 
countrymen. As the flag-ship entered the Narrows, 
on his final return from the Gulf, she was met by a 
representative committee from the city officials and 
citizens of New York. Enthusiastic crowds greeted 
him as he landed at the Battery, and a reception 
given him the same afternoon at the Custom House 
was thronged by the leading men of the city. This 
eager manifestation of good-will and admiration was 
followed, a few days later, by a flattering request 
that the admiral would honor the city by taking up 
his abode in it and becoming thenceforth one of its 
citizens. After reciting the deeds which had won 
for him universal applause and thankfulness, the 
committee said : " The citizens of New York can 
offer no tribute equal to your claim on their grati- 
tude and affection. Their earnest desire is to receive 
you as one of their number, and to be permitted, as 
fellow-citizens, to share in the renown you will bring 



LATER YEARS AND DEATH. 



295 



to the metropolitan city. This desire is felt in 
common by the whole community." 

This graceful tribute of words was accompanied 
by the gift of fifty thousand dollars, to facilitate Far- 
ragut's complying with the request. The letter was 
addressed to Vice-Admiral Farragut ; the United 
States Government, not to be behindhand in ac- 
knowledging its debt to its most distinguished sea- 
man, having created for him that grade soon after 
his arrival. The bill for the purpose was introduced 
on the 226. of December, 1864, immediately passed 
by both houses, and became law by the President's 
signature the following day. Farragut's nomination 
and confirmation followed of course and at once ; so 
that his promotion came to him in the Christmas 
holidays. The admiral gratefully acknowledged the 
warm welcome of the New Yorkers, while modestly 
disavowing, as far as he could, his claim to extraor- 
dinary merit in the brilliant services which he as- 
serted were but the performance of his duty ; and he 
thankfully accepted, as the spontaneous offering of 
his fellow-countrymen, the recompense which in older 
countries is the usual reward of distinguished mili- 
tary success, but conferred there through the formal 
medium of the central government. 

Toward the end of January, 1865, the Confed- 
erate vessels in the James made an attempt to de- 
scend the river, destroy the pontoon bridges of the 
United States armies, and cut off both the Army of 
the James and that of the Potomac from their base 
of supplies at City Point. Rear-Admiral David D. 
Porter, who then commanded the North Atlantic 
Squadron, was fully occupied at the time with the 
bombardment of Fort Fisher and capture of Wil- 



296 



ADMIRAL FARRAGUT. 



mington, North Carolina ; and as the hostile attempt 
threatened a very serious annoyance to the com- 
munications of the army, Farragut, who was then in 
Washington, was ordered to proceed to the spot. 
He accordingly hoisted his flag on a small steamer 
and ran down to the James; but, finding upon his 
arrival that the enemy had been repulsed, and satis- 
factory measures taken to prevent a renewal of the 
effort, he returned to Washington. This slight epi- 
sode concluded his active service in the war. 

When Richmond was evacuated on the 2d of 
April, 1865, Farragut was among the first to visit the 
fallen capital of the Confederacy. From there a few 
days later he visited his old home in Norfolk. Many 
of his former friends still retained strong feelings of 
resentment against him, as a Southern man who had 
taken arms against the South. The impression had 
obtained among some that, though leaving his old 
home, he would remain neutral ; and it was even re- 
ported that he had said he would take no part in the 
war. That Farragut never passed through that 
phase of feeling, in the struggle between life-long 
affections and the sense of duty, would be too much 
to affirm ; but it was a position in which a man of 
his decided and positive character could not have 
stopped when civil strife was upon the land. It was 
inconsistent with his general habits of thought ; and 
it is evident that, before leaving Norfolk, his con- 
victions on the particular crisis had already left far 
behind any such temporary halting place between 
two opinions. When he justified to his excited 
neighbors President Lincoln's call for troops, on the 
ground that the United States Government could do 
no less, when its arsenals and navy yards were seized 



LATER YEARS AND DEATH. 297 

and its flag fired upon, it is inconceivable that the man 
who then had such courage of his opinions entertained 
any further doubt as to his future course ; though it 
may well be that he did not imperil his personal lib- 
erty and safety by any irritating avowal of his pur- 
pose. In a reception given to him, when he thus re- 
visited the place which should no longer be his home, 
he recalled those days and said: "1 was told by a 
brother officer that the State had seceded, and that 
I must either resign and turn traitor to the Govern- 
ment which had supported me from my childhood, or 
I must leave this place. Thank God ! I was not 
long in making my decision. I have spent half my 
life in revolutionary countries, and I know the hor- 
rors of civil war, and I told the people what I had 
seen and what they would experience. They laughed 
at me, and called me ' granny ' and ' croaker ' ; and 
I said : * I can not live here, and will seek some other 
place where I can live, and on two hours' notice.' I 
suppose they said I left my country for my country's 
good, and thank God I did ! I was unwilling to be- 
lieve that this difficulty would not have been settled ; 
but it was all in vain, and as every man must do in 
a revolution, as he puts his foot down, so it marks 
his life." 

In the summer of 1865, following the close of the 
war, Farragut visited several of the New England 
cities, receiving everywhere marks of love and ad- 
miration similar to those tendered to him in New 
York ; but his life for the next two years was 
passed in comparative retirement, seeking the re- 
establishment of his health, which had been severely 
shaken by the exposures and anxieties of the war. 

Though for the most part unassigned to any special 
20 



298 ADMIRAL FARRAGUT. 

duties, the winding up of tiie affairs of the West 
Gulf Squadron fully occupied his time. 

On the 25th of July, 1866, Congress passed a law 
creating the grade of admiral in the United States 
Navy, a position which was of course given at once 
to Farragut, and has been held by but one other — 
the late Admiral David D. Porter. The following 
year he was appointed to command the European 
Squadron, his flag being hoisted on board the steam 
frigate Franklin on the 17th of June, 1867. Without 
any request, and indeed without any expectation, on 
his part, the Government sent the admiral permis- 
sion for Mrs. Farragut and a kinswoman to accom- 
pany him during the cruise. On the 28th of June 
the ship sailed from New York,* and on the 14th of 
July anchored in Cherbourg, France. 

After passing a fortnight there, during which the 
admiral visited Paris and dined with the Emperor, 
the Franklin sailed for the Baltic, where the months 
of August and September were passed in visiting the 
ports of Russia, Sweden, and Denmark. Every- 
where Farraofut was received with the enthusiasm 
and distinguished consideration that were aroused 
among naval officers, by the presence of the man who 
had bestowed upon their profession a lustre un- 
equaled by any other deeds of that generation. 
Toward the end of September he arrived in England, 
where a month was spent in a similar gratifying 
manner ; attentions being lavished upon him by men 



* Before the admiral's departure from New York he gave a 
grand reception on board the flag-ship, which was attended by the 
President and his Cabinet and by many of the most prominent 
people of the Metropolis, including several hundred ladies. — 
Editor. 



LATER YEARS AND DEATH. 



299 



not only of his own calling, but of all positions. 
Here, as in the Baltic, every opportunity was given 
Farragut for visiting all objects of general interest, 
as well as for examining the professional improve- 
ments of the day. 

From England the Franklin went to the Medi- 
terranean, which Farragut had not seen since the 
flying trip made by the Brandywine in the winter of 
1825, after landing Lafayette in France. Between 
October, 1867, and April, 1868, were visited Lisbon, 
Gibraltar, and several ports of the western Medi- 
terranean belonging to Spain, France, and Italy. 
Everywhere the same cordial welcome was extended, 
and the most ample facilities enjoyed for seeing 
thoroughly the points of interest in which the Medi- 
terranean abounds. At Nice he was the object of 
especial attentions from the numerous Americans 
who throng that attractive winter resort; and while 
at Naples a special excavation was made at Pompeii 
for his benefit. Nowhere, however, did he have a 
more elaborate and, from the professional point of 
view, more interesting reception than in Malta, the 
great British stronghold in the central Mediter- 
ranean ; where the Mediterranean fleet, then on the 
point of sailing for the Levant, was detained espe- 
cially to meet him. 

The incidents of this cruise which most nearly 
touch Farragut himself, and have the greatest inter- 
est for his biographer, occurred in the island of 
Minorca, where his family originated. Over forty 
years had passed since, as midshipman and lieu- 
tenant, he had wintered at Port Mahon. During 
those early visits he had received messages from 
persons living in the interior of the island who 



200 ADMIRAL FARRAGUT. 

claimed relationship ; but with boyish indifference he 
had not responded to any of these advances. Since 
that time he had become imbued with the interest 
men commonly feel, in advancing years, in collecting 
all traces of family history which they can find ; 
especially when, as in his case, they have been early 
and completely separated from the home of their 
childhood and of their race. The late George Tick- 
nor had sent him an old Spanish book, the poems of 
Mossen Jaime Febrer, in which he read the account 
of his earliest celebrated ancestor, Pedro Ferragut. 
Among several escutcheons of the family that have 
been preserved, bearing diverse ecclesiastical and 
military emblems indicative of the individual's pro- 
fession, all contain the common distinguishing device 
of a horseshoe ; and this the admiral, moved by the 
feeling of kinship, had adopted for his plate. Drawn 
by these ties of blood and by curiosity, it was a mat- 
ter of course that Farragut should visit the famous 
harbor for which British, French, and Spaniards had 
battled, and which lay within the limits of his com- 
mand. The renown of his achievements had carried 
his name to Ciudadela, the remote inland city where 
his father was born over a century before ; and the 
quiet islanders, who had exulted in the fame of one 
sprung from their race, were ready to greet him and 
claim him as their own. In response to an invitation 
given by them, the admiral, in December, 1867, paid 
a visit to Ciudadela, of which the following account 
is given by his secretary, Mr. Montgomery, who ac- 
companied him on the trip : 

" The day after Christmas had been designated 
by the admiral for his promised visit to Ciudadela, 
in response to the cordial invitation of the authori- 



LATER YEARS AND DEATH. 



301 



ties and people of that city. Tlie news of this tour 
of pleasure had spread rapidly to all parts of the 
island, and occasioned a general rest from labor and 
a popular concentration upon the lines of travel. At 
the towns of Alayor and Mercadal flocks of people 
of both sexes had assembled on the roadside to unite 
with the authorities in tendering our naval chieftain 
a cordial welcome, and in expressing their delight at 
his advent. 

" Although unable to accept the offers of hospi- 
tality which even in these unpretending villages were 
showered upon him, the admiral heartily acknowl- 
edged the gratification he felt at their demonstra- 
tions of personal regard, and, passing along the ex- 
cited lines, he underwent a siege of hand-shaking. 
At these points and elsewhere along the route sol- 
diers had been stationed to pay him proper honors, 
and to tender him any assistance he might require 
throughout his journey. 

" On his arrival within four miles of Ciudadela 
he was formally received by the Alcalde ; and a large 
committee, comprising many prominent citizens, ten- 
dered the hospitalities of the city, and cordially wel- 
comed him as its guest. After a brief interchange 
of courtesies, he was transferred to a very handsome 
barouche, and conducted forward in the van of a 
quite formidable-looking procession, demonstrations 
of every kind increasing as he approached this 
ancient capital of Minorca, the present residence of 
many of those who prefer the quiet seclusion of their 
island home to the more dazzling notoriety incident 
to many of the older and gayer provinces of the 
mainland. Outside the walls of the city his appear- 
ance was no sooner heralded than masses of people 



202 ADMIRAL FARRAGUT. 

of every age, sex, and condition rushed forward to 
greet him, filling the air with cheers and acclama- 
tions. As he passed the gates of the city, the walls, 
house-tops, and balconies were crowded with anxious 
spectators, uniting demonstrations of welcome with 
equally expressive shouts from the swaying multi- 
tude who had taken possession of the principal 
thoroughfares. One old man of threescore years 
and ten, with tears streaming down his weather- 
beaten face, stamped sincerity itself upon the nature 
of the welcome by shouting aloud: ' He is ours ! he 
is ours ! but I shall never see him more.' 

" The avenue leading to the residence of Senor 
Don Gabriel Squella, which had been kindly placed 
by that gentleman at the disposal of the admiral 
and his suite, was literally blocked with people, and 
the excitement rose rapidly to fever heat as the 
head of the column appeared in view endeavoring 
to make a breach in a body absolutely closed in 
mass. It was with no little difficulty that the pro- 
cession forced a passage; and although policemen 
did their utmost, and jostled, and crowded, and 
threatened, accompanying their language with all 
the vocabulary of Spanish expletives, it was found 
necessary to disembark at some distance from the 
hospitable mansion and trust to the humanity of 
our entertainers to afford an entrance on foot. But 
the temporary concealment of the admiral within the 
delightful headquarters which had been assigned 
him seemed to be the signal for a renewed out- 
burst, which brought him to the balcony, upon 
which he stood bowing his thanks and acknowledg- 
ing in every possible way his heartfelt appreciation 
of the cordial welcome extended him, until it ap- 



LATER YEARS AND DEATH. 



303 



peared that there was no prospect of a cessation of 
hostilities, when, for the first time in his life, he 
was persuaded to retreat in the face of superior 
numbers. 

" The excitement continued unabated, however, 
throughout the entire evening, and it was not until 
near midnight that the crowd slowly dispersed, and 
the peaceful little city of Ciudadela resumed its 
wonted quiet, and its order-loving citizens, unac- 
customed to all such sounds of revelry by night, 
retired to their own little homesteads. 

" During this time a fine band of music was sta- 
tioned in the capacious vestibule on the first floor of 
Senor Squella's mansion, and almost all the promi- 
nent citizens of the place, with their families, called 
to pay their respects to the city's guest, making the 
scene of excitement within as pleasant as that with- 
out was tumultuous. 

" On the following morning enthusiasm arose with 
the sun, once more took firm possession of the street 
fronting the headquarters of the admiral, and there 
kept anxious watch. I am confident that, had there 
been an election that day for Governor of the 
Balearic Islands, or for King of Spain itself, the ad- 
miral would have been chosen without opposition. 

*' At an early hour, accompanied by his entire 
suite, all surrounded and followed by an admiring 
and excited throng, he was escorted by the com- 
mittee and other citizens to all the places of interest 
in and about the city, and finally to the cathedral, 
in which he had scarcely been seated before it was 
literally packed in every part by people, their hun- 
dreds of eyes being riveted upon the pleasant counte- 
nance of the unappalled admiral, who withstood the 



304 



ADMIRAL FARRAGUT. 



onslaught with as much sang froid as if accustomed 
to such trying ordeals. 

" Soon after, the great organ pealed forth our 
own national melodies, recalling our far-off land 
even to those whose knowledge of its power and 
glory was limited to its history, and the sparse in- 
formation derived from the few Americans who have 
visited this secluded city." 

After leaving the Mediterranean in April, 1868, 
the Franklin went to Holland and Belgium, and 
thence made a second visit to England, in the course 
of which Farragut was presented to Queen Victoria, 
and visited Scotland and the north of England. In 
July he returned to the Mediterranean and made a 
round of the Levant, visiting Constantinople; a spe- 
cial indulgence to anchor before the city being ac- 
corded to the ship bearing the flag of an admiral, 
whose exceptional achievements made it unlikely 
that the privilege would shortly be construed into a 
precedent. After a short stay in Athens, and a run 
up to Trieste at the head of the Adriatic, the Frank- 
lin returned to Gibraltar, and thence sailed for New 
York, which she reached on the loth of November, 
1868; thus concluding a cruise which, from the be- 
ginning to the end, had resembled a triumphal prog- 
ress in the enthusiastic recognition everywhere ex- 
tended to the hero, whose battle-won blue flag she 
carried at her main. 

Less than two years of life remained to Admiral 
Farragut when he returned from the Mediterranean. 
The following summer of 1869 he visited the Cali- 
fornia coast, where he had not been since he gave 
up the command of the Mare Island Navy Yard in 
1858. The welcome here accorded him was as hearty 



LATER YEARS AND DEATH. 



305 



as that extended in foreign countries, and mingled 
with the admiration due to the conquering admiral 
was the recollection of warm mutual affection 
and esteem engendered by four years of close 
intercourse. Returning from San Francisco to the 
East, Farragut was seized at Chicago with a violent 
illness, in which the heart was affected. For some 
days his life was despaired of ; and although by care- 
ful nursing he recovered so as to resume his journey, 
it is doubtful whether he ever regained the ground 
then lost. Several severe attacks followed this one ; 
and although he rallied with extraordinary rapidity, 
thanks to a vigorous constitution, it was apparent 
that his health was failing. A few months later, in 
the middle of v^inter, he consented to take charge of 
the naval ceremonies in honor of the remains of Mr. 
George Peabody, whose body had been brought to 
the United States in the British ship-of-war Mon- 
arch, in recognition of his benevolence to the poor 
of London. It was his last official duty, and the ex- 
posure attendant upon funeral ceremonies in that 
bleak season was much to be deprecated in a man of 
his years and failing vigor. 

The following summer the Navy Department 
placed at his disposal the dispatch steamer Talla- 
poosa, which took him and his family to Portsmouth, 
New Hampshire ; where he became the guest of the 
late Rear- Admiral Pennock, then commandant of the 
Navy Yard at that place and a connection by mar- 
riage of Mrs. Farragut. It was his last sea voyage, 
and he appeared to have a presentiment that it was 
so ; for as the ship drew near the yard he arose from 
his sick bed at the sound of the salute being fired in 
his honor, dressed himself in full uniform, and went 



3o6 



ADMIRAL FARRAGUT. 



on deck. Looking up with a sad smile at his flag 
flying from the mast-head, he said : " It would be 
well if I died now^ in harness." Shortly after his 
arrival, an old sailor who had charge of the sloop-of- 
war Dale, then lying dismantled at the wharf, met 
there the admiral, who had wandered on board. He 
looked about the ship and, as he left her to go 
ashore, said : '' This is the last time I shall ever 
tread the deck of a man-of-war." This prediction 
proved true. He passed quietly away at the com- 
mandant's house, on the 14th of August, 1870, aged 
sixty-nine years; surrounded by his family and lov- 
ing friends, including many of his old companions in 
arms. The body was laid temporarily in Ports- 
mouth, the naval officers and citizens of the place 
uniting to pay every respect to his memory. 

In September the Navy Department sent the 
steam frigate Guerriere to bring the admiral's body 
to New York. This, ship running aground on Nan- 
tucket Shoal, the remains were transferred to another 
vessel and so conveyed to the city. The final and 
public funeral ceremonies were held on the 30th of 
September ; the day being observed as one of gen- 
eral mourning, the city edifices draped, bells tolled, 
and minute guns fired. In the procession was Gen- 
eral Grant, then President of the United States, with 
the members of his Cabinet, many military and naval 
officers, ten thousand soldiers, and a large number 
of societies. By these the coffin of the admiral was 
escorted to the railroad station, whence it was 
transported to Woodlawn Cemetery, in Westchester 
County, where the body now lies. 

To his memory the United States Government 
has erected a colossal bronze statue in the national 



LATER YEARS AND DEATH. 



307 



capital, in Farragut Square, the work of Miss Vinnie 
Ream. A committee of New York citizens have 
placed a similar memorial, by Mr. St. Gauden, at the 
northwest corner of Madison Square in that city. 
There is also a mural tablet, with a likeness of the 
admiral, in the Protestant Episcopal Church of the 
Incarnation ; of which he was a communicant after 
taking up his residence in New York. 



CHAPTER XII. 

THE CHARACTER OF ADMIRAL FARRAGUT. 

The brilliant and victorious career which has 
secured for Farragut a leading place among the suc- 
cessful naval commanders of all time was of brief 
duration, and began at an age when men generally 
are thinking rather of relaxing their efforts than of 
undertaking new and extraordinary labors. The 
two great leaders of the United States armies during 
the civil war — Grant and Sherman — were not over 
forty-five when the return of peace released them 
from their cares ; while Nelson and Napoleon were 
but a year older than these when Trafalgar and 
Waterloo terminated their long careers, Farragut 
was nearly sixty-one at the time of passing the Mis- 
sissippi forts, and his command of the Western Gulf 
Squadron lasted not quite three years, or rather less 
than the ordinary duration of a naval cruise in times 
of peace. Though not unprecedented, the display 
of activity and of sustained energy made by him at 
such an advanced period of life is unusual ; and the 
severity of the strain upon the mental and physical 
powers at that age is evidenced by the prostration of 
Farragut himself, a man of exceptional vigor of 
body and of a mental tone which did not increase his 
burdens by an imaginative exaggeration of difficul- 



THE CHARACTER OF ADMIRAL FARRAGUT. 309 

ties. He never committed the error, against which 
Napoleon cautioned his generals, " de se faire un tab- 
leau.'' On the other hand, the study of his operations 
shows that, while always sanguine and ready to take 
great risks for the sake of accomplishing a great re- 
sult, he had a clear appreciation of the conditions 
necessary to success and did not confound the im- 
practicable with the merely hazardous. Of this, his 
reluctance to ascend the Mississippi in 1862, and his 
insistence in 1864 upon the necessity of ironclads, 
despite his instinctive dislike to that class of vessel, 
before undertaking the entrance to Mobile Bay, are 
conspicuous illustrations ; and must be carefully kept 
in view by any one desirous of adequately appreciat- 
ing his military character. 

As in the case of Nelson, there is a disposition 
to attribute Farragut's successes simply to dash — 
to going straight at the enemy regardless of method 
and of consequences. In the case of the great 
British admiral the tendency of this view, which 
has been reproduced in successive biographies down 
to the latest, is to sink one of the first of naval 
commanders beneath the level of the pugilist, who 
in his fighting does not disdain science, to that of 
the game-cock ; and it is doubtless to be attributed 
to the emphasis he himself laid upon that direct, 
rapid, and vigorous action without which no mili- 
tary operations, however wisely planned, can suc- 
ceed. In the want of this, rather than of great pro- 
fessional acquirements, will be most frequently found 
the difference between the successful and the unsuc- 
cessful general ; and consequently Nelson, who had 
seen so much of failure arising from slowness and 
over-caution, placed, and rightly placed, more stress 



3IO 



ADMIRAL FARRAGUT. 



upon vigor and rapidity, in which most are found 
deficient, than upon the methods which many under- 
stand, however ill they may apply them. Like the 
distinguished Frenchman, Suffren, who is said to 
have stigmatized tactics as " the veil of timidity," 
yet illustrated in his headlong dashes the leading 
principles of all sound tactics, Nelson carefully 
planned the chief outlines of operations, in the exe- 
cution of which he manifested the extremes of daring 
and of unyielding firmness. There was in him no 
failure to comprehend that right direction, as well 
as vigor and weight, is necessary to a blow that 
would tell ; but experience had taught him that the 
average man wants to be much too sure of success 
before venturing to move, and hence the insistence 
upon that one among the features of his military 
character which to the superficial observer has grad- 
ually obscured all others. Vigor even to desperate- 
nessof action both Nelson and Farragut on occasion 
showed — recklessness never. Neither fought as one 
who beateth the air ; and while for neither can be 
claimed an entire exemption from mistakes, the 
great outlines of their action can safely challenge 
hostile criticism. 

AVhile, however, both in their respective spheres 
illustrated the great leading principles of war, the 
circumstances under which they were called to prac- 
tice them were too diverse to permit any close com- 
parison, or parallel, to be instituted between their 
actions. Nelson, for the most part, shone upon the 
battle-field — by his tactical combinations, by the ra- 
pidity and boldness with which he carried out plans 
previously laid, or, on occasion, by the astonishing 
coup d'xil and daring with which, in unforeseen 



THE CHARACTER OF ADMIRAL FARRAGUT. 311 

crises, he snatched and secured escaping victory. 
Farragut in actual battle showed that careful adapta- 
tion of means to ends which has a just claim to be 
considered tactical science ; but his great merit was 
in the clearness with which he recognized the de- 
cisive point of a campaign, or of a particular opera- 
tion, and threw upon it the force under his direction. 
Nelson acted chiefly against ships, against forces of 
a type essentially the same as his own, and accessible 
in all parts to his attack, because belonging to the 
same element; he might therefore hope to overcome 
them by the superior quality of his crews or by his 
better tactical dispositions. Farragut contended 
with fortifications, whose military powers, offensive 
and defensive, were essentially different from those of 
a fleet. Their endurance so greatly exceeded that of 
his ships as to exclude any hope of reducing them by 
direct attack ; and their advantages of position, de- 
liberately chosen and difficult of approach, could not 
be outweighed by any tactical arrangement open to 
him to adopt. He was therefore compelled to seek 
their fall by indirect means, by turning and isolating 
them, by acting against their communications — a 
conception not tactical, but strategic. 

It is not meant to imply that the military talents of 
either admiral were confined to the particular field 
ascribed to him, but simply that in general they were 
led by circumstances to illustrate that chiefly. Nelson 
in his fine campaign in the Baltic evinced his profound 
intuitions in the science of strategy; and Farragut, 
as has been said, showed no mean tactical ability in 
the provisions made for his several battles. The dis- 
positions to be adopted were with him the subject of 
very careful consideration ; and before Mobile he 



212 ADMIRAL FARRAGUT. 

spent hours with his flag lieutenant studying, by the 
aid of little wooden models, the different positions in 
which the ships might be placed. Afterward he had 
the squadron get under way several times to practice 
keeping close order, and changing formation and 
course. 

Like all men who have achieved eminence, the 
secret of Admiral Farragut's success is to be found 
in natural aptitudes carefully improved, and in a 
corresponding opportunity tor action. How much 
he was indebted to the latter, is evident from the fact 
that he had passed his sixtieth year before his 
great qualities were manifested to the world. He 
was fortunate also, as was Nelson, in the conditions 
which he was called to meet. Great as were the 
difficulties confronting each, and brilliantly as they 
rose to the demand made upon their energies, it 
may safely be said that more perfect preparation 
upon the part of their enemies would either have 
detracted from the completeness of their victories; 
or else, by imposing greater deliberation and more 
methodical execution, would have robbed their ex- 
ploits of that thunderbolt character which imparts 
such dramatic brilliancy to the Nile and Trafalgar, 
to New Orleans and Mobile Bay. A modern tor- 
pedo line would not leave the gap by which Farra- 
gut first meant to profit, nor would it be crossed 
with the impunity he found ; nor could Nelson in 
his day, without courting destruction, have used 
against a thoroughly efficient enemy the tactics that 
admirably suited the conditions in Aboukir Bay and 
off Cape Trafalgar. But these considerations do 
not diminish the credit of either admiral, though 
they help to explain the fullness of their success, 



THE CHARACTER OF ADMIRAL FARRAGUT. 



313 



and justify proceedings which under different cir- 
cumstances would be unjustifiable. Rather, it may 
be said that, in the adaptation of their measures to 
the conditions opposed to them, what would other- 
wise invite condemnation as rashness, demands recog- 



nition as genius. 



For Farragut had a natural genius for war, to 
which scarcely any opening had been offered before 
the unexpected calamity of the great civil strife burst 
upon the country. In estimating his military char- 
acter and rightly apportioning the credit due to his 
great achievements, much stress must be laid upon 
the constant effort for professional improvement 
made by him from his early life. " Without the op- 
portunity and the environment which enabled him 
to develop himself," writes one who knew him for 
over forty years, " Farragut might have gone to his 
rest comparatively unknown ; yet among his com- 
rades and contemporaries in the navy he would have 
been recognized as no ordinary man, no merely 
routine naval officer, who kept his watch and passed 
through life as easily as he could." *' He told me," 
writes another, who first met him after his flag was 
flying, " that there are comparatively few men from 
whom one could not learn something, and that a 
naval officer should always be adding to his knowl- 
edge ; it might enable him to be more useful some 
day ; that it was hard to say what a naval officer 
might not have to do." Even after the war, when 
his reputation was at its height, in visiting European 
ports he never for a moment lost sight of this duty 
of professional acquirement. Not a harbor was 
visited that he did not observe critically its chances 
for defense by sea or land. " Who knows," said he, 
21 



X 



314 ADMIRAL FARRAGUT. 

" but that my services may be needed here some 
day ?" " Ah, Mr. Tucker," said Earl St. Vincent to 
his secretary when planning an attack upon Brest, 
" had Captain Jervis * surveyed Brest when he visited 
it in 1774, in 1800 Lord St. Vincent would not have 
been in want of his information." 

It was not merely in the acquisition of knowl- 
edge, commonly so called, that this practice contrib- 
uted to prepare Farragut for his great mission as a 
naval commander-in-chief, but also in the discipline 
of character and in the development of natural 
capacities admirably suited for that position. It 
should not be overlooked that before the war, and 
now again in our own day, the idea of professional 
improvement in the United States Navy has fastened 
for its fitting subject upon the development of the 
material of war, to the comparative exclusion of the 
study of naval warfare. This naturally results from 
the national policy, which does not propose to put 
afloat a fleet in the proper sense of the word ; and 
whose ideal is a number, more or less small, of 
cruisers neither fitted nor intended for combined 
action. Under these circumstances, the details of 
the internal economy of the single ship usurp in the 
professional mind an undue proportion of the atten- 
tion which, in a rightly constituted navy, might far 
better be applied to the study of naval tactics, in the 
higher sense of that word, and of naval campaigns. 
Farragut could not but feel the influence of this ten- 
dency, so strongly marked in the service to which he 
belonged ; the more so, as it is a thoroughly good 

* Captain Jervis and Earl St. Vincent were the same officer 
under different appellations. 



THE CHARACTER OF ADMIRAL FARRAGUT, 315 

tendency when not pushed to an exclusive extent. 
But here the habit of study, and stretching in every 
direction his interest in matters professional, stood 
him in good stead, and prepared him unconsciously 
for destinies that could not have been foreseen. The 
custom of reading had made him familiar with the 
biography and history of his profession, the school to 
which the great Napoleon recommended all who 
would fit themselves for high military command; 
and of which a recent distinguished authority has 
said that it may be questioned whether a formulated 
art of war can be said to exist, except as the embodi- 
ment of the practice of great captains illustrated in 
their campaigns. 

From these, with his great natural aptitudes for 
war, Farragut quickly assimilated its leading prin- 
ciples, which he afterward so signally illustrated in 
act and embodied in maxims of his own that have 
already been quoted. He did not employ the termi- 
nology of the art, which, though possibly pedantic 
in sound, is invaluable for purposes of discussion ; 
but he expressed its leading principles in pithy, 
homely phrases of his own, which showed how accu- 
rate his grasp of it was. " If once you get in a 
soldier's rear, he is gone," was probably in part a bit 
of good-natured chaff at the sister profession ; but it 
sums up in a few words the significance and strategic 
importance of his course in passing the batteries of 
the river forts, of Port Hudson and of Mobile, and 
brings those brilliant actions into strict conformity 
with the soundest principles of war. The phrases, 
whose frequent repetition shows how deep a hold 
they had taken upon him — " The more you hurt the 
enemy the less he will hurt you " — " The best protec- 



3i6 ADMIRAL FARRAGUT. 

tion against the enemy's fire is a well-directed fire 
from our own guns " — sum up one of the profoundest 
of all military truths, easily confessed but with diffi- 
culty lived up to, and which in these days of armor 
protection needs to be diligently recalled as a quali- 
fying consideration. It is, in fact, a restatement of 
the oft-admitted, readily-forgotten maxim that of- 
fense is the best defense. " I believe in celerity," 
said he, when announcing his determination soon to 
pass the Mississippi forts; and good reason had he to 
congratulate himself that this faith showed itself in 
his works below New Orleans, and to lament before 
Mobile the failure of his Government to observe the 
maxim which all acknowledge. " Five minutes," 
said Nelson, " may make the difference between vic- 
tory and defeat." " False (circuitous) routes and 
lost moments," wrote Napoleon, "are the determin- 
ing elements of naval campaigns." All admit the 
value of time ; but with what apathetic deliberation is 
often watched the flight of hours which are measur- 
ing the race between two enemies ! 

The personal character of Admiral Farragut af- 
forded the firm natural foundation upon which alone 
a great military character can be built ; for while no 
toleration should be shown to the absurd belief that 
military eminence leaps fully grown into the arena, 
like Minerva from the head of Jupiter— that, unlike 
every other kind of perfection, it grows wild and 
owes nothing to care, to arduous study, to constant 
preparation — it is still true that it can be developed 
only upon great natural aptitudes. The distinction 
conveyed by a phrase of Jomini, applied to Carnot, the 
great war minister of the French Revolution, is one 
that it is well for military and naval officers to bear 



THE CHARACTER OF ADMIRAL FARRAGUT. 



317 



constantly in mind. " Carnot," he says, although a 
soldier by profession, " was rather a man with a 
natural genius for war than an acccomplished {in- 
struit) officer ; " and to the lack of that studious 
preparation which marked Napoleon he attributes 
the mistakes which characterized some of Carnot's 
projects, although as a whole his career showed pro- 
found intuitions in the conduct of war. It is open 
to many able men to be accomplished and valuable 
officers ; a few only — how few, the annals of the past 
show — receive the rare natural gifts which in their 
perfect combination make the great captain the 
highest manifestation of power attainable by human 
faculties. 

The acquirements of the accomplished officer 
may enable him to see the right thing to be done 
under given conditions, and yet fail to lift him to 
the height of due performance. It is in the strength 
of purpose, in the power of rapid decision, of instant 
action, and, if need be, of strenuous endurance 
through a period of danger or of responsibility, 
when the terrifying alternatives of war are vibrating 
in the balance, that the power of a great captain 
mainly lies. It is in the courage to apply knowledge 
under conditions of exceptional danger ; not merely 
to see the true direction for effort to take, but to 
dare to follow it, accepting all the risks and all the 
chances inseparable from war, facing all that defeat 
means in order thereby to secure victory if it may 
be had. It was upon these inborn moral qualities 
that reposed the conduct which led Farragut to fame. 
He had a clear eye for the true key of a military 
situation, a quick and accurate perception of the right 
thing to do at a critical moment, a firm grip upon 



318 



ADMIRAL FARRAGUT. 



the leading principles of war ; but he might have had 
all these and yet miserably failed. He was a man of 
most determined will and character, ready to tread 
down or fight through any obstacles which stood in 
the path he saw fit to follow. Of this a conspicuous 
instance was given in the firmness with which he 
withstood the secession clamor of Norfolk, his out- 
spoken defense of the unpopular Government meas- 
ures, and the promptitude with which he left the 
place, sundering so many associations at the call of 
duty ; and to this exhibition of strength of purpose, 
through the impression made upon Mr. Fox, was 
largely due his selection for command in the Gulf. 

One of the greatest of naval commanders, whose 
experience of men extended through an unusually 
long and varied career — Earl St. Vincent — has de- 
clared that the true test of a man's courage is his power 
to bear responsibility ; and Farragut's fearlessness of 
responsibility in order to accomplish necessary ends, 
while yet captain of a single ship, was the subject of 
admiring comment among his subordinates, who are 
not usually prone to recognize that quality in their 
commanders. " I have as much pleasure in running 
into' port in a gale of wind," he wrote, " as ever a 
boy did in a feat of skill." The same characteristic 
was markedly shown under the weight of far greater 
issues in his determination to pass the river forts, in 
spite of remonstrances from his most able lieutenant, 
of cautious suggestions from other commanding of- 
ficers, and with only the ambiguous instructions of 
the Navy Department to justify his action. It was 
not that the objections raised were trivial. They 
were of the most weighty and valid character, and 
in disregarding them Farragut showed not only the 



I 



THE CHARACTER OF ADMIRAL FARRAGUT. 



319 



admirable insight which fastened upon the true mili- 
tary solution, but also the courage which dared to 
accept on his sole responsibility the immense risks of 
disaster which had to be taken. 

The same moral force showed itself again, in com- 
bination with the most rapid decision and strength of 
purpose, when his ship was nearly thrown on shore 
under the batteries of Port Hudson ; and yet more in 
the highest degree at that supreme moment of his life 
when,- headed off from the path he had himself laid 
down, he led his fleet across the torpedo line in Mobile 
Bay. To the same quality must also be attributed the 
resolution to take his ships above Port Hudson, with- 
out orders, at the critical period of the campaign of 
1863 ; and it is to be regretted in the interest of his 
renown that the merit of that fine decision, both in 
its military correctness and in the responsibility as- 
sumed, has not been more adequately appreciated. 
For the power to take these momentous decisions, 
Farragut was indebted to nature. He indeed justi- 
fied them and his general course of action by good' 
and sufficient reasons, but the reasons carried instant 
conviction to him because they struck a kindred 
chord in his breast. Speaking on one occasion of 
his gallant and accomplished fleet captain, Percival 
Drayton, he said : '' Drayton does not know fear, and 
would fight the devil himself, but he believes in act- 
ing as if the enemy can never be caught unprepared; 
whereas I believe in judging him by ourselves, and 
my motto in action," he continued, quoting the cele- 
brated words of Danton, " is, ' L'audace, et encore de 
I'audace, et toujours de l'audace.* " 

With all his fearlessness and determination, sever- 
ity was not one of Admiral Farragut's characteristics. 



320 ADMIRAL FARRAGUT. 

He was easily approachable, entering readily into con- 
versation with all ; and added much to the labors of his 
position as commanding officer by his great patience 
in listening to matters to which a subordinate might 
have attended. " His kindness was what most im- 
pressed me," says one officer who was a very young 
man when first reporting to him for duty. Another, 
who as a midshipman saw much of him, writes : " He 
had a winning smile and a most charming manner, 
and was jovial and talkative. If any officer or man 
had not spontaneous enthusiasm, he certainly infused 
it into him." Captain Drayton, who had many op- 
portunities of observing, once said of him: "I did 
not believe any man could be great if he did not 
know how to say ' No,' but I see he can ; for cer- 
tainly here is a great man, and he is too kind- 
hearted to say * No ' in some cases where it should 
be said.' 

In person, Admiral Farragut was not above the 
medium size — about five feet six and a half inches 
high, upright in carriage, well-proportioned, alert and 
graceful in his movements. In early and middle life 
he was rather slight than heavy in frame ; and it was 
not until the war, with the prolonged physical inac- 
tivity entailed by the river and blockade service, that 
he took on flesh. Up to that time his weight was 
not over one hundred and fifty pounds. He was 
very expert in all physical exercises, and retained his 
activity to the verge of old age. Even after his fifti- 
eth year it was no unusual thing for him to call up 
some of the crew of the ship under his command and 
have a bout with the single-sticks. He felt great 
confidence in his mastery of his sword, which he in- 
variably wore ashore ; and when returning to the 



THE CHARACTER OF ADMIRAL FARRAGUT. 321 

wharves at night, through low parts of a town 
where there was danger of molestation, he relied upon 
it to defend himself. " Any one wearing a sword," 
he used to say, " ought to be ashamed not to be pro- 
ficient in its use." 

For many years it was his habit on his birthday 
to go through certain physical exercises, or, as he 
worded it to a young officer of the fleet shortly 
before passing the river forts, to take a hand- 
spring ; until he failed in doing this he should not, 
he said, feel that he was growing old. This practice 
he did not discontinue till after he was sixty. A 
junior officer of the Hartford writes : " When some 
of us youngsters were going through some gymnas- 
tic exercises (which he encouraged), he smilingly 
took hold of his left foot, by the toe of the shoe, with 
his right hand, and hopped his right foot through the 
bight without letting go." The lightness with which 
he clambered up the rigging of the flag-ship when 
entering Mobile Bay, and again over the side to see 
the extent of injury inflicted by the collision with 
the Lackawanna, sufficiently prove that up to the 
age of sixty-three he was capable of showing upon 
occasion the agility of a young man. This bodily 
vigor powerfully supported the energy of his mind, 
and carried him from daylight to dark, and from ves- 
sel to vessel of his fleet, in seasons of emergency, to 
see for himself that necessary work was being done 
without slackness ; illustrating the saying attrib- 
uted to Wellington, that a general was not too old 
when he could visit the outposts in person and on 
horseback. 

The features of the admiral can best be realized 
from the admirable frontispiece. As a young man 



322 ADMIRAL FARRAGUT. 

he had the sallow, swarthy complexion usually as- 
sociated with his Spanish blood. His hair at the 
same period was dark brown, becoming in middle life 
almost black. In his later years he was partially 
bald — a misfortune attributed by him to the sun- 
stroke from which he suffered in Tunis, and which 
he to some extent concealed by the arrangement of 
the hair. The contour of the face was oval, the 
cheek-bones rather prominent, until the cheeks filled 
out as he became fleshier during the war ; the eyes 
hazel, nose aquiline, lips small and compressed. At 
no time could he have been called handsome; but 
his face always possessed the attraction given by ani« 
mation of expression and by the ready sympathy 
which vividly reflected his emotions, easily stirred by 
whatever excited his amusement, anger, or sorrow. 
To conceal his feelings was to him always difficult, 
and, when deeply moved, impossible. The old quar- 
termaster who lashed him in the rigging at Mobile 
Bay told afterward how the admiral came on deck 
again as the poor fellows who had been killed were 
being laid out on the port side of the quarter-deck. 
" It was the only time I ever saw the old gentleman 
cry," he said, "but the tears came in his eyes like a 
little child." A casual but close observer, who visited 
him on board the flag-ship in New Orleans, wrote 
thus: " His manners are mild and prepossessing, but 
there is nothing striking in his presence, and the most 
astute physiognomist would scarcely suspect the he- 
roic qualities that lay concealed beneath so simple 
and unpretending an exterior ; unless, indeed, one 
might chance to see him, as we did shortly afterward, 
just on receipt of the news from Galveston, or again 
on the eve of battle at Port Hudson. On such 



THE CHARACTER OF ADMIRAL FARRAGUT. 



323 



occasions the flashing eye and passionate energy 
of his manner revealed the spirit of the ancient 
vikings." 

Throughout his life, from the time that as a lad 
still in his teens he showed to Mr. Folsom his eager- 
ness to learn, Farragut was ever diligent in the work 
of self-improvement, both professional and general. 
His eyes were weak from youth, but he to some ex- 
tent remedied this disability by employing readers in 
the different ships on board which he sailed ; and to 
the day of his death he always had some book on 
hand. Having an excellent memory, he thus accu- 
mulated a great deal of information besides that 
gained from observation and intercourse with the 
world. Hobart Pasha, a British officer in the Turk- 
ish Navy and an accomplished seaman, wrote : " Ad- 
miral Farragut, with whom I had many conversations, 
was one of the most intelligent naval officers of my 
acquaintance." He loved an argument, and, though 
always good-tempered in it, was tenacious of his own 
convictions when he thought the facts bore out his 
way of interpreting their significance. When told by 
a phrenologist that he had an unusual amount of 
self-esteem, he replied : " It is true, I have ; I have 
full confidence in myself and in my judgment " — a 
trait of supreme importance to a man called to high 
command. But against the defects of this quality he 
was guarded by the openness of mind which results 
from the effort to improve and to keep abreast of the 
times in which one lives. 

Farragut was naturally conservative, as seamen 
generally tend to be; but while averse to sudden 
changes, and prone to look with some distrust upon 
new and untried weapons of war, he did not re- 



324 ADMIRAL FARRAGUT. 

fuse them, nor did they find in him that prejudice 
which forbids a fair trial and rejects reasonable 
proof. Of ironclads and rifled guns, both which 
in his day were still in their infancy, he at times 
spoke disparagingly ; but his objection appears to 
have arisen not from a doubt of their efficacy — the 
one for protection, the other for length of range — but 
from an opinion as to their effect upon the spirit of 
the service. In this there is an element of truth as 
well as of prejudice ; for the natural tendency of the 
extreme effort for protection undoubtedly is to ob- 
scure the fundamental truth, which he constantly 
preached, that the best protection is to injure the 
enemy. Nor was his instinct more at fault m recog- 
nizing that the rage for material advance, though a 
good thing, carries with it the countervailing dis- 
position to rely upon perfected material rather than 
upon accomplished warriors to decide the issue of 
battle. To express a fear such as Farragut's, that 
a particular development of the material of war 
would injure the tone of the service, sounds to some 
as the mere echo of Lever's commissary, who rea- 
soned that the abolition of pig-tails would sap the 
military spirit of the nation — only that, and nothing 
more. It was, on the contrary, the accurate mtuition 
of a born master of war, who feels, even without 
reasoning, that men are always prone to rely upon 
instruments rather than upon living agents — to think 
the armor greater than the. man. 

The self-confidence which Farragut exhibited in 
his military undertakings was not only a natural 
trait ; it rested also upon a reasonable conviction of 
his mastery of his profession, resulting from long 
years of exclusive and sustained devotion. He did 



THE CHARACTER OF ADMIRAL FARRAGUT. 



325 



not carry the same feeling into other matters with 
which he had no familiarity ; and he was jealously 
careful not to hazard the good name, which was the 
honor of his country as well as of himself, by attach- 
ing it to enterprises whose character he did not un- 
derstand, or to duties for which he did not feel fitted. 
Accordingly, he refused a request made to him to 
allow his name to be used as director of a company, 
accompanied by an intimation that stock represent- 
ing one hundred thousand dollars had been placed 
in his name on the books. " I have determined," he 
replied, " to decline entering into any business which 
I have neither the time nor perhaps the ability to 
attend to." In like manner he refused to allow his 
name to be proposed for nomination as a presidential 
candidate. " My entire life has been spent in the 
navy ; by a steady perseverance and devotion to it 
I have been favored with success in my profession, 
and to risk that reputation by entering a new career 
at my advanced age, and that career one of which I 
have little or no knowledge, is more than any one 
has a right to expect of me." 

Farragut was essentially and unaffectedly a re- 
ligious man. The thoughtfulness and care with 
which he prepared for his greater undertakings, the 
courage and fixed determination to succeed with 
which he went into battle, were tempered and graced 
by a profound submission to the Almighty will. 
Though not obtruded on the public, his home letters 
evince how constantly the sense of this dependence 
was present to his thoughts ; and he has left on 
record that, in the moment of greatest danger to his 
career, his spirit turned instinctively to God before 
gathering up its energies into that sublime impulse, 



326 



ADMIRAL FARRAGUT. 



whose lustre, as the years go by, will more and more 
outshine his other deeds as the crowning glory of 
them all — when the fiery admiral rallied his stag- 
gered column, and led it past the hostile guns and 
the lost Tecumseh into the harbor of Mobile. 



INDEX. 



Anecdotes of Admiral Farra- 
gut, II, 12, 22, 26, 35, 45-49. 
58, 92, 112, 124, 168-170, 267, 
281, 286, 288, 292, 297, 306, 
313, 318, 319, 321, 322, 323, 
325 ; lashed in rigging at 
Mobile, 272 ; visit to Ciuda- 
dela, his father's birthplace, 
300. 

Arkansas, Confederate ironclad, 
description of, 189 ; dash 
through United States fleet 
at Vicksburg, 191 ; destruc- 
tion of, 193. 

Bailey, Captain Theodorus, 
U. S. N., leads the fleet at 
the passage of Mississippi 
forts, 149, 151-155 ; demands 
surrender of New Orleans, 
168 et seq. 

Banks, General Nathaniel P., 
relieves Butler in command 
in the Southwest, 201 ; move- 
ment in support of Farragut's 
passage of Port Hudson, 21 1 ; 
operations west of the Missis- 
sippi, 229, 232 ; Port Hudson 
surrenders to, 235. 

Barnard, Major J. G., U. S. En- 



gineers, opinion as to effect 
of passing Mississippi forts, 
121. 

Battles : Essex with Phoebe and 
Cherub, 38-44 ; passage of 
New Orleans forts, 149 etseq. ; 
passage of batteries at Vicks- 
burg, 187, 192 ; Port Hudson, 
211 et seq. ; Mobile Bay, 269 
et seq. 

Baudin, French admiral, sketch 
of, 77 ; attack on Vera Cruz 
by, 79-83. 

Bell, Commodore Henry H., 
U. S. N., fleet captain to Far- 
ragut in 1862, 132, 140; 
breaking barrier below river 
forts, 132 ; extract from jour- 
nal of, 140 ; hoists U. S. flag 
over New Orleans, 171 ; at 
Galveston, 202 ; at Rio 
Grande, 240. 

Blair, Montgomery, account of 
interview with Farragut con- 
cerning New Orleans expe- 
dition, 124. 

Boggs, Commander Charles S., 
U. S. N., commands Varuna 
at passage of Mississippi forts, 
163, 164. 



328 



INDEX. 



Brooklyn, U. S. steamer, Far- 
ragut commands, 1858-60, in 
Gulf, 103-105. 

Buchanan, Franklin, Confeder- 
ate admiral, at Mobile, 244, 
279, 281-288. 

Butler, General Benjamin F., 
commands New Orleans ex- 
pedition, 164, 179, 291. 

Caldwell, Lieut. C. H. B., 
U. S. N., commands Itasca 
in Mississippi River, 132, 162 ; 
daring action in breaking 
chain below forts, 133, 150 ; 
commands ironclad Essex at 
Port Hudson, 220. 

Craven, Commander Tunis A. 
M., U. S. N., commands 
monitor Tecumseh at Mobile, 
268 ; eagerness to engage 
Tennessee, and consequent 
error, 273, 274 ; goes down 
with his ship, 275. 

Drayton, Captain Percival, U. S. 
N., Farragut's chief of staff 
at Mobile, 98, 250, 269, 270, 
272, 278, 281, 282, 292, 319, 
320. 

Essex, U. S. frigate, building 
of, 14 ; armament, 15 ; history : 
of, 16 ; cruise under Iporter, 
17-44 ; capture of, by Phoebe 
and Cherub, 44 ; fate of, 50. 

Essex, U. S. ironclad, 192, 193, 
211, 220, 232. 

Essex Junior, prize to Essex, 
and equipped as a tender to 



her, 25 ; mentioned, 26, 27, 
30, 32, 33, 34, 36 ; conveys to 
the United States the surviv- 
ors of the action, 49, 50. 

Farragut, Admiral David G.: 
family history, 1-6, 300 ; 
birth, 4 ; appointed midship- 
man, 8 ; joins frigate Essex, 
II ; cruise in Essex, 11-50; 
first battle, between Essex 
and two British ships, 38-44 ; 
returns to United States, 49 ; 
service in Mediterranean, 
1815-20, 53-62 ; returns to 
United States, 62 ; serves in 
Mosquito fleet in West Indies, 
1823, 63-67 ; first marriage, 
67 ; promoted to lieutenant, 
71 ; Brazil station, 1828-34, 
71-74 ; witnesses French at- 
tack on Vera Cruz, 1838, 75- 
.88 ; death of first wife, 88 ; 
promoted to commander, 89 ; 
Brazil station again, 1841, 
90-94 ; second marriage, 94 ; 
Mexican war, 94-97 ; ordnance 
duties, 97-98 ; commandant 
Mare Island yard, 99-101 ; 
promoted to captain, loi ; 
commands Brooklyn in Gulf, 
i858-'6o, 101-105 ; question 
of secession, 107-112 ; aban- 
dons his home in Norfolk and 
settles in New York, 112 ; 
chosen to command New Or- 
leans expedition, 122-125 ; 
appointed to command West 
Gulf squadron, December, 
1861, 125 ; assumes command 



INDEX. 



329 



at Ship Island, 127 ; opera- 
tions below Mississippi forts, 
127-149 ; passage of the forts, 
149-165 ; surrender of New 
Orleans, 166-176 ; operations 
above New Orleans, 1862, 
177-195 ; promoted to rear- 
admiral, 197 ; blockade opera- 
tions, 1862-63, 196-204 ; 
operations above New Or- 
leans, 1863, 203-235 ; passage 
of batteries at Port Hudson, 
211-216 ; effect of this pas- 
sage, 222-229 ; relinquishes to 
Porter command above New 
Orleans, 235 ; return North, 
Aug., 1863, 235 ; resumes 
command in Gulf, Jan., 1864, 
243 ; blockade duties, 249- 
254 ; battle of Mobile Bay, 
268-289 ; final return North, 
293 ; enthusiastic reception in 
New York, 294 ; promoted 
to vice-admiral, 295 ; tempo- 
rary service in James River, 
296 ; promoted to admiral, 
298 ; commands European 
station, 298-304 ; visit to his 
father's birthplace in Mi- 
norca, 299-304 ; return to 
United States, 304 ; declin- 
ing health, 305 ; death and 
obsequies, 306 ; monuments 
of| 307 J analysis of charac- 
ter, 308-326, 

Military characteristics : 
Personal courage, 44-46, 61, 
62, 161, 277, 317-319 ; moral 
courage in assuming responsi- 
bility, 26, 60, 124-126, 135, 
22 



137-140, 144, 147, 222, 223, 
276-280, 318 ; hopefulness, 
124, 252, 277 ; strategic in- 
sight, 137, 138, 141 et seq., 
147, 172, 178-185, 2CO, 207, 
208, 231, 238, 311, 315 ; tac- 
tical skill, 149, 150, 154, 217- 
220, 239, 260-263, 311 ; self- 
reliance, 323 ; comparison 
with Nelson, 309-312. 

Personal characteristics : 
Appearance and bodily 
strength, 51, 60, 320-322 ; 
gratefulness, 5, 52, 60, 67 ; 
self-improvement, 51, 57-59, 

69, 71, 87, 97, 313-315, 323 ; 

habits of observation, 57, 69, 
75, 83-88, 94, 98, 99, 124, 313, 
314 ; thoughtfulness and de- 
cision, 54, 70, 106 et seq., 113, 
123, 124, 139-141, 147, 208, 
211, 216, 239, 260, 264, 277 ; 
family relations, 65, 74, 88, 
107-109, 227, 265-268 ; kind- 
imess, 320, 322 ; religious 
feelings, 252, 266, 277, 292, 
325. See also *' Anecdotes." 

Farragut, George, father of Ad- 
miral Farragut : birth, i ; 
history, 2-5 ; death, 6. 

Florida, Confederate ship of war 
(first called Oreto), runs block- 
ade into Mobile, 197 ; escapes, 
203 ; effect on Farragut, 204. 

Folsom, Chaplain Charles, U. S. 
Navy, influence on Farragut's 
early life, 57-60. 

Fox, Gustavus V., assistant sec- 
retary of the navy, 1861-65, 
118 ; relations to New Orleans 



330 



INDEX. 



expedition, 118-124, 318 ; 
urges Farragut to ascend the 
Mississippi, 183. 

Gaines, Fort, defense of Mobile 
Bay, 247, 259, 268 ; surrender 
of, 290. 

Garibaldi, services in war be- 
tween Argentine and Uruguay, 

93. 

Granger, United States General, 
commands at siege of Forts 
Gaines and Morgan, 268, 290, 
291. 

Grant, General Ulysses S., anal- 
ogy between his turning the 
position of Vicksburg and 
Farragut's turning the Mis- 
sissippi forts, 135-138 (and 
note, 137) ; anxieties of, in 
1862, 198 ; connection be- 
tween his command and Far- 
ragut's, 198, 199 ; takes the 
line of the Mississippi, -205 ; 
takes chief command at Vicks- 
burg, 206; responsibility as- 
sumed in cutting loose from 
his base before Vicksburg, 
223 ; opinion as to importance 
of Farragut's passage of Port 
Hudson, 224, 226 ; begins turn- 
ing movement against Vicks- 
burg, 229 ; views as to Red 

I River expedition and Mobile, 
1864, 245, 246 ; statesmanlike 
regard to political conditions 
in military operations, 137 
(note), 251 ; present at Farra- 
gut's funeral, 306. 

Harrison, Lieutenant N. B 



commands Cayuga, leading 
fleet at passage of Mississippi 
forts, 159. 

Hartford, U. S. steamer, Farra- 
gut's flag-ship, description of, 
126. 

Hillyar, James, British naval 
captain, commands Phoebe in 
battle with Essex, 38-44 ; dis- 
regard of neutral rights, 32, 
39, 40 ; relations with Porter, 
etc., 33-37. 

Incident : Farragut being lashed 
in rigging at Mobile, 272. 

Indianola, U. S. iron-clad, cap- 
ture of, and effect upon Far- 
ragut's movements, 209-211, 
224. 

Jackson, Fort, defense of New 
Orleans, mentioned, 65 ; de- 
scription of, 119, 127, 258 ; 
surrender of, 171 ; causes of 
the fall of, T41-147. 

Jenkins, Rear-Admiral Thorn- 
ton A., chief of staff" to Farra- 
gut, 1863, 203, 208, 211, 234 ; 
commands Richmond at battle 
of Mobile, 268, 269. 

Jouett, Lieutenant-Command- 
er James E. (now Rear-Ad- 
miral), commands Metacomet 
at battle of Mobile Bay, 271, 
272, 278 ; captures Confeder- 
ate gunboat Selma, 280. 

Kennon, Beverley, Lieutenant, 
Confederate navy, commands 
Governor Moore at New Or- 



INDEX. 



331 



leans and sinks U. S. steamer 
Varima, 158, 159, 163. 
Kimberley, Lieutenant - Com- 
mandei- Lewis A. (now Rear- 
Admiral), executive o^cer of 
Farragut's flag-ship, 281. 

Lovell, Mansfield, Confederate 
general, opinion as to cause 
of fall of Mississippi forts, 
145. 

Manassas, Confederate ram, de- 
scription of, 156 ; part at 
battle of New Orleans, 157, 

Mare Island, Farragut's com- 
mand of, 1854-58, 99-101 ; 
visit to, 304. 

Matamoras, Mexican port, im- 
portance to blockade-running, 
207, 240. 

McClellan, General George B., 
relations to New Orleans ex- 
pedition, 120, 121. 

Minorca, Island of, birthplace 
of George Farragut, i ; Far- 
ragut's visits to, 56, 57, 300 ; 
enthusiastic reception given 
to Admiral Farragut, 300- 

304. 

Mississippi River, importance 
of, in civil war, 11 5-1 17, 
199, 200, 207, 222, 223, 237, 
238. 

Mobile, Farragut's wish to at- 
tack, in 1862, 185 ; blockade 
of, 196, 197, 203, 204, 249, 
250 ; importance of, 241, 242 ; 
description of approaches to. 



from the sea, and defenses of, 
246-248, 258, 259, 260, 264, 
265 ; battle of Mobile Bay, 
269-289. 

Monitors, description of, 255. 

Morgan, Fort, defense of Mobile 
Bay, 247, 258, 259, 271, 290 ; 
surrender of, 290. 

Mosquito fleet, origin and serv- 
ice of, 63-66. 

Napoleon I, Emperor of the 
French, mentioned, 77, 136, 
143, 308, 309, 315, 317. 

Napoleon, Louis, Emperor of 
the French : Purpose to recog- 
nize Confederacy, 173 ; effect 
upon, of fall of New Orleans, 
175. 176 ; Farragut dines with, 
298. 

Navy, United States, indequate 
strength of, at different periods, 
6, 13, 86, loi, 116, 117, 314; 
consequent bad results, 6-8, 
ri, 13, 14, 16, 19, 50, 102, 
223, 242, 314 ; reasons for 
partial successes of 18 12, and 
delayed action in 1861, loi, 
102 ; character and impor- 
tance of services, in civil war, 

135-137, 142, 146, 171-176, 
180-182, 199, 206, 207, 222- 
225, 231 (and note), 233-235, 
238, 242, 244, 291. 
Nelson, Horatio, British Ad- 
miral, mentioned, 70, 160, 
240 (and note), 266, 308 ; 
military character contrasted 
with that of Farragut, 309- 
312. 



332 



INDEX. 



New Orleans, expedition against, 
1 1 5-1 76 ; defenses of, 127- 
129, 131, 136, 145. 146, 165 ; 
scenes at surrender of, 166- 
172 ; effect of fall of, 172- 
176 ; Confederate demonstra- 
tions against, 1863, 233. 

Oreto, see Florida. 

Pemberton, Confederate gen- 
eral, opinion as to effect of 
Farragut's passage by Fort 
Hudson, 224, 225. 

Pensacola, evacuated by Con- 
federates, 196 ; importance to 
navy as base of operations, 
196, 249, 268. 

Perkins, Lieutenant-Command- 
er George H., U. S. N., ac- 
count of Cayuga at passage 
of Mississippi forts, 151-155, 
159 ; accompanies Captain 
Bailey to demand surrender 
of NeviT Orleans, 169 ; com- 
mands Chickasaw at Mobile, 
276, 285, 287, 288. 

Porter, Captain David, U, S. 
N., commands naval station 
at New Orleans, 4 ; adopts 
David Farragut, 5 ; com- 
mands frigate Essex, 11-44 ', 
professional character, 31, 55 ! 
battle with Phoebe and Cher- 
ub, 38-44 ; navy commis- 
sioner, 63 ; commands Mos- 
quito fleet, 63-66 ; court-mar- 
tialed, 66 ; leaves navy, 66 ; 
Minister to Constantinople, 
67 ; death, 67. 



Porter, Admiral David D., U. 
S. N., commanding mortar 
flotilla, 121-123, 130, 152, 
171, 186, 188 ; opinion on 
passing the Mississippi forts, 
138, 139 ; commanding Mis- 
sissippi squadron, 206, 209, 
210, 226, 229, 230, 231 ; opin- 
ion on Farragut's dash past 
Port Hudson, 223, 224 ; takes 
over from Farragut command 
of Mississippi above New Or- 
leans, 235 ; Red River expe- 
dition, 254 ; harmonious co- 
operation with Grant, 206, 
291. 

Port Hudson, position of, 195 ; 
importance of, to Confeder- 
ates, 199, 201, 207, 209, 222- 
225, 232, 233 ; armament of, 
211 ; passage of, by Farragut, 
211-216 ; surrender of, 235. 

Queen of the West, U. S. ram, 
capture of, and effect on Far- 
ragut's movements, 209-211. 

Red River expedition, purpose 
of, 253 ; militarily erroneous, 
245, 246 ; disastrous termina- 
tion, 254 ; consequences, 246. 

River-defense fleet. Confeder- 
ate, description of, 156, 158. 

Rosas, Argentine Dictator, 72, 
74, 91, 92. 

St. Philip, Fort, defense of New 
Orleans, 119, 128, 148, I53» 
258 ; surrender of, 171, causes 
of fall of, 141-147. 



INDEX. 



333 



San Juan de Ulloa, Mexican 
fort, description of, 79 ; French 
attack on, 80 ; Farragut's 
opinion as to attack on, by 
U. S. Navy in 1846, 95. 

Sherman, General W. T., dif- 
ference of opinion with Grant, 
137 (and note) ; attack on 
Vicksburg, 205 ; raid upon 
Meridian, 253. 

Smith, Martin L,, Confederate 
general, opinion as to cause 
of fall of Mississippi forts, 145. 

Szymanski, Confederate colo- 
nel, opinion as to effect of 
Farragut's passage of the Mis- 
sissippi forts, 146. 

Tecumseh, U. S. monitor, sunk 
at Mobile, 256, 268, 271, 273, 

274, 275. 

Tennessee, Confederate iron- 
clad, description of, 248, 256- 
258 ; part taken by, in battle 
of Mobile Bay, 265, 273, 274, 

275. 279-288. 

Texas, importance of, to Con- 
federacy, 207, 209, 237. 

Varuna, U. S. steamer, sunk at 
passage of Mississippi forts, 
163. 

Vera Cruz, French attack on, 



75-83 : Farragut's report on, 
83-88. 
Vicksburg, Farragut's first ad- 
vance against, 181, 182 ; his 
reluctance to a second ad- 
vance, 182-184 ; second ad- 
vance, 186 ; situation of, 186 ; 
Farragut passes batteries, 187 ; 
return below, 192 ; impor- 
tance of Vicksburg to Confed- 
eracy, 180, 187, 194, 195, 233 ; 
Farragut's third advance to, 
226 ; surrender of, 235. 

Warley, A. F., Lieut., Confed- 
erate navy, commands Ma- 
nassas at battle of New Or- 
leans, 157, 158. 

Watson, Lieut. John C, (now 
captain), U. S. N., Farragut's 
flag-lieutenant, 1862-65, 161, 
260, 272. 

Welles, Gideon, Secretary of 
the Navy, i86i-'69, 117 ; con- 
nection with New Orleans 
expedition, 119, I20, I2I, 
125, 126 ; impressions of 
Farragut, 124 ; urges Farra- 
gut up the Mississippi, 177, 
181 ; letter of, 222 (note). 

Wolseley, Lord, views as to the 
cause of reduction of Missis- 
sippi forts criticised, 142-147. 



THE END. 



THE STORY OF THE WEST SERIES* 
The Story of the Soldier. 

By General G. A. Forsyth, U.S.A. (retired). Illustrated by 
R. F. Zogbaum. A new volume in the Story of the West Series, 
edited by Ripley Hitchcock. i zmo. Cloth, ^1.50. 

In the great task of opening the empire west of the Missouri 
the American regular soldier has played a part large and heroic, 
but unknown. The purpose of this book is to picture the Amer- 
ican soldier in the life of exploration, reconnoissances, establishing 
posts, guarding wagon trains, repressing outbreaks, or battling 
with hostile Indians, which has been so large a part of the army's 
acdve work for a hundred years. 

No romance can be more suggestive of heroic deeds than this 
volume, which appears most opportunely at a time when the 
Regular Army is facing so many and so serious duties in both 
hemispheres. No one is better entitled to write it than the brave 
officer who with his little handful of men held the sandspit in the 
Arickaree for days against Roman Nose and his thousands of 
warriors, and finally won their lives by sheer dogged pluck and 
heroism. Mr. Zogbaum' s illustrations are a most valuable gal- 
lery of pictures of Western army life. 

**To General Forsyth belongs the credit of having gathered together for 
the first time the story of the heroic work, invaluable to the progress of our 
civilization, which regular soldiers performed in silence and obscurity," — Boston 
Herald. 

*' General Forsyth's identity with the army extends over a notable period 
in its history, and he is among the few officers who remain who are able to 
write of their personal knowledge of the thrilling experiences of our soldiers on 
the plains." — Tf^ashington Army and Na'vy Register. 

* ' The soldierly qualities of the author appear on every page of the volume 
in a precision of statement, a generosity of praise, and an urbanity of temper. 
The narrative is commended to the interest and attention of every student of 
our national life and development." — Philadelphia Ledger. 

** There is not a dull page in the book." — Buffalo Commercial. 

*'The story presents a fresh and thrilling chapter of American history." — 
Cleveland World. 

D. APPLETON AND COMPANY, NEW YORK. 



BOOKS BY ;• A. ALTSHELER. 

The Wilderness Road* 

A Romance of St. Clair's Defeat and Wayne's Victory. i2mo. 
Cloth, ^1.50. 

"That Mr. Altsheler has caught the wild, free spirit of the Ufe vhich he 
depicts is evident on every page, and nowhere more so than in one of his 
final chapters, 'The Meeting of the Chiefs,' where he vitalizes the life-and- 
death struggle of a friendly and a hostile Indian." — New York Mail and 
Express. 

In Qfclingf Camps* 

A Romance of the American Civil War. i zmo. Cloth, ^1.50. 

" We do not often get as fine a picture as that which Mr. Altsheler paints. 
The tale covers the period from the election and the inauguration of Lincoln 
until the surrender of Lee and the entrance of the Northern army into Rich- 
mond, . . . Every good American who enjoys the smell of powder and the 
crack of the rifle will appreciate the chapters that describe the battle of 
Gettysburg." — The Bookman. 

A Herald of the "West* 

An American Story of 181 1— 181 5, i zmo. Cloth, ^1.50. 

" A portion of our history that has not before been successfully embodied 
in fiction. . . . Extremely well written, condensed, vivid, picturesque, and 
there is continual action. ... A rattling good story, and unrivaled in fiction 
for its presentation of the American feeling toward England during our 
second conflict." — Boston Herald. 

A Soldier of Manhattan^ 

And his Adventures at Ticonderoga and Quebec, i zmo. Cloth, 

^i.oo; paper, 50 cents. 

" Graphic and intensely interesting. . . . The book may be warmly com- 
mended as a good specimen of the fiction that makes history real and living." 
— San Francisco Chronicle. 

" The story is told in such a simple, direct way that it holds the reader's 
interest to the end, and gives a most accurate picture of the times." — Boston 
Transcript. 

The Sun of Saratoga* 

A Romance of Burgoyne's Surrender. i 2mo. Cloth, ;^i.oo; 

paper, 50 cents. 

" Taken altogether, ' The Sun of Saratoga' is the best historical novel of 
American origin that has been written for years, if not, indeed, in a fresh, 
simple, unpretending, unlabored, manly way, that we have ever read." — New 
York Mail and Express. 

D. APPLETON AND COMPANY, NEW YORK. 



BY CYRUS TOWNSEND BRADY. 
The Quiberon Touch. 

A Romance of the Sea. With frontispiece. i2mo. Cloth, 

$1.50. 

" A story to make your pulse leap and your eyes glisten. It fairly glows 
with color and throbs with movement," — Philadelphia Item. 

" This story has a real beauty ; it breathes of the sea. Fenimore Cooper 
would not be ashamed to own a disciple in the school of which he was mas- 
ter in these descriptions of the tug of war as it was in the eighteenth century 
between battle-ships under sail." — New York Mail and Express, 

Commodore Paul Jones. 

A new volume in the Great Commander Series, edited 
by General James Grant Wilson. With Photogravure 
Portrait and Maps. i2mo. Cloth, $1.50 net ; postage, 
II cents additional. 

" A thousand times more interesting than any of the so-called historical 
romances that are now in vogue." — Spirit of the Times. 

*' Mr, Brady's vigorous style, vivid imagination, and dramatic force are 
most happily exhibited in this book." — Philadelphia Press. 

" Incomparably fine. Being the work of a scholarly writer, it must stand 
as the best populir life yet available. The book is one to buy and own. It 
is more interesting than any novel, and better written than most histories." — 
Nautical Gazette. 

Reuben James. 

A Hero of the Forecastle. A new volume in the Young 
Heroes of Our Navy Series. Illustrated by George 
Gibbs and Others. T2mo. Cloth, $1.00. 

•'A lively and spirited narrative." — Boston Herald. 

" Mr. Brady has made a stirring tale out of the material before him, one 

of those brilliant and forceful descriptions of the glories of the old wooden- 
walled navy, which stir the blood like a trumpet call." — Brooklyn Eagle. 

D. APPLETON AND COMPANY, NEW YORK. 



YOUNG HEROES OF OUR NAVY. 

Uniform Edition* Each, J2mo, cloth, $I,CO, 



Reuben James. 

A Hero of the Forecastle. By Cyrus Townsend Brady, author 
of ** Paul Jones." Illustrated by George Gibbs and others. 

"Nothing could be more absorbing than Mr. Brady's graphic tale, which 
forms an eloquent tribute to the heroes of the forecastle, the predecessors of the 
men who did such gallant work at Manila and Santiago." — Cleveland World. 

The Hero of Manila. 

Dewey on the Mississippi and the Pacific. By Rossiter Johnson. 
Illustrated by B. West Clinedinst and others. 

*' There is nothing sensational or bombastic in the story from beginning to 
end. It is, however, picturesque and vivid, as well as dignified, modest, and 
decidedly interesting." — Boston Budget. 

The Hero of Erie {Commodore Perry'). 
By James Barnes, author of *' Midshipman Farragut," «* Com- 
modore Bainbridge," etc. With lo full-page Illustrations. 

Commodore Bainbridge. 

From the Gunroom to the Quarter-deck. By James Barnes. 
Illustrated by George Gibbs and others. 

Midshipman Farragut. 

By James Barnes. Illustrated by Carlton F. Chapman. 

Decatur and Somers. 

By Molly Elliot Seawell. With 6 full-page Illustrations by 
J. O. Davidson and others. 

Paul Jones. 

By Molly Elliot Seawell. With 8 full-page Illustrations. 

Midshipman Paulding. 

A True Story of the War of 1 8 1 2. By Molly Elliot Sea- 
well. With 6 full-page Illustrations. 

Little Jarvis. 

The Story of the Heroic Midshipman of the Frigate Constellation. 
By Molly Elliot Seawell. With 6 full-page Illustrations. 

D. APPLETON AND COMPANY, NEW YORK. 



TWO TIMELY BOOKS. 



**The True Story of the Boers/* 

Com Paul's People. 

By Howard C. Hillegas. With Illustrations. i zmo. 

Cloth, ^1.50. 

" Gives precisely the information necessary to those who desire to follow 
intelligently the progress of events at the present time." — New York Com- 
mercial Advertiser. 

" Has all the timeliness of an up-to-date newspaper article ; in fact, some 
portions of it read almost like a cablegram from the Transvaal." — New York 
Sunday World. 

"A book on the Boer troubles that is free from British prejudices and 
misrepresentations. ... It is the best book of the hour in its unbiased pres- 
entation of the Boer side of the controversy." — Chicago Tribune. 

Actual Africa; or, The Coming Continent. 

A Tour of Exploration. By Frank Vincent. With Map 
and 104 full-page Illustrations. 8vo. Cloth, ^5.00. 

Mr. Vincent's important and instructive book has a peculiar interest for 
readers at this time. The author presents vivid accounts of his visits to 
Delagoa Bay, and to Durban, in Natal, whence he traveled to Newcastle, 
Charlestown, Johannesburg, and Pretoria. Mr. Vincent gives most graphic 
accounts of the life of the Boers, and the mining and other interests of the 
Transvaal. His visit to the Transvaal was followed by a journey through 
the Orange Free State, where he visited the capital, Bloemfontein, and after- 
ward he made a careful study of the Kimberley diamond mines. His journey 
southward and his stay in Cape Town furnished additional facilities for a 
comprehensive view of the present theater of action in Africa. The results 
of this personal study of the territory now attracting so much attention in- 
clude many characteristic illustrations. 

" The completest guide-book to the Dark Continent ever published. " — 
New York Herald. 



D. APPLETON AND COMPANY, NEW YORK. 



By EDGAR STANTON MACLAY, A. M. 

A History of the United States Navy. (1775 
to 1901.) — New edition. 

In three volumes, the new volume containing an Account of the Navy 
since the Civil War, with an authoritative history of the Spanish- 
American War, based upon official sources of information. Illustrated. 
8vo. Cloth, $3.00 net per volume ; postage, 26 cents per volume 
additional. 

Maclay's History of the Navy, which is the historj'^ adopted at Annapolis and the 
standard work everywhere, appears now in a more comprehensive and satisfactory form 
than ever before. The author has had the aid of naval authorities and commanders in 
preparing his permanent history of ihe Spanish-American War. He has developed at 
greater length the interesting theme afforded by the rebuilding of our navy in the last 
twenty years. The navy in the Philippines and in Chinese waters has also furnished 
an interesting field for the historian's comparisons and observations. 

A History of American Privateers. 

Uniform with "A History of the United States Navy." One volume. 
Illustrated. 8vo. Cloth, $3-50- 

After several years of research the distinguished historian of American sea power 
presents the first comprehensive account of one of the most picturesque and absorbing 
phases of our maritime warfare. The importance of the theme is indicated by the fact 
that the value of prizes and cargoes taken by privateers in the Revolution was three 
times that of the prizes and cargoes taken by naval vessels, while in the War of 1812 
we had 517 privateers and only 23 vessels in our navy. Mr. Maclay's romantic tale is 
accompanied by reproductions of contemporary pictures, portraits, and documents, and 
also by illustrations by Mr. George Gibbs. 

The Private Journal of William Maclay, 

United States Senator from Pennsylvania, 1789-1791. With Portrait 
from Original Miniature. Edited by Edgar Stanton Maclay, A. M, 
Large 8vo. Cloth, $2.25. 

During his two years in the Senate William Maclay kept a journal of his own in 
which he minutely recorded the transactions of each day. This record throws a flood 
of Ught on the doings of our first legislators. 



D. APPLETON AND COMPANY, NEW YORK. 



MCMASTER'S FIFTH VOLUME. 

History of the People of the United 
States. 

By Prof. John Bach McMaster. Vols. I, II, III, 

IV, and V now ready. 8vo. Cloth, with Maps, 

^2.50 per volume. 

The fifth volume covers the time of the administrations of 
John Quincy Adams and Andrew Jackson, and describes the 
development of the democratic spirit, the manifestations of new 
interest in social problems, and the various conditions and plans 
presented between 1821 and 1830. Many of the subjects in- 
cluded have necessitated years of first-hand investigations, and 
are now treated adequately for the first time. 

** John Bach McMaster needs no introduction, but only a greeting. . . . 
The appearance of this fifth volume is an event in American literature 
second to none in importance this season." — New York Times. 

"This volume contains 576 pages, and every page is worth reading. 
The author has ransacked a thousand new sources of information, and has 
found a wealth of new details throwing light upon all the private and public 
activities of the American people of three quarters of a century ago." — 
Chicago Tribune. 

" In the fifth volume Professor McMaster has kept up to the high standard 
he set for himself in the previous numbers. It is hard to realize thoroughly 
the amount of detailed work necessary to produce these books, which con- 
tain the best history of our country that has yet been published." — Philadel- 
phia Telegraph. 

"The first installment of the history came as a pleasant surprise, and 
the later volumes have maintained a high standard in regard to research 
and style of treatment." — New York Critic. 

"A monumental work. . . . Professor McMaster gives on every page 
ample evidence of exhaustive research for his facts." — Rochester Herald. 

" The reader can not fail to be impressed by the wealth of material out 
of which the author has weighed and condensed and arranged his matter." 
— Detroit Free Press. 

" Professor McMaster is our most popular historian. . . . He never 
wearies, even when dealing with subjects that would be most wearisome 
under clumsier handling. This fifth volume is the most triumphant evi- 
dence of his art." — New York Herald. 

D. APPLETON AND COMPANY, NEW YORK. 



D. APPLETON AND COMPANY'S PUBLICATIONS. 
THE STORY OF THE WEST SERIES. 

Edited by RIPLEY HITCHCOCK. 



T 



'HE STORY OF THE COWBOY. By E. 

Hough, author of " The Singing Mouse Stories," etc. Illus- 
trated by William L. Wells and C. M. Russell. i2mo. Cloth, 
$1.50. 

" Mr. Hough writes whereof he knows. The sympathetic style in which he handles 
his subject arises out of close association and practical experience in the cowboy's 
saddle. His account of the rude and stirring life of other days upon the Western 
plains, therefore, has all the graphic vigor of an eyewitness and expert cow-puncher. 
Yet to this he adds a polished and diversified literary style such as one would scarcely 
expect to find coupled with his other qualifications. The result is a thoroughly inter- 
esting and valuable volume. There is just enough of the poetic touch in Mr. Hough's 
treatment to preserve the romantic picturesqueness of the vanishing figure he portrays. 
... At once history and literature, with the added merit of being as interesting as tfie 
best of fiction." — Chicago Tribune. 

" Mr. Hough is to be thanked for having written so excellent a book. The cowboy) 
story, as this author has told it, will be the cowboy's fitting eulogy. This volume will 
be consulted in ye.irs to come as an authority on past conditions of the far West 
For fine literary work the author is to be highly complimented. Here, certainly, we 
have a choice piece of writing." — A/'ew York Times. 

** Not to know the cowboy is to acknowledge a wide gap in our acquaintance with 
American products. To know him as this book teaches him, to meet him fairly, 
squarely, face to face, to follow him in the saddle, winter and summer, to eat, sleep, 
and fight with him through the pages of this book, is a liberal education and a highly 
refreshing and invigorating experience. He is worthy of the book and the book is 
worthy of him." — Providence New^ 

" One of the most readable "booki that have appeared in many a day. ... A book 
which is a genuine addition to the literature of the West." — San Francisco Chronicle. 

"An unusually vivid and interestin.<^ picture of Western life, . . . valuable for two 
reasons— first, because it is a true history of cowboy life, and, second, because it gives 
a graphic account of the important cattle industry of the West." — New York Herald. 

*' Nothing fresher or finer has been written in many a day. . . . An admirable 
book." — Chicago Evening Post. 

" We do not believe there is a living authority better equipped for the work than 
Mr. Hough. ... It is more than a story in the sense of an entertaining tale; it is a 
history of the great commercial drama of the West." — Minneapolis Tribime. 

" The book is, without a shadow of a doubt, one of the most notable contributions 
to American narrative history yet published." — Cin<innali Commercial Tribune. 

" In the history of pioneer days of the West there are few chapters better worth tha 
writing than that which deals with the rise and growth of the great cattle industry. 
. . . Mr. Hough, combining actual knowledge with the power of £3-aphic expression, 
gives a true picture of this fast- vanishing representative of this great .. uman industry." 
— New York Sun. 

"Mr. Hough has written an intensely interesting book, and it seems that he was 
just the man to write it. . . . The book was needed. The true story of the cowboy is 
given at last, and in a peculiarly entertaining manner, Mr. Hough has scored an in- 
dubitable success." — Buffalo Enquirer. 

"The book is thrilling and absorbing, and makes the commonplace novel fall into 
insignificance." — St. Paul Glebe. 



D. APPLETON AND COMPANY. NEW YORK. 



D. APPLETON AND COMPANY'S PUBLICATIONS. 



T 



THE STORY OF THE WEST SERIES. 

Edited by RIPLEY HITCHCOCK. 

^HE STORY OF THE INDIAN. By George 

Bird Grinnell, author of " Pawnee Hero Stories," " Blackfoot 

Lodge Tales," etc. Illustrated. i2mo. Cloth, $1.50. 

" In every way worthy of an author who, as an authority upon the Western In- 
dians, is second to none. A book full of color, abounding in observation, and remark- 
able in sustained interest, it is at the same time characterized by a grace of style which 
is rarely to be looked for in such a work, and which adds not a little to the charm of 
it." — Londoti Daily Chronicle. 

"A valuable study of Indian life and character. . . . An attractive book, ... in 
large part one on which the Indians themselves might havo wutten." — New York 
7 ribune. 

"Only an author qualified by personal experience could offer us a profitable study 
of a race so alien from our own as is the Indian in thought, feeling, and culture. Only 
long associations with Indians can enable a white man measurably to comprehend their 
thoughts and enter into their feelings. Such association has been Mr. Grinnell's." — 
Neiv \ ork Sun. 

" It must not be supposed that the volume is one for scholars and libraries of refer- 
ence. It is far more than that. While it is a true story, yet it is a stoiy none the less 
abounding in picturesque description and charming anecdote. We regard it as a valu- 
able contribution to American literature." — New York Mail and Express. 

" Among the various books respecting the aborigines of America, Mr. Grinnell's 
easily takes a leading position. He takes the reader direcdy to the camp-fire and the 
council, and shows us the American Indian as he really is. ... A book which will 
convey much interesting knowledge respecting a race which is now fast passing away." 
— Boston Commercial Bulletin. 

"A most attractive book, which presents an admirably graphic picture of the actual 
Indian, whose home life, religious observances, amusements, together with the various 
phases of his devotion to war and the chase, and finally the effects of encroaching civil- 
ization, are delineated with a certainty and an absence of sentimentalism or hostile 
prejudice that impart a peculiar distinction to this eloquent story of a passing life." — 
Buffalo Coinm.ercial, 

" Full of information, and written in a style which appeals to the average reader." — 
New York Herald. 

" The author is master of a peculiarly clear and graphic style, and his book has a 
most fascinating interest. It gives to its readers an understanding of a much-mis- 
understood race." — Boston Advertiser. 

"A. clear, true, and forcible picture of a race which is fast passing away." — Bos/oh 
Herald. 

" No man is better qualified than Mr. Grinnell to write the story of the original 
owner of the West. . . . He knows the Indian as a savage and also as a man; he 
understands him not as an enemy, nor as a patron, but as an associate, a comrade, and 
a fellow man. The book is valuable, instructive, and entertaining." — New York Ob- 
server. 

"An intensely interesting book. . . . Clearly and concisely told, and the whole 
history good for the American to read. . . . An educator in a field in which the public 
needs education, and only does simple justice to those yet unable to do justice to them- 
selves." — Chicago Inter- Ocean . 



D. APPLETON AND COMPANY. NEW YORK. 



A PICTURESQUE BOOK OF THE SEA. 
A Sailor's Log. 

Recollections of Forty Tears of Naval Life. By Rear- 
Admiral Robley D. Evans, U. S. N. Illustrated. 
Large i2mo. Cloth, $1.00. 

"It is essentially a book for men, young and old ; and the 
man who does not enjoy it is lacking in healthy red blood." — 
Chicago Bookseller. 

•■* A profoundly interesting book. There is not a line of bra- 
vado in its chapters, nor a carping criticism. It is a book which 
will increase the esteem and high honor which the American feels 
and willingly awards our naval heroes." — Chicago Inter-Ocean. 

'*It would be difficult to find an autobiography possessing 
more interest than this narrative of forty years of active naval serv- 
ice. It equals the most fascinating novel for interest ; it contains 
a great deal of materia! that has a distinct historical value. . . . 
Altogether it is a mosc delightful hooV.^ "* -^Brookl^n Eagle. 

** His is a picturesque personality, and he stands the supreme 
test by being as popular with his officers and men as he is with 
the public generally. His life has been one of action and adven- 
ture since he was a boy, and the record of it which he has pre- 
pared in his book *A Sailor's Log' has not a dull line in it from 
cover to cover. It is all action, action, and again action from the 
first page to the last, and makes one want to go and ' do things 
himself. Any boy between tit'teen and nineteen who reads this 
book and does not want to go to sea must be a sluggish youth. 
. . . The book is really an niteresting record oi an interesting 
man." — Nezu York Press. 

D, APPLETON AND COMPANY, NEW YORK. 

R D - 1 86. 



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